FIRST SECTION
\nCASE OF ZIELI\u0143SKI v. POLAND
\n(Application no. 43924\/12)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n5 July 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Zieli\u0144ski v. Poland,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Ale\u0161 Pejchal, President, Having deliberated in private on 12 June 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 43924\/12) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Polish national, Mr Ryszard Zieli\u0144ski (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 25 June 2012.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Ms A. Plejewska, a lawyer practising in Gdynia. The Polish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 January 2014 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Gdynia.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 January 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed homicide together with other persons.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 January 2007 the Gdynia District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) remanded him in custody. The court stressed the need to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given that extensive evidencehad still to be obtained in the case. It also referred to the fact that the proceedings in question concerned several alleged accomplices. The court further relied on the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed on the applicant.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 February 2007 the applicant applied for the preventive measure to be lifted or varied. On 15 February the District Prosecutor refused the request, finding that the grounds for the imposition of this measure remained valid.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s detention was further extended by decisions of the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) of 20 March, 19 June and 21\u00a0August 2007. The applicant appealed against all of those decisions. His appeals were dismissed by the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) on 4\u00a0May, 1 August and 19 September 2007 respectively. The courts repeatedly relied in their decisions on the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question, the likelihood of a severe prison sentence being imposed on him and the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation, especially the need to obtain further expertevidence.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 September 2007 the applicant again applied for release. His application was refused on 21 September 2007 by the Gdynia District Prosecutor.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 November 2007 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 31 March 2008. The applicant appealed, unsuccessfully.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date in late 2007 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court. The applicant was charged with homicide committed together with two other co-accused.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s detention was continually extended during the course of the trial.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 August 2008 the applicant requested the court to release him on health grounds. On 19 August 2008 the trial court refused his request. It relied on the medical certificate issued by a prison doctor, stating that the applicant could be adequately treated in detention.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 September 2008 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court gave judgment (case no. IV 457\/07). The applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. He lodged an appeal.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 May 2009 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case for retrial (case no. II AKa 45\/09).<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s detention was continually extended by the domestic courts, pending his appeal and in the course of the retrial. In particular, on 24 August 2009 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court extended his detention until 31\u00a0December 2009. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 23\u00a0September 2009 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision, finding that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question persisted, despite the fact that the judgment convicting the applicant had been quashed. The Court of Appeal further considered that the Regional Court had correctly relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty as the principal ground for the applicant\u2019s continuing detention and on the risk ofthe obstruction of the proceedings.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 March 2010 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court gave judgment (case no. XIV K 48\/09). The applicant was again convicted as charged and sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant lodged an appeal.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0 On 10 November 2010 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case for retrial (case no. II AKa 277\/10).<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 March 2012 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention, reiterating the grounds given in its initial decisions. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0During the retrial proceedings the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court held fifteen hearings in total.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 July 2012 the court gave judgment (case no. XIV K 210\/10). The applicant was again convicted and sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. He lodged an appeal against that judgment.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 October 2012 the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 30 December 2012. On 13 November 2012 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision.It considered that the applicant\u2019s involvement in the offences with which he had been charged had been supported by the non-final judgment of 12 July 2012, in which he had been convicted and had received a severe sentence. The court also held that further detention on remand was the only preventive measure capable of securing the proper course of the proceedings until the delivery of a final judgment.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 June 2013 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal partly allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal (case no. II AKa 84\/13). The appellate court upheld the conviction but reclassified the offence as involuntary manslaughter (nieumy\u015blne spowodowanie \u015bmierci). The applicant\u2019s sentence was reduced to four years\u2019 imprisonment.The applicant was released on the same day.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of pre-trial detention (tymczasowe aresztowanie), the grounds for its extension, release from detention and rules governing other, so-called \u201cpreventive measures\u201d (\u015brodki zapobiegawcze) are stated in the Court\u2019s judgments in the cases of Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 75\u201379, ECHR 2000-XI; Bagi\u0144ski v. Poland, no. 37444\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 42\u201346, 11 October 2005; and Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 22\u201323, 4 May 2006.