FOURTH SECTION<\/p>\n
CASE OF ANDREYEVA v. UKRAINE
\n(Application no. 24385\/10)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n29 January 2019<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Andreyeva v. Ukraine,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Georges Ravarani, President, Having deliberated in private on 8 January 2019,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 24385\/10) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Ukrainian national, Ms Yevdokiya Ivanovna Andreyeva (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 16 April 2010.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Ms\u00a0O.\u00a0Belyayeva, a lawyer practising in Dnipro. The Ukrainian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, most recently Mr\u00a0I.\u00a0Lishchyna.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 March 2014notice of the application was given to the Government. The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee. Having considered the Government\u2019s objection, the Court rejects it.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in the town of Snizhne, Donetsk region.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 January 2004 the applicant\u2019s son, born in 1967, was found dead in the applicant\u2019s barn. On the same day police officers inspected the scene and reported that the man had committed suicide by hanging.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 January 2004 the investigator of the Snizhne Prosecutor\u2019s Office, following the pre-investigation inquiries, refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established in relation to the death of the applicant\u2019s son.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 February 2004, following a forensic medical examination, an expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death had been caused by strangulation by a loop of rope,possibly as a result of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s body weight pulling against the rope. The body displayed no other injuries.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 April 2005 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office quashed the decision of 24 January 2004 (see paragraph 6 above) as premature and unfounded, finding that further pre-investigation inquiries were necessary given that the possible reasons for suicide had not been examined, and other relatives as well as acquaintances of the deceased had not been questioned either. Numerous investigating instructions were given.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0In the course of further pre-investigation inquiries, between 2005 and 2012, the investigators took measures to establish the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death. They questioned various persons, and ordered numerous additional medical examinations of the corpse of the deceased. At a certain point medical experts noted that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s body had numerous fractures. The experts opined that all those fractures had been inflicted after the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death, possibly during the exhumation of the body. The applicant\u2019s husband informed the authorities that when he had seen his dead son in the barn, the corpse of his son had been in a sitting position and the rope loop had not been tightened. The applicant argued that it had not been suicide but a violent murder. She advanced different theories, suspecting notably: police security guards who had allegedly takenthe applicant\u2019s son from a local bar, following which he had been found dead; a local police officer who had engaged ina dispute with the applicant\u2019s son; a woman who had been employed by the applicant\u2019s son in his textile business and her husband; the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s brothers-in-law; a business partner of the applicant\u2019s son; and people from a local gambling club (the applicant\u2019s son had been engaged in transporting money from the club to another town).<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 April 2005, 26 March 2006, 20 August 2008, 17 February and 12 December 2011, 15 February 2012 and 17 September 2012, following the pre-investigation inquiries, the investigators refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established. Those decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by the supervising authorities, which found that further investigativemeasures were necessary. Numerous investigating instructions were given.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 December 2012 the applicant, relying on the new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012, requested that an investigation be opened in respect of the alleged murder of her son. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 December 2012, 22 July and 30 September 2013 the criminal proceedings were terminated because no elements of a crime could be established. Those decisions were quashed by the supervising authorities as unsubstantiated and further investigations were ordered. In particular, on 5\u00a0December 2013 the Snizhne Town Court quashed the decision of 30\u00a0September 2013 after finding that the investigation had not been thorough and comprehensive. The court noted the theory ofthe possible involvement of the local police had not been properly examined, the role of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s brother-in-lawhad not been clarified even though he might have been the first to find the dead body, the applicant had not been questioned on all the issues which were relevant to the case, and the evidence relating to the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s suicidal tendencies had not been assessed.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 April 2014 the criminal proceedings were closed one more time on the ground that no elements of a crime could be established.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of domestic law can be found inMuravskaya v. Ukraine (no. 249\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a035-36, 13 November 2008) and Nagorskiy v.\u00a0Ukraine ((dec.), no. 37794\/14, \u00a7 38, 12 January 2016).<\/p>\n
\nMarko Bo\u0161njak,
\nP\u00e9terPaczolay, judges,
\nand Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n