THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF \u0160TVRTECK\u00dd v. SLOVAKIA
\n(Application no. 55844\/12)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n5 June 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n05\/09\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of \u0160tvrteck\u00fd v. Slovakia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a\u00a0Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Helena J\u00e4derblom, President, Having deliberated in private on 15 May 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 55844\/12) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe\u00a0Convention\u201d) by aSlovak national, Mr\u00a0Miroslav\u00a0\u0160tvrteck\u00fd (\u201cthe\u00a0applicant\u201d), on 21\u00a0August 2012.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr R. Toman, a lawyer practising in Bratislava. The Government of the Slovak Republic (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Piro\u0161\u00edkov\u00e1.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant allegedthat the length of his detention on remand had been excessive, contrary to Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, and that he had been denied an enforceable right to compensation in that respect, in violation of Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 December 2016 the complaints concerning the length of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand and his right to compensation were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Senica.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Pre-trial detention of the applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 October 2006 the applicant and three others were charged with extortingmoney from P. P.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 October 2006 the Senica District Court (okresn\u00fds\u00fad) remanded the applicantand two of his alleged accomplices in custody from 3 October 2006 onwards. The court held that there was a\u00a0reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with whichhe was charged,that the offence had been committed in anorganisedway, and that therefore there was a risk that he could put pressure onwitnesses, contact other perpetrators and tamper with evidence. The court reliedon the testimony of P.P., who allegedly had been warned by one of the applicant\u2019s accomplices about instructionsfrom the applicant not to cooperate with the police. On\u00a024\u00a0October 2006 the Trnava Regional Court (krajsk\u00fds\u00fad) dismissed an\u00a0interlocutory appeal (s\u0165a\u017enos\u0165) by the applicant.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 December 2006a police investigator charged the applicant and fifteen other people with establishing, masterminding and supporting a\u00a0criminal group. The applicant was also charged with aggravated coercion, extortion, and causing bodily harm.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 December 2006 the Pezinok Special Court (\u0161peci\u00e1lnys\u00fad, hereafter \u201cthe Special Court\u201d), where the case had been transferred in the meantime owing to the organised nature of the crimes,dismissed an\u00a0application by the applicant for release. It relied on the particularly serious and organised nature of the offences he was charged with, and held that there was a real danger that he might influence witnesses and contact other perpetrators in order to tamper with evidence. On 17\u00a0January 2007 the Supreme Court (Najvy\u0161\u0161\u00eds\u00fad) dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 March 2007 the Special Courtextended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 October 2007. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, it relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant was the\u00a0leader of a\u00a0criminal groupwhich had been operating for several years, and that not all of the members of that criminal group had been identified. The court pointed out that the criminal investigation was particularly complex. On 28\u00a0March 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 April 2007 the police investigator charged the applicant with another count of extortion.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 June 2007 the Special Court dismissed another application by the applicant for release. It relied on the testimony of several witnesses who were afraid to testify against him. The court took into account the complexity of the criminal investigation, finding that there had been no undue delays.On 22 June 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an\u00a0interlocutory appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 September 2007 the applicant was charged with two other counts of extortion.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 September 2007 the Special Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 April 2008, and extended the grounds for his detention by including the risk of his reoffending.It held that it was reasonable to suspect that, if released, the applicant would continue his criminal activities,taking into account: the motives for such activities and their duration and extent;the methods of intimidation and violence used by the criminal group; the hierarchical and organised nature of the group; and the fact that not all of the members of the group had been identified. On 26\u00a0September 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 March 2008 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended until 7\u00a0July 2008. The Special Court added that his detention assisted the investigation, since the victims were willing to testify, but still not all of the members of the criminal group had been identified. On 26\u00a0March 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s detention during trial<\/strong><\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was indicted before the Special Court on 13 June 2008. The bill of indictment concerned sixteen criminal acts, eighteen defendants and fourteen victims. The applicant was charged with establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group, aggravated coercion, causing bodily harm, and ten acts of extortion. All the crimes were qualified as particularly serious crimes. The sums extorted ranged from 10,000 to 33,000 euros (EUR).