FIRST SECTION
\nDECISION<\/p>\n
Application no. 21891\/13
\nNuhi FERATI
\nagainst the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 12 June 2018 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Ale\u0161 Pejchal, President,
\nKrzysztof Wojtyczek,
\nArmen Harutyunyan, judges,
\nand Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 March 2013,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The applicant, Mr Nuhi Ferati, is a Macedonian national who was born in 1952 and lives in Skopje. He was represented before the Court by Mr J. Mitrinovski, a lawyer practising in Skopje.<\/p>\n 2. The Macedonian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their former Agent, Mr K. Bogdanov, succeeded by Ms D. Djonova.<\/p>\n The circumstances of the case<\/p>\n 3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 4. The applicant was a farmer whose cattle (82 animals) were slaughtered by the State authorities due to foot-and-mouth disease (\u0448\u0430\u043f \u0438 \u043b\u0438\u0433\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430).<\/p>\n 5. The applicant brought a civil action for damages against the respondent State. By a final judgment of 11 December 1997, later upheld by the Supreme Court (\u0412\u0440\u0445\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0421\u0443\u0434), three levels of jurisdiction granted a part of the applicant\u2019s claim.<\/p>\n 6. As to the remaining part of the applicant\u2019s claim, on 13 January 2009 the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435 II) partially ruled in the applicant\u2019s favour and ordered the State to pay further damages.<\/p>\n 7. N.T., a lawyer whom the applicant had meanwhile appointed to represent him in the proceedings, submitted an appeal which the Skopje Court of Appeal partly accepted and overturned the lower court\u2019s judgment in respect of the interest.<\/p>\n 8. The applicant, through N.T., lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. On 12 April 2012 the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts\u2019 judgments and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim in its entirety. According to a receipt slip (\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430) the judgment was served on N.T. on 29 May 2012. The Government submitted that the applicant was also represented by a second lawyer, A.A. According to a receipt slip submitted in evidence, A.A. received the judgment on 28 May 2012. The applicant stated that this judgment had been served on him at the end of November 2012. No evidence was submitted in support.<\/p>\n COMPLAINTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 9. The applicant complained that his rights under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention were violated in the compensation proceedings.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n 10. The applicant complained of a violation of his rights under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 6 \u00a7 1<\/p>\n \u201c In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n Article 1 of Protocol No. 1<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n A. The parties\u2019 arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n 11. The Government submitted that the final judgment of the Supreme Court had been received by the applicant\u2019s representative N.T. on 29 May 2012. They further submitted that A.A., the applicant\u2019s second representative, had been served with the judgment on 28 May 2012. The applicant\u2019s representative before the Court, J.M., had inspected the case file on 27 February 2013 and was aware of these circumstances. The applicant had not revoked the power of attorney issued to any of his representatives. The Government argued that the application had accordingly been lodged outside the six-month time-limit.<\/p>\n 12. The applicant submitted that by the time the judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered, N.T. and A.A. had no longer been his representatives. He reiterated that the judgment had been delivered to him at the end of November 2012. His request to obtain a copy of the receipt attesting to that had been to no avail.<\/p>\n B. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n 13. The Court reiterates that the six-month period will run from the date on which a decision is actually served (see, for example, Jovanoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 31731\/03, \u00a7 19, 7 January 2010).<\/p>\n 14. In a situation where the applicant is represented by a lawyer, the six\u2011month period will run from the date on which the applicant\u2019s lawyer became aware of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant only became aware of the decision later (see \u00c7elik v. Turkey (dec.), no. 52991\/99, ECHR 2004\u2011X, with further references).<\/p>\n 15. The Court notes that, in the impugned proceedings, the applicant was represented by N.T. and A.A., both lawyers of his own choosing. The applicant did not present any evidence that they had no longer represented him while the proceedings had been pending before the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the six-month period in respect of the applicant started to run at the latest on 29 May 2012, the day following the date when the Supreme Court judgment was served on A.A., as attested by the receipt slip (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant lodged his application with the Court on 22 March 2013, that is, more than six months later. The fact that the applicant himself may only have learned about the judgment in question in November 2012 is not relevant.<\/p>\n 16. Accordingly, the application has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n Declares the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n Done in English and notified in writing on 5 July 2018.<\/p>\n Renata Degener\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ale\u0161 Pejchal
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n