THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF IBRAGIM IBRAGIMOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
\n(Applications nos. 1413\/08 and 28621\/11)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n28 August 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n04\/02\/2019<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Helena J\u00e4derblom, President, Having deliberated in private on 10 July 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in two applications (nos.\u00a01413\/08 and 28621\/11) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Russian national and two Russian non-profit organisations listed in the Appendix, on 3 December 2007 and 4 April 2011 respectively.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were represented by Mr S. Sychev, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin,\u00a0Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr\u00a0M. Galperin.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged, in particular, that a ban on publishing and distributing Islamic books had violated their rights to freedom of religion and freedom of expression.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 March 2011 and 27 November 2013 the above complaints were communicated to the Government and the remainder of application no.\u00a028621\/11 was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 1413\/08(IbragimIbragimov and Cultural Educational Fund \u201cNuru Badi\u201d v. Russia)<\/strong><\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant is one of the founders and thechief executive officer of the second applicant, a non-profit organisation.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant is the publisher of theRisale-I Nur Collection, an exegesis on the Qur\u2019an written by Muslim Turkish scholar Said Nursi in the first half of the 20th century. The books from that collection were used for religious and educational purposes in Russian mosques and medreses.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 March 2005 the prosecutor of the Tatarstan Republic instituted criminal proceedings against members of the religious movement Nurculuk (\u041d\u0443\u0440\u0436\u0443\u043b\u0430\u0440) based on the writings of Said Nursi. They were charged withincitement of hatred or discord, as well as abasement of human dignity, an offence under Article 282 of the Criminal Code, for having distributed Said Nursi\u2019s books from theRisale-I Nur Collection.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 April 2006 the prosecutor of the Tatarstan Republic applied to the Koptevskiy District Court of Moscow, asking that the following books from theRisale-I Nur Collection published by the second applicant be declared extremist and banned (see sections 1 and 13 of the Suppression of Extremism Act cited in paragraphs 41 and 42 below):<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cFaith and Man\u201d, 2000 edition, translated by M.G. Tamimdarov;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Foundations of Sincerity\u201d, 2000 edition, translator not specified;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Truths of an Eternal Soul\u201d, 2000 edition, translated by M.\u00a0Sh.\u00a0Abdullaev;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Truths of Faith\u201d, 2000 edition, translator not specified;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Guide for Women\u201d, 2000 edition, translated by M.\u00a0Sh.\u00a0Abdullaev;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Fruits of Faith\u201d, 2000, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cRamadan.Care. Thankfulness\u201d, 2000 edition, translator not specified;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cMunajat (Prayer). The Third Ray\u201d, 2002 edition, translated by M.\u00a0G.\u00a0Tamimdarov;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThirty-three Windows\u201d, 2004 edition, translated by M. Irsala;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Foundations of Brotherhood\u201d, 2004 edition, translated by M.\u00a0G.\u00a0Tamimdarov;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Path of Truth\u201d, 2004 edition, translated by M. Sh. Abdullaev and M. G. Tamimdarov;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Staff of Moses\u201d, year of publication not specified, translated by T. N. Galimov and M. G. Tamimdarov;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Short Words\u201d, year of publication not specified, translated by M.\u00a0G. Tamimdarov; and<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0\u201cBook for the Sick\u201d, 2003 edition, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0The prosecutor enclosed expert opinionsprepared in the framework of the criminal cases against the members of Nurculuk by four psychologists and a psychiatrist. The experts found that the above-mentioned texts attempted to subconsciously influence the reader to form irrational values and opinions. The reader was thus deprived of the ability to think critically and independently and to choose his religion freely. The texts led the reader to form a negative opinion about adherents of other faiths and thus encouraged hatred and enmity towards them. They also advocated the idea of people\u2019s superiority or inferiority, depending on their religion. In particular, the texts by Said Nursi incited the reader to look at non-believers with disdain and aversion, and therefore promoted discord between believers and non-believers. Muslims guilty of apostasy from Islam were even denied the right to life. The experts concluded that Said Nursi\u2019s texts formed in the reader feelings of aversion, anger, hatred and enmity towards non-believers.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant and the Council of Mufti of Russia were invited to participate in the proceedings as third parties.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 August 2006 the Council of Mufti of Russia submitted an alternative expert opinion by a panel of experts consisting of a doctor of theology and a doctor of religious philosophy. The experts found that in his books, Said Nursi explained the foundations of the Islamic doctrine, and provided a commentary on the Qur\u2019an. His commentary was in conformity with the classical version of Islam. The books did not contain any extremist statements and did not call for violence or ethnic or religious enmity. Although some texts indeed morally condemned sinners and non-believers, blaming them for the immorality of modern society, such discourse was characteristic of all religious texts. A perusal of the texts also revealed that their author promoted the peaceful coexistence of religions and dialogue between them.The experts criticised the conclusions made by the prosecutor\u2019s experts who,in their opinion, were incompetent in religious matters and did not have even a basic knowledge of Islam. The reproaches made by them against Said Nursi\u2019s books could have been made against any theological treatise, be it Muslim, Christian or Judaic, or any other religious text.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0In his letter of 4 August 2006 the Chief Mufti of Russia endorsed the above-mentioned expert opinion. He said that the prosecutor\u2019s experts had interpreted faith in the righteousness of any religion and the preaching of that faith as propaganda about people\u2019s superiority or inferiority, depending on their religion. The experts\u2019 findings had therefore been based on anti\u2011religion concepts and could be applied to any religious text. Said Nursi\u2019s books did not contain any calls to do harm to non-believers or adherents to other religions, to infringe their rights or to otherwise violate Russian laws.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0Counsel for the second applicant submitted the following documents to the Koptevskiy District Court:<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a letter from the president of the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia, stating that Said Nursi\u2019s texts could not be qualified as extremist or fanatical. They did not contain any calls for violence, ethnic or religious hatred or for overthrowing governments. Rather, they promoted Islamic values of goodness, love and belief in God;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a letter from the president of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Tatarstan Republic affirming that Said Nursi was a respected commentator of the Qur\u2019an. He called for love towards all people irrespective of their ethnic origin, race or religion and advocated clemency, compassion, peace, brotherhood and mutual understanding. He encouraged interreligious dialogue and opposed all radical actions and attitudes;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a letter from the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation arguing against declaring Said Nursi\u2019s texts extremistliterature as this would violate the rights of Muslims to freedom of religion;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a letter by Professor J. from the International Islamic University in Malaysia, stating that Said Nursi\u2019s texts called for reconciliation, peaceful co-existence and cooperation between different religions and cultures, as well as for justice, tolerance, freedom and love;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a specialist opinion by the Department of Islamic Studies of the Tatarstan Republic Institute of History, according to which the books by Said Nursi called for self-development and moral perfection, and spoke against violence. For that reason his books were an important tool in the fight against religious extremism. Although he indeed stated that Islam was superior to other religions and to atheism, such statements were inherent in all religious texts;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a letter from Mr M., a Catholic priest and the Secretary for Interreligious Dialogue of the Society of Jesus, affirming that the texts written by Said Nursi belonged to mainstream Islam and were rooted in the centuries-old Islamic tradition. They did not contain any elements of extremism. On the contrary, they were a moderating force in Islam, proposing to Muslims a way of life that was tolerant and open to others. They explicitly endorsed Muslim-Christian cooperation and unity, and stimulated friendship and positive relations between Muslims and followers of Christianity;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a copy of the decision of 1984 of the prosecutor\u2019s office of Istanbul not to initiate criminal proceedings against the publisher of the Risale-I Nur Collection in Turkey. The prosecutor\u2019s office referred to an expert opinion which did not find any indications of a criminal offence in Said Nursi\u2019s texts;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0copies of expert opinions delivered in 1960 by a group of Turkish experts at the request of several Turkish prosecutors. The experts had found that the books by Said Nursi did not contain any harmful or unlawful statements;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a letter from the Council on Religious Matters of the Committee of Ministers of the Turkish Republic, stating that Said Nursi\u2019s books contained directions on moral and religious issues inspired by the Qur\u2019an and did not touch on politics. Said Nursi had been a respected theologian who had always distanced himself from political, ideological and extremist activities, as well as from radical Islam. He had proclaimed that the truth was to be found through dialogue and had spoken against hatred and all forms of compulsion;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a letter from the Ministry of Justice of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Mufti of Egypt, submitting that Said Nursi\u2019s texts were beneficial to the reader as they taught love of God and high moral values, and condemned envy, hatred, anger and resentment;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a letter from the director general of the Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, stating that Said Nursi\u2019s texts promoted love of God, the importance of prayer and high moral values. His books did not contain any insulting or hostile statements against adherents of other religions or persons belonging to other races;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a letter from Dr T., a professor of the Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies of the University of Durham, submitting that Said Nursi\u2019s books did not contain any statements aimed at stirring up religious hatred. Said Nursi had been extremely careful throughout his life to foster a sense of solidarity between followers of different religions and that was reflected in his texts. Nor did his books contain statements promoting the idea of exclusiveness, superiority or inferiority of people based on their religious affiliation or ethnic origin or justifying extremist activities. Said Nursi was one of the few modern Muslim scholars who unequivocally opposed the ideas of extremism, political activism or offensive jihad. His texts provided a welcome antidote to the militancy of the contemporary Islamic discourse as they proscribed military jihad altogether, be it offensive or defensive, and said that Islam was not to be defended by the sword but by the force of reason, progress and civilisation.