THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF MIRKOVI\u0106 AND OTHERS v. SERBIA
\n(Applications nos. 27471\/15 and 12 others \u2013 see appended list)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nThis version was rectified on 13 November 2018 under Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
\nSTRASBOURG
\n26 June 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n03\/12\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Mirkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Helena J\u00e4derblom, President, Having deliberated in private on 5 June 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in thirteen separate applications against Serbia (nos.\u00a027471\/15, 27288\/15, 27751\/15, 27779\/15, 27790\/15, 28156\/15, 28418\/15, 30893\/15, 30906\/15, 32933\/15, 35780\/15, 40646\/15 and 55066\/15) lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by eighteen Serbian nationals.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0A list of applicants, as well as their additional personal details, the dates of introduction of their complaints before the Court, and information regarding their legal representation is set out in the appendix. Applications nos. 30906\/15, 32933\/15 and 40646\/15 have two, three and three applicants, respectively.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The Serbian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms N. Plav\u0161i\u0107.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Alleging rejections of their civil claims by the domestic courts and the simultaneous acceptance of identical claims lodged by other claimants, the applicantscomplain that there have beenbreaches of their right tolegal certainty. Relying on essentially the same facts, they also allege violations of their right to a fair trial, their righttopeaceful enjoyment of their possessions, and violations of the prohibition on discrimination.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 30\u00a0August 2016 the applications were communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Background to the cases<\/em><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were all employees of the Ministry of Justice\u2019s directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions in Serbia. Because of the hardships prison staff endure during service at penal institutions in Serbia, Serbian law providesthat they are eligible for certain employment benefits, such as benefits concerning the calculation of their old-age pensions and salary increases.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0In general, pension and work-related issues in Serbia are regulated by two laws: 1) the Old-Age Pension and Disability Insurance Act (Zakon o\u00a0penzionom i invalidskom osiguranju, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 34\/2003, as amended); and 2) the Labour Act (Zakon o radu, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 24\/2005, as amended). However, in regards to employees of correctional facilities, pension and work-related issues are also regulated by: 1) the Execution of Criminal Sanctions Act (Zakon o izvr\u0161enju krivi\u010dnih sankcija, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia -OG RS- no.\u00a085\/2005, amendments published in the Official Gazette no. 72\/2009); and 2)\u00a0the Directive on personal coefficients for the calculation and payment of salaries to individuals employed within the Ministry of Justice\u2019s directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions (Uredba o koeficijentima za obra\u010dun i isplatu plata u Upravi za izvr\u0161enje krivi\u010dnih sankcija, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia -OG RS- no.\u00a016\/2007, amendments published in the Official Gazette nos.\u00a021\/2009, 1\/2011 \u2013 Constitutional Court decision (implementing decision of the Constitutional Court of 18\u00a0November 2010), 83\/2011 and 102\/2011 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe\u00a0Directive\u201d).<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 262 of the Execution of Criminal Sanctions Act, the director and other employees of the directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions are entitled to an accelerated accumulation of pension rights: this means that twelve months of full-time employment is counted as sixteen months of full-time employment in the civilian economy when their old-age pensions are calculated. Also, the personal coefficient of employees in correctional facilities may, according to the said Article, be increased by up to 30%. The posts to which the accelerated accumulation of pension rights applies are determined by the minister responsible for the judiciary and the minister responsible for pension and disability insurance.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Article\u00a07\u00a7\u00a03 of the Directive, in the period between 1\u00a0January 2007 and 14\u00a0January 2011 the personal coefficients of the applicants and their colleagues were increased by 10% instead of 30% as provided by the Execution of Criminal Sanctions Act.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 18\u00a0November2010, the Constitutional Court adopted a decision (no. IU 63\/2007) stating that Article\u00a07\u00a7\u00a03 of the Directive was unconstitutional. The said Article was struck down. The amendments to the Directive entered into force on 14\u00a0January 2011. As of 14\u00a0January 2011 the personal coefficients were increased by 30%.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0Between 1\u00a0January 2007 and 14\u00a0January 2011, while this unconstitutional norm (neustavna odredba) was in force, the employees of the Ministry of Justice\u2019s directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions received lower salaries that they had been entitled to. For that reason, their old-age pensionswere also reduced.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant circumstances of the cases<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Judgments of thecourts of first instance and courts of appeal<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0Throughout 2011, 2012 and 2013 the applicants,as well as many of their colleagues, lodged with various courts of first instance (osnovni sudovi) separate civil claims against the Republic of Serbia, asking for compensationfor the damage caused while the four-year-long unconstitutional norm pertained.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0Some of the courtsof first instance upheld the claimants\u2019applications for compensation, while others dismissed them. Decisions of the courts of first instance were appealed against either by claimants or the defendant.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0Certain claimants were successful before the courts of appeal; yet all the applicants were unsuccessful. In particular, the applicants\u2019complaints were rejected by the courts of appeal in Belgrade and Kragujevac for the applicants\u2019 failure to pursue the proper avenue of redress. In the view of these courts the applicants should have first initiated administrative proceedings and afterwards lodged a complaint with the civil courts. In any event, the Belgrade and Kragujevac Courts of Appeal also held that they did not have jurisdiction to decide on the applicants\u2019 cases.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0In contrast, in the following cases other courts of appeal or chambers thereof ruled in favour of the applicants\u2019 colleagues:<\/p>\n 1)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Kragujevac Court of Appeal (for example: decisions nos.\u00a0G\u017e1.\u00a043\/11 of 15\u00a0March 2011 and G\u017e1. 3034\/14 of 2\u00a0October 2014);<\/p>\n 2)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Ni\u0161 Court of Appeal (for example: G\u017e1. 2444\/13 of 27\u00a0December 2013);<\/p>\n 3)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Novi Sad Court of Appeal (for example: G\u017e1. 3549\/13 of 24\u00a0December 2013 and G\u017e1. 2379\/14 of 7\u00a0November 2014).<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0In theabove-mentioned decisions the courts of appeal upheld the claimants\u2019 requests,stating that the applicants\u2019 colleaguesshould be paid thedifferences in their salaries together with interest on the unpaid amounts, and the contributions in respect of the their old-age pensions, for the period during the which unconstitutional norm had been applied.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation (Vrhovni kasacioni sud)no.\u00a0Rev.2 393\/2013 of 26\u00a0September\u00a02013<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0Given the differences in adjudication on the matter, on 27\u00a0March\u00a02013 the Novi Sad Court of Appealrequested,in accordance with Article\u00a0395 of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parni\u010dnom postupku, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia \u2013 OG RS \u2013 125\/04 and 111\/2009),that the Supreme Court of Cassationamend its judgment no. G\u017e1-2352\/12 of 12\u00a0December 2012 and harmonise the case-law of the courts of appeal in matters concerning the payment of the differences between the salariesclaimants had received and those they had been entitled to.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 26\u00a0September 2013, in response to the said request, the Supreme Court of Cassation found,acting in accordance with Articles\u00a0395 and\u00a0399 of the Civil Procedure Act, that there was an interest of general concern to deal with this issue. It held that the Novi Sad Court of Appeal in delivering the judgment of 12\u00a0December\u00a02012 had incorrectly applied and interpreted domestic law. The Supreme Court of Cassation held that the judgment should have been rendered in the claimant\u2019s favour and, accordingly, set the judgment of the Novi Sad Court of Appeal aside.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0After the impugned decision, the Courts of Appeal in Novi Sad, Ni\u0161 and Kragujevac assumed the following approach:<\/p>\n \u201c…asthe Supreme Court of Cassation explicitly stated in its decisions nos. Rev.2 br. 393\/2013 of 26\u00a0September 2013 and Rev. br. 983\/2012 of 26\u00a0September 2013, State organs [were engaging in what had to be considered] unlawful work, as the Constitutional Court failed to adopt a decision [regarding] in which manner the consequences of the unconstitutional norm should have been overcome[, and] the Government of the Republic of Serbia, as the regulatory authority, within the scope of their jurisdiction did not secure the execution of the impugned decision of the Constitutional Court concerning the disputed period during which the claimant\u2019s salary was unconstitutionally and illegally reduced, the claimant had a right to lodge a claim for compensation for damage with the civil courts, and the civil courts are in charge of deciding on the matter in accordance with Article 1 of the Civil Procedure Act.