FOURTH SECTION
\nCASE OF LAKATOS v. HUNGARY
\n(Application no. 21786\/15)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n26 June 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n26\/09\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Lakatos v. Hungary,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Ganna Yudkivska, President, Having deliberated in private on 29 May 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 21786\/15) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by aHungarian national, Mr P\u00e9ter Lakatos (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 24 April 2015.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr G.T. Tak\u00e1cs, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr Z. Tall\u00f3di, Agent, Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained in particular that his detention on remand had lasted an unreasonably long time. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 April 2017 the application was communicated to the Government. The Court furthermore decided to inform the parties that it was considering the suitability of applying a pilot judgment procedure in the case (see Broniowski v. Poland [GC], 31443\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 189-194 and the operative part, ECHR 2004-V, and Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a035014\/97, ECHR 2006-VII, \u00a7\u00a7 231-239 and the operative part) and requested the parties\u2019 observations on the matter.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 June 2017, under Article 36 \u00a7 2 of the Convention and Rule\u00a044 \u00a7\u00a03 of the Rules of Court, the President of the Section granted the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the Human Rights Litigation Foundationleave to intervene jointly as a third party in the proceedings.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantwas born in 1986 and lives in Gy\u00e1l.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 February 2011 the Pest Central District Court remanded the applicant in custody under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on suspicion of aggravated murder within the meaning of Article 166 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. It summarised the suspicions against him, referred to police reports, an autopsy report, the victim\u2019s medical documents, examinations of various exhibits and witness testimonies, and concluded that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had poisoned the victim on 8 April 2010. The court found it established that there was a need for the applicant\u2019s detention, because otherwise he would tamper with evidence by exerting pressure on the witnesses, as evidenced by his previous conduct whereby he had threatened them. It dismissed an argument by the applicant that he had committed the criminal offence more than a year before, thus the prosecutor\u2019s office had erred in stating that he could tamper with evidence or influence witnesses. The court also held that the applicant\u2019s \u201cunclear\u201d financial situation and the severity of the possible punishment demonstrated that there was a risk of his absconding. The court gave no consideration to an application by the applicant\u2019s lawyer for the applicant to be placed under house arrest.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0An appeal against that decision was dismissed on 3 March 2011.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 March 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 26 May 2011. It noted again that because of the severity of the possible punishment and the fact that the applicant had neither a permanent address nor a regular income, there were grounds to believe that he would abscond. The court held that there was a risk of his interfering with the investigation if he were to threaten the witnesses or destroy physical evidence.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed, arguing that the conditions for pre-trial detention had not been fulfilled because there was no risk of his absconding or influencing witnesses. He argued that his well-established personal circumstances \u2013 the fact that he lived with his common-law wife and two children, his parents, and his brother\u2019s family \u2013 and the fact that he had no criminal record excluded the risk of his absconding. He further submitted that he had cooperated with the investigating authorities. Alternatively, the applicant requested that he be released and placed under house arrest.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0The first-instance decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 15 April 2011, and the court\u2019s reasoning was that the public interest in the applicant beingdetained was more important than his interest in his right to liberty being respected.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 May 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 26 August 2011. The court maintained its previous reasons justifying the need for his detention. It emphasised that there was a risk of his absconding, owing to the severity of the possible punishment and the fact that he had no declared employment and had previously not been reachable at his permanent address. It added that, if released, the applicant might influence the witnesses or destroy evidence.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 June 2011 the Budapest Regional Court upheld that decision.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 August 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 26 November 2011 under Article 129 \u00a7 2\u00a0(b) (risk of absconding) and (c) (risk of collusion) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the risk of absconding, the court found that although the applicant had previously not been reachable at his permanent address and had only had temporary jobs, his temporary residence had been known and he had no criminal record. However, given the seriousness of the potential punishment and his \u201cunstable\u201d financial circumstances, his presence at the proceedings could only be ensured through the most restrictive measure. As regards the risk of collusion, the court dismissed an argument by the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the prosecution authorities should have questioned all the witnesses by that stage of the proceedings. It held that although the majority of the witnesses had been heard, further questioning could still be necessary.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 August 2011 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s decision under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended on a number of occasions. In particular, on 23 November 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended his detention until 26 February 2012. The court found that he had failed to attach a \u201chosting declaration\u201d (befogad\u00f3 nyilatkozat) and a declaration of his host\u2019s financial capacity to his application to be placed under house arrest. According to the court, although the investigation was about to conclude, based on previous witness testimonies, there was a risk that the applicant would intimidate witnesses. It also held that this last reason could justify the applicant being detained until the closure of the investigation. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 1 December 2011.Although by that time the applicant had submitted a hosting declaration, the appeal court objected to his release for the reason that he had not provided a declaration of his host\u2019s financial capacity.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, on 24\u00a0February 2012 the Budapest High Court held that the unclarified financial situation of the applicant and the seriousness of the crime substantiated the risk of his absconding. It also found, without giving further reasoning, that there were still grounds to believe that at that stage of the proceedings the applicant would influence the witnesses.In an appeal, the applicant argued that the investigating authorities had implemented no procedural measures, the proceedings had been unreasonably lengthy, and previously he had always been reachable at his temporary residence.As regards the risk of his influencing witnesses, the applicant submitted that no such risk could be established two years after the alleged criminal offence. On 8 March 2012 the Budapest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, stating that the investigation was being conducted in a timely manner and witness testimonies had previously evidenced that the applicant had tried to exert pressure on the witnesses.