FOURTH SECTION<\/p>\n
CASE OF ALBERT AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY<\/strong> JUDGMENT This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article\u00a044 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/em><\/p>\n In the case of Albert and Others v. Hungary,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Ganna Yudkivska, President, Having deliberated in private on 4 December 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 5294\/14) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by Ms\u00a0J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 Albert and 240other Hungarian nationals, whose details are set out in the appendix, on 10 January 2014.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were represented by Mr I. G\u00e1rdos, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tall\u00f3di, from the Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged, in particular, that the restriction of their rights to influence the operation of the banks in which they held shares, stemming from the Integration Act of 2013, had violated their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0By a decision of 4 April 2017, the Court declared the application admissible and joined to the merits two objections by the Government concerning the applicants\u2019 victim status.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantsfiled further written observations (Rule 59 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court) and requested a hearing on the merits of the case. The Court however considered a hearing unnecessary in the present case (Rules\u00a054 \u00a7\u00a05 and 59 \u00a7 3).<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0As Mr P\u00e9ter Paczolay, the judge elected in respect of Hungary, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule\u00a028 \u00a7 3), the President decided to appoint Mr\u00a0Robert Spano, the judge elected in respect of Iceland, to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article\u00a026\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention and Rule\u00a029\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01).<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantsare shareholders of two savings banks, namely Kinizsi Bank Zrt. (\u201cKinizsi Bank\u201d) and Moh\u00e1csi Takar\u00e9k Bank Zrt. (\u201cMoh\u00e1csi Bank\u201d), and of one savings cooperative, P\u00e1tria Takar\u00e9ksz\u00f6vetkezet (\u201cP\u00e1tria Cooperative\u201d). A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix, whichalso indicates the financial institution in which they hold shares and any changes to their situation following the lodging of the application.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0At the time the application was lodged, the applicants held shares with an aggregate par value of 2,043,342,000 Hungarian forints (HUF), approximately 6,310,000 euros (EUR), representing 98.28% of the total registered capital of Kinizsi Bank and shares with an aggregate par value of HUF\u00a01,833,300,000, approximately EUR 5,662,000, representing 87.65% of the total registered capital of Moh\u00e1csi Bank, and shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 8,100,000, approximately EUR\u00a025,000, representing 5.61% of the total share capital of P\u00e1tria Cooperative.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 December 2014 and 15 April 2015 respectivelytwo of the applicants,Ms L\u00e1szl\u00f3 J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 Boris (no. 18) and Ms. Endr\u00e9n\u00e9 Csoltk\u00f3 (no.\u00a028), the only shareholders of P\u00e1triaCooperative amongst the applicants, withdrew their complaints before the Court. Therefore, the facts of the casebelowdo not contain any further information relating specifically to P\u00e1tria Cooperative.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Institutional protection system prior to the Integration Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0Kinizsi Bankand Moh\u00e1csi Bank were established in 1958 and used to operate as savingscooperatives. Their clientele was mostly from the local community.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0In 1993 a voluntary and restricted integration took place involving 235\u00a0savings cooperatives, includingthe predecessors ofKinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank. The purpose of the integration was to enhance the cooperatives\u2019 market position and financial security. With the active support of the Hungarian State and the PHARE Program of the European Union, they entered into an integration agreement. The key institutions of the integration were the National Association of Savings Cooperatives (Orsz\u00e1gos Takar\u00e9ksz\u00f6vetkezeti Sz\u00f6vets\u00e9g \u2013 \u201cOTSZ\u201d), the Savings Bank (Takar\u00e9kbankZrt.) and the National Fund for the Institutional Protection of Savings Cooperatives (Orsz\u00e1gos Takar\u00e9ksz\u00f6vetkezeti Int\u00e9zm\u00e9nyv\u00e9delmi Alap \u2013 \u201cOTIVA\u201d), which was created as part of the integration. OTIVA, on the one hand, improved the security of deposits placed with the savings cooperatives by supplementing the National Deposit Insurance Fund (Orsz\u00e1gos Bet\u00e9tbiztos\u00edt\u00e1si Alap \u2013 \u201cOBA\u201d), and, on the other hand, served to prevent crisis situations and improved the stability of savings cooperatives.\u00a0Until changes were introduced by the Integration Act, the shareholding of the savings cooperatives and certain saving banks (together referred to as \u201ccooperative credit institutions\u201d) in the Savings Bank exceeded 60%.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0In 2006 and 2008respectively Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Banktransformed into the companies limited by shares and received their licences for banking operations. They however remained members of OTIVA and part of the above-mentioned integration.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Economic situation of the cooperative credit institutions<\/strong><\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0According to Risk Report 2013\/I issued by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (hereafter \u201cthe Supervisory Authority\u201d) in June\u00a02013, the cooperative credit institution sector remained profitable throughout the economic crisis. However,in 2011 and 2012 respectively the operating licences of two saving cooperatives were revoked by the Supervisory Authority, whichresulted in the deposit holders obtaining indemnification from OBA.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0Following an audit carried out with respect to 121\u00a0cooperative credit institutions,further tothe entry into force of the Integration Act (see paragraph 16 below), a certainnumber of themhad their operating licences withdrawn. Furthermore, ninety-one cooperative credit institutions were obliged to commit reserves, in eight cases aserious crisis situation was established and some required a capital injection from the Integration Organisation (see paragraph 18 below).<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, basing its findings on the data collected after the Integration Act came into force, considering the capital\/loan ratio,thirty-nine cooperative credit institutions would not have been in a position to ensure profitable operations without the new measures. The above-mentioned audit also revealed that thirteen cooperative credit institutions had a capital adequacy ratio below 8%, five of which hadanegative ratio value.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0The Integration Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Main features of the Integration Act and scope of its application<\/em><\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 13\u00a0July 2013 Act no. CXXXV of 2013 on the Integration of Cooperative Credit Institutions and the Amendment of Certain Laws Regarding Economic Matters (\u201ctheIntegration Act\u201d) entered into force. It was then amended in several aspects, including by Act no.\u00a0CXCVI of 2013 on the Amendment of Certain Laws Regarding the Integration of Cooperative Credit Institutions (\u201cthe Integration (Amendment) Act\u201d) with effect from 30\u00a0November 2013.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The Integration Act concerned cooperative credit institutions, that is most savings cooperatives operating as a cooperative and the banks operating as companies limited by shares who on 1 January 2013 had been members of OTIVA. Its scope therefore extended to Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank. It made the cooperative credit institutions ipso jure members of the Integration Organisation and shareholders of the Savings Bank.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The Integration Act abolished the integration of cooperatives organised on a voluntary basis, with voluntary membership, and terminated OTIVA. Instead, it introduced a mandatory integrationheaded by, inter alia, the Integration Organisation of Cooperative Credit Institutions (Sz\u00f6vetkezeti Hitelint\u00e9zetek Integr\u00e1ci\u00f3s Szervezete-\u201cthe Integration Organisation\u201d), which had been newly created as a legal successor of OTIVA and other voluntary institutional protection funds,and\u00a0the Savings Bank, which continued to be the central bank of the integration, now having more extensive powers. The Integration Act also created a financial risk pool, encompassing the whole of the cooperative credit institutions sector.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The Savings Bank supervises the operations of the cooperative credit institutions and is authorised to issue instructions in order to ensure compliance with the law and the regulations issued by the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank. Apart from the cooperative credit institutions, the Savings Bank and the Hungarian Development Bank (Magyar Fejleszt\u00e9si Bank Zrt. \u2013 \u201cthe MFB\u201d) became members of the Integration Organisation by virtue of law. Due to the changes in the ownership of the Savings Bank pursuant to the Integration Act (see in particular, sections 13 and 20, cited in paragraph\u00a039 below) the shareholding of Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank in the Savings Bank changed. While the two banks previously possessed 0.15% and 2.27% respectively in the Savings Bank, they had a 0.12% and\u00a01.83% stake respectively following the implementation of the Integration Act.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The Integration Organisation\u2019s assets are included in the consolidated own funds of the Savings Bank and the cooperative credit institutions. The solvency capital of the cooperative credit institutions is determined collectively, including the property of the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Possibilities to exit the system<\/em><\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0Under section 17 of the Integration Act, the cooperative credit institutions which did not comply with the relevant requirements of the Integration Act were excluded from integration and their operating licences withdrawn. In such cases, and if they decided to exit, their shares in the Savings Bank could be bought by the MFB, who had a call option (section 20(10) of the Integration Act).<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0In July 2013 banks could leave the integration if they were each able to provide an additional HUF 2 billion, approximately EUR 6\u00a0million, as for the creation of a new bank. Moreover, following the amendment of the Integration Act, the cooperative credit institutions were obliged to deposit an amount equivalent to the value of the share capital they had had at the time of the establishment of their membership in the Integration Organisation to a separate account at the Savings Bank for 730\u00a0days (sections 11(7) and (8), and 20\/A(12) and (13) of the Integration Act; see also paragraph 43 below).At least one bank, to which the Integration Act applied, decided to exit the system and this decision was accepted by the Supervisory Authority.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0State\u2019s role in the integration<\/em><\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0In 2012 the Hungarian State emerged as an indirect owner of the Savings Bank, when the MFB (see paragraph 19 above), which is owned by the State, purchased a stake in Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank AG, representing 38.5% of the Savings Bank\u2019s shares. Following the entry into force of the Integration Act, the Savings Bank\u2019s capital was increased by HUF\u00a0654,986,000 to HUF\u00a03,389,704,000 (approximately EUR 10 million) from the previous amount of HUF\u00a02,735,038,000. Out of this capital increase, the State-owned Hungary Post (Magyar Posta) exercised its statutory subscription rights and acquired ordinary shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 654,666,000 (approximately EUR 2 million), almost 20% of the Savings Bank\u2019s shares (see section 20 of the Integration Act, cited in paragraph 39 below).<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0Apart from the capital increase, the State has directly paid HUF\u00a0136\u00a0billion, approximately EUR 420 million, to the Integration Organisation through theJoint Capital Coverage Fund of Cooperative Credit Institutions (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe Fund\u201d).<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0It was envisaged that the State\u2019s ownership in the integration would only be of a temporary nature. In 2014itsstake in the Savings Bankwas sold, through a bidding process, to one company. According to the Government,the majority of the buyer company is owned by savings cooperatives and private individuals and, as a result of this transaction, the direct and indirect shareholding of cooperative credit institutions in the Savings Bankincreased to 76.96%.<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0Impact of the Integration Act on thedecision making of the cooperative credit institutions<\/strong><\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0Following the entry into force of the Integration Act, the cooperative credit institutions were obliged to approve a new memorandum of association conforming to the model established by the Integration Organisation. They continue to be bound by any amendments to the model introduced by the Integration Organisation (sections\u00a017\/H and\u00a019(3) of the Integration Act, see also paragraph 46 below).<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0For a resolution by the board of directors and supervisory board of the cooperative credit institutionsto be valid, an invitation to the relevant meeting of the board of directors or supervisory board, together with all related material, must be simultaneously sent to the Savings Bank (section\u00a015\/A of the Integration Act). Minutes of the general meetings and meetings of the board of directors of the cooperative credit institutions must always be submitted to the Savings Bank, and minutes of the supervisory board meetings must be sent to the Savings Bank in certain cases. The cooperative credit institutions are also required to inform, inter alia, the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank of any legal proceedings in which they are involved (section 15\/C of the Integration Act).<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The shareholders of the cooperative credit institutions may take, inter alia, the following resolutions subject to consent\/approval of the Savings Bank:<\/p>\n – theadoption of the annual financial report of the company (section\u00a015(11) and 17\/J(2) of the Integration Act);<\/p>\n – the issuing of bonds (section 17\/K(1) of the Integration Act);<\/p>\n – decreases or increases of capital (ibid.);<\/p>\n -any payment to the shareholders under any legal title (e.g. dividends, reduction of capital) in connection with their status as shareholders (see section 17\/Q(3) and (4) of the Integration Act, cited in paragraph\u00a039 below);<\/p>\n – theconversion, merger or demerger of the company (section\u00a017\/S(3) of the Integration Act); and<\/p>\n – acquisition of own shares (section 17\/Q(6) of the Integration Act).<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The consent of the Savings Bankis required for the appointment of executive officers of the cooperative credit institutions(section 15(12) of the Integration Act). The Savings Bank is authorised to suspend their mandate; it may appoint a managing official for an interim period if the cooperative credit institutions do not comply with the instructions or their operations are not in compliance with the law or regulations, or if they are in a so-called crisis situation (section 15(4), (7) and (12) of the Integration Act).<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Integration Organisation is entitled to suspend the voting rights of the shareholders of the cooperative credit institution for one year ifthey threaten the reliable and secure operation of the cooperative credit institutions (see section 17\/C(5), cited in paragraph\u00a039 below).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Integration Organisation is authorised to define the level of the cooperative credit institutions\u2019 solvency capital on anindividual case\u2011by\u2011case (not consolidated) basis (section 17\/C(1); if they do not reach the level defined, the Integration Organisation is authorised to increase the capital of the cooperative credit institutions, or take certain other measures (see section 17\/C(2), cited in paragraph 39 below).<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0As to the actual application of the measures provided for by the Integration Act, the Government submitted the following information:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0There have been altogether 151 cases in which cooperative credit institutions sought the consent of the Integration Organisation for the appointment of board members; in ten cases the consent was refused, affecting seven cooperative credit institutions. These cases did not concern Kinizsi Bank or Moh\u00e1csi Bank.<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0Executive officers of cooperative credit institutions were removed in nine cases; four of these affected cooperative credit institutions where the capital adequacy ratio was largely insufficient, which led to a capital injection by the Integration Organisation in three cases and a merger with another cooperative credit institution in the fourth case; in the remaining five cases,executive officers were removed for breaches of the relevant legislation. These cases did not concern Kinizsi Bank or Moh\u00e1csi Bank.<\/p>\n (iii)\u00a0\u00a0In eight cases the Savings Bank refused to consent to the payment of dividends; the reasons were: (a) non-compliance with the relevant legislation (two cases, including Kinizsi Bank (see paragraph 35 below)), (b) the risk of not fulfilling the business plan (four cases), (c) the risk of not fulfilling the business plan but allowing for the payment of a limited amount of dividends (two cases, including Moh\u00e1csi Bank (see paragraph\u00a035 below)).<\/p>\n (iv)\u00a0\u00a0In three cases the increase in capital was provided by the Integration Organisation in order to achieve the 8% capital adequacy ratio; none of them concerned Kinizsi Bankor Moh\u00e1csi Bank.<\/p>\n (v)\u00a0\u00a0The voting rights of shareholders of cooperative credit institutions have neverbeen suspended by the Integration Organisation.<\/p>\n (vi)\u00a0\u00a0In two cases, not concerning Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank, the Savings Bank refused to consent to the payment of the shares\u2019 value in a cooperative credit institution for members who had exited the institution, finding that the payment would have jeopardised the fulfillment of the capital adequacy ratio requirements.<\/p>\n E.\u00a0\u00a0Interference by the integration bodies inthe decision making of Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/strong><\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank had to adopt a memorandum of association in line with the model provided by the Integration Organisation following the entry into force of the Integration Act. However,the shareholders of the two banks who disagreed with the resolution adopting the aforementioned memorandum challenged it in court. On 12\u00a0March 2015 the P\u00e9cs High Courtfound for the plaintiffs in the case brought by the Mohacsi Bank\u2019s shareholders. The court held that the modelmemorandum of associationissued by the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation could not in any way deviate from the mandatory provisions of the Companies Act. On 30 March 2015 a similar judgment was given by the Veszpr\u00e9m High Courtin a case brought by the shareholders of Kinizsi Bank. In both cases, the decision adopting the impugned memorandum at the general meetings of the bank was annulled.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0It would appear that the required solvency capital of Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank was at some point raised. However, both banks were able to comply with the new requirement.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0In the case of Kinizsi Bank, the Savings Bank refused to approve the annual report for 2014 as the bank had not provided data to the auditor to complete the financial audit. The applicants submitted that the required data had been submitted in due time. In the case of Moh\u00e1csi Bank, the Savings Bank approved the annual financial report for 2014 but prohibited the actual payment of dividends amounting to 25% (see paragraph 32 above).<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government averred that several further sets of proceedings were pending before Hungarian courts in which Kinizsi Bank or Moh\u00e1csi Bank or their shareholders had sought a remedy against certain decisions of the Savings Bank or the Integration Organisation.