FOURTH SECTION
\nCASE OF FARCA\u0218 AND OTHERS v. ROMANIA
\n(Application no. 30502\/05)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n5 June 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Farca\u0219 and Others v. Romania,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, President, Having deliberated in private on 15 May 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 30502\/05) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by three\u00a0Romanian nationals, Mr IoanFarca\u0219 (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d), Mr\u00a0\u015etefan\u00a0Voicu (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d) and Ms\u00a0CarmenLeliaB\u0103rbulescu (\u201cthe third applicant\u201d), on 12 August 2005.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Romanian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumar, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 March 2010 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantswere born in 1935, 1945 and 1956 respectively and live in Ploie\u015fti.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Background of the case<\/strong><\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0In 1975 a group of engineerspatented an invention concerning a method for separating hydrocarbon. The first applicant is one of the inventors. The second and third applicants are heirs of the other members of the group.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 January 1995 the applicants lodged an action for compensation against company R., a privately-owned former State company which had used the 1975 invention between 1985 and 1988 (for details about those proceedings, see Farca\u015f and Others v. Romania, no.\u00a067020\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a07-22, 10\u00a0November\u00a02005).<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0In a decision of 24 June 2002 the Bra\u015fovCounty Courtallowed in part the action lodged by the applicants against company R., and ordered the latter to pay to the first applicant 2,284,679,617 Romanian lei (ROL), an amountrepresenting compensation for the use, between 1985 and 1988, of the invention patented in 1975.The second and third applicants appealed, and in a decision of 8 November 2002 the Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal also awarded them compensation \u2013 ROL 2,230,620,676 to the second applicant and ROL1,669,759,157 to the third applicant.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 March 2004 the applicants and company R. signed an agreement for the payment of the compensation awarded by the court. Between 2 and 21 April 2004 the company paid about 20% of the amounts granted.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice took note of the terms of the agreement of 10 March 2004 and concluded that company R. had withdrawn its appeal on points of law against the decision of 8\u00a0November\u00a02002 (see paragraph 7 above), which thus became final.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings on judicial reorganisation (reorganizarejudiciar\u0103)<\/strong><\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0Meanwhile,on 31 March 2004 companyR. had sought its judicial reorganisation under a procedure provided for by Law no. 64\/1995 on judicial reorganisation and bankruptcy.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 April 2004 the Bac\u0103uCounty Court allowed the application, started the reorganisation proceedings and nominated a judicial administrator. The applicants\u2019 claims were accepted by the County Court and recorded in the register of claims compiled by the judicial administrator in conformity with the provisions of the applicable law (tabloulcreditorilor, hereinafter \u201cthe register of claims\u201d).<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants lodged an objection to the register of claims, asking to be recognised as priority creditors (creditoriprivilegia\u0163i). Eleven other creditors also lodged objections against the records in the register of claims.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0Meanwhile, on 24 November 2004 the judicial administrator had submitted a reorganisation plan to a vote by the creditors. It was proposed that the priority claims (crean\u0163eprivilegiate) be paid in full, and the remaining unsecured non-priority claims (crean\u0163echirografare)be paid at a rate of 20% of their value. In an interlocutory judgment of 8\u00a0December\u00a02004 the Bac\u0103u County Court validated the plan after examining the objections raised by the unsecured creditors (creditorichirografari). In 2006 company\u00a0R. paid its debtsin accordance with the plan.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 October 2007 the Bra\u015fov County Court held a hearing on the objections to the register of claims lodged by the applicants. The first\u00a0applicant was present at the hearing to represent both himselfand the other applicants. The County Court gave the parties until 18\u00a0October\u00a02007 to submit written observations. On that date, in the applicants\u2019 absence, itadjourned delivery of the judgment to 1 November 2007. The County Court gave its judgment on 1\u00a0November 2007; it found against the applicants.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 January 2008,in accordance with the rules on notification in relation to court documents in insolvency proceedings (see paragraph\u00a020 below), the judgment of 1 November 2007 was published in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings (BuletinulProcedurilor de Insolven\u0163\u0103, \u201cthe Bulletin\u201d).<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date the applicants enquired about the judgment\u2019s date of delivery and asked the County Court to provide them with a copy of the judgment, which was sent to them on 31 January 2008; they received it on 4\u00a0February\u00a02008. On 13February 2008 they lodged an appeal by post.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0Before the Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal,the applicants argued that,as they had not had access to the Bulletin, they had not been able to know on which date the judgment had been published.