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 April 2012 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended by the Budapest High Court until 26 June 2012. The court maintained that, under Article\u00a0129 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,his detention was still necessary because of the risk of his absconding. It considered that the applicant had no \u201cfinancial or essential\u201d tiescounterbalancing the risk of him escaping an eventual serious punishment. Although he had family ties, a child who was a minor, and a relative willing to give assurances to provide for him if he were released, given the seriousness of the charges, the gravity of the possible punishment and his unstable financial circumstances, there was a real risk that he would abscond. However, the court did not find that the risk of collusion (Article\u00a0129 \u00a7 2 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) was substantiated, since there was no way to influence any of the investigative measures which the prosecution had relied on. In particular, the witness who the investigating authorities still intended to hear was unlikely to testify, given the fact that he was ill andunreachable. The court also considered that although it was likely that the applicant\u2019s acquaintances and relatives had tried to influence witnesses in the two years following the commission of the crime, there was no reliable information that this had actually taken place, and a hypothetical risk of further attempts to do so could not substantiate the risk of collusion.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0That decision was upheld on appeal on 7 May 2012.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 June 2012 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended until 26\u00a0August 2012. The court agreed with the applicant\u2019s argument that his unsettled personal circumstances could not be relied on to justify his detention after the passing of a lengthy period of time following his arrest. It nonetheless held that, in the absence of any financialties, his family ties could not counterbalance the risk of his absconding, also having regard to the severity to the potential punishment.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0That decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 28 June 2012, and an appeal by the applicant to the effect that less restrictive measures could be applied in his case was dismissed.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The Budapest High Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on 21\u00a0August 2012, reiterating the same arguments as before. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments that no investigative measure had been implemented for a considerable period of time. It also found that the hosting declaration of the applicant\u2019s family member, the fact that he was raising a child who was a minor, and the fact that his legal residence had also been clarified were irrelevant, and did not diminish the risk of his absconding. The second-instance court upheld the decision on 24 August 2012.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 October 2012 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended again for a month under Article\u00a0129 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the Budapest High Court expressed doubts as to whether there was enough evidence to conclude that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the crime. It dismissed an argument by the prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant would hinder the investigation. It considered that, irrespective of the seriousness of the charges, it appeared that there was less risk of his absconding, since he was raising two children who were minors and he had no criminal record. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment but extended the applicant\u2019s detention by two months.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 December 2012 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended; the Budapest High Court again referred to the fact that, at the time of his arrest, the applicant had been unreachable at his permanent address and had been earning a living from temporary jobs, which, taken together with the severity of the potential punishment, substantiated the risk of his absconding. The decision was upheld on appeal on 10 January 2013.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 February 2013 the Budapest High Court released the applicant from pre-trial detention and placed him on bail under house arrest. According to that decision, besides the suspicion against the applicant, the only groundsfor restricting his liberty were the risk of his absconding, given the gravity of the offence, and this in itself could not justify his continued pre-trial detention. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the first-instance decision and placed the applicant in detention on 28\u00a0March 2013. It noted that, given the seriousness of the offence, there was a danger of his absconding, irrespective of his family ties.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 April 2013 the Budapest High Court released the applicant from detention upon his giving an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. Relying on the Court\u2019s case-law, the High Court found that pre\u2011trial detention could only serve as a measure of last resort, and the applicant\u2019s continued detention would only serve as an anticipated punishment. The decision was overturned by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 26 April 2016, and the applicant was placed in detention for the same reasons as those given before.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 June 2013 the Budapest Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office preferred a bill of indictment.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 June 2013 the Budapest High Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until the date of the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, under Article\u00a0129 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of absconding), for essentially the same reasons as those given before.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 January the applicant applied for release, but the application was dismissed on 18 February by the Budapest High Court on the grounds that, given the gravity of the offence and the complexity of the case, pre\u2011trial detention did not constitute an anticipated punishment. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 18\u00a0February 2014. A further application by the applicant of 18 April 2014 was dismissed on 8 April 2014 (the dismissal was upheld by the second-instance court on 24 April 2014) on the grounds that the applicant had not relied on new circumstances warranting his release.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s detention was reviewed on 16 July 2014 by the Budapest Court of Appeal. It held that the gravity of the offence, the applicant\u2019s lack of financial resources and essential ties, and the fact that he had only notified the authorities of his place of residence once he had been placed in detention substantiated the risk of his absconding.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0On appeal, that decision was upheld by the K\u00faria on 24 September 2014, which endorsed the reasons given by the lower court. The K\u00faria also found that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was both necessary and proportionate, and no less restrictive measure would be sufficient to ensure the purpose of the criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 October 2014 the applicant was found guilty of aggravated murder and sentenced to eighteen years\u2019 imprisonment by the Budapest High Court.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant parts of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act no.