FOURTH SECTION<\/p>\n
CASE OF OLIVEIRA MODESTO AND OTHERS v. PORTUGAL
\n(Application no. 68445\/10)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n29 January 2019<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Oliveira Modesto and Others v. Portugal,<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Egidijus K\u016bris,President,
\nPaulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
\nIuliaAntoanellaMotoc,judges,<\/p>\n
andAndrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated in private on 8 January 2019,<\/p>\n
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n
PROCEDURE<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 68445\/10) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by 251Portuguese nationals listed in the Annex (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on 17 November 2010.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant represented all the applicants andwas authorised to do so by the President of the former Second Section of the Court, in accordance with Rule 36 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court. The Portuguese Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms M.F. da Gra\u00e7aCarvalho, Deputy Attorney General.<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 March 2012 the Government were given notice of the application.<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee. Having considered the Government\u2019s objection, the Court rejects it.<\/p>\n
THE FACTS<\/p>\n
I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n
5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants are former employees andheirs of former employees of company F. – C.M.E. S.A. (hereinafter \u201ccompany F.\u201d), which owned a factory making engines and electric alternators in Aveiro. The company experienced a series of financial problems in 1985, leading to it beingunable to continue paying salaries to its staff.<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Insolvency and judicial liquidation proceedings<\/p>\n
6.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 October 1994 the Coimbra Court of Appeal declared company\u00a0F. insolvent. On 8 May 1995 the case was remitted to the Aveiro Court.<\/p>\n
7.\u00a0\u00a0By a decision that was made public on 3 July 1995 the Aveiro Court ordered that creditors wishing to declare their claims (reclama\u00e7\u00e3o de cr\u00e9ditos) should be summoned.<\/p>\n
8.\u00a0\u00a0Having learnt that a site division and urban development plan (plano de pormenor) encompassing the land of company F. had been drawn up by the municipality of Aveiro, former employees of the company, including some of the applicants, applied to the Aveiro Court on 12 December 1997, requesting that it wait for the plan to be approved before ordering the sale of company F.\u2019s assets. They hoped that the plan would lead to a rise in the land\u2019s value and thus increase the prospects of their recovering what they were owed.<\/p>\n
9.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 March 2000 the Aveiro Court issued a decision on the classification of the various claims (senten\u00e7a de gradua\u00e7\u00e3o de cr\u00e9ditos). Some of the creditors appealed against that decision to the Coimbra Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n
10.\u00a0\u00a0In a decision of 7 November 2000 the AveiroCourt authorised the suspension of the sale (see paragraph 8 above) until the approval of the site division and urban development plan.<\/p>\n
11.\u00a0\u00a0In a judgment of 23 January 2001 the Coimbra Court of Appeal delivered a judgment on the classification ofthe former employees\u2019claims. On 9 February 2001 the first applicant appealed against that judgmentto the Supreme Court of Justice.<\/p>\n
12.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 February 2001 the applicant Rosa Rodrigues Casal (applicant no.\u00a0199in the appended table) lodged an application with the Aveiro Court, seeking to registera claim against the insolvent company.<\/p>\n
13.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 December 2001 the Supreme Court of Justice delivered a judgment confirming the classification ofclaims by the Coimbra Court of Appeal (see paragraphs9 and 11 above).<\/p>\n
14.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 November 2002 the judicial liquidator informed the AveiroCourt that he had suspended his activities following another court\u2019s decision. In a decision of 29 January 2003 the court appointed a new liquidator.<\/p>\n
15.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 April 2009, as part of a redraft of the court-distribution map (setting out the geographical areas over which courts had jurisdiction), the proceedings were transferred to the Aveiro Commercial Court.<\/p>\n
16.\u00a0\u00a0On29 July 2009the municipality of Aveiro, the body of creditors and company G. entered into anagreement for the exchange of land between company F., company G., a neighbouring company, and the Aveiro municipality.<\/p>\n
17.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date a part of the land measuring 17,629.10 sq.\u00a0m and a separate plot were put up for sale.<\/p>\n
18.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 July 2011 a session at which offers to purchase could be made took place, and no offers were received. The court ordered the judicial liquidator to submit the documentation concerning that session and the proposal for sale within ten days.<\/p>\n