\u201d (cited from the judgment no. G\u017e1. 2444\/13 of 27\u00a0December 2013, p.\u00a04)<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0Decisions of the Constitutional Court<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0In the period between 26\u00a0September 2012 and 13\u00a0May 2014 the applicants appealed to the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0They complained, inter alia, of the inconsistent domestic case-law of the Serbian courts which had caused the rejection of their claims and the simultaneous acceptance of identical claims lodged by their colleagues. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention or Articles\u00a032 and\u00a036 of the Constitution (provisions that correspond to Article\u00a06 of the Convention) the applicants askedthe Constitutional Court to find that there had been a breach of the principle of legal certainty as an integral part of the right to a fair trial.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0Between 23\u00a0October\u00a02014 and 25\u00a0March\u00a02015, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeals as unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Specific circumstances of each applicant\u2019s case<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0The facts relating to each applicant may be summarised as follows:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a027471\/15 (Ms\u00a0Aleksandra Mirkovi\u0107 \u2013 the first applicant)<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the first applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 20\u00a0December 2011 she lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court (Prvi op\u0161tinski sud) in Belgrade asking for payment of the difference between the salary she had received and the one she hadbeen entitled to.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 3\u00a0June 2013 the first-instance court rejected her claim. On 3\u00a0October\u00a02013 the Belgrade Court of Appeal upheld that judgment following an appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 25\u00a0November\u00a02013 complaining, inter alia, of the existence of inconsistent domestic case-law of Serbian courts, in particular the rejection of her own claim and the simultaneous acceptance of identical claims lodged by her colleagues, and asked the Constitutional Court to find that there had been a breach of the principle of judicial certainty as an integral part of her right to a fair trial. She provided the Constitutional Court with copies of several judgments in support of her allegation regarding the inconsistent case-law.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On 12\u00a0June\u00a02014 she provided the Constitutional Court with the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September 2013.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0October\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal and decided not to evaluatethe decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September 2013 because it had been adopted after the judgment of the Belgrade Court of Appeal of 3\u00a0October\u00a02013 had been adopted in the applicant\u2019s case (Ustavni sud nije posebno cenio imaju\u0107i u vidu da ona poti\u010de iz perioda nakon dono\u0161enja osporene presude Apelacionog suda u Beogradu G\u017d1\u00a0556\/13 od 3.\u00a0oktobra\u00a02013. godine.)<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a027288\/15 (Ms\u00a0Biljana Sari\u0107 \u2013 the second applicant)<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the second applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20\u00a0December 2011 she lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. Her complaint was rejected on 8\u00a0February 2013. The judgmentof the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 15\u00a0May\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0On 24\u00a0July 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She amended her appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September 2013 on 12\u00a0June\u00a02014.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0October\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a027751\/15 (Ms\u00a0Sanja Popovi\u0107-Radivojevi\u010b \u2013 the third applicant)<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the third applicant was an employee of Juvenile Detention Centre (Kazneno-popravni zavod za maloletnike) in Valjevo. On an unspecified date in 2011, she lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Valjevo. On 16\u00a0March\u00a02012 the Basic Court ruled in her favour. This judgment was overturned by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 15\u00a0August\u00a02012.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 26\u00a0September\u00a02012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She provided the Constitutional Court with the copy of one relevant judgment in which the Kragujevac Court of Appeal had accepted asimilar claim to her own.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0October\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected her appeal for failure to adequately substantiate her complaint. In particular it held that one relevant judgment submitted by the applicant could not amountto proof of either profound or long-standing differences in the adjudication of the courts\u2019 ruling at final instance in cases similar to the applicant\u2019s.<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a027779\/15 (Mr\u00a0Branislav Markovi\u0107 \u2013 the fourth applicant)<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the fourth applicant was an employee of the prison in Po\u017earevac-Zabela (Kazneno-popravni zavod Po\u017earevac-Zabela). On 14\u00a0July 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. On 8\u00a0February\u00a02012 the Basic Court ruled in his favour. This judgmentwas overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 29\u00a0August\u00a02012.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0On 13\u00a0November\u00a02012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal,alleging a violation of his right to a fair trial. He failed to provide the Constitutional Court with copies of any of the judgments in which the civil courts had allegedly accepted claims similarto his own.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0October\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n (e)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a027790\/15 (Ms\u00a0Milica Bogi\u0107evi\u0107 \u2013 the fifth applicant)<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the fifth applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20\u00a0December\u00a02011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. On 23\u00a0January\u00a02013 the First Basic Court ruled in her favour. This judgmentwas overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 19\u00a0March\u00a02014.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0On 13\u00a0May\u00a02014 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She provided the Constitutional court with the copy of one relevant judgment in which the Novi Sad Court of Appeal had accepted a claim similarto her own.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0October\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected her appeal for the same reason as in the case of the third applicant.<\/p>\n (f)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no. 27288\/15 (Ms\u00a0Gordana Maslovari\u0107 \u2013 the sixth applicant)<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the sixth applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20\u00a0December\u00a02011 she lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. Her complaint was rejected on 25\u00a0December\u00a02012. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 20\u00a0March\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0On 17\u00a0May\u00a02013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She amended her appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September\u00a02013 on 12\u00a0June\u00a02014.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0On 30\u00a0October\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.<\/p>\n (g)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a028418\/15 (Mr\u00a0Velimir Vidi\u0107 \u2013 the seventh applicant)<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the seventh applicant was an employee of Penitentiary institutionin Belgrade-Padinska Skela (Kazneno-popravni zavod u Beogradu \u2013 Padinska Skela) and the prison in Po\u017earevac-Zabela. On 30\u00a0November\u00a02011 he lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. His complaint was rejected on 3\u00a0December\u00a02012. The judgmentof the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 1\u00a0March\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0On 16\u00a0May\u00a02013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He amended his appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September\u00a02013 on 21\u00a0March\u00a02014.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0October\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.<\/p>\n (h)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a030893\/15 (Mr\u00a0Neboj\u0161a Nejkovi\u0107 \u2013 the eighth applicant)<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the eighth applicant was an employee of the prison in Po\u017earevac-Zabela. On an unspecified date in 2013 he lodged a\u00a0civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. His complaint was rejected on 21\u00a0August\u00a02013. Thejudgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 30\u00a0October\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0On 10\u00a0December\u00a02013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He amended his appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September 2013 on 27\u00a0February\u00a02014.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0On 13\u00a0November\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a030906\/15 (Ms\u00a0Aleksandra Pe\u0161i\u0107 \u2013 the ninth applicant; and Ms\u00a0Jelena Jevremovi\u0107 \u2013 the tenth applicant)<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the ninth and the tenth applicants were employees of Penitentiary institutionin Po\u017earevac (Kazneno-popravni zavod za \u017eene). On an unspecified date in 2011, the applicants lodged a joint civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. On\u00a013 January 2012 the Basic Court ruled in their favour. This judgmentwas overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 4\u00a0April 2013.