\u00a0XIX of 1998) provide as follows:<\/p>\n Article 129<\/p>\n \u201c(2)\u00a0\u00a0Pre-trial detention of a defendant may take place in proceedings related to a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment, provided that:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0the defendant has escaped, or has attempted to escape, or has absconded from the court, or the prosecutor or the investigating authority, or other proceedings have been initiated against the defendant for the commission of an intentional criminal offence also punishable by imprisonment,<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0if, owing to the risk of [the defendant] escaping or absconding, or for other reasons, there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant\u2019s presence during procedural actions cannot be otherwise ensured,<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0if there is reasonable cause to believe that, if left at liberty, the defendant would frustrate, obstruct or jeopardise the obtaining of evidence, especially by means of influencing or intimidating witnesses, or by the destruction, falsification or concealment of physical evidence or documents…<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0if there is reasonable cause to believe that, if left at liberty, the defendant would accomplish the attempted or planned criminal offence or commit another criminal offence punishable by imprisonment.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 130<\/p>\n \u201c(2)\u00a0\u00a0Instead of pre-trial detention, the court may impose [on a defendant]:an obligation not to leave a certain area; house arrest; or a restraining order.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 131<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0Pre-trial detention ordered prior to the indictment being preferred may continue until the decision of the court of first instance during the preparations for trial, but may never exceed one month. Pre-trial detention may be extended by the investigating judge by a maximum of three months on each occasion, but the overall period may still not exceed one year after the order for pre-trial detention. Thereafter, pre-trial detention may be extended by the county court acting as a single judge by a maximum of two months on each occasion, in compliance with the procedural rules pertaining to investigating judges.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 133<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0The court shall examine an application to terminate pre-trial detention on the merits, and deliver a reasoned decision on that application. Repeated applications may be rejected by the court without substantial justification, unless the defendant or defence counsel relies on new circumstances.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 136<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0The court, the prosecutor and the investigating authority shall take all necessary steps to reduce a term of pre-trial detention by as much as possible. If the defendant is held in pre-trial detention, an extraordinary procedure shall be conducted.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 186<\/p>\n \u201c(2)\u00a0\u00a0The suspect, defence counsel or victim may inspect any expert opinion prepared during the investigation, but may only inspect other documents if this would not be contrary to the interests of the investigation.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 193<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0After the conclusion of an investigation, the prosecutor or (unless the prosecutor allows otherwise) the investigating authority shall hand over the investigation file to the suspect and defence counsel in a room designated for that purpose. The suspect and defence counsel shall be permitted to inspect all the documents \u2013 with the exception of those treated as confidential \u2013 that may serve as the basis for pressing charges.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 210<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0The investigating judge shall hold a hearing if the application relates to the following:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0the [first] ordering of a coercive measure involving the restriction or deprivation of a person\u2019s liberty …<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0the extension of pre-trial detention or house arrest, if new circumstances [as opposed to previous decisions] have been proposed [by the prosecution] to justify the extension of the measure …\u201d<\/p>\n Article 211<\/p>\n \u201c(1a)\u00a0\u00a0[As in force since 1 July 2015] If the application concerns the ordering of pre-trial detention, copies of all investigation documents relied on in the application shall be attached to the application sent to the suspect and his\/her defence counsel. If the application concerns the extension of pre-trial detention, copies of all investigation documents produced since the last decision on pre-trial detention shall be attached to the application sent to the suspect and his\/her defence counsel.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (3)\u00a0\u00a0At the [court] hearing, the [prosecution], having submitted the application [for pre-trial detention or for extending pre-trial detention] shall present the evidence substantiating the application in writing or orally. Those present shall be given the opportunity to examine the evidence, within the limits set out in Article 186 … If a notified party does not attend the hearing but has submitted observations in writing, this document shall be presented by the investigating judge.<\/p>\n (4)\u00a0\u00a0The investigating judge shall examine whether the statutory requirements related to the application have been met, whether there are any obstacles to the criminal proceedings, and whether the application is substantiated beyond reasonable doubt. In the cases specified in Article 210 \u00a7 1 (a) to (d), this examination shall also extend to the personal circumstances of the suspect.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 214<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0Unless otherwise provided for in this Act, the investigating judge shall deliver a ruling with an explanation of the reasons [for the decision] within three days of the application being submitted, [a ruling] in which he accepts or rejects the application either wholly or in part. The explanation shall include the substance of the application, a brief description, and a classification of the criminal offence underlying the procedure, and shall state whether the statutory requirements related to the application have or have not been met. If the investigating judge rejects the application, it may not be repeated on identical grounds.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 215<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0A decision of the investigating judge may be appealed against by all those parties who have been notified of the decision. Any appeal against a decision given orally shall be lodged [orally] immediately after the decision has been given.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (5)\u00a0\u00a0Regardless of an appeal, an order for a coercive measure involving the restriction or deprivation of a person\u2019s liberty may be executed [immediately].