<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 June 2008 the Special Court examined the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention. It pointed out that, according to the indictment, he was allegedly the leader of a\u00a0criminal group, a group which had been conducting criminal activities for six years against people who were victims and witnesses in the trial, by means ofthreatsand the use of physical and psychological violence.On\u00a04\u00a0July 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 October 2008, when conducting a preliminary examination of the bill of indictment, the Special Court again reviewed the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention. On\u00a015\u00a0October 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 July 2009 the Special Court dismissed another application by the applicant for release. It held that several witnesses were afraid to testify against him in his presence and had thus been heard in his absence. In\u00a0particular, one witness had been contacted and threatened by unknown persons in an attempt to get him to change his testimony. The court also took into account that not all the witnesses had been heard by the trial court. On 19\u00a0August 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 May 2010 the Special Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 13 December 2010. The court limited the grounds for his detention to the risk of his reoffending, because the trial court had already heard all witnesses. It stated that therewas substantial evidence suggesting that the applicant was the leader of a criminal group which had operated systematically for several years, and therefore it was reasonable to assume that,if at liberty, he might continue with the criminal activities. The court further held that it was essential to protect victims and witnesses who had expressed a fear of the applicant when testifying at the trial.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 June 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 June 2010 the applicant was convicted by the Special Court of establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group, four acts of extortion, three acts of aggravated coercion and fraudand was sentenced to twenty-five years\u2019 imprisonment. He remained in detention pending the outcome of an appeal.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 September 2010 a request for release lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the Special Court. The Supreme Court dismissed an\u00a0interlocutory appeal by the applicant on 6 October 2010.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 November 2010 the Supreme Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 April 2011.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 February 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against his conviction,which thereby became final. The applicant started to serve aprison sentence, andthe time spent in detention was taken into account when calculating his prison term.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings before the Constitutional Court<\/strong><\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 August 2010 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint (\u00fastavn\u00e1s\u0165a\u017enos\u0165) against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 10 June 2010 to\u00a0dismiss his interlocutory appeal (see paragraph\u00a021above). Among other things, he complained that his detention was no longer justified, that it had lasted an excessively long time, and that the Supreme Court had not answered all the arguments raised in his interlocutory appeal (\u201cthe first constitutional complaint\u201d). He complained under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03 and 4 and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, and under their constitutional equivalents.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 December 2010 he filed another constitutional complaint, alleging a lack of speediness in relation to the judicial review of his detention by the decisions of the Special Court of 13 September 2010 and the Supreme Court of 6\u00a0October 2010 (\u201cthe second constitutional complaint\u201d \u2013 see paragraph\u00a023 above).<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 October 2010 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00fds\u00fad) accepted a part of the applicant\u2019s first constitutional complaintfor further examination, including the complaint regarding the length of his detention. It held that the formal requirements under sections 20 and 50 of the Constitutional Court Act had been satisfied. At the same time, it dismissed the restof the complaint as manifestly ill-founded.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 January 2011 the Constitutional Court accepted the second constitutional complaint for further examination, and joined the proceedings relating to the first and the second constitutional complaint.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 December 2011 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. It held that the Supreme Court, in its decision of 10 June 2010, had failed to respond to all ofthe applicant\u2019s arguments.Although the Supreme Court had examined in detail the applicant\u2019s arguments regarding the grounds for his detention, it had failed to respond to his other arguments, such as one about the impartiality and independence of the tribunal reviewing his detention, and another about alleged shortcomings in his representation during the judicial review, and thus the court had breached Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n The Constitutional Court further held that the judicial review of the applicant\u2019s detention between 13 September and 6\u00a0October 2010 had not been sufficiently speedy, and found another violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention on this account.