19.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 December 2011 the court ordered the judicial liquidator to provide information on the state of the proceedings.<\/p>\n
20.\u00a0\u00a0Since the judicial liquidator had not replied to the previous request, on 6 March 2012 the court ordered him to urgently provide information on the state of the proceedings, giving him a ten-day time-limit.<\/p>\n
21.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of any reply to the two previous requests, on 17\u00a0April 2012 the court ordered the judicial liquidator to provide information on the state of the proceedings, and also ordered that he would be fined if he did not provide such a reply.<\/p>\n
22.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 April 2012 the judicial liquidator informed the court that no offers to purchase had been received, and he proposed to initiate contactwith companies which specialised in the real-estate sector.<\/p>\n
23.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 May 2012 the court ordered the judicial liquidator to establish contact with real-estate companies, and gave him a ten-day time-limit.<\/p>\n
24.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 May 2012 the judicial liquidator informed the court that he had contacted some real-estate companies, buthe requested ten more days in order to finalise the task.On 4 June 2012 he was informed that his request had been granted.<\/p>\n
25.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 June 2012 the judge ordered the judicial liquidator to draw up a report indicating the detailed amounts to be allocated to each creditor in the light of the Supreme Court of Justice\u2019s judgment (see paragraph13 above).<\/p>\n
26.\u00a0\u00a0Following the AveiroCommercial Court insistingthat the judicial liquidatorprovide information on the progress regarding contact with real-estate companies by way of three notifications(sent to him on 27\u00a0September, 19 October and 19 November 2012), on 16 January 2013 he informed the court that only one real-estate company had expressed interest in mediating the sale of the property.<\/p>\n
27.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 March 2013 the courtinvited the judicial liquidator to initiate new contact with real-estate companies by email, since until then contact with the real-estate companies had been established in person.<\/p>\n
28.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 December 2013 the judicial liquidatorinformed the court that contact by email had been made with 119 real-estate companies, and offers to acquire the property were to be received until 15 January 2014.In the meantime, the court hadsent him three notifications in that regard \u2013 on 21\u00a0May, 10 July and 11\u00a0November 2013.<\/p>\n
29.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 June 2014 the judicial liquidator replied to the 12 June 2012 court order (see paragraph 25 above). He informed the court that most former employees had not detailed the origin of their claims, and therefore it was not possible for him to provide a detailed plan on payment.On the same date the judicial liquidator informed the court that only three real-estate companies had replied and that those replieswere negative. He then suggested thata new procedure for a sale by private agreement should be initiated, this time for 50%\u00a0of the previously requested amount.<\/p>\n
30.\u00a0\u00a0In reply to the judicial liquidator\u2019s information, on 11 July 2014 the judge ordered him to provide information on the amount already obtained as proceeds of the liquidation (produto da liquida\u00e7\u00e3o),by reference to real estate or movable property, in order to assess the practical effects of distributingthose amounts among the creditors.As the judicial liquidator did not reply to that request, on 1 July 2015, 21 April 2016 and 13\u00a0June 2016 the court insisted that he do so.<\/p>\n
31.\u00a0\u00a0Meanwhile, on 30 September and 9 October 2015 the judicial liquidator was summoned in two sets of tax enforcement proceedings against company F.<\/p>\n
32.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 November 2016 the judicial liquidator informed the court of the twosets of tax enforcement proceedings which were ongoing.<\/p>\n
33.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 July 2017 the court notified the judicial liquidatorthat he should provide information on the state of the proceedings within ten days.<\/p>\n
34.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 September 2017 the court insisted that the judicial liquidator provide information on the state of the proceedings.<\/p>\n
35.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 September 2017 the judicial liquidator informed the court that a new tax issue was an obstacle in the insolvency proceedings.<\/p>\n
36.\u00a0\u00a0According to the latest information received by the Court on 21\u00a0May 2018, the insolvency proceedings were, on that date, still ongoing.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 34422\/97<\/p>\n
37.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 September 1996 the applicants and other individuals (represented in the present case by their heirs) identified by numbers 1 to 131 in the Annex lodged an application with the Court to complain about the duration of the proceedings at issuebefore the Aveiro Court.<\/p>\n