\u201d<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 May 2011 the Head of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court issued Opinion No. BKv. 93 on the interpretation and application of the relevant provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure governing access to investigation files in habeas corpus proceedings. The opinion pointed out that: \u201cin the reasoning of the decision on pre-trial detention, the investigating judge gives an account of the general preconditions for pre\u2011trial detention, and gives reasons as to which special groundsfor pre\u2011trial detention he or she has found to be established, based on which data. The reasoning of the decision should elaborate on the factual and legal arguments of the defence and the judicial assessment of those arguments …When assessing the special grounds for pre-trial detention, the court must display special diligence. It must have due regard to the fact that any proposition that a certain event might occur in the future can only be based on factual grounds. The term \u2018reasonable grounds to believe\u2019 refers to events in the future that are predictable, possible, conceivable, that are likely to happen, based on the available facts and circumstances. The severity of the criminal offence \u2013 and the prospective punishment\u2013 is only relevant when taken together with the special circumstances of the case…The severity of the criminal offence does not in itself constitute grounds for pre\u2011trial detention. It is not sufficient to refer to the application of the prosecutor\u2019s office in the reasoning of the decision, the courts should give account of the reasonable suspicion against the suspect, the special grounds for pre-trial detention, and any doubt concerning the well-founded nature of the prosecutor\u2019s application. The court must also elaborate on the personal circumstances of the suspect and what conclusions can be drawn from those circumstances. In compliance with the adversarial nature of the proceedings, the reasoning should establish the facts serving as the basis of each special ground for pre-trial detention, and should present the factual and legal arguments of the defence submitted in response to the application of the prosecutor, and should elaborate on the judicial assessment of those arguments.\u201d<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The statistical data available on the website of the Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office[1] as regards the application of preventive measures \u2013 including remand in custody, the obligation not to leave a certain area, and house arrest \u2013 can be summarised as follows:<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 May 2017 the K\u00faria issued a report entitled \u201cSummary of the assessment of the jurisprudence concerning measures restricting personal liberty\u201d, providing an analysis of the decisions of lower courts in pre-trial detention proceedings. The report contains the following recommendations:<\/p>\n \u201cTo avoid the shortcomings of previous practice, in each case it must be assessed whether a less restrictive measure could serve the same aims. Pre-trial detention could only be ordered if house arrest [or] the obligation not to leave a certain area cannot be envisaged by the court. Similarly, house arrest should only be ordered if the obligation not to leave a certain area cannot sufficiently achieve the same purpose. This assessment is especially important following the presentation of the indictment or the first-instance judgment.<\/p>\n Regard must always be had to the courts\u2019obligation under Article 136\u00a7(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to reduce the length of pre-trial detention to the minimum possible.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n In every case, courts must have regard to the submissions of the suspect and the defence, even if they are not decisive in the decision. It is not enough to make reference to them, sufficient reasons must be given as to why the court did not find them well-founded…<\/p>\n The fact that the suspect has fled or absconded cannot be relied upon to substantiate the special grounds for pre-trial detention under both Article 129 \u00a7 2(a) of the Code of Criminal Code and Article 129 \u00a72 (b). If the suspect has already escaped or fled, it cannot be held that, for the same reasons, the risk of absconding also exists.<\/p>\n If the decision is based on Article 129 \u00a7 [2](a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the reasoning must contain [reference to] the time when the new criminal proceedings were instituted against the suspect, the authority conducting the proceedings, the case number, and the criminal offence which is the subject of the case.<\/p>\n As regards the risk of [a person] fleeing and absconding dealt with in Article\u00a0129 \u00a7\u00a02, it is not sufficient to refer to the severity of the prospective punishment, it is also necessary to establish the scale of the penalty.<\/p>\n …the court must also describe, besides the severity of the prospective punishment, which personal circumstances of the suspect lead it to conclude that a risk of the suspect escaping or absconding existed.<\/p>\n In a decision based on Article 129 \u00a7 2 (c), it is not sufficient to rely on [a proposition] that the suspect would frustrate, obstruct or jeopardise the obtaining of evidence, this presumption must also be substantiated with fact. This is particularly true for restrictive measures maintained following the first-instance judgment, that is [following] the evidence having been obtained.<\/p>\n The factual basis of the risk of reoffending \u2013 the special groundsfor pre-trial detention contained in Article 129 \u00a7 2(d) \u2013 must be contained in the decision. It is not sufficient to mention that the criminal offence is of a repetitive nature. A criminal record can be grounds to conclude that there is a risk of reoffending, nonetheless it is relevant to note how many times [offences were committed], which criminal offences [were committed], when the suspect was the subject of criminal proceedings, and what the resulting punishment was…<\/p>\n The decisions based on the prosecution\u2019s application must also elaborate on the factual and legal arguments of the suspect and the defence and on the judicial opinion on those arguments. In the event that the defence has requested the application of a less restrictive measure, it must also be mentioned why the court does not find [such measures] applicable.\u201d<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOCUMENTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 September 2006 the Committee of Ministers adopted Recommendation Rec(2006)13 to member States on the use of remand in custody, the conditions in which it is applied, and the provision of safeguards against abuse. The relevant parts read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cGeneral principles<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0[1] In view of both the presumption of innocence and the presumption in favour of liberty, the remand in custody of persons suspected of an offence shall be the exception rather than the norm.<\/p>\n [2]\u00a0\u00a0There shall not be a mandatory requirement that persons suspected of an offence (or particular classes of such persons) be remanded in custody.<\/p>\n [3]\u00a0\u00a0In individual cases, remand in custody shall only be used when strictly necessary and as a measure of last resort; it shall not be used for punitive reasons.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0In order to avoid inappropriate use of remand in custody the widest possible range of alternative, less restrictive measures relating to the conduct of a suspected offender shall be made available.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Remand prisoners shall be subject to conditions appropriate to their legal status; this entails the absence of restrictions other than those necessary for the administration of justice, the security of the institution, the safety of prisoners and staff and the protection of the rights of others and in particular the fulfilment of the requirements of the European Prison Rules and the other rules set out in Part III of the present text.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0The use of remand in custody<\/p>\n Justification<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Remand in custody shall generally be available only in respect of persons suspected of committing offences that are imprisonable.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0A person may only be remanded in custody where all of the following four conditions are satisfied:<\/p>\n a.\u00a0\u00a0there is reasonable suspicion that he or she committed an offence; and b. there are substantial reasons for believing that, if released, he or she would either (i) abscond, or (ii) commit a serious offence, or (iii) interfere with the course of justice, or (iv) pose a serious threat to public order; and c. there is no possibility of using alternative measures to address the concerns referred to in b.; and d. this is a step taken as part of the criminal justice process.