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0On 21\u00a0May 2013 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. They amended the appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September 2013 on 27\u00a0February\u00a02014.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0October\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.<\/p>\n (j)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a032933\/15<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0Mr\u00a0\u017deljko Gradi\u0161ka \u2013 the eleventh applicant<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the eleventh applicant was an employee of the women\u2019s prison in Po\u017earevac. On an unspecified date in 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. On 24\u00a0February 2012 the Basic Court ruled in his favour. This judgmentwas overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 16\u00a0October\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0On 10\u00a0December\u00a02013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He subsequently amended the appeal with the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September 2013.<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal because in itsview the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation could not have been considered as proof of inconsistent case-law of courtsruling at final instance (revizijsko re\u0161enje ne mo\u017ee biti dokaz o razli\u010ditom postupanju sudova najvi\u0161e instance).<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0Mr\u00a0Milan Vu\u010di\u0107evi\u0107 \u2013 the twelfth applicant<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the twelfth applicant was an employee of the prison in Po\u017earevac-Zabela. On an unspecified date in 2012, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. His complaint was rejected on 2\u00a0October\u00a02012. Thejudgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 22\u00a0November\u00a02012.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0On 15\u00a0January\u00a02013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He failed to provide the Constitutional Court with copies of any of the judgments in which the civil courts at final instance had allegedly accepted claims similarto his own.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0March\u00a02015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated. The Constitutional Court failed to separately address his complaint concerning the divergent case-law.<\/p>\n (iii)\u00a0\u00a0Mr\u00a0Dra\u0161ko Veljkovi\u0107 \u2013 the thirteenth applicant<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the thirteenth applicant was an employee of Kraljevo District Prison (Okru\u017eni zatvor u Kraljevu). On an unspecified date in 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Kraljevo. On 23\u00a0December\u00a02011 the Basic Court ruled in his favour. This judgmentwas overturned by Kragujevac Court of Appeal on 12\u00a0March\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0On 13\u00a0May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On several occasions, between 30 December\u00a02013 and 19\u00a0August\u00a02014, he amended the appeal,adding copies of afew other judgments in which the civil courts at final instance had accepted claims similarto his own, and adding the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0October\u00a02014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.<\/p>\n (k)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a035780\/15 (Ms\u00a0Branislava Stojanovi\u0107 \u2013 the fourteenth applicant)<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the fourteenth applicant was an employee ofthe women\u2019s prison in Po\u017earevac. On an unspecified date in 2012 she lodged a\u00a0civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. Her complaint was rejected on 22\u00a0May\u00a02012. Thejudgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 13\u00a0September\u00a02012.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0On 22\u00a0October\u00a02012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She subsequently amended the appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September 2013.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0On 29\u00a0January\u00a02015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.<\/p>\n (l)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a040646 (Ms\u00a0Nevenka Bijeli\u0107 \u2013 the fifteenth applicant; Ms\u00a0Vesna Vulevi\u0107 \u2013 the sixteenth applicant; and Ms\u00a0Zorica Jovanovi\u0107 \u2013 the seventeenth applicant)<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the fifteenth, the sixteenth and the seventeenth applicants were employees of thewomen\u2019s prison in Po\u017earevac. On an unspecified date in 2012, the applicants lodged a joint civil claim with the Basic Court in Po\u017earevac. Their complaint was rejected on 29\u00a0May\u00a02013. The judgmentof the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 11\u00a0September\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0On 16\u00a0October\u00a02013 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. They subsequently amended the appeal, adding copies of a few other judgments in which the civil courts ruling at final instance had accepted claims similar to their own, and adding the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013.<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0On 11\u00a0February\u00a02015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.<\/p>\n (m)\u00a0\u00a0As regards application no.\u00a055066\/15 (Mr\u00a0Dejan Stepanovi\u0107 \u2013 the eighteenth applicant)<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0At the relevant time, the eighteenth applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20\u00a0December 2011 he lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. His complaint was rejected on 26\u00a0February\u00a02013. Thejudgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 5\u00a0June\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 August\u00a02013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He amended hisappeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 12\u00a0June\u00a02014.<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0On 25\u00a0March\u00a02015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parni\u010dnom postupku \u2013 published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia nos.\u00a0125\/04 and 111\/2009)<\/strong><\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0The Civil Procedure Act was in force from 22\u00a0February\u00a02005 until 1\u00a0February\u00a02012 (hereinafter\u00a0\u201cthe former Civil Procedure Act\u201d). However, in accordance with Article\u00a0506 \u00a7\u00a01 of the new Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parni\u010dnom postupku, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia nos.\u00a072\/2011, 49\/2013 \u2013Constitutional Court decision, 74\/2013 \u2013Constitutional Court decision 55\/2014\u2013 hereinafter:\u00a0\u201cthe new Civil Procedure Act\u201d) provisions of the former Civil Procedure Act are applicable to all proceedings which commenced before the new Civil Procedure Actentered into force.<\/p>\n Article\u00a01<\/p>\n \u201cThis Act shall govern the rules of proceedings for providing legal protection of the court applied in acting and adjudicating upon civil-law disputes arising from personal, family, labour, business, property and other civil legal relations, with and exception of the disputes in respect of which another type of proceedings is provided in accordance with the specific law.\u201d<\/p>\n Article\u00a0395<\/p>\n \u201cExceptionally, an appeal on points of law shall be permitted against a second-instance decision which is not liable to an appeal on points of law under the provisions referred to in Article\u00a0394 of this Law, if, in the assessment of the Court of Appeal on the admissibility of an appeal on points of law, this is required to examine legal issues in the common interest, achieve uniformity of application of the law in court judgments, or when a new legal interpretation is required.\u201d<\/p>\n Article\u00a0399<\/p>\n \u201cThe court of revision (revizijski sud) shall examine solely the part of a judgment contested by the application for an appeal on points of law and within the limits of the reasons stated in the appeal on points of law, and shall, of their own motion, take due care of a substantial violation of the civil-procedure rules pursuant to Article\u00a0361, paragraph\u00a02, subparagraph\u00a09 of this Act, and about the correct application of the law.\u201d<\/p>\n Article\u00a0407<\/p>\n \u201c(1) If the court of revision establishes that substantive law was applied incorrectly, it shall render a judgment granting an application for review and reverse the contested judgment.<\/p>\n (2) If the court of revision finds that the facts were established incompletely owing to incorrect application of substantive law, and consequently no grounds for the contested judgment to be reversed existed, it shall render a ruling to grant an application for review and, entirely or partially, and set aside the judgments of a court of first instance and a court of second instance, or solely the judgment of a former. The Supreme Court of Cassation shall consequently refer the case for retrial to the same or another court chamber of the court of first instance, or of the court of second instance, or another competent court.\u201d<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parni\u010dnom postupku \u2013 published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia nos.\u00a072\/2011, 49\/2013 \u2013 Constitutional Court decision, 74\/2013 \u2013 Constitutional Court decision, 55\/2014)<\/strong><\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0The new Civil Procedure Act has been in force since 1\u00a0February\u00a02012. It applies to all proceedings which commenced after its entry into force, or to proceedings which were reopened after its entry into force. The relevant provisions read as follows:<\/p>\n Article\u00a0404<\/p>\n \u201cAn appeal on points of law shall exceptionally be permitted in theevent of a\u00a0wrongful implementation of substantive law and against a second-instance judgment which could not be disputed by an appeal on points of law if, according to the estimates of the Supreme Court of Cassation, it would be necessary to consider legal issues of general interest or legal issues in the interest of equal rights of citizens, for the purpose of the harmonisation of domestic case-law, as well as, if necessary, for the purpose of providing a new interpretation of law (special appeal on points of law)[posebna revizija].