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0Article 552 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0An accused who, as a result of the reopening of proceedings or an appeal on points of law, has been acquitted or re\u2011sentenced under a more lenient provision, shall be entitled to receive from the State Treasury compensation for the pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage which he has suffered as a result of having served all or part of the sentence unjustifiably imposed on him.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The provisions of paragraph 1 shall also be applicable if, after the sentencing judgment has been reversed or declared null and void, the proceedings have been discontinued by reason of material circumstances not duly considered in prior proceedings.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0A right to compensation for pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage shall also arise if a preventive measure has been applied under the conditions specified in paragraphs 1 and 2.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0A right to compensation for pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage shall also arise in the event of undoubtedly unjustified (niew\u0105tpliwie nies\u0142uszne) pre\u2011trial detention or arrest.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained that his pre-trial detention had been excessively lengthy.<\/p>\n Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be … entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government asserted that this complaint was inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They stated that the applicant had instituted proceedings for compensation for unjustified detention under Article 552 \u00a7 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCP\u201d) and that these proceedings were pending.In their view, a claim for compensation under Article 552 \u00a7 4 of the CCP covered to some extent a complaint resulting from the length of the detention on remand. The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s accomplice had lodged a complaint under Article 552\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the CCPand had been awarded PLN100,000(approximately EUR 25,000) in that respect.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant lodged appeals against most of the decisions extending his detention. He also lodged many requests for the detention measure to be lifted. The applicant\u2019s aim in using the remedies was to obtain a review of his detention pending trial and to obtain his release.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that under the Convention case-law, where the lawfulness of detention is concerned, an action for damages against the State is not a remedy which has to be used because the right to have the lawfulness of detention examined by a court and the right to obtain compensation for any deprivation of liberty incompatible with Article 5 are two separate rights (see Porowski v. Poland, no. 34458\/03, \u00a7 129, 21 March 2017, with further references). It further reiterates that a request for compensation for manifestly unjustified detention on remand under Article\u00a0552 of the CCP enables a detainee to seek, retrospectively, a ruling as to whether his detention in already terminated criminal proceedings was justified, and to obtain compensation when it was not. The proceedings relating to such a request are essentially designed to secure financial reparation for damage arising from the execution of unjustified detention on remand (ibid.).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to complaints under Article 5 \u00a7 3, the Court has already considered that an appeal against a detention order, a request for release, whether submitted to the prosecutor or to the court, depending on the stage of the proceedings, and also an appeal against a decision extending detention on remand, serve the same purpose under Polish law. Their objective is to secure a review of the lawfulness of detention at any point during the proceedings, both at the pre-trial and trial stage, and to obtain release if the circumstances of the case no longer justify continued detention (see, among other authorities, Wolf v. Poland, nos. 15667\/03 and 2929\/04, \u00a7\u00a078, 16 January 2007, and Gracki v. Poland, no. 14224\/05, \u00a7\u00a033, 29\u00a0January 2008). In the present case, the applicant lodged appeals against most of the decisions extending his detention. On a number of occasions he also requested the authorities to lift the detention measure and appealed against decisions dismissing his requests.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant does not complain that he has not obtained compensation for his detention in contravention of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a05 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 3 cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Period to be taken into consideration<\/em><\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the relevant period lasted from 2 January 2007 to 25 September 2008 (when the applicant was convicted by the first\u2011instance court) and from 13 May 2009 (when the conviction was quashed) to 16 March 2010 (when he was again convicted by the first\u2011instance court) and then from 10 November 2010 (when the conviction was again quashed) to 12 July 2012 (when the applicant was again convicted by the first-instance court). According to the Convention organs\u2019 case-law, a person convicted at first instance cannot be regarded as being detained \u201cfor the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence\u201d, as specified in Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c), but is in the position provided for by Article\u00a05\u00a7 1 (a), which authorises deprivation of liberty \u201cafter conviction by a competent court\u201d (see, for example, B. v. Austria, 28 March 1990, \u00a7\u00a036\u201139, Series A no. 175).<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the period to be taken into consideration lasted 4\u00a0years and 3 months.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that no reasons could have justified the length of his pre-trial detention. He maintained that it had been an inefficient organisation of the courts\u2019 work which had contributed to the length of the proceedings<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0The Government refrained from taking a position on the merits of this complaint.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the general principles regarding the right \u201cto trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial\u201d, as guaranteed by Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention were stated in a number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities, Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7 110 et seq, ECHR 2000\u2011XI;McKay v. the United Kingdom, [GC], no. 543\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 41-44, ECHR 2006-X, with further references; and Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 84-102, 5\u00a0July 2016).