B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government denied that the proceedings had been unfair. They submitted that while Article 6 \u00a7 1 obliged courts to give reasons for their decisions, it could not be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Thus, in dismissing an appeal, an appellate court may, in principle, simply endorse the reasons for the lower court\u2019s decision. The Government argued that a decision of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions would only be binding for the relevant chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court and only for the relevant proceedings in question. They went on to add that the fact that a seemingly contradictory decision was adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions would not be sufficient grounds to grant a rectification request in a similar case. In support of their position they provided the Court with two sample decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court.<\/p>\n
42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed with the Government\u2019s submissions. She argued that one of the grounds for rectification of a decision is the previous decision not being in accordance with the law or procedure, which allows the Supreme Administrative Court to review its previous decision and its compliance with the law, including the case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions.<\/p>\n
43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates at the outset that conflicting decisions in similar cases heard in the same court which, in addition, is the court of last instance in the matter may, in the absence of a mechanism which ensures consistency, breach the principle of fair trial and thereby undermine public confidence in the judiciary, such confidence being one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of law (see, inter alia, Bala\u017eoskiv.\u00a0the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 45117\/08, \u00a7 30, 25\u00a0April 2013, and the cases cited therein). In the Iordan Iordanov and Others case, the Court identified the issues that needed to be assessed when analysing whether conflicting decisions in similar cases stemming from the same court violated the principle of legal certainty under Article 6 of the Convention: (1) the existence of \u201cprofound and long-lasting divergences\u201d in the relevant case\u2011law; (2) whether the domestic law provided for a mechanism capable of removing the judicial inconsistency; and (3) whether this mechanism was applied and, if so, what its effects were (see Iordan Iordanov and Othersv.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 23530\/02, \u00a7 49, 2\u00a0July 2009). Consequently, the Contracting States had an obligation to organise their legal system so as to avoid the adoption of discordant judgments (see Nejdet \u015eahin and Perihan \u015eahinv.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no.13279\/05, \u00a7 55, 20\u00a0October 2011).<\/p>\n
44.\u00a0\u00a0In Emel Boyraz(cited above, \u00a7 73), the Court held that the situation complained of by the applicant, namely that the Supreme Administrative Court had reached contradictory conclusions in similar situations, had not amounted to \u201cprofound and long-lasting divergences\u201d in the relevant case\u2011law of the Supreme Administrative Court, regard being had to the fact that the applicant had submitted only one such decision, which had been rendered in the case of R.B., who had also been refused a post of security officer on account of her sex. The same considerations also hold true for the applicant in the present case, who did not submit any other decisions by the Supreme Administrative Court, and therefore the Court considers that the difference of interpretation between the Twelfth Division and the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions did not, in itself, amount to a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the conflicting decisions rendered by the Supreme Administrative Court.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the Court does not find a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 in respect of the first limb of the applicant\u2019s complaint.<\/p>\n
45.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the second limb of the applicant\u2019s Article 6 \u00a7 1 complaint, the Court recalls that in Emel Boyraz it found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the failure of the Supreme Administrative Court to reply to that applicant\u2019s submissions regarding the conflicting conclusions reached by the Supreme Administrative Court in her case and the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions in the case of R.B (ibid., \u00a775). In that connection, the Court reiterates that according to its established case\u2011law reflecting a principle linked to the proper administration of justice, judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based. The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. Although Article 6 \u00a7 1 obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Thus, in dismissing an appeal, an appellate court may, in principle, simply endorse the reasons for the lower court\u2019s decision (ibid., \u00a7\u00a074,and the cases cited therein). Although such a technique of reasoning by an appellate court is, in principle, acceptable, there might be circumstances in which an appellate court might be required to give proper reasons of its own (see Hirvisaari v. Finland, no.\u00a049684\/99, \u00a7 32, 27\u00a0September 2001; Tatishvili v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a01509\/02, \u00a7\u00a062, ECHR 2007\u2011I; Emel Boyraz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a075; and Deryan v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a041721\/04, \u00a7 37, 21 July 2015).<\/p>\n