<\/p>\n The Supreme Court of Cassation shall decide on the admissibility and legitimacy of an appeal on points of law from paragraph 1 hereof by deliberating in a panel of five judges.\u201d<\/p>\n Article\u00a0408<\/p>\n \u201cThe Supreme Court of Cassation shall examine solely the part of a judgment contested by the application for an appeal on points of law and within the limits of the reasons stated in the appeal on points of law, and shall, of their own motion, pay due attention to a substantial violation of the civil-procedure rules pursuant to Article\u00a0374, paragraph\u00a02, subparagraph\u00a02 of this Act, and about the correct application of the law. \u201c<\/p>\n Article\u00a0426<\/p>\n \u201cThe proceedings in which a final decision was adopted by a court may be opened for a retrial following an application by a party if: …<\/p>\n 11) the party has an opportunity to make use of a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in which a violation of human rights, relevant to the more favourable outcome of proceedings, is found<\/p>\n 12) the Constitutional Court, while deciding on a constitutional appeal, finds a\u00a0violation or denial of a human or minority right or a freedom guaranteed by the Constitution in the civil proceedings, and that might be relevant for a more favourable outcome.\u201d<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Courts Organisation Act (Zakon o ure\u0111enju sudova \u2013 published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia \u2013 OG RS \u2013 nos.\u00a0116\/2008, 104\/2009, 101\/2010, 31\/2011 \u2013 other law, 78\/2011 \u2013 other law, 101\/2011, 101\/2013, 106\/2015, 40\/2015 \u2013 other law, 13\/2016 and 108\/16)<\/strong><\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0TheCourts Organisation Act was enacted in 2008 and came into force on 1\u00a0January\u00a02010.This Act regulates the judicial system in the Republic of Serbia, as well as the organisation, competence and jurisdiction of the courts.<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The Supreme Court of Cassation has its seat in Belgrade, and as set out in Articles\u00a030 and\u00a031 of the Courts Organisation Act it: i) decides on extraordinary legal remedies lodged against decisions of courts of the Republic of Serbia; ii) decides on conflicts of jurisdiction between courts if this does not fall under the jurisdiction of any other court as well as on transfers of jurisdictions of the courts; iii) determines general legal views in order to ensure the uniform application of law; iv) evaluates the application of the laws and other regulations, as well as the work of courts; v)\u00a0appoints judges of the Constitutional Court, provides opinions on candidates for the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation; and vi)\u00a0exercise other competences set forth in the Act.<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0As provided in Article\u00a043 of the Act, the Supreme Court of Cassation must holddepartmental meetings of the Supreme Court of Cassation (sednice odeljenja Vrhovnog kasacionog suda) where the issues arising from the scope of work of different courts\u2019 departments are analysed. The departmental meetings of the Supreme Court of Cassation are, in particular, convened when an issue of inconsistency of domestic case-law appears. Legal opinions (pravna shvatanja) adopted at those meeting are binding for all chambers (ve\u0107a) of the relevant court\u2019departments.<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0Rules of Court (Sudski poslovnik \u2013 published inthe Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia \u2013 OG RS \u2013 nos. 110\/2009, 70\/2011, 19\/2012, 89\/2013, 96\/2015, 104\/2015, 113\/2015 \u2013 addendum, 39\/2016, 56\/2016 and 77\/2016)<\/strong><\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0Articles\u00a027, 28, 29 and 31 provide, inter alia, that: (i) courts with a larger number of judges may have case-law departments entrusted with the monitoring of relevant domestic and international case-law; (ii) courts must keep a register of all legal opinions which are deemed to be of significance for case-law; (iii) courts of appeal may hold joint consultations on case-law related issues, including with the Supreme Court of Cassation; and (iv) the case-law departments shall prepare proposals for judges\u2019 plenary sessions with a view to securing harmonisation of the relevant case-law.<\/p>\n E.\u00a0\u00a0Constitutional Court Act (Zakon o Ustavnom sudu – published in Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia nos. 109\/07, 99\/2011, 18\/13-decision of the Constitutional Court, 40\/15 and 103\/15)<\/strong><\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0Article\u00a085 \u00a7\u00a02 provides that appellants should substantiate their constitutional appeals with any and all evidence of relevance for the determination of their case, provide a copy of the impugned decision, and document that all other effective remedies have already been exhausted.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant decisions of the Supreme Court of Cassation<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation no. Rev2\u00a0400\/2015 \/ R\u017e\u00a0134\/2015 of 2\u00a0April\u00a02015<\/em><\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0On 2\u00a0April 2015 the Supreme Court of Cassation overturnedjudgmentno.\u00a0G\u017e1-2008\/13 of the Belgrade Court of Appeal of 20\u00a0March\u00a02013 and ruled in favour of the claimant in a matter concerning the payment of the difference between the value of the received and anticipated salaries.It held that, while delivering the judgment of 20\u00a0March\u00a02013,the Belgrade Court of Appeal had incorrectly applied and interpreted domestic law.<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0The Supreme Court of Cassationacted by virtue of Articles\u00a0395 and\u00a0399 of the former Civil Procedure Act; those were the provisions the Supreme Court of Cassation used when a need to harmonise case-law of the courts of appeal arose.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation no. Rev2\u00a0381\/2016 of 17\u00a0March\u00a02016<\/em><\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0Acting under Article\u00a0404 of the new Civil Procedure Act and with the purpose of harmonising the inconsistency in the domestic case-law, on 17\u00a0March\u00a02016 the Supreme Court of Cassation overturned judgment no.\u00a0G\u017e1 3851\/2014 of the Belgrade Court of Appeal of 30\u00a0October 2015 in which the complaint of a certain J.T. concerning the payment of the difference between hisanticipated and received salaries was rejected. The Supreme Court of Cassationfound that the judgment should have been rendered in the claimant\u2019s favour.<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0The case was remitted to the Belgrade Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation no. Rev2\u00a01383\/2016 of 21\u00a0July\u00a02016<\/em><\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0Acting under Article\u00a0404 of the new Civil Procedure Act and with the purpose of harmonising the inconsistency in the domestic case-law, on 21\u00a0July\u00a02016 the Supreme Court of Cassation overturned judgment no.\u00a0G\u017e1 2644\/2015 of the Belgrade Court of Appeal of 25\u00a0November\u00a02015 and judgment no. P1\u00a05570\/11 of the Court of First Instance in Belgrade of 26\u00a0May\u00a02014 in which the complaint of a certain R.R. concerning the payment of the difference between the anticipatedand received salaries was rejected. The Supreme Court of Cassation found that the judgments should have been rendered in the claimant\u2019s favour.<\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0The case was remitted to the court of first instance.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Decision of the Constitutional Court of 13\u00a0January\u00a02016<\/strong><\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0On 13\u00a0January 2016 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to a fair trial in a case with facts similar to the applicants\u2019. In particular, it found that because of the inconsistent domestic case-law in regards to the payment of damages for the delayed payment of the same salary increase granted to employees of correctional facilities, the right to a\u00a0fair trial of a certain D.B. had been violated.<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0D.B had been an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital (Specijalna zatvorska bolnica Beograd). On 19\u00a0September\u00a02013 the Belgrade Court of Appeal had rejected D.B.\u2019s appeal. On 21\u00a0October\u00a02013 D.B. had lodged a constitutional appeal (U\u017e-8442\/2013).<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0D.B. hadbeen represented before thedomestic courts by the same lawyer who is representing the first, second, fifth, sixth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and eighteenthapplicants before this Court. D.B.\u2019s claims and appeals at the domestic level hadbeen the same as the claims and appeals of those applicants; the time-frame had also been the same. In the course of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, D.B. referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 2\u00a0April\u00a02015.<\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0Finding the violation of D.B.\u2019s right to legal certainty was an integral part of her right to fair trial, the Constitutional Court stated, in particular, that:<\/p>\n \u201c…the fact that the courts of last instance have been adopting discordant decisions while deciding on the same factual and legal issues has created a situation of legal uncertainty for the complainant. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view those circumstances are enough for the Constitutional Court to find a violation of the right to equal protection guaranteed under Article\u00a036 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Constitution.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in accordance with Rule\u00a042 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Rules of Court, the applications should be joined, given their similar factual and legal background.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 90.