<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0In their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on three grounds, namely (1) the serious nature of the offence with which he had been charged, (2) the severity of the penalty to which he was liable and (3)\u00a0the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. As regards the latter, they relied on the severity of the anticipated punishment which had created a risk that he would attempt to obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings if released (see paragraphs16, 19 and 22 above).<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed serious offences could initially warrant his detention.However, with the passage of time, those grounds became less and less relevant. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds adduced by the courts \u2013 namely, the severity of the anticipated sentence andthe risk that the applicant would tamper with the proceedings \u2013 were \u201csufficient\u201d and \u201crelevant\u201d (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 111).<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0According to the authorities, the gravity of the charges against the applicant and, consequently, the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed on him, created a risk that the applicant would attempt to obstruct the proceedings. However, the Court would reiterate that, while the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of obstructing the proceedings, the gravity of the charges cannot by itself justify long periods of detention on remand (see Michta v. Poland, no.\u00a013425\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 49, 4 May 2006).<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the risk that the applicant would obstruct the proceedings, the Court is not persuaded that it constituted a valid ground for the entire length of his pre-trial detention. Firstly, it notes that the Gdynia District Court, when initially remanding the applicant in custody, made only a general reference to the fact that the offence had been committed by several perpetrators and the risk that the applicant would attempt to avoid a severe penalty. Secondly, the Court notes that the relevant decisions did not contain any argument capable of showing that these fears were well\u2011founded. Such a generally formulated risk, flowing from the nature of the offence with which the applicant had been charged, might possibly be accepted as the basis for his detention at the initial stages of the proceedings. Nevertheless, in the absence of any other factor capable of showing that the risk of his attempting to tamper with the proceedings actually existed, the Court cannot accept that ground as a justification for holding the applicant in custody for the entire period in question (see Krzysztofiak v. Poland, no. 38018\/07, \u00a7 48, 20 April 2010).<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s detention was supervised by the courts at regular intervals. However, in their decisions extending the applicant\u2019s detention, the domestic authorities repeatedly relied on the same grounds, namely a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question, the severity of the likely penalty and the risk that the applicant would obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings. No other grounds for detention were given in those decisions, notwithstanding thesignificant length of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the applicant was eventually sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment (see paragraph 23),while his detention on remand for the purpose of Article 5 \u00a7 3 was three months longer than his eventual sentence.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would also emphasise that under Article 5 \u00a7 3 the authorities, when deciding whether a person should be released or detained, are obliged to consider alternative measures for ensuring his appearance at trial.Indeed, that provision proclaims not only the right to \u201ctrial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial\u201d but also lays down that \u201crelease may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial\u201d (see G.K. v.\u00a0Poland, no. 38816\/97, \u00a7 85, 20 January 2004). A range of other, less stringent, preventive measures could have been alternatively considered and imposed on the applicant to ensure his presence and participation in the proceedings.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that during the entire period of the applicant\u2019s detention, and despite his repeated applications for release, the authorities did not envisage any other guarantees to ensure that he would appear for trial. They did not give any consideration to the possibility of ensuring his presence at trial by imposing on him other \u201cpreventive measures\u201d \u2013 such as bail or police supervision \u2013 expressly foreseen by Polish law to secure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicant was detained on a charge of homicide committed together with two accomplices. The defendants had not been formally charged with acting as part of an organised criminal group. In these circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that the instant case presented particular difficulties for the investigation authorities or for the courts to determine the facts and mount a case against the perpetrators, as would undoubtedly have been the case had the proceedings concerned organised crime (seeB\u0105k v. Poland, no.\u00a07870\/04, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a056-65, 16 January 2007, and, a contrario, Kwiatek v. Poland, no.\u00a020204\/02, \u00a7 46, 6 February 2007).<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that the grounds given by the domestic authorities could not justify the overall period of the applicant\u2019s detention.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with special diligence.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed PLN 100,000 (approximately EUR 25,000) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0 The Government considered the claim groundless, taking into account that the applicant had already lodged a claim for compensation for unjustified detention under Article 552 \u00a7 4 of the CCP with the domestic courts and that these proceedings were pending.<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage which is not sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation of the Convention. Considering the circumstances of the case and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a05,200 under this head.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe application admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 5,200 (five thousand two hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 July 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Renata Degener\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ale\u0161 Pejchal
\nArmen Harutyunyan,
\nJovan Ilievski, judges,
\nand Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n