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0In a final decision of 17 April 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed that argument and concluded that the appeal had been made out of time, as it had been lodged more than ten days after 23 January 2008, the date on which the Bra\u015fov County Court\u2019s judgment had been published (see paragraph\u00a015above). Relying on the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision no.\u00a01137 of 4 December 2007 (see paragraph\u00a021 below), the Court of Appeal considered that the notification procedure via the Bulletin had offered sufficient safeguards to the participants in the proceedings, and had been justified by the nature of the insolvency procedure.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 June 2010 the County Court closed the insolvency proceedings and noted that company R. had complied with all the obligations set out in the reorganisation plan (see paragraph\u00a013 above), and thus it no longer had any debts.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Publication of court documents in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings (BuletinulProcedurilor de Insolven\u0163\u0103)<\/strong><\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The version of Law no. 85\/2006 on insolvency procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe 2006 Insolvency Act\u201d) in force at the material time, whichreplaced Law no. 64\/1995in full as of 20July 2006, provided that all notifications during an insolvency procedure would be served by being published in the Bulletin, with the exception of a notice of the opening of such proceedings, which would be served in accordance with the general procedure provided for by the Code of Civil Procedure.The relevant parts of the 2006 Insolvency Actin force at the material time read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 3<\/p>\n \u201c29.\u00a0\u00a0The Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings is a publication edited by the National Trade Register Office with the aim of publishing notices of court hearings, summons [convoc\u0103ri] and notices of procedural acts issued by the courts, the judicial administrator and the liquidator after the opening of the proceedings provided for by this Law.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 7<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0Notificationin relation to court proceedings and the communication of any procedural acts, summons or notifications will be done via the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings….The Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings will also be made available in an electronic format.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (8)\u00a0\u00a0The Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings will be published by the National Trade Register Office in order to allow the publication of notices of court proceedings, summons and notifications of procedural acts issued by the courts after the opening of the proceedings provided for by this Law.<\/p>\n (9)\u00a0\u00a0From the date they are published, the publication of procedural acts or, if applicable, court decisions in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings replaces [service of]a notice of court proceedings, summonsor notification of procedural acts on each individual participant in proceedings, and such acts will be presumed to have been served on the date of their publication [in the Bulletin].\u201d<\/p>\n Article 8<\/p>\n \u201c(2)\u00a0\u00a0The time-limit for lodging an appeal [recurs] is ten days from the date when notice of a court judgment is given, unless the law provides otherwise.<\/p>\n (3)\u00a0\u00a0The appeal will be examined by specialised benches within thirty\u00a0days of the case file being registered with the appeal court. The notice of appeal proceedings will be served via the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings. …\u201d<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0In its decision no. 1137 of 4 December 2007, the Constitutional Court considered that the special notification procedure as regulated by Article\u00a07 of the 2006 Insolvency Act was justified for the following reasons:<\/p>\n \u201cThe fact that the persons concerned will be notified via the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings after the opening of the insolvency procedure cannot be considered to breach the right of defence. In accordance with Article 126 \u00a7 2 of the Constitution, the legislature has the exclusive power to enact procedural norms, and it can create special regulations derogating from the common law in order to deal with specific situations. The provisions of Article 7 \u00a7 1 of Law no. 85\/2006 are justified by the specificity of insolvency proceedings, which involve a great number of parties and many diverseprocedural acts which could jeopardise the course of the proceedings; [publication via the Bulletin] is justified as a special measure which ensures speed in processing these cases.\u201d<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 November 2008 Article 8 \u00a7 3 was amended by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 173\/2008; in its new version, it provided that the notification of appeal court proceedings was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, at that time, required that the text of a court decision be given to the parties concerned (see S.C.\u00a0Raisa\u00a0M.\u00a0Shipping\u00a0S.R.L. v. Romania, no. 37576\/05, \u00a7\u00a018, 8\u00a0January\u00a02013).<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0In 2014 the 2006 Insolvency Act was replaced by Law no.\u00a085\/2014 on the prevention of insolvency and on insolvency procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe 2014 Insolvency Act\u201d). Articles 42-43 of the new Act provided that service of the notification of appeal proceedings was exclusively via the Bulletin, which only existed in an electronic format.