38.\u00a0\u00a0In a judgment of 8 June 2000, the Court found a violation of Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of the proceedings, awarding each applicant the sum of 900,000 Portuguese escudos (PTE \u2013about EUR 4,489) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and PTE 313,840 (about EUR 1,565) to the first applicant for costs and expenses.<\/p>\n
39.\u00a0\u00a0The just satisfactionwas paid to the applicants on 11 and 12\u00a0December 2000.<\/p>\n
40.\u00a0\u00a0By Resolution CM\/ResDH(2016)149 adopted on 8 June 2016 at the 1259thmeeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies, the Committee of Ministers declared that it hadexercised its functions under Article 46, paragraph 2 of the Convention in respect of application no. 34422\/97, and decided to close the examination of its enforcement.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n
41.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant part of the Portuguese Code on special procedures for the recovery of companies and insolvency (C\u00f3digo dos ProcessosEspeciais de Recupera\u00e7\u00e3o da Empresa e de Fal\u00eancia \u2013 CPEREF), in the version in force at the material time (Legislative Decree no. 132\/93, of 23\u00a0April 1993), provided as follows:<\/p>\n
Article 128
\nDecision to declare insolvency<\/p>\n
\u201c1. In the decision declaring insolvency, the court shall:<\/p>\n
…<\/p>\n
(e) Define a time-limit going from 20 to 60 days for the creditors\u2019 declaration of claims.<\/p>\n
…\u201d<\/p>\n
THE LAW<\/p>\n
I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY ISSUES<\/p>\n
The locus standi of the heirs of the deceased applicants<\/p>\n
42.\u00a0\u00a0Byletters of 3 October 2017 and 21 May 2018 thefirstapplicantinformedthe Courtaboutthedeath of thefollowingapplicants:Mr Rafael Policarpo Neves da Silva, Ms Maria Odete Vieira de Sousa, Ms Isaura Pereira Cort\u00eas, Mr Ant\u00f3nio da Costa Santos, Mr Manuel da Loura Gamelas, Mr Arlindo de Sousa Rodrigues da Silva, Mr Ant\u00f3nio Nobre Machado, Mr\u00a0Carlos Alberto Sim\u00f5es Instrumento, Ms Maria Clara Costa Mesquita, Ms Maria Vit\u00f3ria Branco Rodrigues da Rocha, Ms Maria Carolina Sousa Almeida Neto, Mr Jo\u00e3o Marques Rodrigues, Ms L\u00eddia Lopes, Ms Fernanda Pais da Cruz Silva, Ms Ana Clara dos Santos Silva Ferreira, Ms Maria da Soledade Freire Pinto Nogueira, andMr Jorge Alberto Pinto Nogueira.<\/p>\n
43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the wish of those applicants\u2019 relatives (identified in the Annex) to pursue the proceedings in their stead. To that end, the first applicant submitted notary inheritance certificates (habilita\u00e7\u00f5es de herdeirosnotariais) in respect of all the late applicants except Mr Jo\u00e3o Marques Rodrigues, certifying that the relatives are their heirs.The first applicant also submitted copies of requests made by the relatives of all the late applicants asking the Aveiro Court to continue the proceedings on their behalf.<\/p>\n
44.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the late applicant Mr Jo\u00e3o Marques Rodrigues, the first applicant also submitted documents (namely the late applicant\u2019s death certificate and his wife\u2019s birth certificate) to show that he had been married to Ms Maria Teresa dos Anjos Aires Rodriguesat the date of his death.<\/p>\n
45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where applicants die during the examination of a case, their heirs or next-of-kin may in principle pursue the application on their behalf (seeMalhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII; see alsoJe\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 34578\/97, \u00a7\u00a041, ECHR 2000-IX, where the applicant\u2019s widow had a legitimate interest in pursuing the application). Furthermore, in some cases concerning the length of proceedings, the Court has recognised the right of the applicant\u2019sheirs or close family members to pursue the application (see, for example,Horv\u00e1thov\u00e1 v.\u00a0Slovakia, no. 74456\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 26-27, 17 May 2005).<\/p>\n
46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the rights at stake in the present case are very similar to those at the heart of the cases referred to above. Nothing suggests that the rights which the applicants sought to protect through the Convention mechanism were eminently personal and non-transferable (see, mutatis mutandis,Malhous, decision cited above).<\/p>\n
47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the Government have not disputed that the applicants\u2019 relatives are entitled to pursue the application on their behalf and the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise.<\/p>\n
48.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court finds that the applicants\u2019 relatives identified in the Annex have standing to pursue the proceedings in the deceased applicants\u2019 stead.<\/p>\n
49.\u00a0\u00a0However, for practical reasons, the Court will continue to refer to the initial applicants as \u201cthe applicants\u201d (see, mutatis mutandis, Dalban v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no. 28114\/95, \u00a7 1, ECHR 1999-VI).<\/p>\n