46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in contrast to the Emel Boyraz case (cited above), the decision of the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions in the case of R.B. was rendered on 6\u00a0December 2007, that is to say after the Gaziantep Administrative Court\u2019s judgment had been upheld in the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s appeal review in the applicant\u2019s case. Therefore, unlike the applicant in Emel Boyraz,the applicant in the instant case had the opportunity to submit her pleadings concerning the opposite conclusions reached by the Supreme Administrative Court only during the rectification stage of the proceedings. The Court will therefore examine whether the applicant\u2019s submissions concerning the opposite conclusions reached by the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions regarding the same issue which had only became available after the appeal proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case nevertheless required a specific reply from the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court.<\/p>\n
47.\u00a0\u00a0From the outset the Court emphasises that its review in this matter is not concerned with whether the emergence of a seemingly opposite case\u2011law of the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions could constitute grounds for rectification of a decision in the Turkish Administrative Law context. Furthermore, the Court does not consider it necessary to determine whether Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention imposes an obligation on a court of final instance to reconsider an issue in the light of subsequent case-law of a higher judicial authority. Moreover, it is not the Court\u2019s task to express a view on the correctness of the conclusion reached by the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court when it dismissed the rectification request on the basis of section 54 \u00a7 1, holding that its previous decision was in accordance with law and procedure. The Court\u2019s assessment in the present case is limited to examining whether the high court\u2019s reasoning in the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case complied with the requirements of a fair hearing under the Convention.<\/p>\n
48.\u00a0\u00a0In examining this issue, the Court must bear in mind that where a high court refuses to accept a case on the basis that the legal grounds for such a case are not made out, very limited reasoning may satisfy the requirements of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Nerva v.\u00a0the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 42295\/98, 11 July 2000; Marini v.\u00a0Albania, no. 3738\/02, \u00a7 106, ECHR 2007-XIV (extracts); and, Bachowski v.\u00a0Poland (dec.), no. 32463\/06, ECHR 2010 (extracts)). More specifically, the Court has held that courts of cassation comply with their obligation to provide sufficient reasoning when they base themselves on a specific legal provision, without further reasoning, in dismissing cassation appeals which do not have any prospects of success (see Sale v. France, no.\u00a039765\/04, \u00a7\u00a017, 21 March 2006, and Burg and Others v. France (dec.), no.\u00a04763\/02, ECHR 2003-II; for the same approach with regard to constitutional court practice see e.g. Wildgruber v. Germany, (dec.) no.\u00a032817\/02, 16\u00a0October 2006, and Wnuk v. Poland (dec.), no. 38308\/05, 1\u00a0September 2009; and mutatis mutandis, regarding the public prosecutor\u2019s decision rejecting a civil party\u2019s request to lodge an appeal on points of law Gorou v. Greece (no. 2) [GC], no.\u00a012686\/03, \u00a7 41, 20\u00a0March 2009). However, the Court has also held that in the circumstances of a particular case, the requirement to give more detailed reasons could apply to courts of appeal (see, in particular, Yanakiev v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a040476\/98, \u00a7\u00a072, 10 August 2006; Gheorghe v.\u00a0Romania, no. 19215\/04, \u00a7\u00a050, 15\u00a0March 2007; Wagner and J.M.W.L. v.\u00a0Luxembourg, no. 76240\/01, \u00a7\u00a096, 28 June 2007; Velted-98 AD v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 15239\/02, \u00a7\u00a048, 11\u00a0December 2008). In order to determine the extent to which this duty to give specific reasons applies at the appeal level, the Court has considered matters such as the nature of a filtering procedure and its significance in the context of the proceedings as a whole, the scope of the powers of a court of appeal, and the manner in which the applicant\u2019s interests were actually presented and protected before that court (see Hansen v. Norway, no.\u00a015319\/09, \u00a7 73, 2 October 2014, with further references to Ekbatani v.