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The 2006 Companies Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0Act no. IV of 2006 on Companies (\u201cthe 2006 Companies Act\u201d, as in force on 12 July 2013, a day before the Integration Act\u2019s entry into force) provided, with respect to a general meeting of a limited liability company, as follows:<\/p>\n Section 231<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0The general meeting is the supreme body of a private company limited by shares, and consists of all shareholders.<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0The following shall fall within the exclusive competence of the general meeting:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0decisions to approve and amend the articles of association, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0decisions on changing the operating form of the private limited company;<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0decisions on converting or terminating the company without succession;<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0with the exception of the provisions in section 37 (concerning the delegation of certain competences to the supervisory board), the election and removal of members of the management board or the general director, members of the supervisory board and the auditor, and their remuneration;<\/p>\n (e)\u00a0\u00a0approval of the annual report prepared pursuant to the Accounting Act;<\/p>\n (f)\u00a0\u00a0decisions to pay interim dividends, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;<\/p>\n (g)\u00a0\u00a0decisions to convert printed share certificates into dematerialised shares;<\/p>\n (h)\u00a0\u00a0alteration of the rights attached to the various series of shares, and the conversion of categories or classes of shares;<\/p>\n (i) decisions to issue convertible bonds or bonds with subscription rights, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;<\/p>\n (j)\u00a0\u00a0decisions to increase the share capital, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;<\/p>\n (k)\u00a0\u00a0decisions to reduce the share capital, unless this Act contains provisions to the contrary;<\/p>\n (l)\u00a0\u00a0decisions to abolish preferential subscription rights, or for authorising the management board for the exclusion or restriction of preferential subscription rights;<\/p>\n (m)\u00a0\u00a0decisions on all issues which are assigned to the competence of the general meeting by law or the articles of association.\u201d<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Integration Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The Preamble to the Integration Act (see paragraph 16 above)reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe savings cooperatives industry needs to be restructured; the sector is under\u2011capitalised, and the level of its organisation and the standard of its services are not adequate and its operability may not be ensured in the long term.<\/p>\n Under the authorisation of Act no.CCVI of 2007, in a Government decree the Hungarian State has established the minimum amount provided from State assets for the sectorial restructuring of savings cooperatives. Due to international commitments, however, the funds to be actually devoted to restructuring may not exceed the amount corresponding to the due consideration to be payable by investors in similar market conditions for the rights and positions acquired by the Hungarian State.<\/p>\n Though the Hungarian State acquires major ownership in the industry, it avails such strong positions to restructure, professionalise and reorganise the sector and wishes to sell its positions \u2013thus improved and strengthened\u2013 in due time, provided that the positive developments induced by the Hungarian State seem to be irreversible.<\/p>\n The Act aims to provide a uniform and transparent legal framework for all cooperative credit institutions…<\/p>\n The personal scope of the Act extends to cooperative credit institutions defined in the Act, i.e. savings cooperatives, cooperative credits and other credit institutions described in the Act that at any time prior to the Act entering into force operated in cooperative form and prior to the Act entering into force has transformed from cooperatives to limited liability companies, retaining their cooperative affiliation, indicated by the fact that they continue to operate as members of an organisation representing savings cooperatives\u2019 interests.\u201d<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0Apart from those set out above (see paragraphs21 to 31 above), the following provisions of the Integration Act (as amended) are relevant:<\/p>\n Section 1<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c…<\/p>\n (4)\u00a0\u00a0[The Savings Bank] is obliged to approve a new risk management policy uniformly applicable to members of the integration within 120 days following the entry into force of this Act. The Integration Organisation, [the Savings Bank] and the cooperative credit institution shall bear joint and several liability for obligations assumed after the thirtieth day following theissuing of new risk management policy of [the Savings Bank].\u201d<\/p>\n Section 1\/A<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cThis Act aims to:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0establish a bank for the rural communities, operating under the principle of joint and several liability, the members of which are preferably local private property owners, the efficient operation and economies of scale of which are ensured by professional central management,<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0provide institutional guaranteesfor the prudent operation of cooperative credit institutions in the long term,<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0professionalise, modernise and organise a competitive cooperative credit institution sector,<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0improve risk management of the cooperative credit institution sector,<\/p>\n (e)\u00a0\u00a0ensure integrated operation of the cooperative credit institution sector and establish the necessary infrastructure,<\/p>\n (f)\u00a0\u00a0standardise operational policies in order to achieve the aims described in paragraphs(a) to (e).<\/p>\n (g)\u00a0\u00a0ensure institutional protection of cooperative credit institutions,<\/p>\n (h)\u00a0\u00a0ensure compliance with international and European requirements, regulations, standards and customs applicable to credit institutions.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 3<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c…<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0The Integration Organisation may accept as member who,<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, a preliminary undertaking towards the Savings Bank to take over one \u201cC\u201d preference share with a nominal value of HUF 2,000;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0approved a new memorandum or articles of association in line with the model pre-approved by the board of the Savings Bank in accordance with the present Act;<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0except for the cooperative credit institutions defined in section 19(4), notified, in the manner prescribed by this Act, the Integration Organisation of its intention to join the organisation …\u201d<\/p>\n Section 4<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0The initial assets of the Integration Organisation shall consist of the contribution provided by the MFB and the assets acquired under the title of legal succession …<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0The contribution of the MFB shall amount to HUF 1,000,000,000, that is, one billion forints, to be provided by the MFB …<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n Section 11<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0The Board of the Integration Organisation shall adopt rules obligatory for the members of the Integration Organisation, save for the MFB, on the following:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0accounting procedures;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0internal control procedures;<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0suitability criteria for executive officers and the verification of such suitability;<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0provision of financial aid eligible for cooperative credit institutions;<\/p>\n (e)\u00a0\u00a0building-up of the assets of the Integration Organisation described in section\u00a04(4).<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0Upon the initiative of the Board of [the Savings Bank], the Board of the Integration Organisation shall decide on the admission of a cooperative credit institution into the Integration Organisation and on its exclusion from the Integration Organisation.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (4)\u00a0\u00a0For the purpose of institutional protection, in the event that the measure(s) taken under section 17\/C(2) yield(s) no result, the Integration Organisation may acquire ownership in [the Savings Bank] and the cooperative credit institution by means of a capital increase. The Integration Organisation is obliged to dispose of, within two years, the shares and bonds thus acquired in [the Savings Bank] or the cooperative credit institution<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (7)\u00a0\u00a0Exit from the Integration Organisation shall be regulated by the statutes of the Integration Organisation. Cooperative credit institutions exiting the Integration Organisation shall apply to the Supervisory Authority for operational authorisation within [eight] days following the Integration Organisation\u2019s notification of its exit from the Integration Organisation as if the financial institution were being newly established. If the cooperative credit institution exiting or excluded from the Integration Organisation fails to apply to the Supervisory Authority for operational authorisation…, or the operational authorisation is not granted within 120 days of the date of the Integration Organisation\u2019s notification of its exit or exclusion from the Integration Organisation, the Supervisory Authority shall revoke its operational authorisation and the provisions of section 17 shall be applied to the cooperative credit institution.<\/p>\n (8)\u00a0\u00a0In the event of exit or exclusion from the Integration Organisation, with respect to the exiting or excluded member, the joint and several liability of the members of the Integration Organisation shall terminate for the obligations assumed by the member as of the day of its exit or exclusion …\u201d<\/p>\n Section 12<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(2)\u00a0\u00a0The shareholders of [the Savings Bank] are the cooperative credit institutions, the eventual general or specific successor(s) of the MFB and Magyar Posta, and other organisations, legal entities or natural persons acquiring shares in [the Savings Bank] with the consent of the Board of [the Savings Bank].\u201d<\/p>\n Section 13<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0The authorised share capital of [the Savings Bank] shall be at least HUF\u00a03,389,704,000 …<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0Magyar Posta shall acquire ownership in [the Savings Bank] by subscribing toordinary shares.<\/p>\n (3)\u00a0\u00a0The cooperative credit institutions shall hold series \u201cC\u201d preference shares in [the Savings Bank].<\/p>\n (4)\u00a0\u00a0Shareholders of [the Savings Bank] may only hold one kind of preference share.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 15<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c…(2)\u00a0\u00a0[The Savings Bank] shall adopt rules obligatory for cooperative credit institutions on the following:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0the detailed rules on risk management, including credit authorisation, risk monitoring, deposit allocation, cash management and investment policy … and rules on additional specific capital requirements in addition to laws, regulations and other binding rules;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0the applicable business policy;<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0the joint marketing activity;<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0the establishment of an integrated IT system.<\/p>\n (3)\u00a0\u00a0[The Savings Bank] shall exert control over the activity of the cooperative credit institution, and it may give instructions to the cooperative credit institution in order to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations, the rules issued by or the instructions given by the Integration Organisation and [the Savings Bank]. The cooperative credit institution is under an obligation to comply with those instructions. The instructions must be justified and a deadline for compliance must be set. As to whom the instructions are addressed, the cooperative credit institution has the right to resort to the courts in order to determine if the instructions are in accordance with the Act, other laws and regulations and the rules issued by [the Savings Bank] and the Integration Organisation. Resort to the courts has no suspensive effect; the instructionsirrespectively shall be complied withby the deadline set therein.<\/p>\n (4)\u00a0\u00a0In the event that the cooperative credit institution fails to comply with the instructions or it is operating in discordance with the laws, regulations or rules:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0the Board of [the Savings Bank] may decide to suspend the mandate of the executive officer of the cooperative credit institution for a maximum of 180 days…<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0upon the initiative of the Board of [the Savings Bank] or upon its own initiative, the Board of the Integration Organisation shall decide on the suspension of membership of the cooperative credit institution in the Integration Organisation and\u2011if justified- on the exclusion of the cooperative credit institution from the Integration Organisation.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (7)\u00a0\u00a0If in the view of the Board of [the Savings Bank] a cooperative credit institution or a group of cooperative credit institutions is in crisis,<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0the Board of [the Savings Bank] may decide to suspend the mandate of the executive officer of the cooperative credit institution for a maximum of 180 days; that suspension may be extended for an additional 180 days or \u2013in particularly justified cases\u2013 it may decide to terminate their mandates and appoint executive officer(s) on a provisional basis;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0… the Board of the Integration Organisation shall decide on the suspension of membership of the cooperative credit institution in the Integration Organisation and \u2011if justified- on the exclusion of the cooperative credit institution from the Integration Organisation.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (19)\u00a0\u00a0In its capacity as the central bank of the cooperative credit institutions and of the integration, in order to ensure prudent operation [the Savings Bank] shall be entitled to give \u2013at its sole discretion\u2013 prior consent to the acquisition of own shares or sale of own shares acquired by certain cooperative credit institutions and by the Integration Organisation, provided the value of the ownership to be acquired or to be sold exceeds 0.1% of the own funds of the integration, calculated on a consolidated basis. Transactions pertaining to the same ownership carried out within twelve months shall be aggregated.<\/p>\n (20)\u00a0\u00a0In addition to …section 15(3), the cooperative credit institution may resort to the courts against the decision or instructions of the Board of [the Savings Bank] in accordance with the rules on the judicial review of company resolutions. Resort to the courts has no suspensive effect; the decision or instructionsirrespectively shall be complied with by the deadline set therein.<\/p>\n (21)\u00a0\u00a0The cooperative credit institution has the right to resort to the courts and contest the decision taken by the Integration Organisation against it, in order to determine if the decision is in accordance with the Act, other laws and regulations and the rules issued by the Integration Organisation or other policies of the Integration. Resort to the courts has no suspensive effect; the decision irrespectively shall be complied with by the deadline set therein.<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n Section 17<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0… the Supervisory Authority shall revoke the operational authorisation of any cooperative credit institution that fails to comply with or to respect the deadline for complying with its obligations…\u201d<\/p>\n Section 17\/C<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0A cooperative credit institution may be established with a minimum initial share capital of [HUF 250million]. Regardless of its form of operation, the own funds of the cooperative credit institution may not be lower than the level established from time to time by the Integration Organisation on an individual (not consolidated) basis.<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0Should the own funds of the cooperative credit institution fall below the level specified in subsection (1) or in the case described in section 19(13) [concerning the consequences for cooperative credit institutions who have applied unsuccessfully for a new licence], the Integration Organisation is entitled to resort to the following exceptional measures \u2013without prejudice to the powers and duties of the Supervisory Authority and provided the Supervisory Authority has failed to take such measures \u2011 by giving prior notice to the Supervisory Authority:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0It may provide for the cooperative credit institution:<\/p>\n (aa)\u00a0\u00a0to sell its assets not serving the purposes of banking operations;<\/p>\n (ab)\u00a0\u00a0to improve its capital structure (including the sale of assets) within the deadline set and in compliance with the requirements;<\/p>\n (ac)\u00a0\u00a0with regard to the financial services rendered by the financial institution and the risks assumed by that financial institution, it may determine an individual capital requirement higher than the level specified …<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0It may prevent or prohibit the cooperative credit institution from:<\/p>\n (ba)\u00a0\u00a0performing transactions in the relation [between] the owner and the cooperative credit institution;<\/p>\n (bb)\u00a0\u00a0paying deposits and other repayable funds;<\/p>\n (bc)\u00a0\u00a0assuming obligations.<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0It may determine the maximum rate of interest to be stipulated by the cooperative credit institution.<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0It may oblige the board of the cooperative credit institution to convene a general meeting and invite it to discuss specific items of the agenda or draw the attention of the board and the general meeting to the need for certain decisions to be taken…<\/p>\n (e)\u00a0\u00a0It may call upon the following owner(s) of the cooperative credit institution to take the necessary measures:<\/p>\n (ea)\u00a0\u00a0owner(s) of the cooperative credit institution holding a minimum direct shareholding of 5% as registered in the stock registry or \u2013for cooperative credit institutions operating in a cooperative form\u2013 in the registry of members;<\/p>\n (eb)\u00a0\u00a0owner(s) having qualifying majority influence.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (5)\u00a0\u00a0The Integration Organisation may suspend the voting rights of the owners of the cooperative credit institution for a definite period of time, but for no more than one year, by simultaneously taking the additional measures enlisted in subsection (2)…provided the activity of the owner or his influence over the cooperative credit institution jeopardises the reliable and secure operation of the cooperative credit institution on the basis of the available facts; in such a case, votes concerned by the limitation shall be disregarded upon forming the quorum.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 17\/M<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0… The purpose of the Fund is to compensate and indemnify claims enforced against the members of the integration of cooperatives under the principle of joint and several liability.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 17\/O<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cThe Fund relies on resources paid by the cooperative credit institutions and [the Savings Bank]…\u201d<\/p>\n Section 17\/P<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0The cooperative credit institutions and [the Savings Bank] provide coverage for their joint and several liability defined in section 1(4) primarily by means of paying an annual contribution to the Fund and an extraordinary contribution as ordered by the Fund.<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n Section 17\/Q<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(3)\u00a0\u00a0The general meeting of the cooperative credit institution shall decide upon the decrease of authorised share capital or any payment or repayment made to the member (shareholder) under any [legal title] in connection with its membership (shareholder), and the prior consent of the Board of [the Savings Bank] is required.