FIRST SECTION
\nDECISION<\/p>\n
Application no. 32132\/12
\nIlija KRSTANOVI\u0106
\nagainst Croatia<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 11\u00a0September 2018 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Kristina Pardalos, President,
\nKsenija Turkovi\u0107,
\nTim Eicke, judges,<\/p>\n
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 7 May 2012,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
FACTS AND PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Mr IlijaKrstanovi\u0107, is a Croatian national who was born in 1972 and lives in Osijek. He was represented before the Court by Mr S. Baljak, a lawyer practising in Osijek.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Croatian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms \u0160. Sta\u017enik.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged, in particular, that in securing his personal disability benefit as a disabled war veteran on account of his mental disorder, he had been discriminated against in comparison to other war veterans whose disorders had allowed for a more timely diagnosis.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 February 2015 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The circumstances of the case<\/strong><\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Background to the case<\/em><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0In the period between 1991 and 1995 the applicant participated in the war as a member of military and police formations. Afterwards he developed certain behavioural and psychological problems for which, in April\u00a02007, he sought psychiatric help.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 May 2007 the applicant was examined by a psychologist who found that he was suffering from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (hereinafter: \u201cPTSD\u201d) and symptoms of an anxious-depressive disorder.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant received psychiatric treatment. He complained to the psychiatrist of the deterioration of his condition and, on 19 June 2007, the psychiatrist advised him to apply for treatment at Vrap\u010de Psychiatric Hospital (PsihijatrijskabolnicaVrap\u010de).<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0From 27 June to 18 July 2007 the applicant was treated at Vrap\u010de psychiatric hospital under a diagnosis of permanent personality changes following PTSD and anxious-depressive disorder.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 November 2007 the Osijek Office of the Croatian Health Insurance Fund (Hrvatskizavodzazdravstvenoosiguranje, Podru\u010dniured u Osijeku; hereinafter \u201cthe Fund\u201d) recognised, on the basis of an expert report, that the applicant\u2019s disorder (permanent personality changes following PTSD) had been a consequence of his participation in the war.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings for recognition of the status of disabled war veteran and grant of the related personal disability benefit<\/em><\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 January 2008 the applicant lodged a request, on the grounds of his mental disorder, for recognition of the status of disabled war veteran and grant of the related personal disability benefit, before the Osijek State Administration Office (Ureddr\u017eavneuprave u Osje\u010dko-baranjskoj\u017eupaniji, Slu\u017ebazadru\u0161tvenedjelatnosti; hereinafter \u201cthe Osijek Office\u201d).<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 January 2008 the Osijek Office declared the applicant\u2019s request inadmissible as being lodged out of time. In particular, it found that under the Act on the Rights of Croatian Homeland War Veterans and their Family Members (Zakon o pravimahrvatskihbraniteljaizDomovinskog rata i\u010dlanovanjihovihobitelji; Official Gazette no. 174\/2004, hereinafter \u201cthe 2004 Veterans Act\u201d), a request for recognition of the status of disabled war veteran and grant of the related personal disability benefit on the basis of an illness could have been lodged until 31 December 2005.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed to the Ministry in charge of Homeland War Veterans\u2019 affairs (Ministarstvoobitelji, braniteljaime\u0111ugeneracijskesolidarnosti; hereinafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d) arguing that he had become aware of his mental disorder only after the expiry of the statutory time-limit and that he could not, therefore, have submitted his request earlier. He asked the Ministry to examine his request, taking into account the particular circumstances of his case.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 July 2008 the Ministry dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the Osijek Office.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lodged an administrative action with the Administrative Court (UpravnisudRepublikeHrvatske) contending that before the expiry of the statutory time-limit he had not been aware of his condition. He had been fighting his disorder with more or less success, without even knowing that he actually had one. He had applied for the status of disabled war veteran when the doctors had officially identified his condition. In these circumstances, setting the time-limit at 31 December 2005 had been unfair.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 May 2011 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s administrative action, endorsing the reasoning of the lower bodies. It added that the status of disabled war veteran was recognised only in the proceedings before the bodies of the Ministry. The circumstance that his disorder had been recognised by the Fund as a consequence of his participation in the war had thus been irrelevant.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0Subsequently, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (UstavnisudRepublikeHrvatske), arguing that in obtaining the status of disabled war veteran and the related personal disability benefit he had been discriminated against in comparison to other war veterans whose disorders had manifested earlier, thus allowing them to regulate their status in due time.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 January 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. That decision was served on the applicant on 8 February 2012.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0Meanwhile, on 29 October 2008 the Osijek Office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatskizavodzamirovinskoosiguranje, Poru\u010dnaslu\u017eba u Osijeku) granted the applicant a disability pension after finding that he had a 50% \u201cprofessional inability to work\u201d (profesionalnanesposobnostza rad) caused by an illness contracted during his participation in the Homeland War.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant domestic law<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The 2004 Veterans Act<\/em><\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provision of the 2004 Veterans Act, which entered into force on 1 January 2005, reads as follows:<\/p>\n 125<\/p>\n \u201cThe request for recognition of the status of a disabled war veteran on the basis of an illness, and the illness, deterioration of the illness or appearance of the illness is a direct consequence of the participation in [the Homeland War], may be lodged within twelve months of the entry into force of this Act.