\u00a0Sweden, 26 May 1988, \u00a7 27, Series A no. 134, and Monnell and Morris v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, \u00a7 56). In cases where the Court found that a court of appeal had been required to give more adequate reasons, it took into account factors such as whether the arguments that had been raised by the parties which had a decisive impact on the outcome of the case had been examined beforeany of the previous instances(see Yanakiev, cited above, \u00a7 71; Gheorghe, cited above, \u00a7 48; andDeryan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a736-37) or whether the main pleas put forward by a party, especially when they concern the \u2018rights and freedoms\u2019 guaranteed by the Convention and the Protocols thereto, had been examined with rigour and care (seeWagner and J.M.W.L., cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 96-97). Finally, in a later case concerning the filtering procedure of a court of appeal, the Court held that the very brief reasoning \u2013 namely that the appeal would not succeed \u2011by a high court, ruling at second instance, had been insufficient in the particular circumstances of the case in so far as the appellate court in question had full jurisdiction to review facts, law and procedure in the case and the limited reasons given thereindid not have due regard to that applicant\u2019s interest concerning his effective right of appeal to a higher court (see Hansen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a782-83).<\/p>\n
49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court first notes that in Turkish law, as in force at the material time, the rectification of a decision in administrative proceedings was an ordinary remedy and involved asking the appeal court which had given the impugned judgment to reconsider its decision on the grounds that it had made a mistake. If the rectification requestwereadmitted, the court of appeal in question conducted a re\u2011examination of the case without taking new facts or findings into consideration (see, inter alia, Dedecan and Okv.\u00a0Turkey, nos. 22685\/09 and 39472\/09, \u00a7 23, 22 September 2015). The Court notes in that connection that the relevant provisions of Law no.\u00a02577 gave considerable leeway to the Supreme Administrative Court for its scope of review applicable in the rectification proceedings concerning questions of law and procedure. It can further be understood that if the rectification request wereadmitted, the Supreme Administrative Court had the power to uphold its previous decision, if necessary by giving additional reasons, or to annul it by rendering a new decision and remitting the case to the first\u2011instance court if the circumstances so required (see paragraph\u00a023 above).<\/p>\n
50.\u00a0\u00a0On the question of whether the emergence of new case-law has been recognised as a ground for rectification by the Supreme Administrative Court, the Court observes that in one of two sample decisions submitted by the Government to the Court (E.\u00a02010\/9332, K.\u00a02013\/13079, 30 December 2013), the Supreme Administrative Court granted the rectification of its previous decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh examination, highlighting in particular a decision rendered by the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions in a similar case which had also been rendered after the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s appeal review.<\/p>\n
51.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant\u2019s submissions brought before the Supreme Administrative Court for her rectification request included not only the fact that a similar case had been examined and decided by the General Assembly with an outcome different from the one reached by the Twelfth Division but that the latter\u2019s impugned decision ran contrary to the prohibition of discrimination against women and her Convention right to a fair trial (see paragraph\u00a019 above). In the Court\u2019s view, those arguments concerning the merits of her dispute on points of law, which were coincidentally fully supported by the conclusions of the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions, were not addressed by the Supreme Administrative Court in its previous decision on appeal, which had only endorsed the reasons of the first-instance court.Therefore, the applicant could have reasonably expected a specific reply from the Supreme Administrative Court. What also lends support to this position is the opinion of the judge rapporteur in charge of presenting the case to the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court drawing attention to the decision of the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions in the case of R.B. and recommending that the rectification request be granted. Furthermore, it was not the case that the Twelfth Division was ignorant of the General Assembly decision, the composition of which included some members of the Twelfth Division (see paragraph18 above). Having therefore participated in the determination of the case of R.B.,the interests of justice required them to elucidate the reasons for their decision of inadmissibility in the applicant\u2019s case. In that respect, sight must not be lost of the fact that the applicant who gained knowledge of the General Assembly\u2019s conclusions regarding the same issue sought recourse before the Twelfth Division in the expectation that this would be the final and only opportunity for the Supreme Administrative Court to re-evaluate her case before it became final.<\/p>\n