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the domestic courts\u2019 rejection of their civil claims and the simultaneous acceptance of identical claims lodged by other claimants had resulted in a breach of their rights guaranteed underArticle\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 and Article\u00a014 of the Convention, and Article\u00a01 of Protocol no.\u00a01 and Article\u00a01 of Protocol no.\u00a012 to the Convention. The Court, however, considers that the applications fall to be examined solely under Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, which in relevant part reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a\u00a0fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 91.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. Their arguments are fourfold:<\/p>\n Firstly,the Government asserted that making anapplication for reopening of proceedings on the grounds provided in Article\u00a0426 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(12) of the new Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph\u00a073 above) was an effective remedy in the applicants\u2019 situations. They pointed to the decision of the Constitutional Court of 13\u00a0January\u00a02016 (see paragraph\u00a085 above) in which a violation of an appellant\u2019s right to a fair trialhad been found in a case similar to the applicants\u2019. In accordance with Article\u00a0426 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(12) such a\u00a0decision, in the Government\u2019s view, hadconstituted relevant grounds for the reopening of proceedings;<\/p>\n Secondly, the Government claimed that the applicants had failed to make use of the appeal on points of law as provided for in Article\u00a0395 of the former Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph\u00a072 above). In their view,since this remedy had been effective in the cases of the applicants\u2019 colleagues, it was highly probable that had the applicants used it, they would have succeeded (see paragraphs\u00a017-18 and\u00a079-80 above);<\/p>\n Thirdly, the Government argued that the applicantshad failed to pursue an adequate avenue of redress in order to be successful in their claims for compensation. Specifically, the Government claimed that the applicants should have first initiated administrative proceedings and, if the outcome of those proceedingshad been unfavourable, lodgedcomplaints withthe civil courts (see paragraph\u00a014above);<\/p>\n Fourthly, the Government submitted that the applicants had failed to complain properly before the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n 92.\u00a0\u00a0In the alternative, the Government indicated, in respect of the fourth applicant, that in his constitutional appealhe had alleged a violation only of his right to a fair trial and, accordingly,had failed to raise the complaint concerning the violation of his right to legal certainty properly.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants<\/p>\n 93.\u00a0\u00a0All the applicants contested the Government\u2019s claims. They statedthat by lodging the compensation claims before the civil courtsthey had pursued an adequate avenue of redress.<\/p>\n 94.\u00a0\u00a0The first, second, third, fifth,sixth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and eighteenth applicants, also, disputed the Government\u2019s view about the effectiveness of anapplication for the reopening of proceedings.<\/p>\n 95.\u00a0\u00a0The seventh applicant contested the Government\u2019s allegation concerning the use of an appeal on points of law. He claimed that, as an extraordinary legal remedy, an appeal on points of lawcould not be deemed an effectiveremedy. Moreover, in accordance with Article\u00a0395 of the former Civil Procedure Actthe success of the said remedy depended on the positive assessment of the court of appeals; thosecourtshad in factalready taken a negative view on the applicant\u2019s request.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Relevant principles<\/p>\n 96.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the Court reiterates that under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention it may only deal with an application after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The purpose of Article\u00a035 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, for example, Mifsud v.\u00a0France (dec.) [GC], no.\u00a057220\/00, \u00a7\u00a015, ECHR 2002-VIII).<\/p>\n 97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos.\u00a017153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7\u00a071, 25\u00a0March 2014).<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Reopening of the proceedings<\/p>\n 98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment of an applicant\u2019s obligation to exhaust domestic remedies, including an application for the reopening of proceedings, is normally carried out with reference to the date on which the application was lodged with it (see, for example,Cvetkovi\u0107 v.\u00a0Serbia, no.\u00a017271\/04, \u00a7\u00a041, 10\u00a0June 2008). However, this rule is subject to exceptions, which may be justified by the particular circumstances of each case (compare and contrast Brusco v.\u00a0Italy (dec.), no.\u00a069789\/01, ECHR 2001\u2011IX).<\/p>\n 99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not consider that the present case is an exception to the above rule. It notes that in the present case the applications were lodged between 29\u00a0May\u00a02015 and 23\u00a0October\u00a02015. The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision which might, in accordance with Article\u00a0426 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(12) of the new Civil Procedure Act, present relevant information for the reopening of proceedings was adopted on 13\u00a0January\u00a02016 (see paragraphs\u00a085-88above). The fact that the proceedings in question were still pending at the time the applicants lodged their applications with the Court cannot be held against them in this context, since the applicants had no relevant grounds to apply for the reopening of proceedings(see, mutatis mutandis, Salah Sheekh v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands, no.\u00a01948\/04, \u00a7 125, 11\u00a0January 2007).<\/p>\n 100.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, a request for the reopening of a proceedings concluded by means of a final court decision cannot usually be regarded as an effective remedy within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention (see \u0160orgi\u0107 v.\u00a0Serbia, no.\u00a034973\/06, \u00a7\u00a054, 3\u00a0November 2011 and authorities cited therein).<\/p>\n 101.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Government\u2019s objection concerning the applicants\u2019 failure to make use of anapplication for the reopening of proceedings must be rejected.<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0Appeal on points of law<\/p>\n 102.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the Government\u2019s objection that the applicants should have made use of an appeal on points of law as provided in Article\u00a0395 of the former Civil Procedure Act, the Court observes that it is an extraordinary legal remedy which is only exceptionally granted. As provided in Article\u00a0395 a competent court of appeal may, \u201cexceptionally\u201d, decide that an appeal on points of law is admissible if this would be useful in order to deal with \u201ca legal issue of general interest\u201d, harmonise inconsistent case-law, or adopt a \u201cnew interpretation of the law\u201d.<\/p>\n 103.\u00a0\u00a0In its guidelines (Stavovi Ustavnog suda koji se odnose na postupak prethodnog ispitivanja ustavne \u017ealbe) of 2\u00a0April 2009 the Constitutional Court noted that an appeal on points of law must be exhausted before a constitutional appeal may be lodged only if the former Civil Procedure Act itself provided for the direct admissibility of the former, thus implicitly excluding Article\u00a0395 of the former Civil Procedure Act,whose application has always been contingent upon a favourable, discretionary, assessment of the court of appeal concerned.<\/p>\n 104.\u00a0\u00a0In view of theabove, it would be unduly formalistic of the Court to require the applicants to exercise a remedy which even the highest court of their country would not oblige them to exhaust (see, mutatis mutandis, D.H. and Others v.\u00a0the Czech Republic [GC], no.\u00a057325\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0117 and 118, ECHR 2007\u2011IV). In any event, the Constitutional Court did notrejectthe applicants\u2019constitutional appeals for their failure to lodge appeals on points of law.<\/p>\n 105.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Government\u2019s objection concerning the applicants\u2019 failure to make use of an appeal on points of law, in the particular circumstances of the present case (compare and contrast Raki\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia, nos.\u00a047460\/07 and 29 others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a037-38, 5\u00a0October\u00a02010),must be dismissed.<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0Adequacy of the redress pursued<\/p>\n 106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submittedthatthe applicants\u2019 complaints were also inadmissible on non-exhaustion grounds since the applicants had failed to apprisethe domestic authorities in the proper manner by lodging their complaints with the civil courts instead of initiating administrative proceedings first. In the Government\u2019s view, by failing to make use of the administrative avenueprior to the civilone, the applicants could not have expected a favourable outcometo their civil claims.<\/p>\n 107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that this limb of the Government\u2019s objection raises issues which are not connected to the violation alleged, thatbeing the inconsistent case-law of the civil courts in the adjudication of cases with the same facts as the applicants\u2019.The Government\u2019s objectionmust therefore be dismissed.<\/p>\n (e)\u00a0\u00a0Complaintsmade before the Constitutional Court<\/p>\n 108.\u00a0\u00a0The Governmentalso argued that the applicants had failed to complain properly before the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n 109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies normally requires that the complaints intended to be made subsequently in Strasbourg should have been raised before the domestic courts, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in the domestic law (see Fressoz and Roire v.\u00a0France [GC], no.\u00a029183\/95, \u00a7\u00a037, ECHR 1999\u2011I).<\/p>\n 110.