II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the length of the proceedings since 8\u00a0June 2000 had been incompatible with the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement laid down in Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:<\/p>\n
\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal…\u201d<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s submissions<\/p>\n
51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the application was inadmissible as an abuse of the right of petition. According to the Government, by requesting that the proceedings be stayed pending the outcome of the site division and urban development plan, the applicants were themselves responsible for a delay in the proceedings.<\/p>\n
52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also argued that the applicant Ms. Rosa Rodrigues Casal was not a party to the proceedings and was therefore not a victim of the alleged violation, as shehad not declared her claims at thestage of the proceedings when she was supposed to. In fact, when she had lodged her requests to have her claims recognised, her claims had not been admissible.<\/p>\n
53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not reply to these objections.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/p>\n
(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection as to abuse of the right of petition<\/p>\n
54.\u00a0\u00a0In relation to the Government\u2019s argument that the applicants abused the rights set out in the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03 (a), the Court reiterates that an application may only be rejected as an abuse of process in extraordinary circumstances, notably when there is persistent use of insulting or provocative language by an applicant (see Felbab v. Serbia, no.\u00a014011\/07, \u00a7 56, 14 April 2009), when the application was knowingly based on untrue facts, or when incomplete and thus misleading information concerning the very core of the case was submitted to the Court (see Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810\/10, \u00a7\u00a028, ECHR 2014).<\/p>\n
55.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its case-law, the Court considers that the applicants\u2019 requests regarding the site division and urban development plan (see paragraph8 above) during the domestic proceedings are not of such a nature as would justify the application being declared inadmissible as an abuse of the right of petition.<\/p>\n
56.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s objection as to the alleged abuse of the right of petition must be rejected.<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection regarding the applicant Ms Rosa Rodrigues Casal<\/p>\n
57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, while the creditors had been summoned for the purpose of declaring their claims (see paragraph7 above) the applicant Rosa Rodrigues Casal only declared her claims on 19 February 2001 (see paragraph 12 above), long after the time-limitfixed by the domestic law had expired (see paragraph 41 above). As her claims were inadmissible because they had been lodged out of time, she could no longer becomea party to the insolvency proceedings.<\/p>\n
58.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this particular applicant cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, and the application should be rejectedin so far as it concerns her, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0 3 and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n
(c)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/p>\n
59.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above, the Court notes that the applicationin respect of all applicants except the applicant Rosa Rodrigues Casal is neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0The period to be taken into consideration<\/p>\n
60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants complainedabout the length of the proceedings as of 8 June 2000, the date on which theCourt\u2019s judgment regarding application no. 34422\/97 was delivered (see paragraph 38 above). At that time, the case was pending before the Coimbra Court of Appeal and the claims were awaiting classification. The latest information made available to the Court (dated 21 May 2018 \u2013 see paragraph 36above), indicated that the insolvency proceedings were still ongoing.<\/p>\n
61.\u00a0\u00a0The period to be taken into consideration within the framework of the examination of the present application thus extends over approximately seventeen years and eleven months.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings<\/p>\n
62.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the length of the proceedings was mostly due to the fact that the Aveiro Court had accepted to act in the applicants\u2019 interest at their request. They also argued that the insolvency proceedings had been delayed by the tax enforcement proceedings, as they were an obstacle to the sale procedure (see paragraphs31 and 35 above).<\/p>\n
63.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979\/96, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2000-VII, and Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal [GC], no. 35382\/97, \u00a7 19, ECHR 2000-IV).<\/p>\n