52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that the applicant\u2019s submissions concerning the different conclusion reached by the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions were not only relevant in the examination of admissibility of the rectification stage, but that it was the sole opportunity for the Twelfth Division to differentiate the applicant\u2019s case from that of R.B.\u2019s before her case became final. Having regard in particular to the fact that the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning the prohibition of discrimination between women and men were not reviewed during any of the relevant stages before the Supreme Administrative Court, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case, the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court failed to fulfil its obligation to provide adequate reasoning for dismissing the applicant\u2019s rectification request.<\/p>\n
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n
III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n
53.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n
\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 25,000\u00a0euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. In respect of pecuniary damage, she claimed EUR\u00a056,318.90 representing the salary and social benefits she would have received from the day when her employment contract was terminated by TEDA\u015e until 14 September 2014, the date when she made her final submissions to the Court. The applicant explained that in calculating that amount, she had taken an average of the minimum wage amounts applicable during the period of thirteen years and two monthsto compensate for her loss of salary.<\/p>\n
55.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested these amounts for being unsubstantiated and excessive.<\/p>\n
56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s case-law establishes that there must be a clear causal connection between the damage claimed by the applicants and the violation of the Convention. In appropriate cases, this may include compensation in respect of loss of earnings (see, among other authorities, Kuri\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Slovenia [GC], no. 26828\/06, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2012 (extracts),and the cases cited therein).<\/p>\n
57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case the applicant was dismissed from her post on account of her sex, which the Court has found to be discriminatory, in breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. The loss of her employment undoubtedly deprived the applicant of her main source of income. Hence, there is a direct causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage claimed, which has to be reimbursed in such a way as to restore, as far as possible, the situation existing before the breach (see, inter alia, Rainys and Gasparavi\u010dius v.\u00a0Lithuania, nos. 70665\/01 and 74345\/01, \u00a7 45, 7 April 2005). However, the Court notes that a precise calculation of the sums necessary to make complete reparation (restitutio in integrum) in respect of the pecuniary loss suffered by the applicant is prevented by the inherently uncertain character of the damage flowing from the violations. This is particularly so in relation to the question of how long the applicant would have remained in TEDA\u015e had it not been for her dismissal. Nevertheless, an award may still be made notwithstanding the large number of imponderables involved in the assessment of future losses, though the greater the lapse of time involved the more uncertain the link becomes between the breach and the damage. The question to be decided in such cases is the level of just satisfaction, in respect of both past and future pecuniary loss, which it is necessary to award to each applicant, the matter to be determined by the Court at its discretion, having regard to what is equitable (see Lustig-Prean and Beckett v.\u00a0the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos.\u00a031417\/96 and 32377\/96, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a022-23, 25\u00a0July 2000, and Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos. 33985\/96 and 33986\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 18-19, ECHR 2000\u2011IX).<\/p>\n
58.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not provide information to the Court as to how long she had remained unemployed after she had been dismissed from her position in TEDA\u015e or whether she hadtaken any steps to mitigate her loss of earnings. The Court therefore finds it difficult to ascertain the precise amount ofpecuniary damage which ensued. At the same time, itconsiders thatthe applicant would have been able to work as a security officer at least from the moment when she was offered the post after having succeeded in the examination and until the date her employment was actually confirmed by TEDA\u015e subsequent to the stay of execution decision of the Gaziantep Administrative Court. Moreover, had the administrative courts prevented the violation found under Article 14 in conjunction with Article8 of the Convention, the applicant would have been able to obtain redress for her loss of income concerning the period starting from her dismissal until the date of the final judgment in the domestic proceedings.The Court also considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage which the finding of a violation of the Convention in this judgment does not suffice to remedy. Therefore, taking into account the number of imponderables involved in the assessment of the applicant\u2019s loss of earnings and in the light of all the information in its possession, the Court decides on an equitable basis to award the applicant an aggregate sum of EUR\u00a011,000 under all heads of damage combined, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 6,769.11 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court. In support of her claim, the applicant only referred to the Istanbul Bar Association\u2019s scale of fees.<\/p>\n