<\/p>\n (4)\u00a0\u00a0In relation to the above subsection (3), the Board of [the Savings Bank] may not refuse to grant its prior consent as long as the payment of dividends does not jeopardise the solvency of the cooperative credit institution or the performance of its business policy or the level of own funds as established on an individual basis. In connection with the above subsection (3), the Board of [the Savings Bank] is obliged to refuse its prior consent, provided that the investigation … is not yet terminated or it has terminated and found … that capital replacement is needed and capital replacement has not yet taken place.\u201d<\/p>\n Section 20<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0Within thirty days following the entry into force of the Act…the two auditors, independent … upon the invitation of the MFB [they]shall determine the current market price of series \u201cB\u201d preference shares and establish the price unit of one ordinary share and one series \u201cB\u201d preference share of [the Savings Bank]. …<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0From the first capital increase of HUF 654,986,000 the share capital of [the Savings Bank], to be effected following the entry into force of this Act, Magyar Posta shall take over additional ordinary shares of HUF 654,666,000 at nominal value, while the cooperative credit institutions shall take over a maximum of HUF\u00a0320,000 of series \u201cC\u201d preference shares at nominal value. Series \u201cC\u201d preference shares have priority rights as determined in the statutes of [the Savings Bank]…<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (10)\u00a0\u00a0The MFB shall have a call option on the series \u201cB\u201d preference shares of shareholders …and for [the Savings Bank] shares held by the cooperative credit institutions of which the operational authorisation has been revoked. The call option is valid for one year and may be called as of the day following revocation of the operational authorisation. The call option may be exercised at the value determined by section 20(1). …The purchase price shall be paid within [ninety] days following the call option statement. The consent of an authorised body of [the Savings Bank] is required for the acquisition of own shares by the MFB.<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n Section 20\/A<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201c…<\/p>\n (12)\u00a0\u00a0The cooperative credit institution which has declared its intention to exit the Integration Organisation is obliged to fully perform its obligations arising from this Act so long as it is a member of the Integration Organisation. As regards section\u00a011(7) the declared intention to exit will become effective, and the cooperative credit institution ceases to be a member of the Integration Organisation on the subsequent working day, if and when:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0the operational authorisation is granted by the Supervisory Authority, based on an application for authorisation,<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0the cooperative credit institution has settled all its claims with the Integration Organisation and all its members and has no outstanding debt towards them, excluding cases where a member of the Integration Organisation placed a deposit with the institution and excluding pending liabilities within the scope of joint and several liability…,<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0the conditions for exit as determined in the statutes of the Integration Organisation effective at the date of the exit have been fulfilled,<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0the condition described in subsection (13) has been fulfilled,<\/p>\n (e)\u00a0\u00a0the cooperative credit institution and the Integration Organisation have signed a joint statement on the scheduled exit.<\/p>\n (13)\u00a0\u00a0With regard to section 11(8), the excluded or exiting member is obliged to hold the value of its own funds as upon the establishment of its membership in the Integration Organisation in a separate account maintained with [the Savings Bank] for 730 days following the declaration of the intention to exit and to duly notify the Integration Organisation thereof. The amount paid to the [Fund] by the cooperative credit institution until the declaration of the intention to exit may be deducted from the amount to be placed in the separate account maintained with [the Savings Bank] under this subsection. The amount to be placed in the separate account maintained with [the Savings Bank] may be released on the conditions anddates to be determined in the statutes …\u201d<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Constitutional Court decision no. 20\/2014<\/strong><\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court reviewed the Integration Act in its decision no. 20\/2014 (VII.3) of 30 June 2014. As regards the process of its adoption in noted, in particular, the following:<\/p>\n \u201cThe legislation under examination aimed at the transformation of a significant subsystem of the financial sector and was based on a complex regulatory concept. Due to this and the [particular] sensitivity of the sector the legislator had reasonable grounds for keeping the process of arrangement and preparation to a strict minimum. It was in the interest of both the credit institutions and their clients\/depositors to maintain a [precarious]situation for as short a time as possible [so that] an atmosphere of panic or negative chain reaction did not occur.\u201d<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the aim of the Integration Act and the justification for the limitations imposed on the cooperative credit institutions\u2019 operations, the Constitutional Court held, inter alia, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c… [S]pecific credit institutions operate as a subsystem of the highlyorganised financial system and cannot be considered autonomous entities even in terms of civil law …<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Secure operation of credit institutions operating in cooperative form plays an important role in ensuring the stability of the financial sector as a whole. The sector in question gains its importance from its extensive branch network, the fact that in the majority of municipalities financial services are available solely through cooperative credit institutions, furthermore, cooperatives play a defining role in financing sole enterprises and businesses active in the agricultural sector. Maintaining this financial infrastructure and ensuring its operability constitutes a public interest that may justify interference with property (and financial autonomy) as part of economic and financial policy, social responsibility, the role of the national economy and social rigidity of property.<\/p>\n Since 2008-2009 statutory conditions of establishing and operating financial organisations, their supervision and control, consolidated management and coordination have become stricter all over the world. The integration itself and the control rights conferred to its bodies aim to coordinate the operation of cooperative credit institutions by means of rules and regulations on a general level and by means of specific measures and instructions on an individual level. These are necessary to coordinate the operation of the credit institutions concerned and to ensure integrated operation. For operational activity, the issues enlisted in section 15(2) of the Act (such as risk management, business policy, marketing and IT systems) are undoubtedly important, therefore the legislator has authorised [the Savings Bank] to establish binding regulations on such issues. In exercising its right of control, [the Savings Bank] monitors compliance with the regulations issued and, in that framework, it is entitled to give specific instructions. Taking into consideration that integrated operation is contingent upon compliance with the regulations and instructions mentioned, the legislator has also authorised the implementation of certain sanctions. Since cooperatives are managed by executive officers on an operative level, their mandates may be suspended or terminated. Sanctions against cooperatives not complying with the binding rules (suspension of the Integration Organisation\u2019s membership, exclusion) are one means of ensuring integrated operation. It is also justified to exercise [the Savings Bank]\u2019s right of control and implement sanctions if a cooperative is in crisis, since \u2013because of a financial risk pool\u2013 the operation of a single member may jeopardise the security of the whole system. … The requirement pertaining to the suspension of the rights of [the Savings Bank] shareholders is a provision promoting the establishment and maintenance of the integration and compliance with integration requirements. …<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n In addition to all this, the Act introduces a further limitation on the financial operations of cooperative credit institutions … The objective of these rules is to ensure predictable, stable and prudent operation, minimise business risks and improve secure lending activity.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n In examining the proportionality of the limitation, the Constitutional Court has considered it an important aspect that though the rights of control of the bodies of the integration have a decisive impact on the operational independence of cooperative credit institutions, this is outweighed by the benefits of integrated operation (mainly the reduction of business risks, improved profitability) and the fact that \u2013in order to ensure the stability and security of the sector\u2013 the State contributes significant amounts to institutional protection through the MFB, thereby improving the stability of the sector. In legal terms, not only does the State take something from the system (from the independence of credit institutions), but also gives something (financial coverage, security). …<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n … The State \u2013in this case as an economic and financial public administration authority\u2013 has set the objective of strengthening the cooperative credit institution sector within the system of financial institutions, ensuring its stability and operability and promoting efficient and competitive operation. In the view of the Constitutional Court, limitations on the right to property ofordinary shareholders are duly justified and compensated by this fact.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n The acquisition of property by the State effected indirectly via Magyar Posta and the restriction of ordinary shareholders resulting therefrom has so far involved not only the mere acquisition of management rights, but alsoa real and complex financial reinforcement of the sector. Capital was provided by the State to the sector in two ways: on the one hand, through a capital increase effected in [the Savings Bank] the State provided extra assets to the central bank of integration, and,on the other hand, a significant amount (…about HUF 136.5 billion) was provided to [the Integration Organisation]. The latter amount should be spent on the transformation, professionalisation and reorganisation of the sector.\u201d<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the call option of the MFB, the Constitutional Court noted the following:<\/p>\n \u201cSince the [call] option, if exercised, entails loss of property, the proportionality of the public interest and deprivation requires compensation. The option may only be constitutional with a value guarantee … In the case under review, the legislator has also provided for consideration: by virtue of section 20(1) and (10) to (11), a purchase price must be paid for the shares, the value of which is established as the [average] of an estimation given by two independent auditors, and the purchase price is to be paid within [ninety] days following the statement on the call option. The legislator has thus taken into consideration the requirement of a value guarantee, with no reduction in the assets of the shareholders.\u201d<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the scope of the Integration Act, extending to certain banks, the Constitutional Court found as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn considering the reasonable nature of such distinction it must not be overlooked that cooperatives-turned-banks have kept their membership in the institutional protection fund, hence maintaining their strong attachment to the cooperative credit institution sector at their own discretion despite the change in the way they operate. Membership … offered them a special \u2018financial safety net\u2019 but the Act has dissolved such funds. [The Integration Organisation] has become their legal successor; hence, it is reasonable for this organisation to provide protection to all credit institutions which were members of one of the voluntary funds. Accordingly, it was necessary to extend the integration to those credit institutions already transformed into banks on the condition that \u2013if they so decide\u2013 it is possible to leave the integration (in the meantime, one of the banks concerned has already taken this opportunity).\u201d<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the following parts of the Constitutional Court decision are relevant to the issue of the remedies available as of 30 November 2013:<\/p>\n \u201c … As a means of exercising control rights, the Act authorises the bodies of the integration to establish various regulations and decisions (…(i) rules, (ii) instructions and (iii) other decisions); thereby giving them powers to exercise a fundamental influence on the operation of the cooperative credit institutions concerned. Misuse or abuse of such rights may result in a grave violation of the rights of those involved. To counterbalance this fact, the Act \u2013as of 30\u00a0November 2013\u2013 ensures cooperative credit institutions the right to resort to the courts:<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Section 15(3) of the Act ensures such a right … against the instructions of [the Savings Bank]. …<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with section 15(20) of the Act, the cooperative credit institution may contest the decision or instruction of [the Savings Bank] under the rules applying to the judicial review of company resolutions …<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0Section 15(21) of the Act provides a judicial avenue to contest the decisions of [the Integration Organisation] for the cooperative credit institution [concerned] by the decision. The court may examine whether that decision was in conformity with the law and other regulations and the policies issued by the integration bodies.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n On the basis of the foregoing, it may be established that the right to seek a legal remedy against the instructions of [the Savings Bank] is ensured by section\u00a015(3) and\u00a0(20) of this Act, against its binding rules by section 45 of the Business Associations Act, or section 3:35 of the Civil Code replacing [it] [confirmed by section 15(20) of this Act].<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n As regards [the Integration Organisation\u2019s] rules, the Act does not provide for a similar requirement, regulating judicial review. Nevertheless, rules established by [Integration Organisation] are enforced through specific instructions and other individual decisions. In the event the rules are directly applicable, non-compliance entails sanctions for the cooperative credit institution, …[the Savings Bank] takes measures to enforce the rules by means of a specific measure (gives instructions) under section 15(3) or implements sanctions in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such individual decisions may be contested before the court and, in the course of the judicial review, the rules serving as the basis of the individual decisions [must] be examined.\u201d<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0As regards joint and several liability, the Constitutional Court revoked certain provisions of the Integration Act and held that the Fund should pay any amount payable on the grounds of joint and several liability instead of the debtor within a set time-limit. After payment has been effected by the Fund, any amount payable on the grounds of joint and several liability shall be paid by the other cooperative credit institutions, the Integration Organisation or the Savings Bank. It also noted that \u201cliability for debts is incurred solely for the debts of cooperative credit institutions, so members of the integration assume no liability for the debts of [the Savings Bank] and [the Integration Organisation].\u201d<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court also held that the provisions concerning the model memorandum of association should be interpreted so that such statutes may only contain compulsory elements that are essential for the purposes of the Integration Act or serve the implementation thereof or are necessary for meeting the EU requirements on the integrated operation of credit institutions.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY ISSUES<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objections<\/strong><\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicants could not be considered victims of a breach of their rights because, firstly, only the cooperative creditinstitutions, not the shareholders themselves, had been affected by the Integration Act. A mere loss of value of shares would also not be sufficient for conferring victim status on shareholders of a company. Secondly, a capital increase and the fundsthat the State had provided to the Integration Organisation (directly to the Fund) had to be considered as compensation for the restrictions imposed because such a contribution had decreased the business risk and increased the profitability of the cooperative credit institutions.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that their complaints were limited to the provisions of the Integration Act that restricted their rights to influence the operations of the banks in which they held shares. They further explained that their complaints did not extend to the effect the Integration Act had on the cooperative credit institutions.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0In its admissibility decision of 4\u00a0April 2017 the Court joined to the merits the two above-mentioned Government objections (see Albert and Others v. Hungary (dec.), no. 5294\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 57 and 61, 4 April 2017). It will thus address them together with the merits of the application.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Withdrawal of the application in so far as it concernsthe shareholders of P\u00e1tria Cooperative<\/strong><\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0Two of the applicants, Ms L\u00e1szl\u00f3 J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 Boris (no.\u00a018) and\u00a0Ms\u00a0Endr\u00e9n\u00e9 Csoltk\u00f3 (no.28), who wereshareholders of P\u00e1tria Cooperative,withdrew their complaints before the Court (see paragraph\u00a09 above).<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, and in the absence of any special circumstances regarding respect for the rights guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, the Court, in accordance with Article\u00a037\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(a) of the Convention, considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application in so far as it has been introduced by Ms\u00a0L\u00e1szl\u00f3 J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 Boris and\u00a0Ms\u00a0Endr\u00e9n\u00e9 Csoltk\u00f3 and finds it appropriate to strike it out of the list.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the abovefinding, the Court observes that the case before it now concerns only shareholders of Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Whether it is justified to continue the examination of the application as regards the deceased applicants<\/strong><\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that seven of the applicants, Ms Erzs\u00e9bet Ambergn\u00e9 Schumacher (no. 3), Mr Gyula Csan\u00e1di (no. 24), Ms Gyul\u00e1n\u00e9 Fl\u00f3ri\u00e1n (no.\u00a045), Mr\u00a0Andr\u00e1s G\u00e1sz (no. 50),\u00a0Mr L\u00e1szl\u00f3 S\u00e1ndor J\u00f3n\u00e1s (no.\u00a084), Mr\u00a0Mikl\u00f3s Kov\u00e1cs (no. 111) and Mr J\u00e1nos M\u00fath (no.\u00a0137), died while the case was pending before the Court. Their heirs informed the Court that they wished to pursue the application lodged by them. The Court has accepted on a number of occasions that close relatives of a deceased applicant are entitled to take his or her place (see, among many authorities, Petrovi\u0107 v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, nos.\u00a030721\/15, \u00a7\u00a7 15 and 16, 22\u00a0June 2017). For the purposes of the instant case, the Court is prepared to accept that the heirs of the deceased applicants, who are indicated in the appendix, can pursue the application initially brought by the aforementioned applicants.<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, Mr J\u00f3zsef Gy\u0151ri (no. 59), Mr J\u00f3zsef Jakab (no. 83) and Mr Gy\u00f6rgy Kiss (no. 102) also died pending the proceedings before the Court. As regardsMr J\u00f3zsef Gy\u0151ri and Mr Gy\u00f6rgy Kiss,no heirs or relatives expressed any wish to continue the proceedings before the Court. As regards Mr J\u00f3zsef Jakab, his heir informed the Court that she did not wish to pursue the proceedings in his stead.<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court concludes that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application in so far as it concerns Mr J\u00f3zsef Gy\u0151ri, Mr J\u00f3zsef Jakab and Mr\u00a0Gy\u00f6rgy Kiss, within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention (see, for example,Din\u00e7er and Others v. Turkey, no.