<\/p>\n It quashed the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 10 June 2010 and awarded the applicant EUR\u00a04,500 as just satisfaction. It did not order hisrelease, since the applicant had been convicted in the meantime and had started to serve aprison term.<\/p>\n The Constitutional Court considered it unnecessaryto examine the rest of the applicant\u2019s complaints, including the one under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention regarding the length of his detention.<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0Conduct of the criminal proceedings against the applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0Between the applicant\u2019s arrest and the completion of the pre-trial investigation, the authorities conducted interviews with eighteen defendants, interviewed fifteen victims and twenty\u2011three witnesses, commissioned five expert opinions, analysed telecommunication recordings, conducted home searches and identity parades, and gathered a large amount of documentary evidence.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0Betweenthe lodging of the indictment with the trial court and the applicant\u2019s conviction by the court of first instance, the trial court held hearings over the course of fifty-one days. The hearings were scheduled on a monthly or near monthly basis.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 September 2008 the presiding judge of the Special Court appointed a substitute defence lawyer for the applicant to prevent the obstruction of court hearings.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 December 2008 the presiding judge of the Special Court fined two of the applicant\u2019s defence lawyers: one for failing to appear at three court hearings, and the other for obstructing justice.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The Code of Criminal Procedure<\/strong><\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 71 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (no.\u00a0301\/2005 Coll.),as applicable at the relevant time, a person charged with a\u00a0criminal offence could be detained where there were reasonable grounds for believing that he would: abscond (Article\u00a071\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 (a)); influence witnesses or other defendants or otherwise hamper the investigation (Article 71 \u00a7 1 (b));or continue his criminal activities, complete an\u00a0attempted offence, or commit an offence which he had prepared or threatened to commit (Article 71 \u00a7 1 (c)).<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court Act 1993 and relevant practice<\/strong><\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0Section 20(1) provides that a complaint before the Constitutional Court must indicate the decision which the plaintiff seeks to obtain, specify the reasons for the request, and identifyevidence in support.\u00a0The Constitutional Court is bound by such a complaint unless the Act expressly provides otherwise (section 20(3)). Pursuant to section 50(1)(a), in addition to the information mentioned in section 20, a complaint must indicate the fundamental rights or freedoms which a plaintiff alleges have been violated.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with section 20(3) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993, the Constitutional Court has declared itself bound by a party\u2019s submissionsto initiate proceedings before it. The Constitutional Court has expressly stated that this is particularly relevant as regards the ruling which parties seek to obtain, as it can only decide on matters which a party has requested be determined (see, for example, decisions III. \u00daS 166\/02 of 6\u00a0November 2002 or III. \u00daS 65\/02 of 9 October 2002).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complainedregarding the excessive length of his detention on remand. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be … entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Victim status<\/em><\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 8\u00a0December 2011 (see paragraph\u00a030 above) and argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to an\u00a0applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive the applicant of his or her status as a \u201cvictim\u201d within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, among many authorities, G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a0115, ECHR 2010).<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Constitutional Court foundthat the Supreme Court had breached the applicant\u2019s right under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention, in that in its decision of 10 June 2010 it had failed to give answers to all the arguments raised in his interlocutory appeal, and that the judicial authorities had breached the same provision when they had failed to\u00a0review the applicant\u2019s detention speedily. In view of those conclusions, the Constitutional Court considered it unnecessary to decide the rest of the applicant\u2019s complaints, including the oneunder Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention regarding the length of his detention (see paragraph\u00a030above).<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the rights guaranteed under paragraph 3 of Article 5 are distinct from those under paragraph 4 of that provision (see Rosselet-Christ v. Slovakia, no. 25329\/05, \u00a7 51, 26 October 2010). Since the Constitutional Court made no separate finding on the alleged breach of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention regarding the length of the applicant\u2019s detention, the argument that he can no longer claim to be a victim in respect of this part of the application cannot be accepted. It follows that the preliminary objection of the Government concerning the applicant\u2019s victim status must be dismissed.