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 November 2006 the Koptevskiy District Court ordered an expert opinion and appointed a panel of experts consisting of a philologist, a linguist psychologist, a social psychologist and a psychologist from the Linguistics and Psychology Departments of the Russian Academy of Science.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0Counsel for the second applicant appealed, submitting that the appointed experts were incompetent in religious matters. He asked the court to appoint persons with expertise in religious issues. On 26 December 2006 the Moscow City Court rejected the appeal and upheld the decision of 9\u00a0November 2006.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 February 2007 the experts delivered their joint report, finding that Said Nursi\u2019s texts encouraged religious discord between believers and non-believers, contained negative and humiliating statements about non\u2011believers and promoted the notion that believers had superiority over non-believers. Accordingly, they made the following findings:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The printed texts submitted for expert review contain statements aiming to incite religious discord (between believers and non-believers, that is on grounds ofattitude to religion) and also statements substantiatingand justifying the necessity of disseminating the above statements and declarations.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The printed texts submitted for expert review contain verbal expressions giving humiliating depictions, an unfavourable emotional assessment and a negative evaluation of people on the basis of their attitude to religion.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The printed texts submitted for expert review contain propagandaabout the superiority or inferiority of citizens based on their attitude to religion (believers or non-believers) and contain statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating such ideas and world-views.<\/p>\n They do not advocate ideas concerning people\u2019s superiority or inferiority based on their ethnic origin.\u201d<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0Counsel for the second applicant submitted to the Koptevskiy District Court the following specialist opinions, criticising the report of 15\u00a0February 2007:<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a specialist opinion by Mr Mu., president of the Russian Islamic University, who found that the court-appointed experts were not competent in religious matters and that they had quoted and analysed Said Nursi\u2019s statements out of context. Although in his books Said Nursi indeed criticised the Western way of life and condemned non-believers, he did not promote hatred or enmity towards those who did not share his opinion. Moreover, similar statements were present in all religious texts;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a specialist opinion by Mr S., a doctor of law specialising in Muslim law, who expressed similar criticisms of the report of 15 February 2007 and found that Said Nursi\u2019s texts did not contain any propaganda in favour of discrimination, hatred or religious superiority. On the contrary, they were permeated with ideas of brotherhood, friendship and goodness, while anger and hatred were clearly condemned;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0a specialist opinion by Mr Me., a doctor of philosophy specialising in religious matters, who came to the same conclusions. He found, in particular, that Said Nursi\u2019s texts were no different from other religious texts in terms of assuming that their religion was superior to the others and condemning non-believers.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0Counsel for the second applicant again asked the court to appoint experts in religious matters. On 9 April 2007 the Koptevskiy District Court rejected his request, finding that only experts in psychology, social psychology and linguistics could analyse the meaning of the texts.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 April 2007 the Koptevskiy District Court ordered an additional expert opinion by the same experts.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 May 2007 theexperts delivered an additional expert report, confirming their previous findings.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0During a closed hearing before the Koptevskiy District Court,two of the experts who had prepared the expert reports submitted by the prosecutor confirmed their previous findings. They said that the texts had been analysed from the perspective of social psychology. One of them, however,added that the analysed texts did not contain any explicit calls for social, racial, ethnic or religious discord.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0Two of the court-appointed experts were also questioned and confirmed their findings.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0A co-president of the Council of Mufti of Russia stated that Said Nursi was a world-renowned Muslim scholar whose texts formed an integral part of the official teachings of Islam. They did not contain any extremist statements. Any religious text would be found irrational and extremist by an atheist. The ban on Said Nursi\u2019s books would hinder the religious life of Russian Muslims and unjustifiably restrict their freedom of religion.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0A specialist called by the applicants, a doctor of philosophy, criticised the experts appointed by the prosecution for taking fragments of text out of context and thereby distorting their meaning. Said Nursi\u2019s texts indeed proclaimed the superiority of Islam over other religions, but all religions did that.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 May 2007 the Koptevskiy District Court declared the books written by Said Nursi extremist material. After summarising the applicable domestic law, the submissions by the parties and the documents produced by them in support of their positions, it referred to the expert opinions commissioned by it.It held:<\/p>\n \u201cIt follows from [the court-appointed expert reports of 15 February and 15 May 2007] that Said Nursi\u2019s books from the Risale-I Nur Collection [list of books] contain statements aiming to incite religious discord (between believers and non-believers, that is on grounds ofattitude to religion) and also statementssubstantiating and justifying the necessity ofdisseminating the above-mentioned statements and declarations.<\/p>\n The books contain verbal expressions giving humiliating depictions, an unfavourable emotional assessment and a negative evaluation of people on the basis of their attitude to religion.<\/p>\n The books contain propagandaaboutthe superiority or deficiency of citizens on the basis of their attitude to religion (believers or non-believers).They also contain statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating such ideas and world-views.<\/p>\n The court does not have any reason to doubt these expert reports…\u201d<\/p>\n The court then rejected the specialist opinions submitted by the applicants, finding that only experts in psychology, social psychology and linguistics were competent to establish the meaning of the contested texts.It held that the specialists cited by the applicants did not have such expertise. It also rejected the oral submissions by the co-president of the Council of Mufti of Russia on the grounds that he was an interested party. It continued:<\/p>\n \u201cIn view of the above, the court concludes that the books from theRisale-I Nur Collection by Said Nursi are extremist literature. Their content aims to incite religious discord and advocate the idea of the superiority or inferiority of citizens, depending on their religion. They also advocate and justify the necessity of such actions.\u201d<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 September 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 21 May 2007 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. It stressed that the subject matter of the case was the specific editions of the books, rather than Said Nursi\u2019s teaching as such.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 28621\/11(United Religious Board of Muslims of the Krasnoyarsk Region v. Russia)<\/strong><\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0In May 2008, the applicant, a religiousassociation, commissioned the Klass publishing house to print the book \u201cThe Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u201d (\u00ab\u0414\u0435\u0441\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0435\u0421\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438\u0438\u0437\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0432\u044b\u0445\u00bb) from the Risale-I NurCollectionby Said Nursi.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The prosecutor of the Krasnoyarsk Region applied to the Zhelezhnodorozhniy District Court of Krasnoyarsk for protection of the interests of the Russian Federation, asking that the book be declared extremist material and all printed copies be confiscated. He relied on previous decisions by the Russian courts, which had declared other works from the Risale-I NurCollection extremist, and on areport of 24\u00a0December 2008byspecialists from the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The report of 24\u00a0December 2008 had been prepared by a panel of \u201cspecialists\u201d consisting of a philologist, a psychologist and a doctor of philosophy in religious studies.They had made the following finding:<\/p>\n \u201cThe book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 by Said Nursi submitted for expert review is ideological literature addressed to a wide audience. The gist of the book is propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion.<\/p>\n The text under review aims to arouse feelings of aversion, anger, enmity and discord against non-believers.<\/p>\n The book substantiates and justifies extremist activity.\u201d<\/p>\n That finding was based, among other things, on the fact that the book contained military metaphors which, according to the specialists, could incline the reader to see the reality through the prism of the conditions of a military camp, a military ground and potential military actions. The specialists also noted that the value of such a world-view was stressed by positive epithets. The specialist report cited the following expressions:<\/p>\n \u201cListen, this state is a military ground; an exhibition of wonderful royal art;<\/p>\n The military camp becomes like a lavish colourful blossoming garden on the Earth\u2019s surface. The armies of the Eternal King are plentiful, consisting of angels, jinn, people and ignorant animals and plants in a battle for the preservation of their lives. Having received God\u2019s order: \u2018Prepare your weapons and equipment for the defence!\u2019, all thorny trees and plants on the Earth link up their little bayonets, resembling a majestic military camp ready for battle …<\/p>\n The One Wise and Almighty creates anew, from nothing, by a simple order \u2018Be and it comes true\u2019, and places in perfect order, wisely and in balance all parts and minute details of unit-like bodies of all animals and other living creatures who are like an army; every century, every spring He creates on the Earth\u2019s surface hundreds of thousands of species and tribes of living creatures who are like an army. How can you doubt that He can … He says \u2018He who will resurrect you on the Resurrection Day is He for whom the entire universe is like an obedient soldier. It obeys with perfect submissiveness the order \u2018Be and it comes true\u2019. It is as easy for Him to create spring as it is to create a single flower\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant organisation was invited to participate in the proceedings as a third party. It submitted, in particular, that the opinion of 24\u00a0December 2008 had been made by specialists who had no knowledge of Islam and who had therefore incorrectly interpreted the text.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Zhelezhnodorozhniy District Courtordered an expert opinion and appointed a panel of experts consisting of two psychologists and a doctor of philosophy in religious studies from the Lomonosov Moscow State University.