\u201d<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Draft proposal for passing a new Veterans Act<\/em><\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0In August 2017 the Ministry of Homeland War Veterans (Ministarstvohrvatskihbranitelja; hereinafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d) published a draft proposal for the Act on Croatian Homeland War Veterans and their Family Members (Zakon o hrvatskimbraniteljimaizDomovinskog rata i\u010dlanovimanjihovihobitelji). The draft noted that for some Homeland War veterans, the consequences of war trauma appeared much later, and that due to the time-limit for lodging the request for recognition of the status of disabled war veteran on the basis of an illness, those persons were unable to regulate their status and obtain the related rights. The Ministry therefore proposed to remove the time-limit for lodging the request on that ground.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The 2017 Veterans Act<\/em><\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The Act on Croatian Homeland War Veterans and their Family Members (Zakon o hrvatskimbraniteljimaizDomovinskog rata i\u010dlanovimanjihovihobitelji: Official Gazette no. 121\/2017, hereinafter: the \u201c2017\u00a0Veterans Act\u201d), which entered into force on 14 December 2017, lifted the temporal restriction for lodging the request for recognition of the status of disabled war veteran on the basis of an illness caused by participation in the war.<\/p>\n COMPLAINTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that in securing his status of disabled war veteran and obtaining the related personal disability benefit he had been discriminated against on the grounds of the nature of his disorder. He also complained about the outcome of the proceedings.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant relied on Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 14<\/p>\n \u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 1 of Protocol No. 1<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, since the 2017 Veterans Act removed the time-limit for lodging the request for recognition of the status of disabled war veteran on the basis of an illness caused by participation in the war, the applicant was free to apply to the competent authorities and regulate his status on that ground. The matter giving rise to the present case had therefore been resolved and it was no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the applicant had failed properly to exhaust the domestic remedies when wishing to regulate his status; that the facts of the case did not fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and that accordingly there was no room for application of Article 14 of the Convention; that the applicant could not have been held to be in a comparable situation to those Homeland War veterans whose PTSD had been established in the relevant administrative proceedings as a direct consequence of their participation in the Homeland War; and that setting the time-limit for applying for the status of disabled war veteran on the basis of an illness by the 2004 Veterans Act had not been discriminatory.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that he had instituted the relevant proceedings as soon as he had become aware of his mental disorder. In those proceedings he had properly exhausted all the domestic remedies. He could not have applied for the status of disabled war veteran on the basis of an illness until he knew that he had actually developed one.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that it was not possible to set a time-limit on the onset of a mental disorder. He alleged that medical studies had confirmed that mental disorders could develop even twenty years after a trauma. By the operation of the time-limit under section 125 of the 2004 Veterans Act, those who had managed to identify their disorders in due time had been able to regulate their status and obtain benefits and he, who had also developed PTSD as a consequence of his participation in the war, which the doctors had only managed to diagnose later, was left to deal with his illness on his own. There had been no reasonable justification for such a discriminatory legislative solution.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lastly submitted that the purpose of his application to the Court was to remove the time-limit for applying for the status of disabled war veteran on the basis of an illness and to obtain a fair trial. He did not submit any just satisfaction claim under Article 41 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not have to address all the issues raised by the parties. In the light of the new developments brought to its attention, it considers that, for the reasons set out below, there is no objective justification for continuing to examine the applicant\u2019s complaints, and that it is thus appropriate to apply Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that<\/p>\n (a) the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or<\/p>\n (b) the matter has been resolved; or<\/p>\n (c) for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.<\/p>\n However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires.\u201d<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0In order to ascertain whether Article 37 \u00a7 1 (b) applies to the present case, the Court must answer two questions: firstly, whether the circumstances complained of directly by the applicant still obtain; and, secondly, whether the effects of a possible violation of the Convention on account of those circumstances have also been redressed (see Pisano v. Italy (striking out) [GC], no. 36732\/97, \u00a7 42, 24 October 2002; Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia, no. 60654\/00, \u00a7 97, 16 June 2005; and Kaftailova v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 59643\/00, \u00a7 48, 7 December 2007).<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in the present case, the applicant complained that setting a time-limit for applying for the status of disabled war veteran on the basis of an illness by the 2004 Veterans Act had been discriminatory in respect of persons like him, who had managed to identify their disorders only later.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the 2017 Veterans Act, which came into force in December 2017, removed the time-limit complained of (see paragraph 22 above). Consequently, any war veteran, including the applicant, may lodge a request with the competent authorities and regulate his or her status.It therefore follows that the circumstances of which the applicant complained no longer obtain.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes further that removing the time-limit in question was precisely the purpose of the applicant\u2019s application to the Court and that he did not seek any just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention (see\u00a0paragraph 29 above). It therefore considers that, in the present case, the second criteria under Article 37 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Convention (see paragraph 31 above) has also been met.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court concludes that the matter has been resolved within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Convention. Furthermore, it is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols does not require it to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine).<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, this part of the application should be struck out of the Court\u2019s list of cases.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings concerning his request for recognition of the status of disabled war veteran and the related personal disability benefit.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention. It follows that it is inadmissible under Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases in so far as it concerns the complaint under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;<\/p>\n Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n Done in English and notified in writing on 4 October 2018.<\/p>\n Renata Degener\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Kristina Pardalos
\nDeputyRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n