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies<\/em><\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government objected that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, in that he had not raised the complaint regarding the length of his detention before the Constitutional Court in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements. Relying on Obluk v. Slovakia(no.\u00a069484\/01, \u00a7 62, 20 June 2006), they argued that the applicant had formulated his first constitutional complaint only against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision,and thus had failed to identify all authorities responsible for the alleged violation of his rights, notably the Special Court.<\/p>\n The Government furthermore contended that it was possible to lodge a constitutional complaint regarding the length of the applicant\u2019s detention within two months after the delivery of the judgment by which he had been convicted by the court of first instance.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that principles regarding the non\u2011exhaustion rule were reviewed in Koky and Others v. Slovakia(no.\u00a013624\/03, \u00a7\u00a0169, 12 June 2012).<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0As a general rule, the scope of the Constitutional Court\u2019s examination of a case following an individual complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution is defined and limited by the summary of the complaint, as formulated in a standardised and prescribed form (petit) by the complainant (see Obluk, cited above, \u00a7 48; see paragraphs 36-37 above).However, in the present case, the Constitutional Court accepted the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint for further examination, including his complaintregarding the length of his detention, and expressly held that it\u00a0had complied with the formal procedural requirements (see paragraph\u00a028 above). In such a situation, the Government cannot successfully argue that the applicant wrongly formulated his complaint.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0Nor is the Court convinced of the nature and relevance of the Government\u2019s auxiliary argument in relation to the possibility of lodging a constitutional complaint about the length of the applicant\u2019s detention within two months of the delivery of his first-instance judgment.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the preliminary objection of the Government concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention must be dismissed.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that,given the length of the applicant\u2019s detention,this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his detention had been excessively long. He argued that the grounds given by the authorities to justify his detention had not been relevant and sufficient, and the competent authorities had not conducted the trial with special diligence.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the domestic courts had given sufficient and relevant reasons to justify the applicant\u2019s detention. They pointed out that he had been charged with serious criminal activities of an\u00a0organised nature and had faced a twenty to twenty-five-year prison term. The authorities had conducted the trial with special diligence. Theauthorities had needed to gather extensive evidence and hear a number of witnesses, but had also been obliged to adhere to the statutory time limits regarding summonsingdefendants and preparing a defence. The trial court had taken necessary precautions to avoid the obstruction of justice and possible delays, for example by appointing a\u00a0substitute defence counselfor the applicant and imposing fines for the obstruction of justice.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant made no further arguments in reply to Government\u2019s observations.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The general principles as regards Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention have recently been summarised in the case ofBuzadji v. the Republic of Moldova ([GC], no. 23755\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 84-91, ECHR 2016).<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Period to be taken into consideration<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The period of detention to be taken into consideration under Article\u00a05 \u00a7 3 of the Convention starts when a person is arrested or remanded in custody and ends when he or she is released and\/or the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance (see Buzadji, cited above, \u00a7 85).<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, this period started on 3 October 2006, when the applicant was remanded in custody (see paragraph\u00a07 above), and ended on 23\u00a0June 2010, when he was convicted by the court of first instance (see paragraph\u00a022 above). Accordingly, the period of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand to be considered in the present case is three years, eight months and twenty days.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Reasonableness of the length of detention<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the length of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand \u2013 more than three and a half years\u2013 is a matter of great concern requiring a\u00a0very strong justification (see Tsarenko v. Russia, no.\u00a05235\/09, \u00a7\u00a068, 3\u00a0March 2011).<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Court takes into account that the present case concerned a serious crime, namely leadership of a criminal group that had operated systematically for several years using methods of extortion, extreme violence and aggravated coercion with a view to obtaining financial gain. Thus, it was a\u00a0classic example of organised crime, by definition presenting more difficulties for the investigating authorities, and later for the courts, in relation to determining the facts and the degree of responsibility of each member of the group. It is obvious that, in cases of this kind, continuous control and limitation of the defendants\u2019 contact with each other and with other persons may be essential to avoid their absconding, tampering with evidence and, most importantly, influencing or even threatening witnesses. Accordingly, longer periods of detention than in other cases may be reasonable (see B\u0105k v. Poland, no. 7870\/04, \u00a7\u00a056, 16\u00a0January 2007; Lukovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 43808\/07, \u00a7\u00a046, 26 March 2013;Mierzejewski v. Poland, no. 15612\/13, \u00a7\u00a042, 24 February 2015 and Podeschi v. San Marino, no. 66357\/14, \u00a7 147, 13 April 2017).In the Court\u2019s view, the fact that the case concerned the alleged leader of such a criminal group should be taken into account in assessing compliance with Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0of the Convention (seeTomecki v. Poland, no. 47944\/06, \u00a7 30, 20 May 2008, andLukovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a047).