\u00a010435\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a013 and 14, 3 November 2011). Furthermore, the Court finds no reasons of a general nature, as defined in Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine, which would require the further examination of the application in so far as it concerns the complaints made on behalf of the above-mentioned applicants. Accordingly, this part of the application should be struck out of the list.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained about the impact of the Integration Act on the exercise of their rights toinfluence the conduct and policy of the banks of which they were shareholders. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 to the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that the Integration Act imposed measures which could not be regarded as in the public interest because the cooperative credit institutions, which had amounted to only 5% of thecredit institution sector had, already prior to the Act, been highly profitable. Theycontested the Government\u2019s argument that the cooperative credit institutions hadbenefited from membership in the new protection system. They submitted that the latter had resulted from a misuse of power by the legislator, who had adopted the Integration Act and its amendment in haste, giving extensive powers to the Savings Bank.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants acknowledged that they continued to own shares in Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank but argued that as shareholders they had lost their autonomy in exercising the rights normally attached to shares. In particular, they maintained that after receiving their licences for banking operations, Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank had no longer belonged to the sector of cooperatives but the Integration Act nevertheless applied to them. In their view, it excessively interfered with their rights to freely establish and amend amemorandum of association, adopt resolutions on a number of issues (such as adoption of the annual financial report, the issuing of bonds, reductions\/increases of the share capital, any payments to the shareholders, acquisition of own shares, and the conversion, merger or demerger of the company),appoint directors\/members of supervisory board and determine their remuneration. Moreover, the Integration Act required them to comply with the instructions issued by the Savings Bank, allowed for the suspension of voting rights and authorised the International Organisation to define, without any clear limits, the banks\u2019 solvency capital (see paragraphs\u00a026 to\u00a031and 39above). This, in their view, amounted to a deprivation of their rights without receiving any compensation. In this connection, they submitted that the funds supplied by the State to the protection system could in no way improve their situation and that, in any event, the funds had been provided to the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation, not to them. Moreover, the applicants explained that their complaints did not extend to the effect the Integration Act had on Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bankand to the concrete measures taken by the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation against those banks. They argued that their right to property had been violated by \u201cthe mere existence of the obligation to request consent and by the right of the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation [to interfere]\u201d. In this connection, they also submitted that they as shareholders could only directly challenge the shareholders\u2019 resolutions, not the measures of the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation, and that a judicial review made sense only if the impugned measures exceeded the scope allowed by the Integration Act.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further argued that the security of depositors and prudent operation of financial institutions could be reached by much less restrictive measures, such as the effective operation of the supervisory authorities and proper regulation of the sector. They further submitted that though the provision of the Integration Act allowed for the banks to leave the integration it was practically impossible for themto fulfil the conditions for exiting, especially following the amendment of the Integration Act.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that the change in the ownership of the Savings Bank was irrelevant to the alleged violation in the present case. They also submitted that \u201cthe loss suffered by [their] banks with respect to the value of their shares in the Savings Bank [was] of an insignificant amount\u201d. In their view, the only relevant issue was who should influence the operation of KinizsiBank andMoh\u00e1csi Bank and how. In this connection, they submitted that while their property had not been transferred to another entity, the Integration Act\u2019s interference with their rights had been so severe as to amount to de facto expropriation.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The Government conceded that in so far as Article 1 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 could be applied to the present case, the measuresin question could be considered as interference with the applicants\u2019 right to property. However, they had been lawfully basedon the Integration Act and the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision. The impugned legislation concerned a very sensitive financial sector and the legislator had thusbeen justified in keeping the process and preparation to a strict minimum.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also argued that the Integration Act pursued the legitimate aims of averting potential financial crises affecting the cooperative credit institutions, improving their function in the financial sector, protecting the interest of thousands of their depositors as well as making the system compliant with the requirements of the Third Basel Accord (2013\/36\/EU Directive).<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the cooperative credit institutions had not been at an immediate risk before the entry into force of the Integration Act because they had kept their lending activity low. However, low capitalisation of the cooperative credit institutions prior to the Integration Act, which had not been properly addressed in the 2013 Supervisory Authority\u2019s report due to their inadequate risk assessment mechanisms, would have not allowed for long-term profitable operations. This was the case because, inter alia, the interest rates of newly issued Hungarian State Bonds, often used by the cooperative credit institutions,had significantly dropped. In any event, even if the cooperative credit institutions could have maintained their previous business model, they would have not fulfilled their social function. Credit institutions were there to provide capital for the development of the economy through providing loans to enterprises and consumers. They did not fulfil this functionby investing the consumers\u2019 deposits in State bonds.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the application of the Integration Act to Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank, the Government submitted that both banks had been members of OTIVA, whose assets had been included in the Integration Organisation\u2019s assets. It had thus been inevitable that the Integration Organisation would provide protection to the two banksand that other services previously provided through the voluntary integration would be provided to them under the newsystem. They also drew attention to the funds provided by the MFB to the Integration Organisation,submitting that they had significantlyraised the own funds of every single cooperative credit institution participating in the integration. Furthermore, the Government pointed out that certain uniformity regarding the operations of the cooperative credit institutions was necessary because of the joint and several liability, which had benefited the cooperative credit institutions and their creditors, and the fact that the solvency and liquidity were monitored as a whole on the basis of consolidated accounts of these institutions. For instance, the limitations on the use of profit served bank stability, did not make it impossible to eventually use such profit and could be challenged in court. The applicants\u2019 argument of de facto expropriation was thus wholly unfounded.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the transfer of shares following the entry into force of the Integration Act, the Government submitted that the introduced rules were meant to provide membership rights to each cooperative credit institution, which had not previously been the case. The MFB paid proper compensation for series \u201cB\u201d shares. Moreover, as a result of the measures taken under the Integration Act,the value of the Savings Bank\u2019s shares had increased, meaning that the cooperative credit institutions had in fact benefited from them.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0In its decision of 4 April 2017 the Court found Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to be applicable to the circumstances of the case (see Albert and Others, cited above, \u00a7 43). In this connection, the Court reiterates that a share in a company is a complex object which certifies that the holder possesses a share in the company together with the corresponding rights. This encompasses an indirect claim over the company\u2019s assets, including the right to a share in them in the event of it being wound up, but also other unrestricted rights, especially voting rights and the right to influence the company\u2019s conduct and policy (see, among many authorities, Olczak v.\u00a0Poland (dec.), no. 30417\/96, \u00a7\u00a060, ECHR\u00a02002\u2011X (extracts)).<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants hold shares in Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank (see paragraph 8 above) and that these banks, being ipso jure members of the Integration Organisation, are subject to control exercised by the integration\u2019s central bodies, namely the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank (see paragraphs 26 to 31 above). The Court notes that the legislative provisions complained of mostly allow for measures to be takenagainst the cooperative credit institutions. Only very few provisions seem to allow for measures to be taken directly against particular shareholders. In this connection, it isobserved that such measureswere taken by the Savings Bank when it refused to consent to the payment of dividends in the case of Kinizsi Bank and imposed the limits on such payment in the case of Moh\u00e1csi Bank (see paragraphs 32 and 35 above). However, the applicants explicitly excluded such concrete measures from the scope of their complaint (see paragraph 58 above).<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the impugned legislative provisions allowing for measures to be taken against Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank, it cannot be ignored that the applicants fall short of holding 100% shares in the respective banks (see paragraph 8 above) and are thus not the \u201csole\u201d owners of the companies in question (see, by contrast, Ankarcrona v.\u00a0Sweden (dec.), no.\u00a035178\/97, 27\u00a0June 2000, and Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a014134\/02, \u00a7\u00a040, ECHR 2007).\u00a0Therefore,it should normally be forKinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank, not the applicants, to pursue an application before the Court, save if there were exceptional circumstances justifying the disregarding of legal personality (see Agrotexim and Others v.\u00a0Greece, 24\u00a0October 1995, \u00a7\u00a765 and 66, Series A no. 330\u2011A). Such exceptions could be accepted when it is clearly established that it was impossible for the company to apply to the Convention institutions through the organs set up under its articles of incorporation or, in the event of liquidation, through its liquidators (see Agrotexim and Others, cited above,\u00a7\u00a066; Credit and Industrial Bank v. the Czech Republic, no. 29010\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 50 to 52, ECHR 2003\u2011XI (extracts); and Feldman and Slovyanskyy Bank v. Ukraine, no. 42758\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 28 and 29, 21 December 2017);where the acts or decisions complained of related to the actions of persons such as a liquidator acting on the company\u2019s behalf (see G.J. v.\u00a0Luxembourg, no. 21156\/93, \u00a7\u00a024, 26\u00a0October 2000); or where the measures complained of consisted of the cancellation of shares belonging to the applicant and weredirectly aimed at the applicant\u2019s rights as a shareholder (see Olczak, cited above, \u00a758).<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes,however, that the present case cannot be compared to any of the above situations. Firstly,notwithstanding their criticism of the reform of the institutional protection system, the applicants did not show that their shares in Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bankhad lost theireconomic value due tothose banks\u2019automatic membership in the Integration Organisation (see paragraph 23 above and section 20 of the Integration Act, cited in paragraph 39 above). Secondly, the applicants did not complain about any concrete measures directly affecting them but about the provisions of the Integration Act which (i) allow for instructions to be imposed on the cooperative credit institutions, including Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank,(ii) obligethe latter to seek the Savings Bank\u2019s consent for a number of important decisions such as the adoption of the annual financial report, issuing of bonds,changes in capital and theappointment of their executive officers (see paragraphs28, 29 and 39 above) and (iii) require them to adjust their memorandum of association in line with the standard provisions issued by the Integration Organisation (see paragraph\u00a026 above). These legislative provisions could indeed affect the applicants\u2019 interest, for instance by constraining the scope of the decisions which could be taken at the general meeting. However, none of them are directly aimed at the applicants as shareholders.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, it is to be reiterated that whenever a shareholder\u2019s interests are harmed by a measure directed at the company, it is up to the latter to take appropriate action. An act infringing only the company\u2019s rights does not involve responsibility towards the shareholders, even if their interests are affected. Such responsibility arises only if the act complained of is aimed at the rights of the shareholder as such or if the company has been wound up (see Olczak, cited above, \u00a759), which is not the situation in the present case.<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, while bearing in mind the applicants\u2019 argument that their rights had been infringedby \u201cthe mere existence\u201d of the impugned legislative provisions (see paragraph 58 above), the Court cannot ignore the fact that Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bankcould contestdecisions of the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank\u2019s instructions before the domestic courts (see section 15 of the Integration Act cited in paragraph 39, see also paragraphs 44 and 58 above).Accordingly, sincethe applicants as shareholders are not entitled to pursue remedies against such measures, accepting the assumption that they havelocus standi would engender considerable problems concerning the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies (seeAgrotexim and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a065).<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above and to the fact that the applicants did not point to any circumstances justifying the lifting of the corporate veil, the Court finds that they cannot claim to be victims of the alleged violation stemming from the legislative provisions that are aimed at regulating the operation of the cooperative credit institutions and allow for measures to be taken against Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank. Such measures could possibly amount to interference with the rights of thosebanks, but not the applicants.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Integration Act allows for measures to be taken directly against the owners or shareholders of the cooperative credit institutions (for instance, the Savings Bank\u2019s consent\/approval needed for any payment to the shareholders under any legal title \u2013 see paragraph 28above), the Court has already noted that the applicants had explicitly excluded concrete measures, such as the Savings Bank\u2019s refusal to consent to the payment of dividends in the case of Kinizsi Bank and the limitation imposed on such payment in the case ofMoh\u00e1csi Bank, from the scope of their complaint (see paragraph 67 above).<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that measures such as the suspension of the shareholders\u2019 voting rights(see paragraph 30 above)and certain other measures stipulated in section 17\/C of the Integration Act (see paragraph 39 above) can be takenonly in exceptional cases. For instance, they can be takenon the condition that the cooperative credit institutions\u2019 funds fall under the required level or that they have been unsuccessful in applying for a new licence (see paragraph 39 above). Having regard to the information in the Court\u2019s possession (see paragraph 32 above) it has not been demonstrated that the applicants, as the shareholders of Kinizsi Bank and Moh\u00e1csi Bank,were in fact likely to run the risk of being affected by the aforementioned measures (see, mutatis mutandis, Jensen and Rasmussen v.\u00a0Denmark (dec.), no. 52620\/99, 20\u00a0March 2003).<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the question whether an applicant can claim to be a victim of the violation alleged is relevant at all stages of the proceedings under the Convention (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433\/09, \u00a7 80, ECHR 2012). In the present case, itfinds that the impugned legislation did not interfere with the applicants\u2019 rights in view of the scope of their complaints (see paragraphs 58 and 67 above) and that they thereforecannot claim to be victims of the alleged violations within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. Therefore, the Court is unable to take cognizance of the merits of the applicants\u2019 complaint.Accordingly, it upholds theGovernment\u2019s related objection.<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently there has been no violation of Article\u00a01 of\u00a0Protocol\u00a0No. 1. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to examine the remainingGovernment\u2019s objection concerning the alleged compensation received by the applicants(see paragraph 47 above).<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT,<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, unanimously, that(i) Ms Erzs\u00e9bet Amberg, (ii) Mr L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Gyula Csan\u00e1di, (iii) Mr Gyula Gy\u00f6rgy Fl\u00f3ri\u00e1n, (iv)Ms\u00a0Judit Ter\u00e9zia \u00c1d\u00e1mn\u00e9 G\u00e1sz, Ms Andrea Domokosn\u00e9 G\u00e1sz and Ms\u00a0Andr\u00e1sn\u00e9 G\u00e1sz, (v)\u00a0Ms\u00a0Gl\u00f3ria Hoffmann\u00e9 J\u00f3n\u00e1s and Mr Robin J\u00f3n\u00e1s, (vi) Ms Mikl\u00f3sn\u00e9 Kov\u00e1cs, and (vii) Ms Edina Koll\u00e1rn\u00e9 M\u00fath, Ms\u00a0J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 M\u00fath and Ms\u00a0Melinda Schneidern\u00e9 M\u00fath have standing to continue the present proceedings instead of, respectively, (i)Ms\u00a0Erzs\u00e9bet Ambergn\u00e9 Schumacher (no. 3), (ii) Mr Gyula Csan\u00e1di (no.\u00a024), (iii) Ms Gyul\u00e1n\u00e9 Fl\u00f3ri\u00e1n (no.\u00a045), (iv) Mr\u00a0Andr\u00e1s G\u00e1sz (no.\u00a050),\u00a0(v) Mr L\u00e1szl\u00f3 S\u00e1ndor J\u00f3n\u00e1s (no. 84), (vi) Mr\u00a0Mikl\u00f3s Kov\u00e1cs (no.\u00a0111) and (vii) Mr J\u00e1nos M\u00fath (no.\u00a0137);<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Decides, unanimously, to strike the application out of its list of cases as far as it concerns the applicants Ms L\u00e1szl\u00f3 J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 Boris (no.18),\u00a0Ms.\u00a0Endr\u00e9n\u00e9 Csoltk\u00f3 (no.28), Mr J\u00f3zsef Gy\u0151ri (no. 59), Mr J\u00f3zsef Jakab (no.\u00a083) and Mr Gy\u00f6rgy Kiss (no. 102);<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, by six votes to one, that the applicants cannot claim to be victims of the alleged violation and that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 January 2019, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Marialena Tsirli\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ganna Yudkivska In accordance with Article\u00a045 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention and Rule\u00a074 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque is annexed to this judgment.<\/p>\n G.Y. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Albert and Others v. Hungary\u00a0concerns one of the most consequential issues in property rights in Europe today: the extent to which State control of banks should be tolerated. The majority evade this extremely important question by erroneously arguing that individual shareholders are not directly harmed by the regulation of banks in which they have a stake. I respectfully disagree with this proposition, and would find a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0This case presents an excellent occasion for the European Court of Human Rights (\u201cthe Court\u201d) to address the legality of excessively stringent banking regulations, which have unfortunately become typical in many States under our jurisdiction. Given this judgment\u2019s impact on millions of ordinary shareholders beyond Hungary, the Court must consider the significant ramifications of the challenged legislation.