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 April 2010 the court-appointed expertsdelivered their joint report, finding as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bedi\u00fczzaman Said Nursi, 2005 edition, is a popular exposition of the Qur\u2019an. Its aim is to acquaint the reader with Said Nursi\u2019s point of view. The main part of the text is devoted to lauding and glorifying God and his wisdom, as is customary for any monotheistic religious tradition. Said Nursi\u2019s ideology, or his world-view, is quite traditional for Islam, as well as for any monotheistic religion. The author\u2019s objective is to \u2018show that the truths of Islam are reasonable, solid and interrelated\u2019, which is a typical objective of any theologian …<\/p>\n The verbal means used in the book do not go beyond value judgments used in any religious literature …<\/p>\n Under a normal perception of the text the book does not contain anything that could have a possible incentive influence on the human consciousness, will, socio\u2011psychological characteristics or conduct. Possible aberrant perceptions of the textual material by emotionally unstable or easily suggestible people cannot be evaluated in the framework of the present review, as they would require an evaluation of the readers rather than of the text itself …<\/p>\n The book does not contain any statements, appeals or declarations which could be definitely interpreted as incitement of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord associated with violence or as calls to violence …<\/p>\n The book does not contain any ideas which could be definitely interpreted as propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion or their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation …<\/p>\n The book does not contain any statements which could be definitely interpreted as statements aiming to humiliate persons on the basis of their sex, race, ethnic origin, native language, origin, attitude to religion, affiliation to a social group or on any other basis …<\/p>\n From a scientific point of view, the book is not different from any other religious text; it does not substantiate, justify or advocate the idea that people have an exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency on the basis of their religious affiliation or attitude to religion …<\/p>\n Islam, like any other religion as well as atheism, is characterised by a psychologically based belief in the superiority of its world-view over all other world\u2011views, which made it necessary to substantiate the choice of that world-view …\u201d<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0At the hearing the applicant organisation requested the District Court to secure the attendance and in-court examination of the Moscow State University experts to clarify several of their findings which could be considered ambiguous. The District Court rejected that request, finding that the applicant organisation had not made it at the preliminary hearing and that it was not possible to clarify an expert report by questioning the experts; it would have been necessary to order an additional expert report, which the applicant organisation had not requested. The request to question the experts had therefore been \u201cformal, unjustified\u201d and an attempt \u201cto prevent the court from examining the case and deciding on the matter\u201d.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court also rejected as irrelevanta request for the examination of additional material about Said Nursi\u2019s life and teachings. It also refused to read the text of the book, noting that the book was sufficiently quoted in the reportby specialists from the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 September 2010 the Zhelezhnodorozhniy District Court of Krasnoyarsk granted the prosecutor\u2019s application, declared the book \u201cThe Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u201d by Said Nursi extremist and ordered the destruction of the printed copies. After summarising the applicable domestic law and the submissions by the parties, it held as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cAccording to the specialists\u2019 report of 24\u00a0December 2008 by the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University, [the specialists] read the book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bedi\u00fczzaman Said Nursi …<\/p>\n Having analysed the textual content of the book, its syntax structures, the genre characteristics and the methods of structuring the text and expressions, the panel of specialistscame to an unanimous finding that, as a whole,the book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bedi\u00fczzaman Said Nursi is ideological, and at the same time religious, literature inciting religious discord and containing propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion. In particular, it incites discord between Muslims and non-believers, which term is understood to include adherents of other religions as well as those who do not belong to any religion. The gist of the book is a breach of religious equality consisting in forming in the reader a negative and aggressive attitude towards non-believers and adherents to other religions, which amounts to inciting hatred and discord against them (see [specialist report of 24\u00a0December 2008]).<\/p>\n According to the specialists\u2019 report mentioned above, the values inspired in the reader by the text are the exceptional nature of the Islamic faith, which is presented to the reader as the ultimate truth. People are divided into two groups: those who do not follow the Islamic faith are described by the author as \u2018the dissolute\u2019, \u2018the philosophers\u2019 and \u2018the idle talkers\u2019; and those who belong to that religion are described by the author as \u2018the faithful\u2019 and \u2018the just\u2019. It follows that believers and non-believers are rated differently on the basis of their adherence to the Islamic religion: the unfaithful are rated negatively, while the faithful to Islam are rated positively. The author uses in his text disparaging words and expressions to belittle the European culture, which is understood, in the light of the religious contents of the book, as religious confessions other than Islam. The author uses military metaphors in the text, which inevitably inclines the reader to see the reality through the prism of the conditions of a military camp, a military ground and potential military actions. The value of such a world-view is stressed by positive epithets. Simultaneously, through the use of verbal means and expressions, the author implicitly (that is covertly rather than openly, by influencing the subconscious) forms in the reader\u2019s mind the idea of an enemy, the notion of a potential aggressor. Taken together, it creates in the reader\u2019s mind an idea that it is necessary to be ready for a fight. The structure of the book is such that in the subsequent text the idea of the necessity to fight, of being ready for a fight, is, on the one hand, attenuated as it is not expressed directly; on the other hand, having been already stated earlier, it may be reinforced in the readers\u2019 minds because the text inspires the idea that non-believers commit a crime consisting in the very fact of not believing and which, according to the text under review, does not merit forgiveness. Thereby the author of the book attempts to influence the reader\u2019s psyche on a subconscious level and to influence the mechanisms of his faith, that is to formon an irrational basis conscious values and attitudes. It may deprive the reader of the capacity to think critically about changes happening in real life, may undermine his ability to make independent decisions and thereby breach the right to freedom of religion. According to the book, anyone who does not accept Islam, a non-believer, is the most inferior person who is deprived of his rights, is a criminal not deserving forgiveness. The book suggeststo the reader corporate norms and a model of society where all people follow the same rules; the actions of all members of such a society are tightly regulated, they are encouraged to comply like obedient soldiers, military officers or civil servants who must unquestioningly carry out orders and commands (see [expert report of 24\u00a0December 2008]).<\/p>\n According to the specialists\u2019 report mentioned above (see [specialists\u2019 report of 24\u00a0December 2008]), the book \u2018The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u2019 from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bedi\u00fczzaman Said Nursi is potentially addressed to different people.<\/p>\n On the one hand, the text is addressed to non-believers who do not have a developed ability to think critically. If the reader does not have a certain ideology of life, the text may influence him ideologically and form in his mind the ideas described above by methods of emotional induction and on the least rational level.<\/p>\n On the other hand, the text is addressed to readers who have a religious world-view other than Islam, as it calls on them to accept the only true God \u2013 Allah. The author suggests to the reader that it is normal to change one\u2019s world-view and that the author desires it.<\/p>\n The text is also addressed to people who accept the Islamic religious worldview, revere Allah and are ready to carry out his will and his commandments, which follows from a reconstruction of such an addressee\u2019s characteristics: readiness to fight for \u2018eternal life\u2019 andthe constant service of Allah and his messengers in such forms as may transpire from respective orders.<\/p>\n The text is also addressed to readers who \u2018delay\u2019 religious activity … until an undetermined future point, which may however come at the will of someone who has the right to command and give orders.<\/p>\n The text uses the expression \u2018little man\u2019, which may be understood as \u2018the most common\u2019 man who perceives himself as a \u2018little man\u2019. The author suggests that the essence of such a person, if he is not a follower of Islam, is an \u2018infinitely big crime\u2019.<\/p>\n In addition, the reader is encouraged to take responsibility for his parents; to save them he must accept the advocated Islamic religious creed. It means that any person who identifies with his parents, who has the slightest feeling of existential guilt for them, may be moved to adopt the view of the world suggested by the author.<\/p>\n To sum up, in the opinion of the panel of specialists, the psychological characteristics of the potential addressees (readers) mentioned above are not essential for understanding the text of the book because the text itself, by its specific structure and its [psychological] methods of holding attention and suggestion, is capable, after a long reading, to transmit the advocated religious ideology to any person who is in search of ideological support for his life, who is inclined to reflection and is in the process of self-development.\u201d<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The court considered the findings of thereport by the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University to be credible because they had been made by specialistswith professional expertise in the spheres of social psychology, psycholinguistics, philosophy and religious studies who had usedscientific methods of analysis. The specialists had confirmed their findings when questioned at the hearing.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0By contrast, the courtrejected the expert report of 28 April 2010 by the Lomonosov Moscow State University, prepared at its own request, as \u201cnot credible\u201d. It held that the report of 28 April 2010 was insufficiently reasoned and was based on assumptions. In particular, the experts had not explained what they understood by \u201ca normal perception\u201d and \u201cpossible aberrant perceptions by emotionally unstable or easily suggestible people\u201d. It was not clear what the experts meant when saying that \u201cthe book [did] not contain any statements which could be definitely interpreted as incitement of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord associated with violence or as calls to violence\u201d, that \u201cthe book [did] not contain any ideas which could be definitely interpreted as propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion or their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation\u201d, or that \u201cthe book [did] not contain any statements which could be definitely interpreted as statements aiming to humiliate persons on the basis of their sex, race, ethnic origin, native language, origin, attitude to religion, affiliation to a social group or on any other basis\u201d. The court considered that the experts\u2019 wording gave reason to believe that such interpretations could not be excluded, but that interpretations could in fact differ depending on the reader\u2019s individual perceptions. The experts had not cited the statements which, in their opinion, could be subject to different interpretations and had not explained why they had come to that conclusion. The court further found that the comparison of the book with other monotheistic religious textshad been misconceived because it had not asked for a comparative study. If the book contained propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion or their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation, it was irrelevant that other religious texts also contained such statements. Lastly, the District Court noted the absence of a linguist or a philologist in the panel of experts.In the court\u2019s view, that omission undermined the comprehensive nature of the study.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court concluded that the book \u201cThe Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u201d by Said Nursi was extremist literature because itwas aimed at inciting religious discord and contained propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion. Its contents substantiated and justified the necessity of carrying out such activity. It therefore had to be seized wherever it was found and on whatever information medium it was reproduced.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 November 2010 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant organisation, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court in a summary fashion.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, only the editor\u2019s copy of the book was seized. It proved impossible to seize the other copies as they had already been distributed.