<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The Courtaccepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant committed the offences he had been charged with was based on cogent evidence and persisted throughout the trial leading to his conviction. At the same time, it reiterates that the existence of reasonable suspicion cannot on its own justify pre-trial detention, and must be supported by additional grounds (see Buzadji, cited above, \u00a7\u00a095). Thus, it will examine whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities justified the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty, and whether those grounds were \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0When remanding the applicant in custody, the domestic authorities relied principally on two grounds: (i) therisk that he would frustrate the criminal proceedings by putting pressure on witnesses, contacting other perpetrators and tampering with evidence; and (ii) the risk that he might continue with his criminal activities. In addition, the authorities referred to\u00a0the particularly serious and organised nature of the charges against the applicant, the fact that he was suspected of being the leader of the criminal group, and the complexity of the investigation (see paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 19and 20above).<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the risk of collusion,the Court observes that this was the principal ground for the applicant\u2019s detention from the time of his arrest until 27\u00a0May 2010, when all witnesses had been heard by the trial court (see paragraph\u00a020 above). The Court acknowledges that, in cases such as the present one concerning organised criminal groups, the risk that a detainee, if released, might put pressure on witnesses or other co-accused, or otherwise obstruct the proceedings, is by the nature of things often particularly high (see G\u0142adczak v. Poland, no. 14255\/02, \u00a7\u00a055, 31 May 2007). The Court observes that,apart from the general risk flowing from the organised nature of the applicant\u2019s alleged criminal activities, the domestic courts relied on specific threats made to one of the victims, P.P., the testimony of one witness who had been threatened in an attempt to get him to change his testimony, and the testimony of several witnesses who were afraid to testify against the applicant if he were at liberty (see paragraphs 7 and\u00a019 above). The domestic courts considered these fears to be serious, and allowed these witnesses to testify against the applicant in his absence. The Court accepts that the risk of collusion flowing from the nature of the applicant\u2019s criminal activities actually existed, and justified holding him in custody on this ground for the relevant period (for similar reasoning, seeMkhitaryan\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 46108\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 94-98, 5 February 2013).<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the ground analysed above, on 18 September 2007 the domestic authorities extended the groundsfor the applicant\u2019s detention by including the risk of his reoffending (see paragraph\u00a014above). They relied on the seriousness and nature of the charges against him at that time, and the fact that not all of the members of the criminal group had been identified. The Court reiterates that while the gravity of the crimes allegedly perpetrated by the applicant could not by itself justify the overall length of his detention, the judicial authorities relied on information relating to the applicant\u2019s behaviour, the motives for his criminal activities, their duration, extent and methods, and his authority in the criminal group (see paragraphs 14, 17, and 20 above).<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that between 27 May 2010 and 23 June 2010 the risk of reoffending was the sole ground for the applicant\u2019s detention. During this period, the domestic courts relied heavily on the need to protect victims and witnesses who had expressed a serious fear of the applicant when testifying at the trial (see paragraph\u00a020 above). The Court is of the opinion that, given the nature of the applicant\u2019s alleged criminal activities, especially the methods of violence and extortion, it was reasonable for the authorities to presume, even at the later stage of the trial, that if released he might carry out his threats. Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court is prepared to accept that the authorities thoroughly evaluated the risk of the applicant\u2019s reoffending, and were not unreasonable in fearing that he might reoffend if released.