<\/p>\n The impact of the Integration Act on shareholders\u2019 rights<\/strong><\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s finding that the shareholders lack victim status because only the banks are affected by Act no. CXXXV of 2013 on the Integration of Cooperative Credit Institutions and the Amendment of Certain Laws Regarding Economic Matters (\u201cthe Integration Act\u201d) is entirely misguided. The Integration Act has real and serious consequences for the property rights of the applicants as individual shareholders.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0First, the right to establish and modify the deed of foundation of the banks is an important right associated with the ownership of shares. Yet, instead of enjoying the freedom to collectively create or amend the deed of foundation of Mohacsi Bank and Kinizsi Bank, the applicants are obliged to approve the standard statutes with content prescribed by the Integration Organisation[1].<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Before the Integration Act came into force, this freedom was tangible and valuable for the applicants: since the applicants in aggregate held over 87% and 98% of shares in Mohacsi Bank and Kinizsi Bank respectively[2], they had effective control over the banks\u2019 major decisions. It is misleading to suggest that anything falling short of a 100% shareholding means that the applicants could not exercise control over the company[3]. Without the interference of the Integration Act, the applicants together would have had the power to determine the most important matters of their credit institutions, including the many areas in which the Integration Organisation now has uncontested authority.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Second, the Integration Act excessively restricts the ordinary rights of shareholders by subjecting shareholder resolutions to prior approval of the Savings Bank[4]. Consequently, the Savings Bank can veto the most basic decisions like decreases or increases of capital, acquisition of own shares or the issuing of bonds. The legislation thus deprives the shareholders of the ability to determine a variety of questions that can affect the value of their shares dramatically.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Third, the Integration Act entitles the Integration Organisation to suspend the voting rights of the applicants altogether for one year if it considers that the shareholders \u201cjeopardise the reliable and secure operation of the cooperative credit institution\u201d[5]. Despite the drastic nature of such measure, the Act does not provide any concrete guidelines on what actions would count as jeopardising the operation. Considering that voting is the paramount right associated with shares, such suspension is an extremely serious, direct infringement upon the applicants\u2019 property rights.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Integration Organisation can actually act contrary to the resolution of the shareholders. For instance, if the bank\u2019s solvency capital does not reach a specific level, the Integration Organisation is authorised to increase that capital without shareholder approval[6]. The Savings Bank can also suspend the mandate of executive officers of the shareholders\u2019 choosing; they may even appoint a managing official for an interim period[7].<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0Under the majority\u2019s reasoning, these strict, invasive regulations have had no measurable effect on the shareholders. However, the cumulative impact on shareholders who are unable to participate in such consequential choices cannot be precisely predicted, nor should it be underestimated. Even if there is no immediate, visible financial detriment, the sheer loss of control in these matters in and of itself constitutes interference with the shareholders\u2019 right to the enjoyment of their property.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0The majority further state that the suspension of voting rights and measures against the interests of shareholders occur only in exceptional cases, and that the applicants were not \u201cin fact likely to run the risk of being affected by\u201d[8] these measures. These are entirely speculative observations that have no basis in the submissions. Even if these measures do not occur frequently, the fact that the law provides for the possibility of such extreme measures should itself be of great concern. After all, there has been no principle in the history of the Court\u2019s case-law to the effect that a single occurrence of a violation is not enough.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0Fourth, cooperative credit institutions that do not comply with the relevant requirements of the Integration Act can be excluded from integration, and even have their operating licences withdrawn[9]. This means that the requirements with which the credit institutions must comply dictate the day-to-day activities of their banks, rather than the collective wishes of the shareholders. The applicants are thus subjected to an ongoing, continuous interference with their exercise of shareholder rights.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0Fifth, the Savings Bank can actually refuse to consent to the payment of dividends on grounds of \u201cnon-compliance with the relevant legislation\u201d or the \u201crisk of not fulfilling the business plan\u201d, which has already happened to shareholders of Mohacsi Bank[10]. Given that the right to payment of dividends is an essential right associated with shares, this is another instance of a severe encroachment.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The majority have unjustifiably disregarded these serious consequences by noting that \u201c[o]nly very few provisions seem to allow for measures to be taken directly against particular shareholders\u201d[11]. This evaluation misses the point: the analysis ought to focus on the impact on the shares, not on the particular shareholders as persons. The interference at issue unequivocally targets the core substance of shareholders\u2019 rights, namely their economic or pecuniary rights, such as the right to dividends, and their control or governance rights, such as the right to vote on the most significant decisions for their banks[12].<\/p>\n Shareholders\u2019 rights under the Court\u2019s case-law<\/strong><\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The majority\u2019s conclusion that the applicants cannot claim victim status under Article 34[13] is inconsistent with the development of this Court\u2019s case-law since Agrotexim and Others v. Greece,the leading case on the victim status of individual shareholders[14]. In Agrotexim, the Court held that \u201c[o]nly a person whose personal interests have been directly affected could have [victim] status\u201d[15], and therefore matters that only concern the corporate entity do not necessarily confer victim status on the shareholders. Put differently, the Court held that in the presence of measures affecting shareholder rights, \u201csuch as the right to attend the general meeting and to vote\u201d[16], these would be direct violations against which shareholders might bring claims. Thus, when shareholders in a public company complained that they were obliged to exchange their shares in an old company for shares in a new one at an unfavourable rate, as a result of a merger of the latter with another company, the Court found that they could claim to be victims of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1[17]. The Court held that the protection sought by the shareholder could include a guarantee that the terms of the share exchange were appropriate.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0Put simply, shareholders have standing before the Court where the impugned measures have a direct bearing on their own rights which are inherent in the ownership of stocks or shares[18].<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0Such a direct bearing is indeed at stake here. As the majority correctly explain, a share \u201ccertifies that the holder possesses a share in the company together with the corresponding rights. This encompasses an indirect claim over the company\u2019s assets … [and] also other unrestricted rights, especially voting rights and the right to influence the company\u2019s conduct and policy\u201d[19]. As demonstrated above, the shareholders have been directly affected by the Integration Act\u2019s interference with the most important and representative rights associated with their shares, such as voting rights and the right to dividends.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0Developments since Agrotexim have reaffirmed the standing of shareholders when their rights are directly at stake. For example, in Olczak the Court found that the cancellation of the applicant\u2019s shares entitled him to bring a claim[20].<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, in Yukos v. Russia[21], the Court ordered the State to compensate the individual shareholders for the damage sustained by the relevant company, recognising their status as victims. The Court awarded damages to shareholders even though the direct harm at issue \u2013 the tax arrears and the injunction prohibiting the company from disposing of its assets \u2013 had been imposed on the company as a whole.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0Likewise, in Suzer and Eksen Holding v. Turkey, the Court found that the takeover of a private bank by the State authorities could be regarded as an interference with the property right of the former shareholders of the bank[22]. The measures taken by the Turkish authorities had resulted in depriving the applicants of the economic rights, both tangible and intangible, related to the operation of their former bank[23]. Thus, the Court recognised that some economic rights might not be immediately quantifiable, but nevertheless relevant. This conclusion was reached in spite of an acknowledgment that initially the measures taken by the government had fallen within its power of control over the Turkish banking sector to ensure its proper functioning.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0As with those cases, the Integration Act has also gone beyond mere regulation of the control of property by interfering with the substance of the ownership \u2013 in this case, of shares. Therefore, there is no justification for deviating from this line of authority recognising the victim status of applicants in such a situation.<\/p>\n Protection of shareholders\u2019 rights in international law<\/strong><\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0International standards on the protection of shareholders\u2019 interests would also support a finding that the present applicants have victim status.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0Shareholders\u2019 rights in situations where the company is adversely affected by government regulations have been recognised by various international courts and bodies. For instance, the International Court of Justice (\u201cthe ICJ\u201d) has held that direct infringement of a shareholder\u2019s rights include the right to any dividend, voting rights and the right to a share in the company\u2019s residual assets upon liquidation \u2013 whenever one of these direct rights is infringed, the shareholder has an independent right of action[24]. Similarly, in the ELSI case[25], the ICJ accepted without discussion that the United States was entitled to initiate a suit on behalf of American shareholders in the Italian company when the authorities issued an order requisitioning ELSI\u2019s plant and related assets for six months[26].<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has also taken the position that shareholders\u2019 rights give rise to independent claims. One prominent arbitrator has concluded that \u201cit is beyond doubt that shareholders have standing in ICSID to submit claims separate and independent from the claims of the corporation\u201d and that \u201cthis principle applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or not they own the majority of the shares or control the corporation\u201d[27].<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0For instance, in proceedings initiated by minority shareholders in a company after the value of their investment was diminished by conversion of contract sums from US dollars to pesos, the ICSID tribunal found \u201cno bar in current international law to the concept of allowing claims by shareholders independently from those of the corporation concerned, not even if those shareholders are minority or non-controlling shareholders\u201d[28]. ICSID tribunals have consistently concluded that shareholder investments are protected by bilateral investment treaties, including in the context of financial institutions[29].<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has held in a NAFTA arbitration that \u201c[t]he fact that a host State does not explicitly interfere with share ownership is not decisive\u201d and that \u201c[t]he issue is rather whether a breach of [the applicable treaty] leads with sufficient directness to loss or damage in respect of a given investment\u201d[30].<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has also accepted that controlling shareholders have standing to challenge State action affecting the company. Thus, in the widely known Yukos cases, the PCA dismissed Russia\u2019s jurisdictional objection that the company itself was \u201cdead\u201d as a legal person[31]. Significantly, the PCA found for the claimant shareholders despite acknowledging that Russia had \u201cnot explicitly expropriated Yukos or the holdings of its shareholders\u201d[32].<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, contemporary treaty law on foreign investments gives an \u201cindependent standing to shareholders\u201d[33]. Many investment treaties \u201cinclude shareholding … in their definitions of \u2018investment\u2019\u201d[34], thereby allowing the shareholder to pursue claims for adverse action by a host State that affects the company\u2019s value or profitability. There are \u201cextensive and uniform\u201d examples of arbitral cases on this point[35].<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Inter-American system also upholds the right of the shareholder to bring a suit. In Cantos, the applicant \u2013 the main shareholder of a corporation \u2013 filed a claim in his own name and on behalf of his company which had been subjected to arbitrary measures by the government[36]. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights admitted the case, holding that \u201cthe rights and obligations attributed to companies become rights and obligations for the individuals who comprise them or who act in their name or representation\u201d[37].<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The European Court of Justice has admitted cases from shareholder applicants where the \u201cintensity of [the regulation\u2019s] effects … necessarily affects the substance and extent of [the shareholders\u2019] rights\u201d[38]. Therefore, in Trasta Komercbanka AS v European Central Bank, \u201csince the contested decision ha[d] the effect of withdrawing [the] bank\u2019s authorisation and, accordingly, of preventing it from achieving its object and having an economic activity\u201d, the Court found that the contested measure \u201cdirectly affect[ed] the legal position of the shareholder applicants\u201d and admitted their claims[39].<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, international law supports the finding that the victim status of shareholders must be recognised where their rights and privileges are affected[40].<\/p>\n Interference with the applicants\u2019 right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions<\/strong><\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0It is well-established that shares in a public company have an economic value and, therefore, must be regarded as \u201cpossessions\u201d within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention[41]. Having established that the shareholders have standing in the present case to challenge the measure, I will now turn to the substance of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 lays out \u201cthree distinct rules\u201d for the protection of property, as was explained in Sporrong and L\u00f6nnroth v.\u00a0Sweden[42]:<\/p>\n \u201cThe first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that the States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is contained in the second paragraph.\u201d<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0Notably, the Court has clarified in James and Others v. United Kingdom that the three rules are not \u201cdistinct\u201d in the sense of being \u201cunconnected\u201d[43]. Rather, \u201c[t]he second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule\u201d[44].<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant inquiry is thus the same for all three rules: the nature of the measure, the margin of appreciation, existence of a legitimate purpose, and proportionality.<\/p>\n Deprivation or regulation of the use of a possession?<\/strong><\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides for two forms of interference with possessions: control and deprivation. Deprivation is the transfer de jure or de facto of the possession away from its owner to the State or to a third party, or its destruction. Control involves no transfer: the owner retains his possession, but is restricted in his use of it.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0However, in Sporrong and L\u00f6nnroth the Court identified a new type of interference: interference with \u201cthe very substance of ownership\u201d[45]. This form of interference, which is of a general nature, allows the Court to review all situations not falling under the other two forms (deprivation or control of use).<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0Defining the nature of the violation is important because it determines the margin of appreciation: the scope of the margin of appreciation depends on the extent of the intrusion into the applicant\u2019s sphere of interests[46]. The margin of appreciation afforded in instances of deprivation of a possession is narrower than for the control of the use of property.Deprivation of a possession is, in the literal terms of Protocol No.\u00a01, prohibited \u201cexcept in the public interest\u201d. By contrast, regulation (control of use) measures are not per se prohibited, but fall within a \u201cright of the State to enforce such laws\u201d[47]. States do not have per se a \u201cright\u201d to deprive people of their possessions; such highly intrusive State action will be subjected to an enhanced standard of judicial review by this Court.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The majority have essentially given the State a wide margin of appreciation because they have treated the present case simply as a control of the use of property. However, it is evident that the nature of the violation at issue here is much more grave and consequential than mere control of the use of possessions.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0What qualifies a measure as incompatible with the substance of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of property is not properly defined. However, the Court\u2019s jurisprudence provides some guidance as to what constitutes interference with the substance of ownership. For instance, simply recognising the lawfulness of expropriation in advance, even where actual expropriation has not happened, was an unlawful interference with the substance of ownership since it rendered possession \u201cprecarious\u201d[48]. Similarly, a restriction on the use of land \u2013 despite preserving the right to use the property \u2013 affected the very substance of ownership since it \u201creduced the possibility of its exercise\u201d[49].<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0These cases are similar to the circumstances at issue, since the Integration Act has made the applicants\u2019 ownership of shares \u201cprecarious\u201d by conditioning shareholder rights upon various requirements. The Integration Act is like an ever-present sword of Damocles over affected shareholders: non-compliance will result in an immediate termination of a variety of rights. While the Government argue that the provisions of the Integration Act have the \u201cmere possibility\u201d of affecting the applicants[50], the case-law is clear that making a property right \u201cprecarious and defeasible over a long period of time\u201d, by enabling the State to interfere with it in the future, can suffice for a violation to be found[51].<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Act \u201creduced the possibility of\u201d exercising the rights associated with shares by severely limiting the choices left to banks and hindering the decision-making ability of shareholders[52]. As previously demonstrated, the tremendous impact on shareholder rights cannot be denied.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the Integration Act cannot be understood merely as a form of control of the use of property, but rather \u201cinterference with the substance of ownership\u201d. Accordingly, the margin of appreciation applicable in this case must be narrower than that afforded by the majority.<\/p>\n The legitimacy of the purpose of the interference measure<\/strong><\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0Where there is a clear interference with a property right as in this instant case, it must pursue a legitimate aim, or be in the general public interest.The notion of general interest \u201cis necessarily extensive\u201d[53].<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0But even under this generous standard, I am sceptical as to whether the Integration Act had a legitimate purpose. The purported aims of the Integration Act are laid out in Section 1\/A[54].