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Anti-extremism legislation<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Suppression of Extremism Act<\/em><\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The Suppression of Extremism Act (Federal Law no. 114-FZ of 25\u00a0July 2002, as in force at the material time) defines \u201cextremist activities\u201d as, among others:(i) incitement of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord;(ii) propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of people on the basis of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or their attitude to religion; (iii) violation of human and civil rights and freedoms, and of lawful interests in connection with a person\u2019s social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; and (iv) public appeals to commit the above-mentioned acts, or mass dissemination of material known to be extremist, as well as the production or storage of such material with the aim of mass dissemination.The Act further defines \u201cextremist material\u201d as documents intended for publication, or information disseminated via other media, calling for extremist activity to be carried out or substantiating or justifying the necessity of carrying out such activity (section 1).<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0It is prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation to publish or distribute printed, audio, audiovisual or other material corresponding to at least one of the criteria mentioned in section 1 of the Act.Following an application by the prosecutor, documentary material is to be declared extremist by the federal court that has jurisdiction over the location of the organisation that published the documentary material. The judicial decision declaring documentary material extremist serves as the legal basis for seizing any undistributed copies of the issue. An organisation which has published extremist material twice within twelve months is deprived of the right to publish. A copy of the judicial decision declaring documentary material extremist which has entered into legal force is to be sent to the federal State registration authority. A federal list of extremist material will be published periodically in the media.A decision to include documentary material in the federal list of extremist material may be appealed against in court under the procedure established by Russian Federation legislation. It is prohibited to distribute in the Russian Federation material which has been included in the federal list of extremist material. Anyone guilty of producing, disseminating or storing such material with the aim of dissemination will be held liable under criminal or administrative law (section 13 of the Suppression of Extremism Act).<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 November 2015 the Suppression of Extremism Act was amended. A new section 3.1 provided that the Bible, the Qur\u2019an, the Tanakh and the\u00a0Kangyur, as well as their contents and quotations from them, may not be declared extremist material.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Case-law of the Constitutional Court<\/em><\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 July 2013 the Constitutional Court, in its decision no. 1053-O, dismissed as inadmissible a request for a review of the constitutionality of sections 1 and 13 of the Suppression of Extremism Act \u2013 in particular, the parts of section 1 concerning incitement of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord and propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of people on the basis of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or their attitude to religion \u2013on the grounds of their alleged vagueness and the consequent lack of foreseeability in their application. The Constitutional Court held, in particular, that the requirement of foreseeability did not prevent the use of value or common terms the meaning of which was understandable directly from the legal provision in question, from a combination of related legal provisions or through interpretation by the courts. When applying section 1 of the Suppression of Extremism Act, the courts had to take into account that the requisite element of that form of extremism was explicit or implicit disrespect for the constitutional prohibition of incitement of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord and of propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or their attitude to religion. To establish whether there was such disrespect, the courts had to take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case, such as the form and content of the activity or information in question, its addressees, purposes, social and political context and whether there was a real threat to public order arising from, among others, calls to, or substantiation or justification of, unlawful infringements of constitutionally protected values. The Constitutional Court found that anti-extremism legislation did not permitrestrictions to be imposed on the right to freedom of conscience, religion and speech on the sole ground that the activity or information did not conform to common views, established traditions and beliefs, or moral and religious preferences. Such restrictions would be contrary to the constitutional requirements of necessity, proportionality and fairness. The wording of section 1 of the Suppression of Extremism Act did not, therefore, allow for its unforeseeable interpretation or arbitrary application.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court further held that the seizure of extremist material under section 13 of the Suppression of Extremism Act was not a sanction for an offence but a measure of combatting extremism and preventing extremist activities. Declaring a piece of material extremist meant that it breached anti-extremism legislation and for that reason alone presented a real danger to human rights and freedoms, to the foundations of the constitutional regime and the safety and security of the Russian Federation. Therefore, each judicial decision on the matter had to be followed by the seizure of the material declared extremist in order to exclude access to such material and thereby prevent the risk of their negative influence on persons, including their owners. The owner of the material was entitled to participate in the respective judicial proceedings. The seizure of extremist material did not therefore contravene the Constitution.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 February 2017 the Constitutional Court, in its decision no.\u00a0463-O, dismissed as inadmissible a request for a review of the constitutionality of section 3.1 of the Suppression of Extremism Act. It held, in particular, that the courts\u2019 findings on whether material, including religious literature, was extremist should not be arbitrary. They had to be based on a complete, thorough and objective assessment of all the circumstances of the case and be confirmed by experts in philology, linguistics, psychology and religious studies. The courts should not limit their assessment to the literal contents of the text, but should also assess its potential ability, in modern society and in combination with beliefs widespread in society, to acquire characteristics that were inadmissible from the standpoint of constitutionally protected values. The courts could, taking into account the circumstances of the case, declare extremist only a part of the documentary material in question and to prohibit the distribution of that part only.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 April 2017 the Constitutional Court, in its decision no. 906-O, dismissed as inadmissible another request for a review of the constitutionality of section 3.1 of the Suppression of Extremism Act. The applicants in that case had complained about a prosecutor\u2019s refusal, by reference to section 3.1, to declare extremist a book calling for the murder of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses on the grounds that that book was a commentary on the Bible and contained quotations from it.The Constitutional Court held that documentary material could not be declared extremist on the basis of a subjective perception of that material by certain persons. It further held that classic literary works which were part of the history and culture of a people,had been widely distributed in some historical period, had been subject to voluminous scientific research and widely quoted, and which had never before been banned for calling on its followers to commit extremist activities or for being a source of extremist ideology, could not be declared extremist. The contested section 3.1 provided that religious texts, including their contents and quotes from them, which constituted the source of the major traditional world religions\u2013 Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism \u2013and which played a particularly important role in Russian multiconfessional society, could not be declared extremist.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Civil proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The Code of Civil Procedure of 2002provides that evidence is information \u2013 obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law \u2013 about facts which serve as a basis for the court to establish the circumstances to which the parties refer in support of their claims and submissions and other circumstances relevant for the correct examination of the case. That information may be obtained from the submissions by the parties or third persons, testimony of witnesses, documentary or material evidence and expert reports (Article 55 \u00a7 1). Evidence is submitted by the parties and other participants to the proceedings (Article 57 \u00a7 1).<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0An expert report should be read out at the hearing. Questions may be put to the expert in order to clarify or supplement the expert report. The expert report is assessed by the court together with other evidence. It does not have any predetermined value for the court. If the court does not agree with the expert report, it must explain why it disagrees in the decision on the merits or in the decision to order an additional expert report (Article 187).<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0If necessary, when examining documentary or material evidence, playing audio or video recordings, ordering an expert report or questioning witnesses, the court may consult a specialist to obtain opinions, explanations or technical assistance (such as taking pictures, drawing plans or diagrams, selecting samples for an expert opinion or evaluating property). A specialist must reply to the court\u2019s questions and give oral or written opinions and explanations or provide technical assistance. The specialist\u2019sopinions are provided on the basis of his or her professional knowledge without making any expert evaluations. The court and the parties may put questions to the specialist (Article 188).<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANTINTERNATIONAL MATERIAL<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0United Nations<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<\/em><\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provide:<\/p>\n Article 19<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0For respect of the rights or reputations of others;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.<\/p>\n Article 20<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.\u201d<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Human Rights Council<\/em><\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant parts of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Ms Asma Jahangir, and the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Mr Doudou Di\u00e8ne, further to Human Rights Council decision 1\/107 on incitement to racial and religious hatred and the promotion of tolerance, A\/HRC\/2\/3, of 20 September 2006 (HRC 2006 Report), read:<\/p>\n \u201c47.\u00a0\u00a0The Special Rapporteur notes that article 20 of the Covenant was drafted against the historical background of the horrors committed by the Nazi regime during the Second World War. The threshold of the acts that are referred to in article 20 is relatively high because they have to constitute advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that expressions should only be prohibited under article 20 if they constitute incitement to imminent acts of violence or discrimination against a specific individual or group …<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0Domestic and regional judicial bodies – where they exist – have often laboured to strike the delicate balance between competing rights, which is particularly demanding when beliefs and freedom of religion are involved. In situations where there are two competing rights, regional bodies have often extended a margin of appreciation to national authorities and in cases of religious sensitivities, they have generally left a slightly wider margin of appreciation, although any decision to limit a particular human right must comply with the criteria of proportionality. At the global level, there is not sufficient common ground to provide for a margin of appreciation. At the global level, any attempt to lower the threshold of article 20 of the Covenant would not only shrink the frontiers of free expression, but also limit freedom of religion or belief itself. Such an attempt could be counterproductive and may promote an atmosphere of religious intolerance.