64.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that the stage of the proceedings concerning the classification of the former employees\u2019 claims was conducted in a speedy and efficient way. Indeed, on 23 January 2001 the Coimbra Court of Appeal delivered a judgment on that issue (see paragraph\u00a011 above), and on 6 December 2001 the Supreme Court of Justice ruled on the first applicant\u2019s appeal (see paragraph 13 above). As far as this stage of the proceedings is concerned, the Court is unable to detect any significant delays imputable to the authorities.<\/p>\n
65.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the proceedings to liquidate the assets of company F., the Court observes that on 12 December 1997 former employees of company\u00a0F., including some of the applicants, requested that the Aveiro Court wait for the approval of a site division and urban development plan that had been drawn up by the municipality of Aveiro before ordering the sale of company F.\u2019s assets, hoping that the plan would lead to a rise in the value of the land and thus increase their prospects of recovering their debts (see paragraph 8 above). That request led the Aveiro Court to authorise the suspension of the sale of company F.\u2019s assets on 7 November 2000 (see\u00a0paragraph10 above). The proceedings could not be resumed until 29\u00a0July 2009, when the body of creditors, including the applicants, concluded an agreement with the Aveiro municipality and companies F. and G. (see paragraph 16 above).<\/p>\n
66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that only delays attributable to the State may justify a finding of failure to comply with the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement (see, among other authorities, Humen v. Poland [GC], no. 26614\/95, \u00a7\u00a066, 15\u00a0October 1999, and Proszak v. Poland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 40, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII).<\/p>\n
67.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case, the period between 8 June 2000 and 29 July 2009 consisted of a protraction of the case requestedby the applicants and accepted by the court for their own benefit. That protraction cannot be imputed to the respondent Government. It remains to be ascertained whether there has been a breach of the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement in respect of the subsequent eight years, nine months and twenty-two days that elapsed between 30 July 2009 and 21 May 2018.<\/p>\n
68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that this stage of the proceedings was of some complexity,owing to the number of parties involved. However, the Court considers that this element alone cannot explain the length of the proceedings.<\/p>\n
69.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the applicants\u2019 conduct, the Court considers that they cannot be deemed responsible for any delays encountered since 30\u00a0July 2009.<\/p>\n
70.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the conduct of the national authorities, the Court notes that there were some periods of inactivity on the part of the judicial liquidator for which the Government have provided no explanation, notably:<\/p>\n
–\u00a0\u00a0it took almost four months (from 27 September 2012 until 16 January 2013) for the judicial liquidator to reply to the court order on establishing contact with real-estate companies (see paragraph26 above);<\/p>\n
–\u00a0\u00a0it took him more than nine months (from 6 March 2013 until 18\u00a0December 2013) to reply to the court order onestablishing new contact with real-estate companies by email (see paragraphs27 and28 above);<\/p>\n
–\u00a0\u00a0it took him two years (from 12 June 2012 until 17 June 2014) to reply to the court order on the report indicating the detailed amounts to be allocated to each creditor in the light of the Supreme Court of Justice\u2019s judgment (see paragraphs25and29 above);<\/p>\n
–\u00a0\u00a0it took him more than one year (from 30 September 2015 until 23\u00a0November 2016) to inform the Aveiro Commercial Court that he had been summoned in two sets of tax enforcement proceedings against company F. (see paragraphs31and 32above).<\/p>\n
71.\u00a0\u00a0Even assuming that the liquidator enjoyed a considerable amount of operational and institutional independence and did not act as a State agent, thus not rendering the respondent State directly responsible for his acts (see, mutatis mutandis, Kotov v. Russia [GC], no. 54522\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 91-107, 3\u00a0April 2012), it cannot be overlooked that the domestic courts were responsible for ensuring that he complied with the relevant rules (ibid., \u00a7 107). Indeed, the liquidator was working in thecontext of judicial proceedings, supervised by a court which remained responsible for the preparation and speedy conduct of the trial (see, mutatis mutandis, and with respect to court-appointed experts, Billi v.\u00a0Italy, 26 February 1993, \u00a7 19, Series A no. 257-G, and Scopelliti v. Italy, 23 November 1993, \u00a7 23, Series A no. 278; see also Terebus v. Portugal, no.5238\/10, \u00a7 49, 10 April 2014).<\/p>\n