<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0On the surface, these aims appear legitimate[55]. However, I am not convinced that they actually reflect the purpose of the Integration Act, because I fail to see how the violations at issue \u2013 severe restrictions on shareholder rights \u2013 achieve these goals. For instance, it is doubtful that the Act would \u201cprofessionalise, modernise and organise\u201d the cooperative credit institution sector. In fact, it is quite the opposite: severe State regulation of the banking industry turns the clock back on the modernisation of banks by hindering efficient and profit-maximising decision-making.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, it is doubtful whether the Act really seeks \u201cprudent operation of cooperative credit institutions in the long term\u201d, since it is unreasonable to expect that such extensive interference in bank management would improve the industry\u2019s sustainability. If prudential bank regulation aims at the safety and soundness of the financial sector and the protection of depositors, any such interference should not undermine other regulatory objectives, such as corporate competiveness and the variety of market-based business and risk-taking policies in the banking sector. Otherwise the negative externality of the prudential policy will be that of supressing diversity in the banking sector, which in itself had a foreseeable social and economic cost, independent of the losses imposed on the banks\u2019 shareholders.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0Even if there is a legitimate aim involved, the Integration Act remains unlawful. It should be recalled that the Court found a violation in Olczak despite admitting that the purpose of the intervention in that case was \u201cto prevent the bank from becoming insolvent\u201d and that \u201c[c]onsequently, the bank was to benefit from them, whereas the applicant\u2019s interests suffered\u201d[56]. Likewise, the Integration Act seeks to ensure the \u201cprudent operation of the cooperative credit institutions and protect the resources of the whole network\u201d[57] to the detriment of the applicants who lost the privileges associated with their shares. No proper balancing of the rights of shareholders against the alleged objectives of prudential regulation and crisis management was performed, as will now be explained.<\/p>\n The proportionality of the interference measure<\/strong><\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The most evident problem with the Integration Act is its failure to satisfy the proportionality test. Even where there is a general interest or legitimate aim behind the interference, States are required to strike a fair balance \u201cbetween the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual\u2019s fundamental rights\u201d[58]. Specifically, the \u201cmeasure must be both appropriate for achieving its aim and not disproportionate thereto\u201d[59]. In other words, there \u201cmust be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued\u201d[60].<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0This balance is upset when the victims must bear \u201can individual and excessive burden\u201d[61] or one that is \u201cdisproportionate\u201d[62]. Several factors can be relevant to whether a \u201cfair balance\u201d has been struck: the degree of protection from arbitrariness that is afforded by the proceedings[63]; availability of less restrictive alternatives[64]; and the degree of harm imposed on the victims (including, for instance, whether the affected individuals have been adequately compensated)[65].<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, there are plenty of factors to justify the conclusion that the interference has been entirely disproportionate.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0First, there is no evidence that the financial circumstances of the credit institutions had necessitated government interference. In the decade leading up to the Integration Act, only two non-OTIVA[66] savings cooperatives had gone into liquidation[67]. By contrast, both Kinizsi Bank and Mohacsi Takarek Bank were healthy and profitable at the time the Integration Act was introduced. Mohacsi Takarek was ranked fifth and Kinizsi fourteenth for profitability among thirty-six banks in 2012[68]. The capital adequacy ratio of the cooperative credit institutions at all times exceeded the regulatory requirements, and fared better than the rest of the banking and credit institution sectors[69]. Indeed, in the years leading up to the Integration Act, cooperative credit institutions remained profitable while some of the other groups in the banking sector (major banks, small- and medium-sized banks) suffered losses[70].<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0Even the Government admitted that \u201c[o]bviously, there has been no immediate risk for cooperative credit institutions since they kept their lending activity low\u201d[71]. Nonetheless, the Government\u2019s position is that the Integration Act was necessary for \u201clong term profitable operation\u201d[72]. Yet it is difficult to see how such future concerns \u2013 which have yet to manifest themselves \u2013 merited the immediate, drastic provisions of the Integration Act.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0Second, the State failed to consider or evaluate any less restrictive measures. The Integration Act was adopted without any period of prior consultation with the banks and shareholders affected, nor any form of preliminary impact assessment. Indeed, it bypassed the ordinary legislative procedure, as the Act passed during an extraordinary sitting of Parliament, as a matter of urgency, within two days following the submission of the legislative proposal[73]. In other words, there is no evidence that the government had considered any alternative methods of intervention that would have had a less drastic impact on the applicants\u2019 rights. Moreover, the rushed nature of the Act\u2019s passage and the apparent lack of a proper deliberation process raise concerns for \u201cregulatory arbitrage\u201d, a common worry for macro-prudential supervision of the banking sector in general[74].<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0Third, the Integration Act provided no compensation for the individual shareholders. Compensation terms are \u201cmaterial to the assessment whether the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance\u201d[75]. Interference with property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value is usually disproportionate, and a total lack of compensation is justifiable only in exceptional circumstances[76]. The Government submit that the funding provided to the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank must be regarded as compensation. However, there is no direct relationship between these organisations and the applicant shareholders that would allow the funding to flow to the latter. Even if there is some indirect advantage afforded to the shareholders vis\u2011\u00e0\u2011vis their banks, any such benefit is too tenuous to be considered adequate compensation[77].<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0Fourth, the State provided no judicial remedy for the applicant shareholders. The Act is entirely silent on the right to legal remedy for individual shareholders. While provisions in section 15 of the Integration Act allow the banks to initiate legal proceedings to challenge policies of the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation that do not comply with the Integration Act[78], there are no similar provisions that enable shareholders to challenge these policies. Besides, the scope of judicial challenge for banks is limited, rendering the potential remedy particularly weak.<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Integration Act ensures that any delay caused by judicial proceedings favours the government. Section 15 provides that \u201c[r]esort to the courts has no suspensive effect\u201d[79], making any remedy less timely and, therefore, less effective.<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0Fifth, the consequences for non-compliance with the Integration Act are excessively drastic and punitive. In essence, the Integration Act presents an ultimatum to the banks and applicant shareholders: follow the guidance of the Savings Bank to the letter, or shut down the business entirely. For one, all banks are obliged to apply for an operating licence again by fulfilling the new conditions imposed by the Integration Act.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0Remarkably, such re-certification is an ongoing, repeated process: the Savings Bank proposes what is called a \u201csample statute\u201d that can be modified without any approval from the affected banks. While the Government alleged that the sample statute could not encroach upon the rights of the shareholders\u2019 meeting provided for by the law on companies, they admitted that this was so \u201cunless there [was] an express authorisation to the contrary in the Integration Act\u201d[80]. In other words, the Integration Act supersedes any infringement of shareholder rights.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, if the majority shareholders do not adopt these changes by amending the deed of foundation of their banks accordingly, the Supervisory Authority can withdraw the operating licence[81].<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, it is impossible to conclude that there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the public interest pursued by the Integration Act and the consequences suffered by the applicant shareholders and their banks.<\/p>\n Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0As shareholders, the applicants are entitled to make decisions for the credit institutions. Multiple provisions of the Integration Act violate the very essence of the right conferred on the applicants by virtue of their shares. As the Hungarian Constitutional Court has found, the Integration Act \u201ccontains provisions directly, factually and actually affecting the person and the specific legal relationship\u201d of shareholders, including the applicants[82].<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0The violations at issue deprived the applicants of the essential rights associated with their shares. The majority recognise the violation but sidestep the issue by invoking the legal fiction that there was no direct impact on their rights. The applicants are clearly victims of the State policy as their right to vote, to participate in the making of major decisions for the respective banks, and the right to payments, were all undermined. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n APPENDIX<\/p>\n concerned<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n SCHUMACHER*<\/p>\n (heir: Erzs\u00e9bet Amberg)<\/td>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n (heir: L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Gyula Csan\u00e1di)<\/td>\n (heir: Gyula Gy\u00f6rgy Fl\u00f3ri\u00e1n)<\/td>\n (heirs: Judit Ter\u00e9zia \u00c1d\u00e1mn\u00e9 G\u00e1sz, Andrea Domokosn\u00e9 G\u00e1sz, Andr\u00e1sn\u00e9 G\u00e1sz)<\/td>\n (heir: Gl\u00f3ria Hoffmann\u00e9 J\u00f3n\u00e1s, Robin J\u00f3n\u00e1s)<\/td>\n KOV\u00c1CS<\/td>\n (changed her name from Krisztina Jordanne Kresz)<\/td>\n ROTT<\/td>\n (heir: Mikl\u00f3sn\u00e9 Kov\u00e1cs)<\/td>\n (heir: Edina Koll\u00e1rn\u00e9 M\u00fath, J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 M\u00fath, Melinda Schneidern\u00e9 M\u00fath )<\/td>\n PANGHY<\/td>\n P\u00c1VKOVICSN\u00c9 HEGED\u0170S<\/td>\n SZ\u0170CS<\/td>\n PONGR\u00c1CZN\u00c9 KOV\u00c1CS<\/td>\n PAPP<\/td>\n * Applicants who died in the course of the proceedings.<\/p>\n ____________________<\/p>\n [1].\u00a0\u00a0Applicants\u2019 Observations of 17 April 2015, \u00a760; Government\u2019s Observations of 26 June 2015, \u00a7 3. and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as \u2018Investors\u2019 and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis, 4 Law and Practice Intl Courts and Tribunals 19 (2005); Charles Schreuer, ShareholderProtection in International Investment Law, in P.-M. Dupuy\/B. Fassbender\/M.N. Shaw et al.(eds) V\u00f6lkerrecht als Wertordnung, Festschrift f\u00fcr Christian Tomuschat (2006), pp. 601-619. (h)\u00a0\u00a0ensure compliance with international and European requirements, regulations, standards and customs applicable to credit institutions\u201d. Ibid. FOURTH SECTION CASE OF ALBERT AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY (Application no. 5294\/14) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 29 January 2019 This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article\u00a044 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.…<\/p>\n
\n(Application no. 5294\/14)<\/em><\/p>\n
\nSTRASBOURG
\n29 January 2019<\/p>\n
\nPaulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
\nRobert Spano,
\nFaris Vehabovi\u0107,
\nIulia Antoanella Motoc,
\nCarlo Ranzoni,
\nMarko Bo\u0161njak, judges,
\nand Marialena Tsirli, SectionRegistrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n
\nM.T.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n \nNo.<\/td>\n Name of applicant<\/td>\n Date of birth<\/td>\n Place of residence<\/td>\n Name of the bank<\/p>\n \n 1.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 ALBERT<\/td>\n 17\/04\/1935<\/td>\n Szentjakabfa<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n Zolt\u00e1n AGG<\/td>\n 26\/07\/1975<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n Erzs\u00e9bet AMBERGN\u00c9<\/p>\n 11\/04\/1948<\/td>\n Nagyv\u00e1zsony<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n Anita AUTH (changed her name from Anita Ritzln\u00e9 Auth)<\/td>\n 27\/02\/1971<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/p>\n \n 5.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef AUTH<\/td>\n 02\/12\/1943<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 6.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 AUTH<\/td>\n 12\/09\/1945<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 7.<\/td>\n Katalin BALI<\/td>\n 31\/05\/1941<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 8.<\/td>\n G\u00e1bor BARTA<\/td>\n 11\/11\/1951<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 9.<\/td>\n Antaln\u00e9 BAUMGARTNER<\/td>\n 01\/12\/1951<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 10.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef Antal BECK<\/td>\n 27\/07\/1954<\/td>\n Babarc<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 11.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef BECKER<\/td>\n 03\/07\/1961<\/td>\n Babarc<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 12.<\/td>\n Mih\u00e1ly BELVARACZ<\/td>\n 13\/07\/1939<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 13.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 BICS\u00c9RDI<\/td>\n 22\/06\/1947<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 14.<\/td>\n \u00c1d\u00e1mn\u00e9 BODA<\/td>\n 19\/11\/1949<\/td>\n Kisny\u00e1r\u00e1d<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 15.<\/td>\n M\u00e1rta BOGD\u00c1N<\/td>\n 22\/08\/1958<\/td>\n Z\u00e1nka<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 16.<\/td>\n Endre B\u00d3KAY<\/td>\n 25\/05\/1954<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 17.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1nn\u00e9 BOKROS<\/td>\n 24\/12\/1951<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 18.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 BORIS<\/td>\n \u00a01951<\/td>\n Gy\u00f6mr\u0151<\/td>\n P\u00e1tria<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 19.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n BUBREG<\/td>\n 08\/11\/1942<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 20.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1nn\u00e9 BUBREG<\/td>\n 26\/01\/1946<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 21.<\/td>\n Krisztina BUBREGN\u00c9 HARIS<\/td>\n 28\/08\/1977<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 22.<\/td>\n Eszter BUCHER<\/td>\n 14\/11\/1977<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 23.<\/td>\n Tam\u00e1s BUCHER<\/td>\n 30\/03\/1986<\/td>\n Szombathely<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 24.<\/td>\n Gyula CSAN\u00c1DI*<\/p>\n 23\/12\/1940<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 25.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Gyula CSAN\u00c1DI<\/td>\n 28\/04\/1967<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 26.<\/td>\n Ferenc CSEH<\/td>\n 10\/12\/1947<\/td>\n Szentantalfa<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 27.<\/td>\n Eszter CSIZMADIA<\/td>\n 22\/05\/1968<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 28.<\/td>\n Endr\u00e9n\u00e9 CSOLTK\u00d3<\/td>\n \u00a01965<\/td>\n \u00a0Monor<\/td>\n P\u00e1tria<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 29.<\/td>\n Gergely D\u00c1RDAI<\/td>\n 09\/05\/1952<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 30.<\/td>\n Gergelyn\u00e9 D\u00c1RDAI<\/td>\n 31\/07\/1956<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 31.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1nn\u00e9 D\u00c1VID<\/td>\n 12\/02\/1959<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 32.<\/td>\n Gyula DOMBAI<\/td>\n 17\/11\/1939<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 33.<\/td>\n Imre L\u00e1szl\u00f3 DOMONKOS<\/td>\n 05\/03\/1962<\/td>\n Kesz\u00fc<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 34.<\/td>\n Dezs\u0151 EJHINGER<\/td>\n 23\/09\/1935<\/td>\n Ajka<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 35.<\/td>\n Gell\u00e9rt \u00c9VA<\/td>\n 08\/10\/1954<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 36.<\/td>\n Endre Bertalan F\u00c1BI\u00c1N<\/td>\n 22\/04\/1951<\/td>\n Nemesv\u00e1mos<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 37.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1nn\u00e9 FACSK\u00d3<\/td>\n 17\/08\/1935<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 38.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 FADDI<\/td>\n 23\/08\/1961<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 39.<\/td>\n M\u00e1ria M\u00e1rta FEKETE<\/td>\n 17\/12\/1940<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 40.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef Attil\u00e1n\u00e9 IR\u00c9NYI<\/td>\n 03\/04\/1955<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 41.<\/td>\n Gy\u00f6rgy FISCHER<\/td>\n 28\/03\/1956<\/td>\n Dunaszekcs\u0151<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 42.<\/td>\n G\u00e1bor FL\u00d3DUNG<\/td>\n 22\/03\/1970<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 43.<\/td>\n Bence FLORI\u00c1N<\/td>\n 18\/03\/1983<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 44.<\/td>\n D\u00f3ra FL\u00d3RI\u00c1N<\/td>\n 22\/12\/1978<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 45.<\/td>\n Gyulan\u00e9 FL\u00d3RI\u00c1N*<\/p>\n 16\/05\/1916<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 46.<\/td>\n Gyula Gy\u00f6rgy FL\u00d3RI\u00c1N<\/td>\n 10\/12\/1943<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 47.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n Fl\u00f3ri\u00e1n FODOR<\/td>\n 11\/08\/1946<\/td>\n T\u00f3tv\u00e1zsony<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 48.<\/td>\n Andr\u00e1s FOLBERT<\/td>\n 23\/04\/1959<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 49.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef FRISCHMANN<\/td>\n 12\/10\/1951<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 50.<\/td>\n Andr\u00e1s G\u00c1SZ*<\/p>\n 04\/09\/1940<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 51.<\/td>\n Andr\u00e1sn\u00e9 G\u00c1SZ<\/td>\n 17\/09\/1942<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 52.<\/td>\n Judit GERGELY<\/td>\n 22\/12\/1964<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 53.<\/td>\n Tibor GERGELY<\/td>\n 16\/04\/1960<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 54.<\/td>\n Orsolya Erzs\u00e9bet GILLY<\/td>\n 05\/03\/1964<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 55.<\/td>\n P\u00e9ter Istv\u00e1n GINTER<\/td>\n 20\/08\/1938<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 56.<\/td>\n Gy\u00f6rgyi GR\u00d3B<\/td>\n 09\/07\/1952<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 57.<\/td>\n \u00c9va Ir\u00e9n GYIMESI<\/td>\n 01\/12\/1962<\/td>\n Bonyh\u00e1d<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 58.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 GYIMESI<\/td>\n 05\/02\/1942<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 59.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef GY\u0150RI*<\/td>\n 17\/11\/1934<\/td>\n Someberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 60.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef J\u00e1nos HADRA<\/td>\n 03\/01\/1959<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 61.<\/td>\n Zsolt HAFNER<\/td>\n 15\/05\/1970<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 62.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n HAGEN<\/td>\n 06\/04\/1972<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 63.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nos Istv\u00e1n HAGEN<\/td>\n 20\/08\/1938<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 64.<\/td>\n Ern\u0151 HARCZ<\/td>\n 06\/04\/1944<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 65.<\/td>\n Zolt\u00e1n Elek HARDI<\/td>\n 07\/10\/1954<\/td>\n \u00d6cs<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 66.<\/td>\n K\u00e1roly HEGYI<\/td>\n 12\/05\/1942<\/td>\n Ajka<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 67.<\/td>\n Zolt\u00e1n Andr\u00e1s HELILIG<\/td>\n 01\/03\/1956<\/td>\n T\u00f3tv\u00e1zsony<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 68.<\/td>\n Hanna HEIRICH<\/td>\n 05\/07\/1982<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 69.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef HEIRICH<\/td>\n 26\/03\/1962<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 70.