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0[1] In order to establish whether the concerns referred to in Rule 7b. exist, or continue to do so, as well as whether they could be satisfactorily allayed through the use of alternative measures, objective criteria shall be applied by the judicial authorities responsible for determining whether suspected offenders shall be remanded in custody or, where this has already happened, whether such remand shall be extended.<\/p>\n [2]\u00a0\u00a0The burden of establishing that a substantial risk exists and that it cannot be allayed shall lie on the prosecution or investigating judge.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0[1] The determination of any risk shall be based on the individual circumstances of the case, but particular consideration shall be given to:<\/p>\n a.\u00a0\u00a0the nature and seriousness of the alleged offence; b. the penalty likely to be incurred in the event of conviction; c. the age, health, character, antecedents and personal and social circumstances of the person concerned, and in particular his or her community ties; and d. the conduct of the person concerned, especially how he or she has fulfilled any obligations that may have been imposed on him or her in the course of previous criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n [2]\u00a0\u00a0The fact that the person concerned is not a national of, or has no other links with, the state where the offence is supposed to have been committed shall not in itself be sufficient to conclude that there is a risk of flight.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0Wherever possible remand in custody should be avoided in the case of suspected offenders who have the primary responsibility for the care of infants.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0In deciding whether remand in custody shall be continued, it shall be borne in mind that particular evidence which may once have previously made the use of such a measure seem appropriate, or the use of alternative measures seem inappropriate, may be rendered less compelling with the passage of time.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0A breach of alternative measures may be subject to a sanction but shall not automatically justify subjecting someone to remand in custody. In such cases the replacement of alternative measures by remand in custody shall require specific motivation.<\/p>\n Judicial authorisation<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The responsibility for remanding someone in custody, authorising its continuation and imposing alternative measures shall be discharged by a judicial authority.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Duration<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0[1] Remand in custody shall only ever be continued so long as all the conditions in Rules 6 and 7 are fulfilled.<\/p>\n [2]\u00a0\u00a0In any case its duration shall not exceed, nor normally be disproportionate to, the penalty that may be imposed for the offence concerned.<\/p>\n [3]\u00a0\u00a0In no case shall remand in custody breach the right of a detained person to be tried within a reasonable time.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0Any specification of a maximum period of remand in custody shall not lead to a failure to consider at regular intervals the actual need for its continuation in the particular circumstances of a given case.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0[1] It is the responsibility of the prosecuting authority or the investigating judicial authority to act with due diligence in the conduct of an investigation and to ensure that the existence of matters supporting remand in custody is kept under continuous review.\u201d<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 October 2015 the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution no. 2077 entitled \u201cAbuse of pre-trial detention in States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights\u201d, in which it called on all States Parties to the Convention to:<\/p>\n \u201c12.1. implement measures aimed at reducing pre-trial detention, including the following:<\/p>\n 12.1.1. raising awareness among judges and prosecutors of the legal limits placed on pre-trial detention by national law and the European Convention on Human Rights and of the negative consequences of pre-trial detention on detainees, their families and on society as a whole;<\/p>\n 12.1.2. ensuring that decisions on pre-trial detention are taken by more senior judges or by collegiate courts and that judges do not suffer negative consequences for refusing pre-trial detention in accordance with the law;<\/p>\n 12.1.3. ensuring greater equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence, including by allowing defence lawyers unfettered access to detainees, by granting them access to the investigation file ahead of the decision imposing or prolonging pre-trial detention, and by providing sufficient funding for legal aid, including for proceedings related to pre-trial detention;<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 December 2011 the Committee of Ministers adopted Resolution CM\/ResDH(2011)222 on the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in four cases against Hungary concerning the length of detention on remand. According to information provided by the Government, following amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure which had entered into force on 1 July 2003, domestic courts were to give detailed reasons for remanding a person in custody. In addition, the risk that an accused person might abscond was no longer to be deduced from the seriousness of the alleged crime alone. Moreover, following further amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure which had entered into force on 1 May 2006, courts were only to remand a person in custody as a last resort, while taking into account the principle of proportionality.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0In its decision of CM\/Del\/Dec(2017)1288\/H46-16 of 7 June 2017 concerning prison overcrowding in Hungary, the Committee of Ministers \u201cnoted with interest the further extension of the application of \u201creintegration custody\u201d, the facilitation of and increase in the use of house arrest, and the slight decrease in the number of defendants placed in pre-trial detention; and it strongly encouraged the authorities to further pursue their efforts in this regard and to find all possible means \u201cto encourage prosecutors and judges to use as widely as possible alternatives to detention…\u201d.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his pre-trial detention had been repeatedly extendedwithout a reasonable suspicion of his having committed a crime andwith the courts applying only formulaic reasoning and failing to take into account his personal circumstances. Furthermore, his detention had exceeded a reasonable length, since the domestic authorities had failed to display diligence in conducting the proceedings. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 3 which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be … entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention.It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant indicated that the domestic courts had failed to conduct the proceedings with the special diligence required when a defendant was in pre-trial detention. In particular, there had been inactive periods in the proceedings when the investigating authorities had not implemented any measures. As a result, he had been in pre-trial detention for three years and eight months in respect of a criminal offence which could not in any way be considered complex.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0In the proceedings before the Court, the applicant claimed that there had been no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence, and the prosecutor\u2019s office had failed to provide the requisite evidence in this respect. Furthermore, the domestic authorities had not substantiated with any proof that either he or his family members had tried to influence witnesses. The applicant further contended that the domestic authorities had erroneously relied on his being unreachable at his registered permanent address, his lack of regular income, and the gravity of the alleged criminal offence in order to establish a risk of his absconding.