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Price of the Bulletin<\/strong><\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0In Government Decision no. 124\/2007, published in the Official Bulletin of 13 February 2007, the price of the Bulletin was set at: 1.20\u00a0Romanian lei (RON) for one issue; RON\u00a0212.55 for a monthly subscription; RON 637.66 for a three-month subscription; and RON\u00a02,550.65 for a yearly subscription. Subscriptions had to be ordered thirty days in advance and could only start on 1 January, 1 April, 1 July or 1\u00a0September for a three-month subscription, or on 1 January for a yearly subscription. The electronic version of the Bulletin was priced at RON\u00a079.16 for a monthly subscription, RON 237.49 for a three-month subscription, and RON 949.95 for a yearly subscription. Access to the electronic version was provided within two days of subscription. Sales of the paperversion of the Bulletin started in the second half of 2007.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Aim of the reorganisation procedure<\/strong><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0At the material time, the 2006 Insolvency Act provided as follows:<\/p>\n Article 103<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0After the reorganisation plan is confirmed, the debtor will conduct its activity under the supervision of the judicial administrator and in accordance with the confirmed plan, until such time as the court will order, by means of a reasoned decision, either that the reorganisation proceedings be terminated, or that all measures to allow the debtor to restart its commercial activity be taken, or that the reorganisation proceedings be terminated and bankruptcy [proceedings] be startedunder the provisions of Article\u00a0107 and following.\u201d<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0Article 2 of the 2014Insolvency Act stated that the aim of the law was to provide a collective procedure for paying off a debtor\u2019s liabilities (pasivul), while giving the debtor, whenever possible, the chance to recover its activity.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF A LACK OF ACCESS TO COURT IN THE APPEAL INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article 13 of the Convention,the applicants complained that their appeal in the insolvency proceedings had been unlawfully declared out of time.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the safeguards of Article 6 \u00a7 1, implying the full panoply of a judicial procedure, are stricter than, and absorb, those of Article 13 (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 146, ECHR 2000\u2011XI). It will therefore examine the complaint from the standpoint of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Conventionalone, the relevant part of which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations<\/em><\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants reiterated that they had not had a subscription to the Bulletin, and they had not had a computer or access to the Internet. In such circumstances, they would have been forced to go to Bra\u015fov in order to find out about the outcome of the first-instance proceedings. They reiterated that a copy of the judgment had eventually been sent to them at their request and after they had paid the requisite fees, but they had received it on 4\u00a0February\u00a02008 (see paragraph 18 above), the very day that the time-limit for filing their appeal had expired.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the right to fair proceedings was not absolute, and could be subject to legitimate restrictions. In the case at hand, the restrictions imposed on the applicants had been provided for by law and had pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring that insolvency proceedings were efficient and expeditious. Moreover, the Bulletin had been created in order to allow for better and faster access to proceedings and the harmonisation of judicial notifications, as well as to create a national database concerning insolvency proceedings, in coordination with the National Trade Register Office. The Government contended that access to the Bulletin was free, as it could be read at the Trade Register\u2019s offices attached to each county court, or accessed on the Internet.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court makes reference to the general principles concerning service of court notifications (see Zavodnik v. Slovenia, no.\u00a053723\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a070-74, 21May 2015). It also reiterates that its task is not to review the relevant law and practice in abstract, but to determine whether the manner in which the law and practice were applied, or the way in which they affected an applicant, gave rise to a violation of the Convention (see Zavodnik, cited above, \u00a7 74). In doing so, the Court must ascertain whether,given the facts of the case, a fair balance was struck between, on the one hand, the interests of the effective administration of justice, and on the other hand, those of the applicants (ibid., \u00a7 75).<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicants asked the domestic courts to recognise them as priority creditors in the insolvency proceedings regarding company R. The first applicant, who represented the applicants in the domestic proceedings, was present at the hearing before the court of first instance on 11 October 2007, but not when the court gave its judgment on 1 November 2017 (see paragraph\u00a014 above). The judgment was published on 23 January 2008 in the Bulletin (see paragraph 15 above), and from that date the ten-day time-limit for lodging an appeal started running (see paragraph 20 above). In accordance with the special rules on notification, the applicants did not receive written notice of the date the judgment was delivered; a copy of the judgment of 1\u00a0November\u00a02007 was sent to them, at their request, only on 31\u00a0January\u00a02008. They received it on 4 February, the very day of the expiry of the time-limit for lodging an appeal (see paragraph 18 above). Consequently, their appeal, lodged by post on 13 February 2008, was declared inadmissible by the Court of Appealwithout examination of the merits of their complaint for failure to comply with the relevant time-limit (see paragraph 18 above).