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 HEIRICH<\/td>\n 27\/09\/1956<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 71.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef HELLEBRAND<\/td>\n 19\/09\/1961<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 72.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 HELLEBRAND<\/td>\n 17\/04\/1965<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 73.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nos HENGL<\/td>\n 13\/11\/1954<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 74.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef HIGLI<\/td>\n 16\/10\/1937<\/td>\n Balatoncsics\u00f3<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 75.<\/td>\n Gy\u00f6rgyn\u00e9 HOFFMANN<\/td>\n 23\/02\/1932<\/td>\n Babarc<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 76.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 HOLOCSI<\/td>\n 17\/09\/1943<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 77.<\/td>\n Etele P\u00e9tern\u00e9 HORV\u00c1TH<\/td>\n 21\/01\/1959<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 78.<\/td>\n Judit HUNYADIN\u00c9 T\u00d3TH<\/td>\n 03\/12\/1955<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 79.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Gy\u00f6rgy HUPPERT<\/td>\n 09\/10\/1955<\/td>\n Majs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 80.<\/td>\n Konr\u00e1d H\u00dcTTNER<\/td>\n 31\/05\/1951<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 81.<\/td>\n Bence Ferenc ILL\u00c9S<\/td>\n 12\/12\/1989<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 82.<\/td>\n Zsuzsanna ILL\u00c9SN\u00c9 HENGL<\/td>\n 19\/01\/1964<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 83.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef JAKAB*<\/td>\n 07\/04\/1944<\/td>\n Szeb\u00e9ny<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 84.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 S\u00e1ndor J\u00d3N\u00c1S*<\/p>\n 16\/10\/1949<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 85.<\/td>\n Attila JORD\u00c1N<\/td>\n 03\/05\/1970<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 86.<\/td>\n Kl\u00e1ra Katalin JORD\u00c1NN\u00c9<\/p>\n 09\/12\/1974<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 87.<\/td>\n Krisztina KRESZ<\/p>\n 16\/01\/1970<\/td>\n Koz\u00e1rmisleny<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 88.<\/td>\n B\u00e9la JUHOS<\/td>\n 29\/12\/1940<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 89.<\/td>\n B\u00e9l\u00e1n\u00e9 JUHOS<\/td>\n 24\/08\/1942<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 90.<\/td>\n Erzs\u00e9bet JUNG<\/td>\n 10\/12\/1954<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 91.<\/td>\n Ferenc KAISER<\/td>\n 18\/03\/1948<\/td>\n Sz\u00e9kelyszabar<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 92.<\/td>\n Anita KAJT\u00c1R<\/td>\n 26\/07\/1972<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 93.<\/td>\n Csaba KAJT\u00c1R<\/td>\n 31\/10\/1974<\/td>\n P\u00e9csv\u00e1rad<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 94.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n KAPONYI<\/td>\n 09\/06\/1942<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 95.<\/td>\n K\u00e1lm\u00e1nn\u00e9 KAR\u00c1DI<\/td>\n 26\/11\/1962<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 96.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 KERN<\/td>\n 27\/03\/1955<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 97.<\/td>\n Attila KESZLER<\/td>\n 04\/05\/1969<\/td>\n Romonya<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 98.<\/td>\n Gy\u00f6ngyi Anna KETTN\u00c9<\/p>\n 13\/05\/1963<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 99.<\/td>\n Gyul\u00e1n\u00e9 KINCSES<\/td>\n 13\/05\/1926<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 100.<\/td>\n Kl\u00e1ra Ilona KINCSES<\/td>\n 25\/05\/1953<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 101.<\/td>\n K\u00e1roly KIS<\/td>\n 07\/04\/1953<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 102.<\/td>\n Gy\u00f6rgy KISS*<\/td>\n 03\/03\/1948<\/td>\n Geresdlak<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 103.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n KISS<\/td>\n 17\/08\/1947<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 104.<\/td>\n S\u00e1ndor KISS-SEB\u0150K<\/td>\n 22\/07\/1946<\/td>\n Balatonf\u00fcred<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 105.<\/td>\n Zolt\u00e1n Gy\u00f6rgy KLIEBERT<\/td>\n 29\/09\/1952<\/td>\n Babarc<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 106.<\/td>\n Attila KOSTY\u00c1K<\/td>\n 01\/04\/1979<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 107.<\/td>\n G\u00e1bor KOV\u00c1CS<\/td>\n 12\/11\/1945<\/td>\n Szentantalfa<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 108.<\/td>\n G\u00e1bor Attila KOV\u00c1CS<\/td>\n 22\/11\/1979<\/td>\n Szentantalfa<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 109.<\/td>\n G\u00e1born\u00e9 KOV\u00c1CS<\/td>\n 14\/10\/1952<\/td>\n Szentantalfa<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 110.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nos KOV\u00c1CS<\/td>\n 25\/08\/1940<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 111.<\/td>\n Mikl\u00f3s KOV\u00c1CS*<\/p>\n 13\/12\/1951<\/td>\n G\u00f6rcs\u00f6nydoboka<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 112.<\/td>\n Andr\u00e1sn\u00e9 KRAFT<\/td>\n 22\/09\/1949<\/td>\n Himesh\u00e1za<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 113.<\/td>\n \u00c1d\u00e1m KRAMMER<\/td>\n 30\/08\/1953<\/td>\n B\u00e1tasz\u00e9k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 114.<\/td>\n Rita KULTN\u00c9 M\u00c1TY\u00c1S<\/td>\n 09\/03\/1956<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 115.<\/td>\n S\u00e1ndor KURUCZ<\/td>\n 13\/11\/1965<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 116.<\/td>\n Antal LAKATOS<\/td>\n 06\/08\/1963<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 117.<\/td>\n Antal LAKATOS ifj.<\/td>\n 13\/11\/1986<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 118.<\/td>\n Bal\u00e1zs LAKATOS<\/td>\n 04\/09\/1990<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 119.<\/td>\n Eszter LAKATOS<\/td>\n 15\/07\/1985<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 120.<\/td>\n \u00c9va LAKATOS<\/td>\n 24\/11\/1960<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 121.<\/td>\n Judit LAKATOS<\/td>\n 17\/12\/1986<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 122.<\/td>\n P\u00e9ter LAKATOS<\/td>\n 29\/06\/1985<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 123.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Antaln\u00e9 LESCHING<\/td>\n 10\/09\/1949<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 124.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nos LINK<\/td>\n 28\/06\/1960<\/td>\n Geresdlak<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 125.<\/td>\n \u00c1d\u00e1m LOV\u00c1SZ<\/td>\n 17\/04\/1992<\/td>\n B\u00f3ly<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 126.<\/td>\n Ildik\u00f3 Anna LOV\u00c1SZ<\/td>\n 13\/06\/1964<\/td>\n B\u00f3ly<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 127.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef LOV\u00c1SZ<\/td>\n 26\/04\/1961<\/td>\n B\u00f3ly<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 128.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef MARKOVICS<\/td>\n 16\/03\/1943<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 129.<\/td>\n L\u00e1z\u00e1rn\u00e9 M\u00c1RTON<\/td>\n 28\/07\/1951<\/td>\n G\u00e1rdony<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 130.<\/td>\n Attila Vince M\u00c1TRAI<\/td>\n 22\/12\/1953<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 131.<\/td>\n Zolt\u00e1n MEZEY<\/td>\n 19\/07\/1947<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 132.<\/td>\n Lajos M\u00d3D<\/td>\n 10\/02\/1942<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 133.<\/td>\n K\u00e1roly MOLN\u00c1R<\/td>\n 29\/01\/1945<\/td>\n Dunaszekcs\u0151<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 134.<\/td>\n M\u00e1rtonn\u00e9 MOLN\u00c1R<\/td>\n 21\/02\/1953<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 135.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nos M\u00d3R\u00d3<\/td>\n 17\/03\/1954<\/td>\n Z\u00e1nka<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 136.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 M\u00d3R\u00d3<\/td>\n 25\/10\/1956<\/td>\n Z\u00e1nka<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 137.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nos M\u00daTH*<\/p>\n 22\/04\/1952<\/td>\n Geresdlak<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 138.<\/td>\n Ambrus M\u00dcLLER<\/td>\n 01\/12\/1938<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 139.<\/td>\n Katalin M\u00dcLLERLEI (changed her name from Katalin Purmann Gy\u00f6rgyn\u00e9)<\/td>\n 04\/01\/1958<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 140.<\/td>\n B\u00e9l\u00e1n\u00e9 NAGY<\/td>\n 11\/02\/1952<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 141.<\/td>\n Emiln\u00e9 NAGY<\/td>\n 26\/02\/1936<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 142.<\/td>\n G\u00e1born\u00e9 NAGY<\/td>\n 22\/11\/1938<\/td>\n Nemesv\u00e1mos<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 143.<\/td>\n Lajos NAGY<\/td>\n 26\/10\/1939<\/td>\n Kapolcs<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 144.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 J\u00f3zsef NAGY<\/td>\n 30\/04\/1957<\/td>\n Nagyv\u00e1zsony<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 145.<\/td>\n Norbert NAGY<\/td>\n 08\/04\/1982<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 146.<\/td>\n S\u00e1ndor Imr\u00e9n\u00e9 NAGY<\/td>\n 26\/09\/1955<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 147.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n N\u00c9MET VARGA<\/td>\n 13\/02\/1962<\/td>\n Homor\u00fad<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 148.<\/td>\n Gabriella NYIR\u0150N\u00c9<\/p>\n 22\/10\/1960<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 149.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n G\u00e1bor NYUL<\/td>\n 22\/09\/1968<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 150.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n J\u00e1nos NYUL<\/td>\n 24\/12\/1940<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 151.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 NYUL<\/td>\n 28\/12\/1938<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 152.<\/td>\n Zolt\u00e1n Istv\u00e1n NYUL<\/td>\n 17\/02\/1967<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 153.<\/td>\n R\u00f3bert PAIZS<\/td>\n 20\/01\/1978<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 154.<\/td>\n Zolt\u00e1n PAKUSZA<\/td>\n 29\/08\/1954<\/td>\n Sz\u00e9kelyszabar<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 155.<\/td>\n Endre K\u00e1lm\u00e1n PAP<\/td>\n 10\/07\/1941<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 156.<\/td>\n Endre Tam\u00e1s PAP<\/td>\n 26\/04\/1972<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 157.<\/td>\n Zita M\u00e1ria PAP<\/td>\n 21\/07\/1974<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 158.<\/td>\n G\u00e1bor PAPP<\/td>\n 03\/10\/1972<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 159.<\/td>\n G\u00e1born\u00e9 PAPP<\/td>\n 28\/08\/1979<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 160.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 P\u00c1VEL<\/td>\n 21\/05\/1963<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 161.<\/td>\n G\u00e1bor P\u00c1VKOVICS<\/td>\n 11\/10\/1969<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 162.<\/td>\n Tam\u00e1s P\u00c1VKOVICS<\/td>\n 31\/07\/1968<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 163.<\/td>\n Erika\u00a0Anna<\/p>\n 10\/08\/1969<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 164.<\/td>\n Gitta Szilvia P\u00c1VKOVICSN\u00c9<\/p>\n 28\/01\/1971<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 165.<\/td>\n Gyul\u00e1n\u00e9 P\u00c9TER<\/td>\n 15\/03\/1959<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 166.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef P\u00c9TER<\/td>\n 24\/02\/1939<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 167.<\/td>\n Alexandra PETHES<\/td>\n 21\/10\/1989<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 168.<\/td>\n Csaba PETHES<\/td>\n 25\/06\/1985<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 169.<\/td>\n Csaba S\u00e1ndor PETHES<\/td>\n 01\/06\/1958<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 170.<\/td>\n Csaba S\u00e1ndorn\u00e9 PETHES<\/td>\n 19\/08\/1967<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 171.<\/td>\n Bal\u00e1zs PETH\u0150<\/td>\n 17\/03\/1977<\/td>\n Balatonf\u00fcred<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 172.<\/td>\n Csaba PETH\u0150<\/td>\n 09\/06\/1979<\/td>\n Balatonf\u00fcred<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 173.<\/td>\n Jen\u0151 PETH\u0150<\/td>\n 24\/12\/1954<\/td>\n Balatonf\u00fcred<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 174.<\/td>\n \u00c1gnes PETH\u0150N\u00c9 SCHULCZ<\/td>\n 23\/08\/1956<\/td>\n Balatonf\u00fcred<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 175.<\/td>\n \u00c9va M\u00e1ria PETZ<\/td>\n 01\/03\/1961<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 176.<\/td>\n Bal\u00e1zs PINT\u00c9R<\/td>\n 04\/04\/1977<\/td>\n Balatonf\u00fcred<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 177.<\/td>\n P\u00e9ter PINT\u00c9R<\/td>\n 03\/05\/1975<\/td>\n Asz\u00f3f\u0151<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 178.<\/td>\n S\u00e1ndor PINT\u00c9R<\/td>\n 21\/03\/1945<\/td>\n Asz\u00f3f\u0151<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 179.<\/td>\n Ren\u00e1ta Ildik\u00f3<\/p>\n 25\/11\/1977<\/td>\n Szentantalfa<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 180.<\/td>\n Edina Zsuzsanna RAPP\u00c1L<\/td>\n 12\/11\/1962<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 181.<\/td>\n Benj\u00e1min RITZL<\/td>\n 11\/12\/1991<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 182.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 RITZL<\/td>\n 11\/03\/1957<\/td>\n G\u00f6rcs\u00f6nydoboka<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 183.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef RITZL<\/td>\n 29\/06\/1968<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 184.<\/td>\n Albert ROSTA<\/td>\n 15\/10\/1951<\/td>\n Ajka<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 185.<\/td>\n Szilvia SAJNOVICSN\u00c9<\/p>\n 09\/08\/1973<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 186.<\/td>\n Andr\u00e1s SCHAFFER<\/td>\n 27\/06\/1984<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 187.<\/td>\n Judit SCHAFFER<\/td>\n 04\/09\/1987<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 188.<\/td>\n R\u00f3bert SCHAFFER<\/td>\n 23\/08\/1954<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 189.<\/td>\n Ferenc J\u00e1nos SCHAUER<\/td>\n 03\/10\/1948<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 190.<\/td>\n Andr\u00e1s SCHMALCZ<\/td>\n 30\/11\/1984<\/td>\n Budapest<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 191.<\/td>\n \u00c1d\u00e1mn\u00e9 SCHMIDT<\/td>\n 04\/08\/1952<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 192.<\/td>\n \u00c9va SCHMIDTN\u00c9 M\u00c1RI<\/td>\n 03\/05\/1971<\/td>\n Dunaszekcs\u0151<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 193.<\/td>\n Dezs\u0151 SCHWOY<\/td>\n 26\/10\/1960<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 194.<\/td>\n Zsolt D\u00e9nesn\u00e9 SIMONYI<\/td>\n 31\/01\/1950<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 195.<\/td>\n \u00c1kos STADLER<\/td>\n 20\/02\/1979<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 196.<\/td>\n Emese Gabriella STADLER<\/td>\n 15\/05\/1969<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 197.<\/td>\n Ferenc J\u00e1nos STADLER<\/td>\n 10\/07\/1946<\/td>\n Nemesv\u00e1mos<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 198.<\/td>\n G\u00e1bor STADLER<\/td>\n 26\/05\/1970<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 199.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 STEIXNER<\/td>\n 26\/05\/1946<\/td>\n Szentjakabfa<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 200.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 STOLCZ<\/td>\n 23\/01\/1959<\/td>\n Geresdlak<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 201.<\/td>\n Antal STRENNER<\/td>\n 12\/07\/1963<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 202.<\/td>\n Zolt\u00e1nn\u00e9 STRENNER<\/td>\n 04\/10\/1935<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 203.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n SV\u00c9GER<\/td>\n 27\/08\/1952<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 204.<\/td>\n Lajos SZALAY<\/td>\n 28\/01\/1939<\/td>\n Balatonsz\u0151l\u0151s<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 205.<\/td>\n Zolt\u00e1n Tam\u00e1s SZARKA<\/td>\n 11\/01\/1967<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 206.<\/td>\n B\u00e9l\u00e1n\u00e9 SZEKERES<\/td>\n 08\/11\/1946<\/td>\n R\u00e9vf\u00fcl\u00f6p<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 207.<\/td>\n K\u00e1roly P\u00e9ter SZIROM<\/td>\n 02\/04\/1953<\/td>\n P\u00e9cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 208.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef SZOMBATI<\/td>\n 10\/01\/1943<\/td>\n Nagyv\u00e1zsony<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 209.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 SZOMBATI<\/td>\n 27\/01\/1949<\/td>\n Nagyv\u00e1zsony<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 210.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nos Tiborn\u00e9 TAK\u00c1CS<\/td>\n 28\/10\/1953<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 211.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 TAK\u00c1CS<\/td>\n 02\/04\/1964<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 212.<\/td>\n Ferencn\u00e9 TAK\u00c1CS NAGY<\/td>\n 27\/04\/1964<\/td>\n Somberek<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 213.<\/td>\n Marianna TAK\u00c1CSN\u00c9 HIGLI<\/td>\n 13\/09\/1966<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 214.<\/td>\n Katalin TAK\u00c1CSN\u00c9 OBERT<\/td>\n 08\/10\/1964<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 215.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 TILL<\/td>\n 19\/01\/1953<\/td>\n V\u00e9m\u00e9nd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 216.<\/td>\n G\u00e1bor Tam\u00e1s TORJAY<\/td>\n 03\/12\/1969<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 217.<\/td>\n G\u00e1bor T\u00d3TH<\/td>\n 03\/02\/1955<\/td>\n R\u00e9vf\u00fcl\u00f6p<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 218.<\/td>\n Gabriella T\u00d3THN\u00c9 NYIR\u0150<\/td>\n 13\/07\/1981<\/td>\n Szeksz\u00e1rd<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 219.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef TRAPP<\/td>\n 21\/01\/1957<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 220.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsefn\u00e9 TRAPP<\/td>\n 17\/04\/1960<\/td>\n Palotabozsok<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 221.<\/td>\n J\u00f3zsef TROSZT<\/td>\n 23\/11\/1961<\/td>\n G\u00f6rcs\u00f6nydoboka<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 222.<\/td>\n Gabriella TUTTIN\u00c9 MERKLER<\/td>\n 28\/09\/1967<\/td>\n K\u00f6lked<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 223.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3n\u00e9 VAJDA<\/td>\n 25\/09\/1959<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 224.<\/td>\n L\u0151rinc VARGA<\/td>\n 25\/03\/1951<\/td>\n Nemesv\u00e1mos<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 225.<\/td>\n Gy\u00f6rgy S\u00e1ndor VARGA<\/td>\n 29\/07\/1948<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 226.<\/td>\n P\u00e9ter Ferenc VARGA<\/td>\n 12\/06\/1952<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 227.<\/td>\n Antaln\u00e9 V\u00c1RHEGYI<\/td>\n 17\/01\/1947<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 228.<\/td>\n Gyula VASS<\/td>\n 23\/09\/1951<\/td>\n Z\u00e1nka<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 229.<\/td>\n Gyul\u00e1n\u00e9 VASS<\/td>\n 27\/11\/1954<\/td>\n Z\u00e1nka<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 230.<\/td>\n L\u00e1szl\u00f3 VEINER<\/td>\n 09\/05\/1980<\/td>\n Z\u00e1nka<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 231.<\/td>\n Tivadar VILL\u00c1NYI<\/td>\n 29\/04\/1958<\/td>\n Veszpr\u00e9m<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 232.<\/td>\n Gy\u00f6rgy J\u00e1nos WERNER<\/td>\n 29\/09\/1950<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1cs<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 233.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nos WERNER<\/td>\n 14\/04\/1954<\/td>\n Himesh\u00e1za<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 234.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 WERNER<\/td>\n 09\/04\/1959<\/td>\n Himesh\u00e1za<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 235.<\/td>\n Istv\u00e1n ZAB<\/td>\n 21\/04\/1963<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 236.<\/td>\n Orsolya ZEILER<\/td>\n 13\/01\/1973<\/td>\n Romonya<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 237.<\/td>\n Mih\u00e1ly Z\u00d6MBIK<\/td>\n 24\/07\/1954<\/td>\n Nemesv\u00e1mos<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 238.<\/td>\n Mih\u00e1ly Z\u00d6MBIK ifj.<\/td>\n 25\/04\/1980<\/td>\n Nemesv\u00e1mos<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 239.<\/td>\n N\u00f3ra Z\u00d6MBIK<\/td>\n 26\/03\/1987<\/td>\n Nemesv\u00e1mos<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 240.<\/td>\n Gy\u00f6rgyn\u00e9 ZSIFKOVICS<\/td>\n 03\/03\/1939<\/td>\n L\u00e1nycs\u00f3k<\/td>\n Moh\u00e1csi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 241.<\/td>\n J\u00e1nos ZSOLDOS<\/td>\n 17\/11\/1937<\/td>\n Balatonszepezd<\/td>\n Kinizsi Bank<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
\n[2].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 8.