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicant\u2019s view, his detention had been repeatedly extended, with brief, abstract and almost identical formulationsbeing given in terms of reasoning, and in the absence of any individual examination.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0He further submitted that the decisions of the domestic courts had not reflected any consideration of the defence\u2019s arguments concerning less restrictive measures on the basis of personal circumstances.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention had been in full compliance with the requirements of the relevant domestic law, and had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. In particular, the pre-trial detention had lasted only as long as had been absolutely necessary.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0In their view, there was no doubt that throughout the period of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention both a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence in question and special grounds for pre-trial detention had existed.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic authorities had paid due attention to the particular circumstances of the case, the applicant\u2019s personal situation and the defence counsel\u2019s submissions.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the domestic authorities had had grounds for holding the applicant in custody, given that the investigation had been on-going and further evidence had had to be collected. In relation to this point, the Government stressed that the domestic courts had found that a less restrictive measure would be insufficient to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also noted that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention had been justified by the risk that he would influence witnesses or reoffend, as evidenced by the parallel investigation initiated against him for attempted murder.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government submitted that the authorities had displayed due diligence in handling the applicant\u2019s case, and there had been no periods of inaction attributable to them. Thus, the length of the coercive measures had not exceeded the period that was absolutely necessary.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities. The requirement for the judicial officer to give relevant and sufficient reasons for the detention \u2013 in addition to the persistence of reasonable suspicion \u2013 applies already at the time of the first decision ordering detention on remand, that is to say \u201cpromptly\u201d after the arrest (see Buzadji v.\u00a0the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 87 and 102, ECHR 2016 (extracts)). Furthermore, when deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (see, for example, Idalov v.\u00a0Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, \u00a7 140, 22 May 2012).<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0Justifications which have been deemed \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d reasons in the Court\u2019s case-law have included such grounds as the danger of absconding, the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of evidence being tampered with, the risk of collusion, the risk of reoffending, the risk of causing public disorder and the need to protect the detainee (see, for instance, Ara Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 629\/11, \u00a7 50, 20 October 2016, with further references).<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The presumption is always in favour of release. The national judicial authorities must, with respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts militating for or against the existence of the above-mentioned requirement of public interest or justifying a departure from the rule in Article 5, and must set them out in their decisions on applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the well-documented facts stated by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 (see, among other authorities, Buzadji, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 89 and 91). Arguments for and against release must not be \u201cgeneral and abstract\u201d (see Smirnova v. Russia, nos. 46133\/99 and 48183\/99, \u00a7 63, ECHR 2003\u2011IX (extracts)). Where the law provides for a presumption in respect of factors relevant to the grounds for continued detention, the existence of the specific facts outweighing the rule of respect for individual liberty must be convincingly demonstrated (see Ilijkov v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 33977\/96, \u00a7 84 in fine, 26 July 2001).<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant was remanded in custody on 26\u00a0February 2011 and convicted at the first level of jurisdiction on 29\u00a0October 2014. He thus remained in pre-trial detention within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention for three years and eight months. Even taking into account that the case concerned the suspicion of murder, the Court does not consider this period short in absolute terms (compare and contrastG\u00e1bor Nagy v. Hungary (no. 2), no. 73999\/14, \u00a7 66, 11\u00a0April 2017, and Doronin v. Ukraine, no. 16505\/02, \u00a7 61, 19 February 2009).<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the reasonable suspicion on which the domestic courts based their decisions to extend the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention arose as a result of extensive material gathered during the investigation. It also accepts that the suspicion that the applicant had committed murder may have persisted throughout the period of his pre-trial detention, but reiterates that the existence of reasonable suspicion cannot on its own justify pre-trial detention, and must be supported by additional grounds (see G\u00e1bor Nagy (no. 2), cited above, \u00a7 67). Thus, it will examine whether the other grounds relied on by the judicial authorities justified the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0When justifying the need to detain the applicant during the criminal proceedings against him, the domestic judicial authorities reasoned that he might abscond or interfere with the administration of justice by, inter alia, putting pressure on witnesses.They referred to an incident when the applicant had allegedly threatened witnesses to discourage them from testifying (see paragraph7above).Whenextending the applicant\u2019s detention during the initial phase of the investigation (see paragraphs9, 14, 17, 12, and 16 above), the courts still relied on the risk of the applicant obstructing the investigation, stating, without further explanation, that, based on the witness testimonies, there were grounds to believe that he would influence the witnesses.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates in this respect that it was for the domestic courts to demonstrate that a substantial risk of collusion existed and continued to exist during the entire period of the applicant\u2019s detention. The courts should have analysed other pertinent factors, such as the progress of the investigation or judicial proceedings, the applicant\u2019s character, his behaviour before and after his arrest, and any other specific justifications for the fear that he might abuse his liberty by carrying out acts aimed at the falsification or destruction of evidence or the manipulation of witnesses (see Mikhail Grishin v. Russia, no. 14807\/08, \u00a7\u00a0148, 24 July 2012).<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0 The decision of 26 February 2011 of the Pest Central District Court referred to the fact that the applicant had attempted to threaten witnesses to keep them from testifying. However, for more than a year following his arrest,the domestic authorities failed to provide any clarification as to how this event allowed them to draw an inference that the applicant would interfere with justice if left at liberty.