\u201d<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant parts of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr Frank La Rue, submitted in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 16\/4, A\/67\/357, of 7 September 2012, read:<\/p>\n \u201c46.\u00a0\u00a0While some of the above concepts may overlap, the Special Rapporteur considers the following elements to be essential when determining whether an expression constitutes incitement to hatred: real and imminent danger of violence resulting from the expression; intent of the speaker to incite discrimination, hostility or violence; and careful consideration by the judiciary of the context in which hatred was expressed, given that international law prohibits some forms of speech for their consequences, and not for their content as such, because what is deeply offensive in one community may not be so in another. Accordingly, any contextual assessment must include consideration of various factors, including the existence of patterns of tension between religious or racial communities, discrimination against the targeted group, the tone and content of the speech, the person inciting hatred and the means of disseminating the expression of hate. For example, a statement released by an individual to a small and restricted group of Facebook users does not carry the same weight as a statement published on a mainstream website. Similarly, artistic expression should be considered with reference to its artistic value and context, given that art may be used to provoke strong feelings without the intention of inciting violence, discrimination or hostility.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, while States are required to prohibit by law any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence under article 20 (2) of the Covenant, there is no requirement to criminalize such expression. The Special Rapporteur underscores that only serious and extreme instances of incitement to hatred, which would cross the seven-part threshold, should be criminalized.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0In other cases, the Special Rapporteur is of the view that States should adopt civil laws, with the application of diverse remedies, including procedural remedies (for example, access to justice and ensuring effectiveness of domestic institutions) and substantive remedies (for example, reparations that are adequate, prompt and proportionate to the gravity of the expression, which may include restoring reputation, preventing recurrence and providing financial compensation).<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, while some types of expression may raise concerns in terms of tolerance, civility and respect for others, there are instances in which neither criminal nor civil sanctions are justified. The Special Rapporteur wishes to reiterate that the right to freedom of expression includes forms of expression that are offensive, disturbing and shocking. Indeed, since not all types of inflammatory, hateful or offensive speech amount to incitement, the two should not be conflated.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0In any case, the Special Rapporteur reiterates that all hate speech laws should, at the very least, conform to the following elements outlined in the 2001 joint statement on racism and the media:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0No one should be penalized for statements that are true;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0No one should be penalized for the dissemination of hate speech unless it has been shown that they did so with the intention of inciting discrimination, hostility or violence;<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0The right of journalists to decide how best to communicate information and ideas to the public should be respected, in particular when they are reporting on racism and intolerance;<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0No one should be subject to prior censorship;<\/p>\n (e)\u00a0\u00a0Any imposition of sanctions by courts should be in strict conformity with the principle of proportionality …<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The Special Rapporteur also reiterates his concern in relation to anti\u2011blasphemy laws, which are inherently vague and leave the entire concept open to abuse. He wishes to underscore once again that international human rights lawprotects individuals and not abstract concepts such as religion, belief systems or institutions, as also affirmed by the Human Rights Committee (CCPR\/C\/GC\/34, para. 48). Moreover, the right to freedom of religion or belief, as enshrined in relevant international legal standards, does not include the right to have a religion or belief that is free from criticism or ridicule. Indeed, the right to freedom of expression includes the right to scrutinize, debate openly, make statements that offend, shock and disturb, and criticize belief systems, opinions and institutions, including religious ones, provided that they do not advocate hatred that incites hostility, discrimination or violence. The Special Rapporteur thus reiterates his call to all States to repeal anti-blasphemy laws and to initiate legislative and other reforms that protect the rights of individuals in accordance with international human rights standards …\u201d<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Human Rights Committee<\/em><\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant parts of General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, of 12 September 2011, read:<\/p>\n \u201c48.\u00a0\u00a0Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances envisaged in article 20, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Such prohibitions must also comply with the strict requirements of article 19, paragraph 3, as well as such articles as 2, 5, 17, 18 and 26. Thus, for instance, it would be impermissible for any such laws to discriminate in favour of or against one or certain religions or belief systems, or their adherents over another, or religious believers over non-believers. Nor would it be permissible for such prohibitions to be used to prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and tenets of faith …\u201d<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Council of Europe<\/strong><\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The Report of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission)on the Relationship between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion: the Issue of Regulation and Prosecution of Blasphemy, Religious Insult and Incitement to Religious Hatred(Venice, 17-18 October 2008), states:<\/p>\n \u201c49.\u00a0\u00a0At any rate, the concepts of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness on which any democratic society is based mean that the responsibility that is implied in the right to freedom of expression does not, as such, mean that an individual is to be protected from exposure to a religious view simply because it is not his or her own. The purpose of any restriction on freedom of expression must be to protect individuals holding specific beliefs or opinions, rather than to protect belief systems from criticism. The right to freedom of expression implies that it should be allowed to scrutinise, openly debate, and criticise, even harshly and unreasonably, belief systems, opinions, and institutions, as long as this does not amount to advocating hatred against an individual or groups …<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0In this respect, it is worth recalling that it is often argued that there is an essential a difference between racist insults and insults on the ground of belonging to a given religion: while race is inherited and unchangeable, religion is not, and is instead based on beliefs and values which the believer will tend to hold as the only truth. This difference has prompted some to conclude that a wider scope of criticism is acceptable in respect of a religion than in respect of a race. This argument presupposes that while ideas of superiority of a race are unacceptable, ideas of superiority of a religion are acceptable, as it is possible for the believer of the \u201cinferior\u201d religion to refuse to follow some ideas and even to switch to the\u201csuperior\u201d religion.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0In the Commission\u2019s opinion, this argument is convincing only insofar as genuine discussion is concerned but it should not be used to stretch unduly the boundaries between genuine \u2018philosophical\u2019 discussion about religious ideas and gratuitous religious insults against a believer of an \u201cinferior\u201d faith …<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The Commission does not consider it necessary or desirable to create an offence of religious insult (that is, insult to religious feelings) simpliciter, without the element of incitement to hatred as an essential component. …<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0It is true that the boundaries between insult to religious feelings (and even blasphemy) and hate speech are easily blurred, so that the dividing line, in an insulting speech, between the expression of ideas and the incitement to hatred is often difficult to identify. This problem however should be solved through an appropriate interpretation of the notion of incitement to hatred rather than through the sanctioning of insult to religious feelings.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0When it comes to statements, certain elements should be taken into consideration in deciding if a given statement constitutes an insult or amounts to hate speech: the context in which it is made; the public to which it is addressed; whether the statement was made by a person in his or her official capacity, in particular if this person carries out particular functions…<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0As concerns the context, a factor which is relevant is whether the statement (or work of art) was circulated in a restricted environment or widely accessible to the general public, whether it was made in a closed place accessible with tickets or exposed in a public area. The circumstance that it was, for example, disseminated through the media bears particular importance, in the light of the potential impact of the medium concerned. It is worth noting in this respect that \u2018it is commonly acknowledged that the audiovisual media have often a much more immediate and powerful effect than the print media; the audiovisual media have means of conveying through images meanings which the print media are not able to impart.\u2019…<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0As concerns the content, the Venice Commission wishes to underline that in a democratic society, religious groups must tolerate, as other groups must, critical public statements and debate about their activities, teachings and beliefs, provided that such criticism does not amount to incitement to hatred and does not constitute incitement to disturb the public peace or to discriminate against adherents of a particular religion.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0Having said so, the Venice Commission does not support absolute liberalism. While there is no doubt that in a democracy all ideas, even though shocking or disturbing, should in principle be protected (with the exception, as explained above, of those inciting hatred), it is equally true that not all ideas deserve to be circulated. Since the exercise of freedom of expression carries duties and responsibilities, it is legitimate to expect from every member of a democratic society to avoid as far as possible expressions that express scorn or are gratuitously offensive to others and infringe their rights …<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0In the long term, every component of a democratic society should be able to express in a peaceful manner his or her ideas, no matter how negative, on other faiths or beliefs or dogmas. Constructive debates should take place as opposed to dialogues of the deaf.\u201d<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The Opinion of the Venice Commissionon the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 91stPlenary Session (Venice, 15-16 June 2012), states:<\/p>\n \u201c… 7.\u00a0\u00a0The broad interpretation of the notion of \u2018extremism\u2019 by the enforcement authorities, the increasing application of the Law in recent years and the pressure it exerts on various circles within civil society, as well as alleged human rights violations reported in this connection have raised concerns and drawn criticism both in Russia and on the international level …<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0According to Article 9 ECHR, any limitations to manifestations of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion may only be motivated by the interests of public safety, by the protection of public order, health or morals, and by the rights and freedoms of others. Article 18 ICCPR is very similar: the freedom of thought, conscience and religion may be restricted if this is necessary to protect \u2018public safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others\u2019. It should be noted that both instruments only address limitations regarding \u2018the freedom to manifest one\u2019s religion or beliefs\u2019 and not the substance or contents of such religion or beliefs. According to Article 18.2 ICCPR, \u2018no one shall be subject to coercion whichwould impair his freedom to adopt a religion or belief of his choice\u2019…<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The definition of \u2018extremism\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n …28.