\n[3].\u00a0\u00a0See Judgment, \u00a7 68.
\n[4].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 28; Applicants\u2019 Observations of 17 April 2015, \u00a7 60(b).
\n[5].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7\u00a7 30 and 39.
\n[6].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 31.
\n[7].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 29.
\n[8].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 74.
\n[9].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 39 [citing Section 17(1) of the Integration Act].
\n[10].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 32.
\n[11].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 67.
\n[12].\u00a0\u00a0On the economic and the control or governance rights of shareholders see, for example, Kern Alexander, \u201cBank resolution regimes: balancing prudential regulation and shareholder rights\u201d (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 67.
\n[13].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 75.
\n[14].\u00a0\u00a0Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 24 October 1995, Series A no. 330\u2011A. On this case and the subsequent case-law see Marius Emberland, \u201cThe Corporate Veil in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights\u201d (2003) 63 Zeitschrift f\u00fcr ausl\u00e4ndisches \u00f6ffentliches Recht und V\u00f6lkerrecht\u200e945, and The human rights of companies: exploring the structure of ECHR protection, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.
\n[15].\u00a0\u00a0Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, \u00a7 59.
\n[16].\u00a0\u00a0Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, \u00a7 62.
\n[17].\u00a0\u00a0See\u00a0Offerhaus and Offerhaus v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a035730\/97, 16 January 2001.
\n[18].\u00a0\u00a0See Michal Kucera, Convergence and Conflicts between Investment Law and Human Rights Law: A Dispute Settlement Approach \u2013 Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, in Walid Ben Hamida and Frederique Coul\u00e9e (eds), Convergences et Contradictions du droit des investissements et des droits de l\u2019homme: une approche contentieuse (2017), p.\u00a054.
\n[19].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 66.
\n[20].\u00a0\u00a0See Olczak v. Poland (dec.), no. 30417\/96, \u00a7 58, ECHR 2002\u2011X (extracts)
\n[21].\u00a0\u00a0OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukosv. Russia (Just Satisfaction), no. 14902\/04, 31 July 2014; on this case see Hans-Georg Dederer, \u201cThe Yukos cases: a comparative case note on the ECtHR’s decisions and the PCA Tribunal’s awards\u201d (2015) 10 (8) Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & and social sciences 2062; and Belen Giupponi, \u201cDisentangling human rights and investors\u2019 rights in international adjudication: the legacy of the Yukos cases\u201d (2017) 24 Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 127.
\n[22].\u00a0\u00a0S\u00fczer and Eksen Holding A.\u015e. v. Turkey, no. 6334\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 143-144, 23 October 2012.
\n[23].\u00a0\u00a0\u00ab\u00a0Les mesures prises par l\u2019ARSB ont eu pour cons\u00e9quence de priver les requ\u00e9rants des droits patrimoniaux, tant corporels qu\u2019incorporels, li\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019exploitation de leur ancienne banque.\u00a0\u00bb, ibid., \u00a7 144.
\n[24].\u00a0\u00a0Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 5\u00a0February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 4, \u00a7 47.
\n[25].\u00a0\u00a0Case concerning the Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v.\u00a0Italy), Judgment, 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15.
\n[26].\u00a0\u00a0Ibid., \u00a7 137.
\n[27].\u00a0\u00a0Stanimir Alexandrov, The \u201cBaby Boom\u201d of Treaty-Based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as \u201cInvestors\u201d and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis, 4 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2005), p.\u00a030.
\n[28].\u00a0\u00a0CMS v Argentina Decision on Jurisdiction(USA\/ Argentina BIT), 42 ILM 788 (2003), \u00a7 48.
\n[29].\u00a0\u00a0See, e.g.,Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia, Award, 25 June 2001, 6 ICSID Reports 241.
\n[30].\u00a0\u00a0GAMI Investments Inc. v United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 15\u00a0November 2004, 44 ILM 545 (2005), \u00a7 33.
\n[31].\u00a0\u00a0Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v.The Russian Federation, Final Award, 18 July 2014, PCA Case No.AA 226; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v.The Russian Federation, Final Award, 18 July 2014, PCA Case No. 227; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, Final Award, 18 July 2014, PCA Case No. 228.
\n[32].\u00a0\u00a0Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v.The Russian Federation, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009, Final Award, 18 July 2014, PCA Case No.AA 226, 1580.
\n[33].\u00a0\u00a0C Schreuer and U Kriebaum, The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, in S Breitenmoser et al, Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Rechtsstaat: liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber(2007),p.754.
\n[34].\u00a0\u00a0Ursula Kriebaum, Is the European Court of Human Rights an alternative to investor\u2011state arbitration?inHuman Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.U. Petersmann (eds), New York: Oxford University Press 2009), p. 224.
\n[35].\u00a0\u00a0Kriebaum, p. 224 [citing Antoine Goetz and ors v Burundi, Award, 10 February 1999, 6 ICSID Reports 5; Emilio August\u00edn Maffezini v Spain, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25\u00a0January 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 396; Compa\u00f1\u00eda de Aguas del Aconquija, PA\u00a0&\u00a0Compagnie G\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Eaux v Argentina (the Vivendi case), Decision on Annulment, 3\u00a0July 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 340; Azurix Corp v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8\u00a0December 2003, 43 ILM 259 (2004); LG&E Energy Corp v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 30 April 2004; AMT v Zaire, Award, 21 February 1997, 5 ICSID Reports 11; Alex Genin v Estonia, Award, 25 June 2001, 6 ICSID Reports 241; CME Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13 September 2001, 9\u00a0 ICSID Reports 121; Camuzzi v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 May 2005, at paras 12, 78\u201382, 140\u2013142; Gas Natural v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005, at paras 32\u201335, 50\u201351; AES Corp v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 26 April 2005, at paras 85\u201389; Compa\u00f1\u00eda de Aguas del Aconquija, SA & VivendiUniversal SA v.\u00a0 Argentina (Vivendi II), Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, at paras 88\u201394; and Continental Casualty v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 February 2006, at paras\u00a051\u201354, 76\u201389.]
\n[36].\u00a0\u00a0Cantos v Argentina, Preliminary Objections, 7 September 2001, Series C No 85.
\n[37].\u00a0\u00a0Ibid.,\u00a7 27. The Court made specific reference to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in PineValley Developments Ltd and Others v. Ireland, 29 November 1991, Series Ano. 222.
\n[38].\u00a0\u00a0Trasta Komercbanka AS v Europea Central Bank, Case T-247\/16, 27 September 2017, \u00a7 67.
\n[39].\u00a0\u00a0Ibid., \u00a7 66.
\n[40].\u00a0\u00a0See generally Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The \u2018Baby Boom\u2019 of Treaty-Based Arbitrations<\/p>\n
\n[41].\u00a0\u00a0Olczak v. Poland (dec.), \u00a7 60; see also Marini v. Albania, no. 3738\/02, \u00a7 164, 18\u00a0December 2007.
\n[42].\u00a0\u00a0Sporrong and L\u00f6nnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, \u00a7 61, Series A no. 52.
\n[43].\u00a0\u00a0James and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 8793\/79, \u00a7 37, Series A no. 98.
\n[44].\u00a0\u00a0Ibid.
\n[45].\u00a0\u00a0Sporrong and L\u00f6nnroth v. Sweden, \u00a7 60,
\n[46].\u00a0\u00a0Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 103 and 123, ECHR\u00a02003\u2011VIII.
\n[47].\u00a0\u00a0See my concurring opinion (\u00a7 24) in K\u00f6nyv-T\u00e1r Kft and Others v. Hungary (merits), no.\u00a021623\/13<\/a>, 16 October 2018.
\n[48].\u00a0\u00a0Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 79, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV. See also Sabrina Robert-Cuendet, Interference et Expropriation, in Walid Ben Hamida and Frederique Coul\u00e9e (eds), Convergences et Contradictions du droit des investissements et des droits de l\u2019homme: une approche contentieuse (2017), p. 134 (noting that where a property right has been made precarious, the doctrines of deprivation and control of use intersect).
\n[49].\u00a0\u00a0Ayangil and Others v. Turkey, no. 33294\/03, \u00a7 40, 6 December 2011.
\n[50].\u00a0\u00a0Government\u2019s Observations of 26 June 2015, \u00a7 8.
\n[51].\u00a0\u00a0Ayangil and Others v. Turkey, \u00a7 40.
\n[52].\u00a0\u00a0See \u00a7 6 of this opinion.
\n[53].\u00a0\u00a0Hentrich v. France, 22 September 1994, \u00a7 39, Series A no. 296\u2011A.
\n[54].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a7 39.
\n[55].\u00a0\u00a0\u201c(a)\u00a0\u00a0establish a bank for the rural communities, \u2026(b)\u00a0\u00a0provide institutional guarantees for the prudent operation of cooperative credit institutions in the long term, (c)\u00a0\u00a0professionalise, modernise and organise a competitive cooperative credit institution sector, (d)\u00a0\u00a0improve risk management of the cooperative credit institution sector, (e)\u00a0\u00a0ensure integrated operation of the cooperative credit institution sector and establish the necessary infrastructure, (f)\u00a0\u00a0standardise operational policies in order to achieve the aims described in paragraphs (a) to (e). (g)\u00a0\u00a0ensure institutional protection of cooperative credit institutions,<\/p>\n
\n[56].\u00a0\u00a0See Olczak v. Poland (dec.), \u00a7 58.
\n[57].\u00a0\u00a0See Judgment, \u00a7 41 (citing the Constitutional Court decision no. 20.2014).
\n[58].\u00a0\u00a0Sporrong and L\u00f6nnroth v. Sweden, \u00a7 69.
\n[59].\u00a0\u00a0James and Others v. the United Kingdom, \u00a7 50.
\n[60].\u00a0\u00a0Ibid.
\n[61].\u00a0\u00a0Sporrong and L\u00f6nnroth v. Sweden, \u00a7 73.
\n[62].\u00a0\u00a0Erkner and Hofauer v. Austria, 23 April 1987, \u00a7 79, Series A no. 117.
\n[63].\u00a0\u00a0Hentrich v. France, \u00a7 45.
\n[64].\u00a0\u00a0OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, no. 14902\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 652-654, 20\u00a0September 2011.
\n[65].\u00a0\u00a0James v. the United Kingdom, \u00a7 54.
\n[66].\u00a0\u00a0OTIVA stands for Orsz\u00e1gos Takar\u00e9ksz\u00f6vetkezeti Int\u00e9zm\u00e9nyv\u00e9delmi Alap (National Fund for the Institutional Protection of Savings Cooperatives).
\n[67].\u00a0\u00a0Applicants\u2019 Observations of 17 April 2015, \u00a7 19; Government\u2019s Observations of 26\u00a0June 2015, \u00a7 46.
\n[68].\u00a0\u00a0Applicants\u2019 Observations of 17 April 2015, \u00a7 12.
\n[69].\u00a0\u00a0Applicants\u2019 Observations of 17 April 2015, \u00a7 7. The Government argued that ratios were often calculated on the basis of unsound estimates, which \u201cbecame apparent through the audits carried out after the integration by independent audit firms\u201d. However, they failed to provide the said audits to substantiate this point, despite admitting that the Supervisory Authority actually relied on these estimates. See Government\u2019s Observations of 26 June 2015, \u00a7 32.
\n[70].\u00a0\u00a0Applicants\u2019 Observations of 17 April 2015, \u00a7 7.
\n[71].\u00a0\u00a0Government\u2019s Observations of 26 June 2015, \u00a778.
\n[72].\u00a0\u00a0Ibid.
\n[73].\u00a0\u00a0Applicants\u2019 Observations of 17 April 2015, \u00a7 20.
\n[74].\u00a0\u00a0See Bart P.M. Joosen, \u201cThe Limitations of Regulating Macro-Prudential Supervision in Europe\u201d, in 25 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 10, 498 (2010).
\n[75].\u00a0\u00a0Visti\u0146\u0161 and Perepjolkins v. Latvia (Just Satisfaction) [GC], no. 71243\/01, \u00a7 110, ECHR\u00a02014.
\n[76].\u00a0\u00a0Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 25701\/94, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2000 XII, andBroniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443\/96, \u00a7 176, ECHR 2004\u2011V.
\n[77].\u00a0\u00a0By contrast, the EU has a Single Resolution Fund for countries which are part of the Banking Union and are subject to the Single Resolution Mechanism, which imposes responsibilities on shareholders such as mandatory bail-in provisions. This fund directly compensates shareholders or creditors in accordance with Article 75 of the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive [Directive 2014\/59\/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82\/891\/EEC, and Directives 2001\/24\/EC, 2002\/47\/EC, 2004\/25\/EC, 2005\/56\/EC, 2007\/36\/EC, 2011\/35\/EU, 2012\/30\/EU and 2013\/36\/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093\/2010 and (EU) No 648\/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ 2014 L173\/190 (BRRD)]. This mechanism leaves no shareholder worse off \u2013 at least in theory \u2013 since the fund can be used to pay the difference to any shareholder or creditor who has incurred greater losses than they would have incurred in a winding-up under normal insolvency proceedings. The Hungarian government has set up no such fund to compensate shareholders who may incur losses.
\n[78].\u00a0\u00a0Judgment, \u00a739 [citing Integration Act, Section 15(3), (20), (21)].
\n[79].\u00a0\u00a0Ibid.
\n[80].\u00a0\u00a0Government\u2019s Observations of 26 June 2015, \u00a7 7.
\n[81].\u00a0\u00a0Section 17\/H(1) of the Integration Act, cited in Applicants\u2019 Observations of 17 April 2015, \u00a7 52.
\n[82].\u00a0\u00a0Applicants\u2019 Observations of 17 April 2015, \u00a7 62 [citing CC Resolution, part III, Section 2.1, paragraphs 43 and 49].<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"