\u00a0In any event, it appears that the domestic authorities had sufficient time to take statements from witnesses in a manner which could have excluded any doubt as to their veracity, and which would have eliminated the need to continue depriving the applicant of his liberty on that basis. The Court also notes that while the decision of 25 April 2012 of the Budapest High Court explained that there were no investigative measures that could possibly be influenced by the applicant, it does not appear that any assessment was made as to theprogress of the proceedings or the applicant\u2019s conduct during this initial phase of the criminal investigation.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that as of 25 April 2012 the domestic courts relied only on the risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0As regards this risk, the Court reiterates that it should be assessed with reference to various factors, especially those relating to the character of the person involved, his morals, his home, his occupation, his assets, his family ties and all kinds of links with the country in which he is being prosecuted. Although the seriousness of the charges or severity of the sentence faced is relevant in the assessment of the risk of an accused absconding or reoffending, it cannot by itself serve to justify long periods of pre-trial detention (see G\u00e1bor Nagy (no. 2), cited above, \u00a7 70).<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to citing the seriousness of the charges as a reason for the extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, in the present case, the domestic authoritiesconsidered that the applicant might abscond owing to his lack of employment and his being unreachable at his registered permanent place of residence at the time of his arrest. The Court might accept these grounds as relevant. However, it cannot find them decisive, given that the judicial decisions authorising the applicant\u2019s detention remained silent as to why those risks could not be offset by any other means of ensuring his appearance at trial.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes in this regard that the domestic courts refused to consider the hosting declaration signed by a person who had agreed to vouch for the applicant.Without referring to the applicable rules of criminal procedure, they also relied on the applicant\u2019s failure to submit documents concerning that person\u2019s financial situation (see paragraph\u00a016 above).The Court finds such an argument unconvincing.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, on two occasions the Budapest High Court ordered the applicant\u2019s continued detention under house arrest, yet both detention orders were quashed by the Budapest Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above), which found again that the applicant could abscond. The higher court therefore ordered that his continued detention take place in a prison facility. It did not explain the reasons why it disagreed with the first-instance court as to the absence of reasons to detain him.<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court cannot establish that the authorities gave proper consideration to the possibility of ensuring the applicant\u2019s attendance by the use of other \u201cpreventive measures\u201d \u2013 measures which are expressly provided for in Hungarian law to ensure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings, such as release on bail or house arrest, as requested by the applicant.<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the above-mentioned problems, the Court considers that the reasons relied on by the domestic courts for ordering and extending the applicant\u2019s detention were stereotyped and abstract. Their decisions relied on grounds for detention without any attempt to show how those grounds applied specifically to the particular circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case (see Buzadji, cited above, \u00a7 122).<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court cannot but note that it took the authorities over three and a half years (from 26 February 2011 until 29 October 2014) to proceed from the applicant\u2019s arrest to the first-instance judgment.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all of the above factors, the Court considers that there were no relevant and sufficient reasons to extend the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for three years and eight months. It follows that, in the present case, there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore makes no award in this regard and finds no exceptional circumstances which would warrant a different conclusion (see,a contrario, Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no. 35589\/08, \u00a7 92, 30 March 2017).<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0Article 46 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.\u201d<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a judgment in which it finds a breach of the Convention imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, general measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress as far as possible its effects. It is primarily for the State concerned to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used in its domestic legal order to discharge its obligation under Article 46 of the Convention. However, with a view to helping the respondent State to fulfil that obligation, the Court may seek to indicate the type of general measures that might be taken in order to put an end to the situation it has found to exist (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 158-59, ECHR 2014; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 254-55, ECHR 2012; Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no.\u00a010249\/03, \u00a7 148, 17 September 2009; and Broniowski, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0194).<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissionsas to the suitability of the pilot-judgment procedure<\/strong><\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered it unnecessary for the Court to embark on a pilot procedure, given that the facts of the present case had not raised structural, systematic problems. Although, admittedly, domestic courts ordered pre-trial detention in a large number of cases, which had resulted in there being some 3,600 detainees in pre-trial detention at present, the Court had only found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 in a few cases, and this had been due to individual errors rather than structural problems.<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not comment on this issue.<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0The interveners jointly relied on two arguments, namely the widespread practice of the domestic courts which they asserted was incompatible with Article 5\u00a7 3 of the Convention, and the deficiencies in the legal system,for arguing that there was a systematic problem in Hungary as regards the extension of pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the practice of the Hungarian courts, they argued that, in general, pre-trial detention lasted for an excessive period of timeand was based on formulaic, repetitive and abstract court decisions which did not take into account the individual circumstances of defendants. Furthermore, domestic courts gave no consideration to alternative less restrictive measures, and the equality of arms was not respected in the proceedings leading to pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0The interveners also submitted that in about 90% of cases the courts upheld applicationsby the prosecutor\u2019s office. They referred to a report published by the K\u00faria on 29 May 2017 stating that, in a number of cases, court decisions were entirely based on applicationsby the prosecutor\u2019s office and failed to react to the arguments of the defence counsel, including applications for less restrictive coercive measures. According to the report of the K\u00faria, in general, this was coupled with a frequent lack of reasoning.<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0The interveners further submitted that the domestic courts failed to substantiate specific grounds for ordering pre-trial detention. As evidenced by research conducted by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee in 2013-2014, covering the cases of 116 defendants, the risk of absconding was often established solely or primarily on the basis of the gravity of the offence and the prospective punishment, and the risk of interfering with the course of justice on the basis of very abstract arguments. On certain occasions, a lack of regular income served as the only basis for ordering pre-trial detention, and the risk of reoffending was established with reference to convictions that had taken place long before the on-going criminal proceedings. Furthermore, according to the K\u00faria\u2019s report, the risk of collusion was often referred to without specific reasons for that risk being mentioned.