\u00a0\u00a0The only definition of \u2018extremism\u2019 contained in an international treaty binding on the Russian Federation is to be found in the Shanghai Convention[on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of 15 June 2001, ratified by Russia on 10 January 2003]. In Article 1.1.1.3) of the Extremism Law, \u2018extremism\u2019 is defined as \u2018an act aimed at seizing or keeping power throughthe use of violence or changing violently the constitutional regime of a State, as well as a violentencroachment upon public security, including organization, for the above purposes, of illegalarmed formations and participation in them, criminally prosecuted in conformity with thenational laws of the Parties\u2019. The latter clause allows signatory states to prosecute such \u2018extremist\u2019 actions according to their national laws.<\/p>\n a) \u2018Extremist actions\u2019<\/p>\n …30.\u00a0\u00a0The Venice Commission notes that the definitions in Article 1 of the Law of the \u2018basic notions\u2019 of \u2018extremism\u2019 (\u2018extremist activity\/extremism\u2019, \u2018extremist organisation\u2019 and \u2018extremist materials\u2019) do not set down general characteristics of extremism as a concept. Instead, the Law lists a very diverse array of actions that are deemed to constitute \u2018extremist activity\u2019 or \u2018extremism\u2019. This should mean that, according to the Law, only activities defined in Article 1.1 are to be considered extremist activities or fall within the scope of extremism and that only organisations defined in Article 1.2 and materials defined in Article 1.3 should be deemed extremist.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Commission however has strong reservations about the inclusion of certain activities under the list of \u2018extremist\u2019 activities. Indeed, while some of the definitions in Article 1 refer to notions that are relatively well defined in other legislative acts of the Russian Federation, a number of other definitions listed in Article 1 are too broad, lack clarity and may open the way to different interpretations. In addition, while the definition of \u2018extremism\u2019 provided by the Shanghai Convention, as well as the definitions of \u2018terrorism\u2019 and \u2018separatism\u2019, all require violence as an essential element, certain of the activities defined as \u2018extremist\u2019 in the Extremism Law seem not to require an element of violence (see further comments below) …<\/p>\n Article 1.1 point 3: \u2018stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord\u2019<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0Extremist activity under point 3 is defined in a less precise manner than in a previous version of the Law (2002). In the 2002 Law the conduct, in order to fall within the definition, had to be \u2018associated with violence or calls to violence\u2019. However the current definition (\u2018stirring upof social, racial, ethnic or religious discord\u2019) does not require violence as the reference to it has been removed. According to non-governmental reports, this has led in practice to severe antiextremism measures under the Extremism Law and\/or the Criminal Code. The Venice Commission recalls that, as stated in its Report devoted to the relation between freedom of expression and freedom of religion, hate speech and incitement may not benefit from the protection afforded by Article 10 ECHR and justify criminal sanctions. The Commission notes that such a conduct is criminalized under Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code and that, under Article 282.2, the use of violence or the threat of its use in committing this crime is an aggravating circumstance.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Venice Commission is of the opinion that in order to qualify \u2018stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord\u2019as \u2018extremist activity\u2019, the definition should expressly require theelement of violence. This would maintain a more consistent approach throughout the variousdefinitions included in article 1.1, bring this definition in line with the Criminal Code, theGuidelines provided by the Plenum of the Supreme Court and more closely follow the generalapproach of the concept of \u2018extremism\u2019 in the Shanghai Convention.<\/p>\n Article 1.1 point 4: \u2018propaganda of the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion\u2019<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0At first sight, this provision reiterates the usual non-discriminatory clauses in international treaties and national laws, which prohibit a difference in treatment of persons on the basis of their inherent or inherited qualities, such as race, ethnic origin, religion or language. Nevertheless, under the headings contained therein, all kinds of propaganda activities including preaching such difference in treatment, whether or not they are associated with violence or calls to violence, are deemed \u2018extremism\u2019.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0In the view of the Venice Commission, to proclaim as extremist any religious teaching or proselytising activity aimed at proving that a certain worldview is a superior explanation of the universe, may affect the freedom of conscience or religion of many persons and could easily be abused in an effort to suppress a certain church thereby affecting not only the freedom of conscience or religion but also the freedom of association. The ECtHR protects proselytism and the freedom of the members of any religious community or church to \u2018try to convince\u2019 other people through \u2018teachings\u2019. The freedom of conscience and religion is of an intimate nature and is therefore subject to fewer possible limitations in comparison to other human rights: only manifestations of this freedom can be limited, but not the teachings themselves.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0It therefore appears that under the extremist activity in point 4, not only religious extremism involving violence but also the protected expressions of freedom of conscience and religion may lead to the application of preventive and corrective measures. This seems to be confirmed by worrying reports of extensive scrutiny measures of religious literature having led, in recent years, to the qualification of numerous religious texts as \u2018extremist material\u2019 (see below point (b)).<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0In the Commission\u2019s view, the authorities should review the definition under article 1.1 point 4 so as to ensure\/provide additional guarantees that peaceful conduct aiming to convince other people to adhere to a specific religion or conception of life, as well as related teachings, in the absence of any direct intent or purpose of inciting enmity or strife19, are not seen as extremist activities and therefore not unduly included in the scope of anti-extremism measures.<\/p>\n Article 1.1 point 5: \u2018violation of human and civil rights and freedoms and lawful interests in connection with a person\u2019s social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion\u2019<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0Extremist activity under point 5 brings together a collection of criteria, the combination of which may or may not be required before establishing that the Law applies to them. Clarification is required of what is intended here. If violating rights and freedoms \u2018in connection with a personal\u2019s social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion\u2019, in the absence of any violent element is an extremist activity, it is clearly a too broad category.<\/p>\n Article 1.1 point 10: \u2018public calls inciting the carrying out of the aforementioned actions or mass dissemination of knowingly extremist material, and likewise the production or storage thereof with the aim of mass dissemination\u2019<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, under point 10 incitement to extremist activity is in itself an extremist activity. This provision is problematic to the extent that certain of the activities listed, as pointed out above, should not fall into the category of extremist activities at all …<\/p>\n b)\u00a0\u00a0\u2019Extremist materials\u2019<\/p>\n …47.\u00a0\u00a0This provision defines extremist materials not only as documents which have been published but also as documents intended for publication or information, which call for extremist activity (to be understood, most probably, by reference to the definition of such an activity in Article 1.1) or which justify such activity …<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0Considering the broad and rather imprecise definition of \u2018extremist documents\u2019 (Article 1.3), the Venice Commission is concerned about the absence of any criteria and any indication in the Law on how documents may be classified as extremist and believes that this has the potential to open the way to arbitrariness and abuse. The Commission is aware from official sources, that the court decision is systematically based on prior expert review of the material under consideration and may be appealed against in court. It nonetheless considers that, in the absence of clear criteria in the Law, too wide a margin of appreciation and subjectivity is left both in terms of the assessment of the material and in relation to the corresponding judicial procedure. According to non-governmental sources, the Federal List of Extremist Materials has in recent years led to the adoption, in the Russian Federation, of disproportionate anti\u2011extremist measures. Information on how this list is composed and amended would be necessary for the Commission to comment fully …<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0…The Venice Commission received information in relation to specific cases where a particularly broad interpretation of the notion of \u2018extremism\u2019 has been taken and of reportedly disproportionate measures taken under the Extremism Law, such as … adding to the Federal List of Extremist Materials literature of religious communities known to be peaceful …<\/p>\n … Conclusions<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0The Venice Commission is aware of the challenges faced by the Russian authorities in their legitimate efforts to counter extremism and related threats. It recalls that, in its recent recommendation devoted to the fight against extremism, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe expressed its concern over the challenge of fighting extremism and its most recent forms and encouraged the member States of the Council of Europe to take resolute action in this field, \u2018while ensuring the strictest respect for human rights and the rule of law\u2019.<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0However, the manner in which this aim is pursued in the Extremism Law is problematic. In the Commission\u2019s view, the Extremism Law, on account of its broad and imprecise wording, particularly insofar as the \u2018basic notions\u2019 defined by the Law – such as the definition of \u2018extremism\u2019, \u2018extremist actions\u2019, \u2018extremist organisations\u2019 or \u2018extremist materials\u2019 \u2013 are concerned, gives too wide discretion in its interpretation and application, thus leading to arbitrariness.<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0In the view of the Venice Commission, the activities defined by the Law as extremist and enabling the authorities to issue preventive and corrective measures do not all contain an element of violence and are not all defined with sufficient precision to allow an individual to regulate his or her conduct or the activities of an organisation so as to avoid the application of such measures. Where definitions are lacking the necessary precision, a law such as the Extremism Law dealing with very sensitive rights and carrying potential dangers to individuals and NGOs can be interpreted in harmful ways …<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0The Venice Commission recalls that it is of crucial importance that, in a law such as the Extremism Law, which has the capacity of imposing severe restrictions on fundamental freedoms, a consistent and proportionate approach that avoids all arbitrariness be taken. As such, the Extremism Law has the capacity of imposing disproportionate restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (in particular Articles 6, 9, 10 and 11) and infringe the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. In the light of the above comments, the Venice Commission recommends that this fundamental shortcoming be addressed in relation to each of the definitions and instruments provided by the Law in order to bring them in line with the European Convention on Human Rights …\u201d<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Other international material<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions, and Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Extremism Legislation<\/em><\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 December 2008 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co\u2011operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples\u2019 Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information adopted a joint declaration, which reads, in so far as relevant:<\/p>\n Defamation of Religions<\/p>\n \u201cThe concept of \u2018defamation of religions\u2019 does not accord with international standards regarding defamation, which refer to the protection of reputation of individuals, while religions, like all beliefs, cannot be said to have a reputation of their own.