60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim arguing that it was not sufficiently itemised.<\/p>\n
61.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant merely referred to the Istanbul Bar Association\u2019s scale of fees and failed to submit any supporting documents. In those circumstances, and bearing in mind the terms of Rule 60 \u00a7 2 and 3 of its Rules, the Court makes no award in respect of the costs and expenses claimed by the applicant (see, inter alia, Hasan D\u00f6nerv. Turkey, no. 53546\/99, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a059\u201161, 20\u00a0November 2007, and Y\u0131lmaz Y\u0131ld\u0131zand Others v. Turkey, no.\u00a04524\/06, \u00a7 57, 14 October 2014).<\/p>\n
C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT,<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares, unanimously,the application admissible;<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, unanimously,that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention;<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, unanimously,that there has been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the conflicting decisions rendered by the Supreme Administrative Court;<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, by five votes to two,that there has been a violation of Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention on account of the absence of adequate reasoning in the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s rectification decision;<\/p>\n
5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, unanimously,<\/p>\n
(a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, EUR 11,000 (eleven thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n
6.\u00a0\u00a0Dismisses, unanimously,the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 June 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n
Stanley Naismith\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Robert Spano
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n
_______________<\/p>\n
In accordance with Article 45 \u00a7 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 \u00a7 2 of the Rules of Court, the joint partly dissenting opinionof Judges Spano and Kj\u00f8lbro is annexed to this judgment.<\/p>\n
R.S.
\nS.H.N.<\/p>\n
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES<\/strong>
\nSPANO AND KJ\u00d8LBRO<\/strong><\/p>\nI.<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention due to the lack of reasoning in the Turkish Supreme Administrative Court\u00b4s rejection of the applicant\u2019s request for rectification of the same court\u2019s judgment on the merits. We respectfully dissent from this finding which does not in our view find support in the existing case-law of the Court, as we will explain below. However, we agree with our colleagues that there has been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the conflicting decisions rendered by the Supreme Administrative Court and also that there has, conversely, been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with 8.[1]<\/p>\n
II.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0When the Court examines a complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, of the type presented by the applicant, the starting point must be the scope of appellate review in the high court in question. The majority is right when it states at paragraph 48 of the judgment, that according to the Court\u00b4s case-law where a high court refuses to accept a case on the basis that the legal grounds for such a case are made out, very limited reasoning may satisfy the requirement of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. In fact, the Court has held that courts of cassation comply with their obligation to provide sufficient reasoning when they base themselves on a specific legal provision, without further reasoning, in dismissing cassation appeals which do not have any prospects of success. In other words, in order to determine the extent to which this duty to give specific reasons applies at the appeal level, the Court has considered matters such as the nature of a filtering procedure and its significance in the context of the procedure as a whole, the scope of the powers of a court of appeal, and the manner in which the applicant\u2019s interests were actually presented and protected before the Court. The most recent consolidation of these general principles is found in the judgment of the Court in Hansen v Norway (no. 15319\/09, \u00a7 73, 2\u00a0October 2014).