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies incumbent on applicants, in respect of the alleged violation of the right to legal certainty, contains two connected aspects: on the one hand, the applicants must have aired a Convention complaint at national level (see Azinas v.\u00a0Cyprus,GC], no.\u00a056679\/00, \u00a7\u00a038, ECHR 2004\u2011III; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a075; and Perihan and Mezopotamya Bas\u0131n Yay\u0131n A.\u015e.v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a021377\/03, \u00a7\u00a047, 21\u00a0January 2014), and on the other they must substantiate their complaint with the proper evidence (see Golubovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia (dec.), no.\u00a010044\/11 et seq., \u00a7\u00a043, 17\u00a0September\u00a02013, and, mutatis mutandis, \u015etef\u0103nic\u0103 and Others v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a038155\/02, \u00a7\u00a035, 2\u00a0November 2010)<\/p>\n 111.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the first aspect, the Court finds that it is apparent from the copies of the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeals and the decisions of the Constitutional Court that, contrary to the Government\u2019s argument, and with the exception of the fourth applicant, who only mentioned the violation of his right to a fair trial (see paragraph\u00a037 above), all the applicants submitted specific complaints in respect of the violation of their right to legal certainty. Those complaints wereidentical to the complaints raised before this Court (see paragraph\u00a021 above), which is in accordance with the requirement that the violation alleged must have beenraised at the domestic level.<\/p>\n 112.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the second aspect, that is to say the requirement that the applicantsmust havefurnished the Constitutional Court with the proper evidence (see Golubovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia,cited above,\u00a7\u00a043) orevidence proving the divergence of interpretation of national law by the different courts ruling at final instance (see, mutatis mutandis, \u015etef\u0103nic\u0103 and Others v.\u00a0Romania, cited above, \u00a7\u00a035, 2\u00a0November 2010), the Court notes that all but the fourthand twelfthapplicants (see paragraphs\u00a037 and\u00a058above) provided the Constitutional Court with at least one copy of a judgment in which domestic courts, ruling at final instance,had accepted the same claims as the applicants\u2019. It further observes thatall but the third andfifthapplicants (see paragraphs\u00a034 and\u00a040above) subsequently amended their constitutional appeals andfurnished the Constitutional Court with the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September\u00a02013.<\/p>\n 113.\u00a0\u00a0So far, the Court has rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies complaints where the applicants failed to comply with the formal requirements laid down in domestic law (see Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0105), or failed to complain in the proper form and to include proper evidence in support of their complaints (see Golubovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a043).<\/p>\n 114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has however repeatedly held that the application of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must make due allowance for the context. It has, thus, recognised that Article\u00a035 must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism.<\/p>\n 115.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that despite some differences in the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaints, their forms and the ways in which corroborating evidence were submitted, they have all been rejected for the same reason, that is tosay because of their failure to substantiate their complaints concerning the divergence of the case-law on the matter.<\/p>\n 116.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the constitutional appeal of the fourth applicant was rejected because of his failure to address the complaint concerning the divergent case-law (see paragraph\u00a038 above).<\/p>\n 117.\u00a0\u00a0The complaint of the twelfth applicant was rejected because of his failure to provide the Constitutional Court with copies of any of the judgments in which the civil courts at final instance had allegedly accepted claims similarto his own(see paragraph\u00a059 above).<\/p>\n 118.\u00a0\u00a0The constitutional appeals of the third and fifth applicants were rejected because the evidence submitted by those applicants was not sufficientto establish the existence of either profound or long-standing differences in the adjudication of the courts ruling at final instance in cases same as the applicants\u2019(see paragraphs\u00a035 and\u00a059 above).<\/p>\n 119.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the first, second, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth applicants the Constitutional Court rejected their complaints alleging violations of their right to legal certainty as in its view the inconsistency in the domestic case-law could not have affected the applicants because the Supreme Court of Cassation had made the decision of 26\u00a0September 2013 after the courts of appeal had adopted the judgments in their cases(see\u00a0paragraph\u00a029 above).<\/p>\n 120.\u00a0\u00a0In the case of the eleventh applicant the Constitutional Court rejected his constitutional appeal because in its opinion the decisions of the Supreme Court of Cassation did not present proof of inconsistencies in the case-law of the courts of final instance(see paragraph\u00a056 above).<\/p>\n 121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in accordance with its settled case-law, the failure of an applicantat the domestic level tobring a complaint at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law will cause the application to be declared inadmissible before this Court(see Cardot v.\u00a0France, 19\u00a0March 1991, \u00a7\u00a034, Series A no.\u00a0200, K\u00e1roly Nagy v.\u00a0Hungary [GC], no.\u00a056665\/09, \u00a7\u00a042, ECHR\u00a02017).<\/p>\n 122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that for complainants to be successful before the Constitutional Court, their complaints should be made in compliance with the formal requirements as laid down in domestic law (see Skenderi and Others v.\u00a0Serbia (dec.), nos.\u00a015090\/08 and 4 others, \u00a7\u00a0109, 4\u00a0July 2017). In accordance with Article\u00a085 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Constitutional Court Act the complaints raised before the Constitutional Court should be properly substantiated and furnished with the proper evidence (see paragraph\u00a078 above). Failure to do so will lead to the rejection of the constitutional complaint.<\/p>\n 123.\u00a0\u00a0The Courtfurthernotes that the constitutional appeals of the third, fourth, fifth, and twelfth applicants were rejected for their failure to substantiate their constitutional appeals with any or proper evidence of the violation alleged. Had the third, fourth, fifth and twelfth applicants supported their constitutional appeals with the proper evidence, the constitutional remedy would have offered them a reasonable prospect of success (see, mutatis mutandis, Cupara v.\u00a0Serbia, no.\u00a034683\/08, \u00a7\u00a016-17, 12\u00a0July 2016). Besides, the requirement to include proper evidence in support of their complaints seems anything but unreasonable (compare and contrast Golubovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a046).<\/p>\n 124.\u00a0\u00a0The third, fourth, fifth and twelfth applicants, thus,failed to make the proper use of the constitutional-appeal procedure.<\/p>\n 125.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of all the other applicants, the Court observes that they all, at least, supported their complaints concerning the violations of their right to legal certainty with the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26\u00a0September\u00a02013. In their cases, the Constitutional Court decided not to evaluate the relevance of the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation either becauseit did not consider the decision of the said court to be evidence of inconsistent case-law at the domestic level, or because itdid not consider it relevant to the applicants\u2019 cases.<\/p>\n 126.\u00a0\u00a0As in accordance with the Courts Organisation Act and the Rules of Court (see paragraphs\u00a074 – 77 above) the Supreme Court of Cassation is the authority charged with the harmonisation of domestic case-law, the Court has no reason to doubt that the impugned decision actually established the divergence in the case-law in the matter. The Court further notes that, contrary to its reasoning in the applicants\u2019 cases (see paragraphs\u00a0119 and\u00a0120above), the Constitutional Court itself found a violation of a complainant\u2019s right to legal certainty and established the inconsistency in domestic case-lawbased on the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation(see paragraph\u00a088 above). Accordingly, the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation was deemed to be sufficient substantiation of the applicants\u2019constitutional appeals as well.<\/p>\n 127.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the constitutional appeals of the first, second, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenthapplicants were lodged in compliance with the formal domestic requirements and with the proper evidence. The Government\u2019s objection concerning the failure of those applicants to properly complain before the Constitutional Court thusmustbe rejected.<\/p>\n 128.\u00a0\u00a0In view of paragraph\u00a0124 above, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the Government\u2019s separate objection in respect of the fourthapplicant.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/em><\/p>\n 129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the third, fourth, fifth and twelfth applicants had failed to complain properly before the Constitutional Court and rejects their complaints under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.<\/p>\n 130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the remainingapplicantscomplained properly before the Constitutional Court. The Court finds that their complaints are not inadmissible within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. It also finds that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must, therefore, be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties<\/em><\/p>\n 131.