<\/p>\n Restrictions on freedom of expression should be limited in scope to the protection of overriding individual rights and social interests, and should never be used to protect particular institutions, or abstract notions, concepts or beliefs, including religious ones.<\/p>\n Restrictions on freedom of expression to prevent intolerance should be limited in scope to advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.<\/p>\n International organisations, including the United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council, should desist from the further adoption of statements supporting the idea of \u2018defamation of religions\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Camden Principles<\/em><\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The non-governmental organisation ARTICLE 19: Global Campaign for Free Expression (\u201cARTICLE 19\u201d) prepared the Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality on the basis of discussions involving a group of high-level UN and other officials, civil society and academic experts in international human rights law on freedom of expression and equality issues at meetings held in London on 11\u00a0December 2008 and 23\u201124\u00a0February 2009 (\u201cthe Camden Principles\u201d). They read as follows in so far as relevant:<\/p>\n Principle 12: Incitement to hatred<\/p>\n \u201c12.1.\u00a0\u00a0All States should adopt legislation prohibiting any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (hate speech). National legal systems should make it clear, either explicitly or through authoritative interpretation, that:<\/p>\n i.\u00a0\u00a0The terms \u2018hatred\u2019 and \u2018hostility\u2019 refer to intense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the target group.<\/p>\n ii.\u00a0\u00a0The term \u2018advocacy\u2019 is to be understood as requiring an intention to promote hatred publicly towards the target group.<\/p>\n iii.\u00a0\u00a0The term \u2018incitement\u2019 refers to statements about national, racial or religious groups which create an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence against persons belonging to those groups.<\/p>\n iv.\u00a0\u00a0The promotion, by different communities, of a positive sense of group identity does not constitute hate speech.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 12.3.\u00a0\u00a0States should not prohibit criticism directed at, or debate about, particular ideas, beliefs or ideologies, or religions or religious institutions, unless such expression constitutes hate speech as defined by Principle 12.1.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 12.5.\u00a0\u00a0States should review their legal framework to ensure that any hate speech regulations conform to the above.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their factual and legal similarities.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES9 AND 10 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the Russian courts had violated their rights to freedom of religion and freedom of expression, as provided for in Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, by declaringthat Islamic books by Said Nursi, which they had published and used for religious and educational purposes, were \u201cextremist\u201d. Articles9 and 10 of the Convention read:<\/p>\n Article 9<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Freedom to manifest one\u2019s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 10<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted, in respect of application no.\u00a028621\/11, that statements directed against the Convention\u2019s underlying values had been removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17. They argued that the application should therefore be rejected under Article 17 of the Convention, which reads:<\/p>\n \u201cNothing in [the] Convention may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.\u201d<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, as recently confirmed by the Court, Article\u00a017 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases. Its effect is to negate the exercise of the Convention right that the applicant seeks to vindicate in the proceedings before the Court. In cases concerning Article 10 of the Convention, it should only be resorted to if it is immediately clear that the impugned statements sought to deflect this Article from its real purpose by employing the right to freedom of expression for ends clearly contrary to the values of the Convention (see Perin\u00e7ek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510\/08, \u00a7 114, ECHR 2015 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0Since the decisive point under Article 17 \u2013 whether the text in question sought to stir up hatred, violence or intolerance, and whether by publishing it the applicant attempted to rely on the Convention to engage in an activity or perform acts aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it \u2013 overlaps with the question whether the interference with the applicant\u2019s rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d, the Court finds that the question whether Article\u00a017 is to be applied must be joined to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention (see Perin\u00e7ek, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115).<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that in both cases the domestic decisions declaring Said Nursi\u2019s books extremist and banning their publication and distribution had been lawful \u2013 they had been based on the Suppression of Extremism Act. The domestic law was foreseeable in its application as the Suppression of Extremism Act gave clear definitions of \u201cextremist activity\u201d and \u201cextremist material\u201d. In particular, it explicitly mentioned incitement of religious discord and propaganda about superiority on the basis of attitude to religion as extremist activities.<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the author of the books, Said Nursi, had been a preacher and commentator of Islam who had created an international religious movement, Nurculuk (\u041d\u0443\u0440\u0436\u0443\u043b\u0430\u0440). That movement had been declared an extremist organisation and banned by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 10 April 2008. The domestic courts had then found that Said Nursi\u2019s books incited religious discord and proclaimed religious superiority. It was not for the Court to question that finding, as it had been reached after a thorough examination of each case through a fair decision-making process.<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no. 1413\/08, the domestic courts had included in the case file and studied the opinions of authorities on religious matters submitted by the applicants, but had found them unconvincing because the court-appointed experts had established that the books in question contained extremist statements. As regards application no.\u00a028621\/11, the judgments of the domestic courts had also been based on expert reports. The courts had examined the report by specialists from the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University and the expert report by the Lomonosov Moscow State University and had found the former more complete and better reasoned; the judge had given extensive reasons for the decision to discard the latter. The Government argued that the report by specialists from the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University had been submitted by the prosecutor, who had been a party to the proceedings in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, and had therefore been admissible as evidence. According to the Government, that report had had no pre\u2011determined value for the judge and had not been the sole evidence in her possession. After examining all the evidence in the case file, the judge had concluded that the book was extremist.<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that in democratic societies, in which several religions coexisted within one and the same population, it was necessary to place restrictions on the freedom to manifest one\u2019s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone\u2019s beliefs were respected. Rules in this sphere could vary from one country to another in accordance with national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order.Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations took had to be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it depended on the specific domestic context. They referredin this context to Leyla \u015eahin v.\u00a0Turkey ([GC], no. 44774\/98, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0106-09, ECHR 2005\u2011XI). The Government interpreted the cases of Cha\u2019are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France([GC], no. 27417\/95, \u00a7 84, ECHR 2000\u2011VII)and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom(25 November 1996, \u00a7 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V) to mean that where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions were at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society might differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body had to be given special importance. Given that Said Nursi\u2019s books incited religious discord and proclaimed religious superiority and could therefore provoke serious religious clashes with unpredictable negative consequences, the ban on their publication and dissemination had pursued the aims of protecting territorial integrity and public safety in Russia, public order and the rights of others. Moreover, it had been necessary in a democratic society, taking into account the tense ethnic situation in the country and the possible negative impact of those books on non-religious citizens.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also referred to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Kutlular v. Turkey (no. 73715\/01, 29 April 2008) which they interpreted as holding that a brochure distributed by one of the followers of Said Nursi and quoting some passages from his books encouraged superstition, intolerance and obscurantism and was moreover offensive to non-believers and to the authorities. They also argued that the present case was similar to the cases of S\u00fcrek v. Turkey(no. 3) ([GC], no. 24735\/94, 8 July 1999) and Medya FM Reha Radyo ve \u0130leti\u015fim Hizmetleri A.\u015e v. Turkey ((dec.), no.\u00a032842\/02, 14\u00a0November 2006), where the Court had found that the statements published by the applicants amounted to an incitement to violence.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicants were trying to present the case, which concerned the content of specific books, as a case of religious persecution of the followers of Islam in Russia. They asserted that the applicants\u2019 allegations were false.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that by banning the books by Said Nursi, the Russian authorities had declared unlawful religious literature explaining the Islamic doctrine and had therefore interfered with the applicants\u2019rights to freedom of religion and freedom of expression.In particular, \u201cThe Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter\u201d was a commentary on the Qur\u2019an, recognised as such by the Council of Mufti of Russia. It dealt with the topics of resurrection, the judgment day and the afterlife. The applicant organisation in application no. 28621\/11 had planned to use it for religious and educational purposes.By declaring it extremist, the domestic authorities had prohibited its use and distribution.<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0All of the applicants argued, firstly, that the provisions of the Suppression of Extremism Act, which had served as the legal basis for the banning of Said Nursi\u2019s books,were vague and therefore unforeseeable in their application. The Act did not contain a legal definition of key elements of the term \u201cextremist activity\u201d. In particular, it did not explain what was meant by \u201cdiscord\u201d or \u201cpropaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency\u201d (they relied in that connection on the Opinion by the Venice Commission, see paragraph56above). Those terms could have different meanings and the absence of a clear definition in law or in judicial practice could lead to arbitrary interpretations and abuse. In the present case,the texts had been interpreted by linguists and psychologists from the standpoints of those academic disciplines, rather than on the basis of any legal interpretation established by law or judicial practice.Those expert or specialist opinions were the sole basis for the ensuing judicial decisions.