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the Constitutional Court, in its judgment of 8 December 2011,found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention in that the Supreme Court had failed to answer several procedural arguments posed by the applicant in its decision of 10 June 2010 (see paragraph\u00a030 above). However, the Constitutional Court found no shortcomings in the Supreme Court\u2019s examination of the applicant\u2019s arguments regarding the grounds for detention, which were reviewed and answered in detail. The Court concurs with this assessment, and is of the view that the Supreme Court gave relevant and sufficient reasons for the applicant\u2019s detention, even if it did not answer all his procedural arguments as identified by the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the domestic authorities reviewed and extended the applicant\u2019s detention every six months, and in the meantime regularly examined his applications for release. The judicial authorities referred to the specific facts of the case and did not use \u201cgeneral and abstract\u201d arguments for his continued detention,nor can it be said that the authorities ordered or extended the applicant\u2019s detention on identical or stereotypical grounds, using pre-existing template or formalistic and abstract language (see, a contrario, Tsarenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a070, and cases cited therein).The Court also notes that, with the passing of time, the courts\u2019 reasoning evolved to reflect the state of the investigation and, later, the trial, and to verify whether the grounds for detention remained valid. In particular, on 18 September 2007 the Special Court extended the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention to include the risk of his reoffending, and on 27\u00a0May 2010 the same court lifted the grounds of a risk of collusion because all witnesses had already been heard (see paragraphs\u00a014 and 20above).<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the grounds given for the applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention were \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d to justify holding him in custody for the entire period of his detention.<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0Conduct of the proceedings<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be ascertained whether the domestic authorities displayed \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in conducting the criminal proceedings against the applicant.<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the proceedings were of considerable complexity andinvolved the collection of extensive evidence, numerous hearings, and the serving of summonseson various parties. The proceedings also required individual determination of the criminal responsibility of a\u00a0number of the defendants in relation to a variety of separate criminal acts.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that during the pre-trial investigation, that lasted one year and eight months, new crimes were continually revealed and investigated. In the course of the investigation,the authorities expanded the charges against the applicant on three occasions, interviewed a number of witnesses and suspects, and implemented multiple other investigative measures which appear to have been necessary and were carried out with sufficient frequency. Having regard to the fact that the pre-trial investigation concerned multiple crimes allegedly committed by a\u00a0criminal group, the Court is of the view that the actions of the domestic authorities during that period could be considered as falling within the standard of special diligence under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0After the case had been transferred to the first-instance court, the applicant remained in detention for another two years. During this period the trial court held hearings over the course of fifty-one days, and hearings were scheduled on a regular basis, allowing statutory time-limits for preparing a defence to be observed. At the same time, the authorities took special precautions to avoid possible frustration of the trial by the applicant by appointing him a\u00a0substitute defence lawyerand imposing a fine on those who obstructed the proceedings (see paragraphs 33and34) (seeB\u0105k, cited above, \u00a7\u00a064; a\u00a0contrario, Lisovskij v. Lithuania, no. 36249\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 79-80, 2\u00a0May 2017).<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the particular complexity of the trial and the fact that the domestic authorities took special precautions to avoid delays in the criminal proceedings, the Court does not find any delays or shortcomings in the proceedings which would indicate that the authorities did not proceed with special diligence as was required of them.<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that there has been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a05 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of a violation of his right to obtain compensation for violation of the provisions of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.\u201d<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the right to compensation under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a05 of the Convention arises only if the violation of other provisions of Article\u00a05 has been established by a national authority or the Court (seeBenham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, \u00a7 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011III).<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0In view of its finding that there was no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention in this case, it concludes that Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention is not applicable. It follows that this complaint is incompatible rationemateriae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 4.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe complaint under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention admissible and the remainder inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been no\u00a0violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3of the Convention.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 June 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Fato\u015f Arac\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Helena J\u00e4derblom
\nBrankoLubarda,
\nHelen Keller,
\nPere Pastor Vilanova,
\nAlena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1,
\nGeorgios A. Serghides,
\nMar\u00eda El\u00f3segui, judges,
\nand Fato\u015f Arac\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n