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantsreaffirmed their complaints, adding that the case-law had remained inconsistent during the relevant period. They also claimed that the Belgrade Court of Appeal had,despite continuous efforts by the Supreme Court of Cassation to harmonise the case-law at issue, continued to reject other claimants\u2019 complaints concerning the same situations throughout 2015 and 2016.<\/p>\n 132.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not dispute the fact that at the time relevant in the applicants\u2019 case competent courts in Republic of Serbia had reached different conclusions in the same factual and legal situations as the applicants\u2019. However, in their view the mere existence of such divergence could not be considered to constitute violations of applicants\u2019right to a fair trial.<\/p>\n 133.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that principles concerning the divergent case-law have been set out in the Grand Chamber\u2019s judgment Nejdet \u015eahin and Perihan \u015eahin v.\u00a0Turkey ([GC], no.\u00a013279\/05, 20\u00a0October 2011) and that they were applicable to the present case.In their view the differences in the case-law of the domestic courts had been neither profound nor long-standing. The Government,relying on the case ofCupara v.\u00a0Serbia (cited above, \u00a7\u00a036), also,alleged that the Serbian legal system provided machinery capable of overcoming the inconsistency in domestic case-law.However, they also stated that the differences in adjudication between the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in the present case could not be explained.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 134.\u00a0\u00a0In its judgment in Nejdet \u015eahin and Perihan \u015eahin (cited above) the Court restated the main principles applicable in cases concerning the issue of conflicting court decisions (\u00a7\u00a7\u00a049-58). Those principleswere summarised as follows in the case of Stankovi\u0107 and Trajkovi\u0107v.\u00a0Serbia (nos.\u00a037194\/08 and\u00a037260\/08, \u00a7\u00a040, 22\u00a0December 2015):<\/p>\n \u201c(i)\u00a0\u00a0It is not the Court\u2019s function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see Garc\u00eda Ruiz v.\u00a0Spain [GC], no.\u00a030544\/96, \u00a7\u00a028, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011I). Likewise, it is not its function, save in the event of evident arbitrariness, to compare different decisions of national courts, even if given in apparently similar proceedings, as the independence of those courts must be respected (see \u0100damsons v.\u00a0Latvia, no.\u00a03669\/03, \u00a7\u00a0118, 24\u00a0June 2008);<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0The possibility of conflicting court decisions is an inherent trait of any judicial system which is based on a network of trial and appeal courts with authority over the area of their territorial jurisdiction. Such divergences may also arise within the same court. That, in itself, cannot be considered contrary to the Convention (see\u00a0Santos Pinto v.\u00a0Portugal, no.\u00a039005\/04, \u00a7\u00a041, 20\u00a0May 2008, and Tudor Tudor v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a021911\/03, \u00a7\u00a029, 24\u00a0March 2009);<\/p>\n (iii)\u00a0\u00a0The criteria that guide the Court\u2019s assessment of the conditions in which conflicting decisions of different domestic courts, ruling at last instance, are in breach of the fair trial requirement enshrined in Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention consist in establishing whether \u2018profound and long-standing differences\u2019 exist in the case-law of the domestic courts, whether the domestic law provides for a machinery capable of overcoming these inconsistencies, whether that machinery has been applied and, if appropriate, to what effect (Iordan Iordanov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a023530\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a049-50, 2\u00a0July 2009; Beian v.\u00a0Romania (no.\u00a01), no.\u00a030658\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a034-40, ECHR 2007\u2011V (extracts); \u015etefan and \u015etefv.\u00a0Romania, nos.\u00a024428\/03 and 26977\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a033-36, 27\u00a0January\u00a02009; Schwarzkopf and Taussik v.\u00a0the Czech Republic (dec.), no.\u00a042162\/02, 2\u00a0December 2008; Tudor Tudor, cited above, \u00a7\u00a031; \u015etef\u0103nic\u0103 and Others v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a038155\/02, \u00a7\u00a036, 2\u00a0November\u00a02010);<\/p>\n (iv)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment has also always been based on the principle of legal certainty which is implicit in all the Articles of the Convention and constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law (see, amongst other authorities, Beian (no. 1), cited above, \u00a7\u00a039; Iordan Iordanov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a047; and \u015etef\u0103nic\u0103 and Others,cited above, \u00a7\u00a031);<\/p>\n (v)\u00a0\u00a0The principle of legal certainty guarantees, inter alia, a certain stability in legal situations and contributes to public confidence in the courts. The persistence of conflicting court decisions, on the other hand, can create a state of legal uncertainty likely to reduce public confidence in the judicial system, whereas such confidence is clearly one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of law (see\u00a0Paduraru v.\u00a0Romania, \u00a7\u00a098, no.\u00a063252\/00, ECHR 2005-XII (extracts); Vin\u010di\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a056; and \u015etef\u0103nic\u0103 and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a038);<\/p>\n (vi)\u00a0\u00a0However, the requirements of legal certainty and the protection of the legitimate confidence of the public do not confer an acquired right to consistency of case-law (see Un\u00e9dic v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a020153\/04, \u00a7\u00a074, 18\u00a0December\u00a02008). Case-law development is not, in itself, contrary to the proper administration of justice, since failure to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk hindering reform or improvement (see Atanasovski v.\u00a0\u2019the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u2019, no.\u00a036815\/03, \u00a7 38, 14\u00a0January 2010).\u201d<\/p>\n 135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, in the present case,the parties did not dispute the fact that there were inconsistencies in the adjudication of civil claims brought by many individuals who were in identical or similar situationsto the applicants. The Court also observes that according to the relevant case-law provided by the parties such inconsistenciescontinued for four years; that is to saybetween 2012 and 2016.<\/p>\n 136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that during that period the inconsistenciesin the case-law had not been the same. Two distinct periods can be discerned:<\/p>\n i)the first period \u2013from 2012 until 26\u00a0September\u00a02013;<\/p>\n ii)the second period \u2013 from 26\u00a0September 2013 until 21\u00a0July 2016.<\/p>\n 137.\u00a0\u00a0During the first period, all four courts of appeal in the respondent State adjudicated situationswhich were the same as the applicants\u2019 differently. That period endedin September 2013with the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation (see paragraphs\u00a017-18 above).<\/p>\n 138.\u00a0\u00a0During the second period the courts of appeal in Novi Sad, Kragujevac and Ni\u0161adoptedan approach in the adjudication of cases with the same facts as the applicants\u2019that was consistent with the Supreme Court of Cassation\u2019s recommendation. The Belgrade Court of Appeal continued with a conflicting approach. On three occasions, the Supreme Court of Cassation censured the inconsistency in the adjudication of the Belgrade Court of Appeal (see paragraphs\u00a079-84 above).<\/p>\n 139.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 situation concerns both periods and with the exception of the thirteenth applicant,all their judgments were given by the Belgrade Court of Appeal. The judgment on appeal in respect of the thirteenthapplicant was given by the Kragujevac Court of Appeal (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a014 above).<\/p>\n 140.\u00a0\u00a0Even thoughdomestic law in Serbia provided a judicial machinery capable of resolvinginconsistencies in adjudication (see paragraphs\u00a072 and 73 above), it would appear that the Supreme Courtof Cassation\u2019s case-law on the matter as well as the efforts of that court to harmonise the case-law did not in the present case have any effect until, at best, the later part of 2016.Besides, even though in the Serbian legal system the Constitutional Court plays an important part in the protection of an individual\u2019s right to legal certainty (see Cupara v.\u00a0Serbia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a036), the inconsistencies in the adjudicationhere in issue existed within this court as well(see paragraphs\u00a085-88 above).<\/p>\n 141.\u00a0\u00a0Under these circumstances, the Court finds thattheundisputed inconsistencies in the adjudication of civil claims during the relevant period cannot be considered as havingbeen institutionally resolved. The aforesaid inconsistenciescreated a state of continued uncertainty, which in turn must have reduced the public\u2019s confidence in the judiciary, such confidence being one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of law. The\u00a0Court notes that therespondent Governmentthemselves were unable to explainthe saidinconsistencies (see paragraph\u00a0133 above). Moreover, the said inconsistencieswere not eliminated until July 2016by virtue of the procedures provided in the Courts Organisation Act and the Rules of the Court (see paragraphs\u00a074-77 above) and other provisions providing for machinery capable of overcoming conflicting decisions within the courts at the domestic level.<\/p>\n 142.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore, without deeming it appropriate to pronounce as to what the actual outcome of the applicants\u2019 lawsuits should have been (see Vin\u010di\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia, nos.\u00a044698\/06 and 30 others, \u00a7\u00a056, 1\u00a0December 2009), considers that the four years of judicial uncertainty in question deprived the applicants of a fair hearing,uncertainty the Supreme Court of Cassation or the Constitutional Court failed to resolve with their decisions. Given the \u201cprofound and long-standing\u201d character of the differences in adjudication, the Court finds that in respect of the remaining applicants there has been a violation of their right to legal certainty enshrined in Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.