<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0In applying these principles, we begin by observing that the question for determination by the Turkish Supreme Administrative Court in examining a request for rectification is, under domestic law, not the same as the question which that court determines by its decision on appeal (see Fazl\u0131 Aslaner v. Turkey, no. 36073\/04, \u00a7 46, 4\u00a0March 2014). In other words, the question in the rectification proceedings is whether the party requesting rectification has demonstrated the existence of arguable grounds which would justify examining the rectification on the merits. Therefore, the decision on the rectification request cannot in itself be equated to a decision on the merits on appeal, for instance whether the law was applied correctly at first instance. It is true that this remedy is considered, as noted by the majority (see paragraph 49 of the judgment), an ordinary remedy under Turkish administrative law. However, for the purposes of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and the duty to give reasons at the appellate stage, rectification proceedings must in our view, due to their very nature and purpose, be treated by this Court as a special and particular type of appellate remedy which requires the Court to be cautious in imposing on the domestic high court the duty to give reasons that limits its ability to adequately apply this mechanism in a manner which conforms with the very narrow scope of possible rectification of a previous judgment on appeal provided under domestic law.<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0We also find it important to recall that the function of a reasoned judgment is to afford the parties the possibility of an effective appeal and to show to the parties that they have been heard. In the present case, account must therefore be taken of the fact that the Supreme Administrative Court, in dismissing the applicant\u2019s rectification request, acted as the final instance and that there was no possibility for the applicant to seek a further review of that decision (compare Hansen v. Norway (cited above, \u00a7 83), and unlike the applicant\u2019s situation in the case of Emel Boyraz (cited in the judgment)).<\/p>\n
5.\u00a0\u00a0In the rectification proceedings, the applicant requested that the Supreme Administrative Court revisit its previous decision in her case on direct appeal, due to the subsequent decision of the General Assembly of the same court applying the law differently. The Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for rectification by referring to the conditions for rectification as set out in section 54 of Law no. 2577 and held that the conditions for granting the rectification had not been made out. It also briefly noted that its previous decision had been in accordance with the law and procedure, implying therefore that the emergence of new case-law on a similar issue was not one of the grounds of rectification and that the decision of the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions which post\u2011dated the Twelfth Division\u2019s decision did not render it retrospectively unlawful.In our view, that decision, which is analogous to a rejection on manifestly ill\u2011founded grounds, cannot be considered a decision on the merits. We also note that changes in domestic case-law are part and parcel of every-day work in courts of appeals and supreme courts all over Europe. High courts must have flexibility to assess if and to what extent changes in previous case-law will be applied retroactively to already decided cases or whether they will only be applied in the future.<\/p>\n
6.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, we conclude that taking account of the nature and scope of the rectification remedy under Turkish domestic law, and the applicable principles in the Court\u00b4s case-law, the Supreme Administrative Court was not under a duty deriving from Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention to provide further reasons for its dismissal of the applicant\u2019s rectification request.<\/p>\n
7.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, we observe that in its decision, the Supreme Administrative Court endorsed the statement of facts and the legal reasoning set out in its previous decision. Furthermore, the written decision contained the judge rapporteur\u2019s analysis as well as the reference to the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions of 6 December 2007 in the case of R.B. It is therefore not the case that the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court ignored the applicant\u2019s submissions altogether (see Ruminski v. Sweden, no.\u00a017906\/15, \u00a7\u00a032, 2 May 2017, and compare Bochan v. Ukraine, no. 7577\/02, \u00a7\u00a084, 3\u00a0May 2007). We are therefore not persuaded that in the circumstances of this case, the absence of further reasoning, on the part of the Twelfth\u00a0Division of the Supreme Administrative Court, regarding the opposite conclusions reached by the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s General Assembly, in itself rendered the proceedings unfair.<\/p>\n
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\n[1].\u00a0\u00a0Statement by Judge Spano: In the light of the precedential value of Chamber judgments of the Court, I accept that there has been a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, in the present case as the facts here cannot be distinguished from the judgment of the Court in the case of Emel Boyraz v\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a06196008, 2 December 2014. However, I remain of the view, as expressed in my separate opinion in the latter case, that the Court\u00b4s application of these provisions of the Convention, to facts, as presented in both of these cases, is not persuasive.<\/p>\n