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further submitted that the passages in the books affirming the pre-eminence of Islamic spiritual concepts did not amount to propaganda about the superiority of people on the basis of their attitude to religion. All religions, including Christianity, Judaism and Islam, proclaimed the pre-eminence of their religious teachings and beliefs in their religious texts. In the applicants\u2019 opinion, Said Nursi\u2019s books did not contain any expressions inciting religious discord, either explicitly or implicitly.The Government had not produced any proof that Said Nursi\u2019s books had ever provoked \u201cserious religious clashes with unpredictable negative consequences\u201d (see paragraph\u00a068 above) or ever caused any other threat to public order. Their statement that there was such a risk was purely hypothetical and was not based on any facts. They had not therefore justified the \u201cnecessity in a democratic society\u201d of banning the books.<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in application no. 1413\/08submitted that the court\u2011appointed experts had no expertise in religious matters and, in particular, had no knowledge of Islam. They had therefore made a purely secular assessment of the texts, without taking into account their religious purpose and the particularities of religious texts. The recognised authorities on Islam, such as a co-president of the Council of Mufti of Russia, had told the courts that Said Nursi was a world-renowned Muslim scholar whose texts formed an integral part of the official teachings of Islam and did not contain any extremist statements. He had also said that the ban on Said Nursi\u2019s books would hinder the religious life of Russian Muslims and unjustifiably restrict their freedom of religion.<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantsin application no. 1413\/08 also argued that the court\u2011appointed experts had not explained how they had reached the finding that the texts at issue incited religious discord. They had not cited a single passage from theRisale-I Nur Collection calling for any actions against non-believers or advocating restriction of rights on the basis of religious affiliation or attitude to religion.<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0In its turn,\u00a0the applicant organisationin application no. 28621\/11 submitted that the domestic courts\u2019judgments had been based exclusively on the report by specialists from the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University. It argued that under domestic law,a specialists\u2019report could not serve as evidence in civil proceedings; only expert reports could do so. Specialists could only give oral or written opinions to the judge in the sphere of their competence(see paragraphs 48 and50above). The specialistsin the case at hand had not explained how they had reached the finding that the text at issue incited religious discord. They had not cited a single passage from thebook that incited hatred or called for violence or indeed for any actions againstnon-believers or any other persons. The report had not mentionedthe use of any scientific methodology (such as focus-group tests or others) to assess the book\u2019s impact on readers\u2019 minds.Ithad therefore been no more than a personal interpretation by secular scholars of a highly metaphorical religious text.<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant organisation also argued that the extracts cited by the specialists had been analysed out of context.For example, the military metaphors used in the book could be explained by the fact that the book had been written as an answer to a colonel. When read in context, it was clear that military terminology had been used purely metaphorically.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the Court notes that in relation to the same facts the applicants rely on two separate Convention provisions: Article 9 and Article\u00a010 of the Convention. Given that the present case concerns a ban on the distribution of books published or commissioned for publication by the applicants, the Court considers thattheir complaintsfall be examined under Article 10 (see Kutlular,cited above, \u00a7 35). That being said, the Court notes that the issues of freedom of expression and freedom of religion are closely linked in the present case. Indeed, the books at issue area commentary on the Qur\u2019an and the applicants intended to use them for religious purposes, including for religious education. The case must therefore be considered in the light of the Court\u2019s case-law on freedom of religion. The Court will therefore examine the present case under Article 10, interpreted where appropriate in the light of Article 9.<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of aninterference<\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that there is no dispute between the parties that declaring Said Nursi\u2019s books published or commissioned for publication by the applicants as \u201cextremist\u201d and banning them from publication and distribution amounted to \u201cinterference by a public authority\u201d with the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of expression, interpreted in the light of their right to freedom of religion to take account of the religious nature of the books and the applicants\u2019 intention to use of them for religious purposes. The Court reiterates that such interference will infringe the Convention unless it satisfies the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10. It must therefore be determined whether it was \u201cprescribed by law\u201d, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d to achieve those aims.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0\u201cPrescribed by law\u201d<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0It was not in dispute that the interference had a basis in national law \u2013 sections 1 and 13 of the Suppression of Extremism Act \u2013 and that the relevant provisions were accessible. Rather, the applicants called into doubt the foreseeability of those provisions, arguing that they were not formulated with sufficient precision.<\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the expression \u201cprescribed by law\u201d in the second paragraph of Article 10 not only requires that the impugned measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, among other authorities, VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, no. 24699\/94, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2001\u2011VI; Gaw\u0119da v.\u00a0Poland, no. 26229\/95, \u00a7 39, ECHR 2002-II; Maestri v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a039748\/98, \u00a7 30, ECHR 2004-I; and Delfi ASv. Estonia[GC], no.\u00a064569\/09, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2015).<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0One of the requirements flowing from the expression \u201cprescribed by law\u201d is foreseeability. Thus, a norm cannot be regarded as a \u201claw\u201d within the meaning of Article 10 \u00a7 2 unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable people to regulate their conduct; they must be able \u2013 if need be with appropriate advice \u2013 to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague, and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see, for example, Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279\/02 and 36448\/02, \u00a7 41, ECHR 2007\u2011IV; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433\/09, \u00a7 141, ECHR 2012; and Delfi AS, cited above, \u00a7 121).<\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0The level of precision required of domestic legislation \u2013 which cannot provide for every eventuality \u2013 depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, \u00a7 142, and Delfi AS, cited above, \u00a7 122).<\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicants argued that the applicable domestic legislation was vague to the point of making the legal rule in question unforeseeable in its application. In particular, the domestic law did not contain a legal definition of the key elements of \u201cextremist activity\u201d, such as \u201cdiscord\u201d or \u201cpropaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency\u201d, creating a risk of arbitrary interpretation and abuse. The Government argued that the Suppression of Extremism Act contained a clear definition of the terms \u201cextremist activity\u201d and \u201cextremist material\u201d.<\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Venice Commission, in its Opinionof 15\u201116\u00a0June 2012 (see paragraph56above), considered the definition of \u201cextremist activity\u201dto be too broad, lacking clarity and open to different interpretations (see \u00a7 31 of the Opinion of the Venice Commission). Furthermore, it expressed concerns regarding the definition of \u201cextremist documents\u201d, which it described as \u201cbroad and rather imprecise\u201d (see \u00a7 49 of the Opinion of the Venice Commission).<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0Although there may be a question as to whether the interference was \u201cprescribed by law\u201d within the meaning of Article 10, the Court does not consider that, in the present case, it is called upon to examine the corresponding provisions of the Suppression of Extremism Act as, in its view, the applicants\u2019 grievances fall to be examined from the point of view of the proportionality of the interference. The Court will therefore leave open the question whether the interference with the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of expression may be regarded as \u201cprescribed by law\u201d, within the meaning of Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention.<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0Legitimate aim<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the Government\u2019s submissions (see paragraph\u00a068 above), the Court will proceed on the assumption that the contested measures sought to pursue the legitimate aims of preventing disorder andprotecting territorial integrity, public safety and the rights of others.<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0\u201cNecessity in a democratic society\u201d<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles<\/p>\n (\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0Freedom of religion<\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a \u201cdemocratic society\u201d within the meaning of the Convention. This freedom is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. That freedom entails, inter alia, freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion (see Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, \u00a7 31, Series A no. 260\u2011A; Leyla \u015eahin, cited above, \u00a7 104; and S.A.S.v. France [GC], no. 43835\/11, \u00a7 124, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies freedom to manifest one\u2019s religion, alone and in private, or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith one shares. Article 9 lists the various forms which the manifestation of one\u2019s religion or beliefs may take, namely worship, teaching, practice and observance (see Cha\u2019are Shalom Ve Tsedek, cited above, \u00a7 73; Leyla \u015eahin, cited above, \u00a7 105; and S.A.S. v. France, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0125).<\/p>\n 90.\u00a0\u00a0In democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to manifest one\u2019s religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone\u2019s beliefs are respected (see Kokkinakis, cited above, \u00a7 33, and Leyla \u015eahin, cited above, \u00a7 106). The Court has frequently emphasised that States have responsibility for ensuring, neutrally and impartially, the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs. Their role is to help maintain public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society, particularly between opposing groups. That concerns both relations between believers and non\u2011believers and relations between the adherents of various religions, faiths and beliefs (see Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 30814\/06, \u00a7 60, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). The Court has also stressed that the State\u2019s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State\u2019s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed (see S.A.S. v. France, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0127, with further references). Accordingly, the role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other (see Serif v. Greece, no.\u00a038178\/97, \u00a7\u00a053, ECHR 1999\u2011IX, and Leyla \u015eahin, cited above, \u00a7 107).<\/p>\n (\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Freedom of expression<\/p>\n 91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently held that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual\u2019s self\u2011fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to \u201cinformation\u201d or \u201cideas\u201d that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no \u201cdemocratic society\u201d. As enshrined in Article 10, freedom of expression is subject to exceptions which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7\u00a0December 1976, \u00a7 49, Series A no. 24; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660\/08 and 60641\/08, \u00a7 101, ECHR 2012; and B\u00e9dat v.\u00a0Switzerland [GC], no. 56925\/08, \u00a7 48, ECHR 2016).<\/p>\n
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nPere Pastor Vilanova,
\nAlena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1,
\nGeorgios A. Serghides,
\nJolien Schukking,
\nMar\u00eda El\u00f3segui, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n