72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court understands from the facts as submitted by the parties that another main reason for the delay in the proceedings was the existence of two sets of tax enforcement proceedings which also concerned company F.\u2019s assets. The Court notes, however, that the Government have not explained exactly how those proceedingsconstituted an obstacle to the insolvency proceedings, nor have they shown that the tax enforcement proceedings, which were allegedly decisive as regards the protractedness of the insolvency proceedings, were conducted diligently by the courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Jama v. Slovenia, no. 48163\/08, \u00a7 36, 19 July 2012). In\u00a0any event, the Aveiro Commercial Court was informed of the tax proceedings only on 23\u00a0November 2016 (see paragraph 32 above).<\/p>\n
73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is for the State to organise its judicial system in such a way as to enable its courts to comply with the requirements of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see Tusa v. Italy, 27 February 1992, \u00a7\u00a017, Series A no.\u00a0231\u2011D, andJama v. Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7 36), and the Court finds that no convincing arguments have been adduced by the Government to show that the length of the proceedings complained of was reasonable as required by that provision.<\/p>\n
74.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the State authorities bear primary responsibility for the excessive length of the proceedings in questionfrom 30 July 2009until 21 May 2018. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that, in the instant case, the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement.<\/p>\n
75.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n
III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
76.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n
\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/p>\n
77.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of pecuniary damage, the applicants claimed the same amounts they had claimed in the domestic proceedings and which they have not yet received. In addition, the applicants claimed an amount going from 4,500\u00a0euros\u00a0(EUR) to EUR 8,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n
78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested these claims.<\/p>\n
79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the amounts claimed in respect of pecuniary damage can only be paid in the context of the domestic proceedings; it\u00a0therefore rejects this claim.<\/p>\n
80.\u00a0\u00a0As far as non-pecuniary damage is concerned, the Court notes that all the applicants, former employees of company F., were parties to the same domestic proceedings which concerned the liquidation of the assets of the company in question. In connection with this, the Court reiterates that where common proceedings have been found to be excessively long, it must take account of the manner in which the number of participants in such proceedings may influence the level of distress, inconvenience and uncertainty affecting each of them. Thus, a high number of participants will very probably have an impact on the amount of just satisfaction to be awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Such an approach is based on the fact that the number of individuals participating in common proceedings before the domestic courts is not neutral from the perspective of the non-pecuniary damage that may be sustained by each of them as a result of the length of those proceedings when compared with the non-pecuniary damage that would be sustained by an individual who had brought identical proceedings on an individual basis. Membership of a group of people who have resolved to apply to a court on the same factual or legal basis means that both the advantages and disadvantages of common proceedings will be shared (see Arvanitaki-Roboti and Others v. Greece [GC], no.\u00a027278\/03, \u00a7\u00a029, 15 February 2008).<\/p>\n
81.\u00a0\u00a0It should also be reiterated that the Court enjoys a certain discretion in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 41, as is borne out by the adjective \u201cjust\u201d and the phrase \u201cif necessary\u201d (see Guzzardi v.\u00a0Italy, 6\u00a0November 1980, \u00a7 114, Series A no. 39). That being the case, and unless it concludes that the finding of a violation provides sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained, the Court must ensure that the amount awarded is reasonable in terms of the seriousness of the violation that is found. In particular, in its assessment, it must take account of the amounts already awarded in similar cases, and, in the event of common proceedings, account of the number of applicants and the total sum awarded to them (see Arvanitaki-Roboti and Others, cited above, \u00a7 32). Given the Court\u2019s principal task, namely securing respect for human rights, rather than compensating applicants\u2019 losses minutely and exhaustively, in cases involving a significant number of victims placed in a similar situation, a uniform approach is to be adopted (see Gaglione and Others v.\u00a0Italy, nos.\u00a045867\/07 and 474 others, \u00a7\u00a7 67-68, 21 December 2010).<\/p>\n
82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the ambit of the domestic proceedings, the applicants were all pursuing the same objective, namely obtaining a rise in the value of the land of company F. and thus increasing the prospects of their recovering what they were owed (see paragraph 8 above). The shared objective of the impugned proceedings was such as to alleviate the inconvenience and uncertainty experienced on account of their delay(see, mutatis mutandis, Arvanitaki-Roboti and Others, cited above, \u00a7 34, and, a\u00a0contrario,Belev and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 16354\/02 and 40 others, \u00a7\u00a0112, 2 April 2009, where the applicants were not parties in common proceedings, but had lodged distinct and separate judicial claims).<\/p>\n