<\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0The interveners also pointed to certain alleged deficiencies in the Hungarian legislation, in particular the 2013 amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure which abolished the four-year time-limit on pre-trial detention in casesinvolving the most serious offences.<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, they submitted that excessive pre-trial detention had given rise to a number of similar applications before the Court, and would continue to give rise to such applications unless tangible change was effected at national level.<\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0The interveners acknowledged that since 2014 there had been a decrease in the number of persons in pre-trial detention, but emphasised that nonetheless a large number of people were still affected by the problem, since about 20% of the total prison population were pre-trial detainees.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in the context of systemic or structural violations, the potential inflow of future cases is an important consideration in terms of preventing the accumulation of repetitive cases on the Court\u2019s list, which hinders effective processing of other cases giving rise to violations, sometimes serious, of the rights it is responsible for safeguarding. A systemic or structural problem stems or results not just from an isolated incident or a particular turn of events in individual cases, but from defective legislation, when actions and omissions based thereon have given rise, or may give rise, to repetitive applications (see G\u00fclmez v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 16330\/02, \u00a7 60, 20 May 2008; Urb\u00e1rska Obec Tren\u010dianske Biskupice v. Slovakia, no. 74258\/01, \u00a7 148, 27 November 2007; and Hutten\u2011Czapska, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 235-37).<\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that since the adoption of the Committee of Ministers\u2019 Resolution in 2011 in respect of the execution of four cases against Hungary concerning the length of detention on remand,in a number of similar cases in recent years it has held that the reasons relied upon by the domestic courts in their decisions to extend pre-trial detention were not relevant and sufficient to justify an applicant\u2019s continued detention, and that the authorities had failed to envisage the possibility of imposing other preventive measures expressly foreseen by the Hungarian law to secure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings (see, among many other examples, Bandur v. Hungary, no.\u00a050130\/12, \u00a7 67, 5\u00a0July 2016; G\u00e1l v. Hungary, no. \u00a062631\/11, \u00a7 47, 11\u00a0March 2014; Baksza v. Hungary, no. 59196\/08, \u00a7\u00a038, 23\u00a0April 2013; and Hagy\u00f3 v. Hungary, no. 52624\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 56 and 58, 23\u00a0April 2013). Similar conclusions were reached in the K\u00faria\u2019s report of 29\u00a0May 2017 (see paragraphs 79 and80 above).<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that approximately sixty applications raising an issue under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention are currently pending before it in respect of Hungary. The Court observes that while the number of pending cases demonstrates that the violation of the applicant\u2019s right under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7 3 of the Convention was not prompted by an isolated incident, it must not be overlooked that the cases have accumulated on the Court\u2019s docket over a period of more than five years.<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0It is also true, as submitted by the third-party interveners, that while the relevant provisions of the domestic law define detention as the most extreme preventive measure, it appears that it is applied most frequently by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 35 and 83 above). Nonetheless, the Court considers that the large number of pre-trial detainees in comparison with persons subject to other types of restrictive measures does not necessarily reflect a practice incompatible with the Convention.<\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further acknowledges that the respondent State has already taken certain steps to remedy the problems related to pre-trial detention. The Court welcomes the efforts made by the Hungarian authorities aimed at bringing Hungarian legislation into compliance with the Convention requirements (see paragraph 39 above). It also takes into account the relevant streamlining of domestic practice prepared by the K\u00faria (see paragraph\u00a036 above).<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0Given these circumstances (see paragraphs 86 to 88 above), the Court does not find it necessary to engage in a pilot-judgment procedure at this stage.<\/p>\n 90.\u00a0\u00a0That being said,the Court has no reason to doubt that the present judgment would be complemented by general measures aimed at raising the awareness of national authorities and developing their capacity in line withthe Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers CM\/Rec (2006)13 of 29\u00a0September 2006, the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly summed up in Resolution no. 2077 (2015) adopted on 1 October 2015,the Committee of Ministers\u2019 decisionCM\/Del\/Dec(2017)1288\/H46-16 of 7\u00a0June 2017 (see paragraph 40 above),and also the K\u00faria\u2019s report of 29\u00a0May 2017 (see paragraph 36 above).<\/p>\n 91.\u00a0\u00a0 Should the efforts made by the Government to tackle the underlying Convention problem prove to be insufficient, the Court may reassess the need to apply the pilot-judgment procedure to this type of cases (see Rutkowski and Others v. Poland, nos. 72287\/10 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 203\u201106, 219 et passim, 7 July 2015; Gazs\u00f3 v. Hungary, no. 48322\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 32-33 and 35, 16 July 2015, and Novruk and Others v. Russia, nos. 31039\/11 and 4 others, \u00a7 135, 15 March 2016).<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe application admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 June 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Marialena Tsirli\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ganna Yudkivska _______________<\/p>\n [1].\u00a0\u00a0Available at: http:\/\/ugyeszseg.hu\/pdf\/statisztika\/Buntetojogi_szakterulet_2016.pdf<\/p>\n
\nPaulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
\nFaris Vehabovi\u0107,
\nCarlo Ranzoni,
\nGeorges Ravarani,
\nMarko Bo\u0161njak,
\nP\u00e9ter Paczolay, judges,
\nand Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n\n\n
\n <\/td>\n Prosecutionapplication for remand in custody<\/td>\n Decisions on remand in custody<\/td>\n Decisions on obligation not to leave a certain area<\/td>\n Decisions on house arrest<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n \n2009<\/td>\n 5,665<\/td>\n 5,591<\/td>\n 97<\/td>\n 57<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n \n 2010<\/td>\n 6,355<\/td>\n 5,885<\/td>\n 136<\/td>\n 97<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2011<\/td>\n 6,245<\/td>\n 5,712<\/td>\n 168<\/td>\n 104<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2012<\/td>\n 5,861<\/td>\n 5,334<\/td>\n 140<\/td>\n 141<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2013<\/td>\n 6,673<\/td>\n 6,098<\/td>\n 169<\/td>\n 148<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2014<\/td>\n 5,319<\/td>\n 4,836<\/td>\n 120<\/td>\n 114<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2015<\/td>\n 5,075<\/td>\n 4,453<\/td>\n 154<\/td>\n 162<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2016<\/td>\n 4,846<\/td>\n 4,199<\/td>\n 168<\/td>\n 198<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n