<\/p>\n V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 143.\u00a0\u00a0Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage<\/em><\/p>\n 144.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants requested that the State be ordered to pay, from its own funds, the respective sums sought in their compensation claims brought before civil courts.<\/p>\n 145.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those claims.<\/p>\n 146.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the violation found in the present case and its reasons for so doing (see paragraph\u00a0142 above, particularly the reference to the outcome of the applicants\u2019 suits), the Court considers that the applicants\u2019 claims, in so far as they relate to the payment of the respective sums sought domestically, must be rejected (see Vin\u010di\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a061).<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage<\/em><\/p>\n 147.\u00a0\u00a0Thefirst, second, sixth, eleventh, thirteenth, and eighteenthapplicantsfurther claimed 1,000\u00a0euros (EUR) each as the compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of the violation of their rights guaranteed under Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.<\/p>\n The seventhapplicant claimed EUR\u00a04,000, while theeighth, ninth, tenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenthapplicantsclaimed EUR\u00a04,200 each in the same respect.<\/p>\n 148.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicants\u2019 claims.<\/p>\n 149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court while making its assessment on an equitable basis, awards the first, second, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth,fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenthapplicants EUR\u00a01,000 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 150.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed between EUR\u00a01,000 and EUR\u00a02,200 eachfor the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and between EUR\u00a0650 and EUR\u00a02,000each for those incurred before the Court.<\/p>\n 151.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those claims.<\/p>\n 152.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum, or in connection to the violation found. Rule\u00a060 of the Rules of Court further requires that an applicant submit itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents. If the applicant fails to comply with the requirements set out in the preceding paragraphs the Chamber may reject the claims in whole or in part.<\/p>\n 153.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds no correlation between the violation found before it and the domestic proceedings. It therefore rejects the claims for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings.<\/p>\n 154.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the costs and expenses incurred before it, the Court observes that the first, second, sixth, eleventh, thirteenth, and eighteenthapplicants were represented by one lawyer, and that the eighth, ninth, tenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenthapplicants were represented by another lawyer.Regard being had to Rule\u00a060 and the submissions of the applicants\u2019 lawyers and the documents in the case-file, the Court considers it reasonable to award each group jointly the sum of EUR\u00a02,500 for the proceedings before the Court. In respect of the seventh applicant who was represented by his own lawyer, the Court considers it reasonable to award him EUR\u00a01,500.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 155.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe complaints under Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 concerningthe divergence in the case-law of the domestic courts raised by the first, second, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenthapplicants admissible;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the applications lodged by the third, fourth, fifth, and twelfthapplicants inadmissible;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention concerning the divergence in the case-law of the domestic courts in respect of first, second, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth,fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenthapplicants;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0the first, second, sixth, seventh,[1]eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenthapplicantseach EUR\u00a01,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0thefirst, second, sixth, eleventh, thirteenth, and eighteenthEUR\u00a02,500 (two thousand five hundred euros) jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses before the Court;<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0theeighth, ninth, tenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth EUR\u00a02,500 (two thousand five hundred euros) jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses before the Court;<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0theseventh applicant EUR\u00a01,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses before the Court;<\/p>\n (e)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicants\u2019 claims for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 26\u00a0June 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and\u00a03 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Helena J\u00e4derblom <\/p>\n APPENDIX<\/p>\n Date of birth<\/strong><\/p>\n Place of residence<\/strong><\/td>\n Practising in<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n 04\/03\/1974<\/p>\n Belgrade<\/td>\n In\u0111ija<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 24\/06\/1973<\/p>\n Beograd<\/td>\n In\u0111ija<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n POPOVI\u0106-RADIVOJEVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n 22\/08\/1975<\/p>\n Valjevo<\/td>\n Valjevo<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 01\/04\/1960<\/p>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 13\/07\/1976<\/p>\n Zemun<\/td>\n In\u0111ija<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 08\/04\/1970<\/p>\n Beograd<\/td>\n In\u0111ija<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 12\/08\/1954<\/p>\n Beograd<\/td>\n Smederevo<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 09\/02\/1958<\/p>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 07\/11\/1980<\/p>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n Po\u017earevac<\/p>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 30\/11\/1977<\/p>\n Malo Crni\u0107e<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 29\/06\/1959<\/p>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n In\u0111ija<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 09\/01\/1961<\/p>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 10\/08\/1962<\/p>\n Kraljevo\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 25\/07\/1955<\/p>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 13\/05\/1964<\/p>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 18\/03\/1961<\/p>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 27\/06\/1954<\/p>\n Po\u017earevac<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 01\/02\/1967<\/p>\n Belgrade<\/td>\n In\u0111ija<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
\nBranko Lubarda,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nPere Pastor Vilanova,
\nAlena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1,
\nJolien Schukking,
\nMar\u00eda El\u00f3segui, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n\n\n
\n No<\/strong><\/td>\n App.nos.<\/strong><\/td>\n Lodged on<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant nos.<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant\u2019s name<\/strong><\/p>\n Represented by<\/strong><\/p>\n \n 1.<\/td>\n 27471\/15<\/td>\n 29\/05\/2015<\/td>\n First applicant<\/td>\n Aleksandra MIRKOVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Rajka JASIKA<\/p>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n 27288\/15<\/td>\n 29\/05\/2015<\/td>\n Second applicant<\/td>\n Biljana SARI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Rajka JASIKA<\/p>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n 27751\/15<\/td>\n 02\/06\/2015<\/td>\n Third applicant<\/td>\n Sanja<\/strong><\/p>\n Spomenka NEGI\u0106<\/p>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n 27779\/15<\/td>\n 29\/05\/2015<\/td>\n Fourth applicant<\/td>\n Branislav MARKOVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Dragan SOKNI\u0106<\/p>\n \n 5.<\/td>\n 27790\/15<\/td>\n 29\/05\/2015<\/td>\n Fifth applicant<\/td>\n Milica BOGI\u0106EVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Rajka JASIKA<\/p>\n \n 6.<\/td>\n 28156\/15<\/td>\n 29\/05\/2015<\/td>\n Sixth applicant<\/td>\n Gordana MASLOVARI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Rajka JASIKA<\/p>\n \n 7.<\/td>\n 28418\/15<\/td>\n 05\/06\/2015<\/td>\n Seventh applicant<\/td>\n Velimir VIDI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Predrag AVRAMOVI\u0106<\/p>\n \n 8.<\/td>\n 30893\/15<\/td>\n 17\/06\/2015<\/td>\n Eight applicant<\/td>\n Neboj\u0161a NEJKOVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Ru\u017eica LEKI\u0106<\/p>\n \n 9.<\/td>\n 30906\/15<\/td>\n 17\/06\/2015<\/td>\n Ninth applicant<\/td>\n Aleksandra PE\u0160I\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Ru\u017eica LEKI\u0106<\/p>\n \n Tenth applicant<\/td>\n Jelena JEVREMOVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n \n 10.<\/td>\n 32933\/15<\/td>\n 16\/06\/2015<\/td>\n Eleventh applicant<\/td>\n \u017deljko GRADI\u0160KA<\/strong><\/p>\n Rajka JASIKA<\/p>\n \n Twelfth applicant<\/td>\n Milan VU\u010cI\u0106EVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n \n Thirteenth applicant<\/td>\n Dra\u0161ko VELJKOVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n \n 11.<\/td>\n 35780\/15<\/td>\n 15\/07\/2015<\/td>\n Fourteenth applicant<\/td>\n Branislava STOJANOVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Ru\u017eica LEKI\u0106<\/p>\n \n 12.<\/td>\n 40646\/15<\/td>\n 21\/07\/2015<\/td>\n Fifteenth applicant<\/td>\n Nevenka BIJELI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Ru\u017eica LEKI\u0106<\/p>\n \n Sixteenth applicant<\/td>\n Vesna VULEVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n \n Seventeenth applicant<\/td>\n Zorica JOVANOVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n \n 13.<\/td>\n 55066\/15<\/td>\n 23\/10\/2015<\/td>\n Eighteenth applicant<\/td>\n Dejan STEPANOVI\u0106<\/strong><\/p>\n Rajka JASIKA<\/p>\n