83.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the present case should be distinguished from those in which, instead of acting on their own behalf in judicial proceedings, affected individuals establish a legal entity to do so, a fact which can justify not taking into account the interests of individual members of the association when determining the amount of just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage caused by the excessive length of civil proceedings (see, a contrario, Dru\u0161tvoZaVarstvoUpnikov v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 66433\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a054-64, 21 November 2017, where an association, and not individual creditors, brought an action against a company which had failed to meet its contractual obligations). Moreover, what was at stake for the applicants in the impugned proceedings, namely the recovery of what they were owed in respect of their work, was such as to exacerbate the prejudice sustained by them on account of the protracted nature of the proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Arvanitaki-Roboti and Others, cited above, \u00a7 35).<\/p>\n
84.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the extension of the impugned proceedings beyond a \u201creasonable time\u201d undoubtedly caused the applicants non-pecuniary damage which would justify an award. It also takes into consideration the number of applicants, the nature of the violation found, and the need to determine the amount in such a way that the overall sum is compatible with the relevant case-law and is reasonable in the light of what was at stake in the proceedings in question(see, mutatis mutandis, Arvanitaki-Roboti and Others, cited above, \u00a7 36). On the basis of the above considerations, and ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards EUR 500 to each of the applicants under this head (see, mutatis mutandis, Gaglione and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-70),as detailed in the appended table (account being taken of the fact that when several heirs are continuing an application on behalf of a deceased applicant, the amount shall be paid jointly).<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/p>\n
85.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant,Ms Maria de Lurdes Ferreira de Matos Oliveira Modesto, also claimed EUR 2,011.14 for costs and expenses incurred in presenting the applicants\u2019 case before the Court.<\/p>\n
86.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim.<\/p>\n
87.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.<\/p>\n
88.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers that the sum claimed should be awarded in full.<\/p>\n
C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/p>\n
89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that the applicants\u2019 heirs identified in the appended table have standing to continue the present proceedings in the stead of the deceased applicants;<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the application inadmissible in so far as it has been lodged by Ms Rosa Rodrigues Casal;<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the remainder of the application admissible;<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n
5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n
(a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts:<\/p>\n
(i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 500 (fivehundredeuros)to each of the applicants, or EUR\u00a0500 (five hundred euros) jointly to the heirs of the late applicants who continued the proceedings before the Court in their stead, as detailed in the appended table,plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage:<\/p>\n
(ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 2,011.14 (two thousand eleven euros and fourteen cents) to the first applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the first applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n
6.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n
Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 January 2019, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n
Andrea Tamietti\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Egidijus K\u016bris
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
ANNEX<\/p>\n