<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found that the existence of a special notice procedure served the legitimate aim of ensuring that insolvency proceedings were expeditious and efficient,in so far asthe personal service of court documents could add substantially to the costs and length of proceedings (see Zavodnik, \u00a7 76).The Court accepts thatpersonal service might have hampered the expeditious assessment of the case in the proceedings currently under examination, in the light of the number of participants in those proceedings (see paragraph 12 above). However, it must be satisfied that the manner in which this limitationof the right of access to a court was applied in the present case struck a fair balance between the various interests at stake and did not render the applicants\u2019 rights illusory (see Articov. Italy, 13 May 1980, \u00a7 33, Series A no. 37). In this vein, it notes that no alternative means were available to the domestic courts to notify the parties about the course of the proceedings (see, in contrast, Zavodnik, cited above, \u00a7 78 in fine, where notice of a hearing could have been published in the mass media).<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0In order to assess the impact of the special notice procedure on the applicants\u2019 rights, the Court must ascertain what means they realistically had at their disposal to keep abreast of the domestic proceedings.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is not convinced that the applicants could have subscribed to the Bulletin at that time, as, in accordance with the applicable Government Decision, they would have had to purchase such a subscription thirty days in advance (see paragraph 24 above). This option would also have entailed significant costs for them (ibid.). Moreover, nothing in the file indicates that the applicants could have had individual issues delivered to their homes in a timely manner. The Court further notes that the first\u00a0applicant, who represented all the applicants in the domestic proceedings, was elderly and did not use a computer or have access the Internet (see paragraphs 4 and 30 above; see also, mutatis mutandis,Zavodnik, cited above, \u00a7 79 in fine).<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, the applicants had the possibility to consult issues of the Bulletin at their local county court (see paragraph\u00a031 above). However,the Governmenthavenot put forward any evidence that would allow the Court to conclude that the applicants could have consulted the Bulletin free of charge. Be that as it may, the first\u00a0applicant (representative of all the applicants) would have had to visit his local county court on a regular basis from 1 November 2007, the date when the judgment was issued, to 23January 2008, the date when the text of the judgment became available (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above).<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0Admittedly, this period of almost three months is not in itself unreasonably long (see, in contrast, Zavodnik, cited above, \u00a7 78,where the applicant was expected to consult the court\u2019s notice board for eight\u00a0years). However, in assessing its reasonableness, regard must be had to the applicants\u2019specific situation. In this connection, the Court observes that the first applicant (representative of all the applicants) lived more than 100\u00a0km away from the county court which delivered the judgment. Even considering that he would have had access to the court documents at the county court situated in his home town, as argued by the Government (see paragraph\u00a031in fine, above), the Court reiterates that the first applicant was elderly at that time (see paragraph 4 above, as well as Zavodnik, cited above, \u00a7 79 in fine). In these specific circumstances, the Court considers that the fact that the first applicant would have to have gone to the county court regularly for a period of three months would have put asignificant burden on him.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds it an aggravating factor that, in the absence of any alternative means of notification, the domestic courts were deprived of their power to assess the participants\u2019individual situation and, if necessary, adapt the service procedure to their situation. This lack of flexibility rendered the applicants\u2019 right of access to a court illusory (see, mutatis mutandis,Artico, cited above, \u00a736).<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that no fair balance was struck between the interests of the effective administration of justice and those of the applicants. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the applicants\u2019 lack of access to a court in the appeal insolvency proceedings.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTIONAND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-ENFORCEMENT OF FINAL COURT DECISIONS<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantscomplained about the length of their proceedings against company R. and pointed out that the final decisions rendered in their favour (the decisions of 24 June and 8November 2002 \u2013 see paragraph\u00a07 above) remained unenforced. They relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Conventionand Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.<\/p>\n The latter provision reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations<\/strong><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the mechanism put in place for enforcing final judgments against debtors who were private actors had allowed the applicants to have their claim registered in the register of claims and obtain payment of their claim in accordance with the provisions of the reorganisation plan voted on by the creditors and sanctioned by the court.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on SC Magna Holding SRL v. Romania (no. 10055\/03, \u00a7\u00a042, 13\u00a0July\u00a02006), the Government further argued that the case concerned a dispute between private parties, for which, in principle, the State should not be held responsible.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contended that the system put in place by the State in order to assist them in obtaining the enforcement of court decisions had been deficient,and reiterated that they had suffered loss because of the impugned non-enforcement.