No.<\/strong><\/td>\n| Applicant reference number<\/strong><\/td>\n | Applicantname<\/strong><\/td>\n | Date of birth and<\/strong><\/p>\n | Residence<\/strong><\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CARREGAL<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n EIXO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n S. BERNARDO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n COSTA DO VALADO<\/td>\n ESTARREJA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n SANTA JOANA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n ANGEJA<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n MAMODEIRO<\/td>\n MAMODEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n LUXEMBOURG<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n GAFANHA DA NAZAR\u00c9<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n EIXO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n \u00d3IS DA RIBEIRA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n OLIVEIRINHA<\/td>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n EIXO<\/td>\n OVAR<\/td>\n LOURE<\/td>\n \u00c1GUEDA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n OI\u00c3<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n S. BERNARDO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ANGEJA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ALBERGARIA-A-VELHA<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ALBERGARIA-A-VELHA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AZURVA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n S. BERNARDO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n FERMEL\u00c3<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n FERMEL\u00c3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n FERMEL\u00c3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n The applicants intervene in their capacity as heirs of Mr Manuel Martins Pinho, who died on 31\u00a0August 2008.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n <\/p>\n The applicant Ms Maria Vit\u00f3riaBranco Rodrigues da Rocha (no. 130) died while the application was pending before the Court. Mr Ant\u00f3nio Manuel da Rocha Tavares Teixeira (applicant no. 131) isheronlyheir.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n TheapplicantMr Ant\u00f3nio Manuel da Rocha Tavares Teixeira thereforeintervenes in hisowncapacity as heir of Mr Ant\u00f3nio Tavares Teixeira andpursuestheapplication in thestead of Ms Maria Vit\u00f3ria Branco Rodrigues da Rocha.<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ANGEJA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n GERMANY<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ESTARREJA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ESTARREJA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n FERMEL\u00c3<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ANDORRE<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n GAFANHA DA NAZAR\u00c9<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n GAFANHA DA NAZAR\u00c9<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AZURVA<\/td>\n ANGEJA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n CANAD\u00c1<\/td>\n FERMEL\u00c3<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ESTARREJA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ALBERGARIA-A-VELHA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n SEVER DO VOUGA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n MIRA<\/td>\n SUISSE<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n S. JO\u00c3O DO ESTORIL<\/td>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n CACIA<\/td>\n OLIVEIRINHA<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n ALBERGARIA-A-VELHA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n OLIVEIRINHA<\/td>\n GAFANHA DA NAZAR\u00c9<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n GAFANHA DA NAZAR\u00c9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n S\u00c3O BERNARDO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n S\u00c3O BERNARDO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n VAGOS<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n VAGOS<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n <\/p>\n The applicant Ms L\u00eddia Lopes (no. 226) died while the application was pending before the Court. Mr Jorge Manuel Lopes Bastos and Ms Olga Maria Lopes Bastos (applicants nos.\u00a0227 and 228) are her only heirs.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The applicants Mr Jorge Manuel Lopes Bastos and Ms Olga Maria Lopes Bastos therefore intervene in their own capacity as heirs of Mr Carlos Ant\u00f3nio Lopes Bastos and pursue the application in the stead of Ms\u00a0L\u00eddia Lopes.<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n ILHAVO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n OI\u00c3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Mr J\u00falio Jos\u00e9 da Cruz Sim\u00f5es, Ms Maria Jos\u00e9 da Cruz Sim\u00f5es Ventura, Mr Jo\u00e3o Jos\u00e9 das Neves Ferreira, Ms Joana Silva Ferreira, andMr Jo\u00e3o Pedro Silva Ferreira, heirs of theapplicants, pursuetheapplication in theirstead.<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n S. JO\u00c3O DE LOURE<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n S. JO\u00c3O DE LOURE<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n <\/p>\n The applicants Ms Maria da Soledade Freire Pinto Nogueira and Mr Jorge Alberto Pinto Nogueira (nos. 237 and 239) died while the application was pending before the Court.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Ms Deolinda Maria Pinto Nogueira (applicant no. 238), Ms B\u00e1rbara Esteves Nogueira, andMs Cristiana Jorge de Figueiredo Nogueira are theonlyheirs of thedeceasedapplicants. They therefore intervene in their own capacity as heirs of Mr Jorge Marques Nogueira and pursue the application in the stead of Ms Maria da Soledade Freire Pinto Nogueira and Mr Jorge Alberto Pinto Nogueira.<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n EIXO<\/td>\n (jointly)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n AVEIRO<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<\/table>\n |