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has repeatedly held that \u201cwhen the debtor is a private actor, … the State is not, as a general rule, directly liable for debts of private actors and its obligations are limited to providing the necessary assistance to the creditor in the enforcement of the respective court awards, for example, through a bailiff service or bankruptcy procedures\u201d (see Acar and Others v.\u00a0Turkey (dec.), no. 26878\/07, \u00a7 29, 12 December 2017;Dachar v.\u00a0France (dec.), no.42338\/98, 6 June 2000; and Pelipenko v.Russia, no.\u00a069037\/10, \u00a7\u00a049, 2 October 2012).<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates its case-law to the effect that an applicant\u2019s inability to obtain the enforcement of a judgment making an award in his or her favour constitutes an interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, as set out in the first sentence of the first\u00a0paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, among other authorities, Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498\/00, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2002\u2011III, and Jasi\u016bnien\u0117 v.\u00a0Lithuania, no. 41510\/98, \u00a7 45, 6 March 2003).<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the aim of the reorganisation procedure is to help a debtor company find, along with its creditors, a solution which allows it to continue its commercial activity (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). In this connection, the Court notes that the creditors in the instant case votedon a plan in accordance with the legal rules in place and the domestic court validated it, taking into account the objections raised (see paragraph\u00a013 above).This decision does not appear in any way arbitrary.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants, whose claims were not secured, received 40% of their claim: 20% before the opening of the insolvency proceedings(see paragraph\u00a08 above) and 20% within the reorganisation procedure (see paragraphs\u00a013in fine and 19 above). As for their outstanding claim, the judgment in their favour remained unenforced on account of the existence of an objective impossibility in that respect, particularly in view of the fact that the debtor, a private party, did not have sufficient assets (see, mutatis mutandis,Shestakov v.Russia (dec.), no. 48757\/99, 18 June 2002).<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0As for the overall length of the enforcement proceedings, the Court has already found in Farca\u015f and Others v. Romania (no.\u00a067020\/01, 50.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court notes that, despite the inherent complexity of the insolvency proceedings, a reorganisation plan was adopted on 24\u00a0November\u00a02004, within a year of thoseproceedingsbeing opened, and the relevant payments were made to the creditors in 2006(see paragraph\u00a013 above).<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court is of the opinion that the State acted diligently and in a timely manner to assist the applicants in executing the court judgments in their favour (see, mutatis mutandis,Fociac v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a02577\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 70-78, 3 February 2005).<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants raised additional complaints under Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article\u00a014 of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the proceedings giving rise to the final decision of 5\u00a0May\u00a02005 (see paragraph 9 above).<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The first and second applicants claimed the following amounts in respect of pecuniary damage: (a) updated sums based on the amounts awarded to them by the court decisionswhich remained unenforced, and (b)\u00a0penalties in respect of those sums. In particular, the first applicant claimed RON 855,746.50under heading (a) and RON 757,337.20under heading\u00a0(b), while the second applicant sought RON 835,254.80 and RON\u00a0738,664.50respectively.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The first and second applicants also claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government asked the Court to strike out the application in so far as it concerned the third applicant because of her failure to submit just satisfaction claims. Theyalso argued that the amounts sought were excessive, and that the finding of a violation should constitute sufficient just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the first and second applicants have not shown the existence of a causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the first and second applicants EUR 3,600 each in respect of B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The first and second applicants also claimed RON 6,312 each, an amount representing the reimbursement of their travel costs for all court hearings before the domestic courts. They did not send the relevant bills.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicants had failed to prove that they had actually incurred the costs claimed.<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaint concerning access to a court in the appeal insolvency proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the first and second applicants, within three months,EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros) each in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent Stateat the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the first and second applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 June 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Andrea Tamietti\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque
\nEgidijus K\u016bris,
\nIulia Motoc, judges,
\nand Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\n\u00a7\u00a7\u00a031-34, 10November 2005) that the applicants were responsible for the protraction of the first set of proceedings giving rise to the final decision of 5\u00a0May\u00a02005 (see paragraph\u00a09 above),whereas the authorities were diligentoverall.<\/p>\n
\nnon-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.The Court makes no award in respect of the third applicant, as no claim was submitted.<\/p>\n
\ncase-law, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses.<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n