FIFTH SECTION
\nCASE OF WOLLAND v. NORWAY
\n(Application no. 39731\/12)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n17 May 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n17\/08\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Wolland v. Norway,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Angelika Nu\u00dfberger, President, Having deliberated in private on 10 April 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 39731\/12) against the Kingdom of Norway lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Norwegian national, Mr Steingrim Wolland, on 17\u00a0May 2012.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr A. Ryssdal, a lawyer practising in Oslo. The Norwegian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr C. Reusch of the Attorney General\u2019s Office (Civil Matters) as their Agent.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that the prosecuting authority and the Oslo City Court, in connection with a search of the applicant\u2019s premises, had collected andkept\u2013 over a lengthy period of time \u2013a large number of documents (papers as well as mirror copies of the applicant\u2019s computer and hard disk) without taking a formal decision on seizure. While awaiting such a decision, the applicant had not had access to any procedure of judicial review, either to examine whether reasonable grounds for suspicion still remained, or to examine the collected material\u2019s relevance as evidence. He submitted, in particular, that this contravened his rights to respect for his private life, his home and his correspondence as provided in Article 8 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 January 2014 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Mr Steingrim Wolland, was born in 1961 and lives in Oslo, Norway.He ran a law firm in his own name in Oslountil his licence to practice was suspended as a result of the opening of bankruptcy proceedings against him personally in April 2009.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings before the City Court<\/strong><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 March 2010, the prosecuting authority (\u00d8kokrim \u2013 The National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime) issued charges (siktelse)against the applicant for aiding and abetting fraud in connection with art sales (kunstbedrageri), an application for a bank loan (l\u00e5nebedrageri), and forgery of documents in connection with the latter.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 March 2010 the Oslo City Court (tingrett), finding that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion (skjellig grunn til mistanke) in respect of the charges, decided at the request of the prosecuting authority to authorise that a search be carried out at the applicant\u2019s premises, including his office. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against the City Court\u2019s decision.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 March 2010 the police were at the applicant\u2019s premises \u2013 his home and office. In accordance with Article 205 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 below) a third party \u2013 a lawyer acquaintance of the applicant \u2013 was present.As there was a presumption that some material would be covered by the applicant\u2019s statutory legal professional privilegeas a lawyer, and therefore be exempt from seizure pursuant to Article 204\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01(ibid.), documents were put in sealed bags instead of being searched for evidence by the police.The police also collected a hard disk and a laptop. The third party had no objections as to how the police had proceeded.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0Mirror copies (speilkopier) of the hard disk and laptop were taken;the hard disk and laptop were returned to the applicant two days later.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 May 2010, at the prosecuting authority\u2019s office, the applicant went through the paper documents that had been collected and sorted out those which he considered to be covered by legal professional privilege. This material was stored separately and placed under seal.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 January 2011 the prosecuting authority applied to the City Court to examine the paper material that had been collected at the applicant\u2019s premisesand tohave those documents that could lawfully be seized made available to it for search. As to the mirror copies, the prosecuting authority proposed that the City Court authorise a staff member at \u00d8kokrim\u2019scomputer department to acquaint him or herself with the material. The prosecution authority would thereafter return to the City Court with anapplication for a decision on whether specific documents would be exempt from seizure owing to legal professional privilege. The City Court accepted this procedure (see, however, paragraph 31 below). Subsequently, the prosecuting authority, upon discussions with the applicant as to which keywords (s\u00f8keord) should be used when looking for documents on the mirror copies, made keyword-searches which gave results in 2,309 files.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0By a letter of 16 February 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer disputed the lawfulness of what he categorised as the \u201cseizure\u201d (\u201cbeslag\u201d), arguing that there had been no reasonable grounds for suspicionagainst the applicant and requested that the City Court quash the \u201cseizure\u201d decision and order that the collected material be returned to him.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 May 2011 the prosecuting authority submitted the 2,309 files from the mirror copies to the City Court for examination.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0In response to the letter from the applicant\u2019s lawyer of 16\u00a0February 2011 (see paragraph 12 above), the City Court wrote a letter of 11\u00a0May 2011, pointing out that the procedure applicable to material allegedly covered by legal professional privilegehad been set out by the Supreme Court (H\u00f8yesterett) in its decision of 3 March 2011, reported in Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2011 page 296 (see paragraphs 38-39 below). In line with that procedure, there were no grounds on which the City Court could at that time hold a court hearing devoted to the discontinuation of any \u201cseizure\u201d and return of the material. No seizure had been decided \u2013 the court was at the time carrying out the task of reviewing the material collected in order to decide on what should be made available to the prosecuting authority for it to search. The City Court would obtain the views of the parties in a hearing before making a formal decision as to whether to authorise the search of the prosecution. Its decision would be amenable to appeal. Since the handling of the case so far had taken considerable time, the City Court\u2019s examination would be expedited.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant and his lawyer disagreed with the City Court\u2019s description of the procedure to be followed.After further exchanges between the parties, the City Court reiterated in a letter of 22 July 2011 \u2013 which was formally a judicial decision amenable to appeal (see paragraphs\u00a016-24below) \u2013 that a decision on seizure had not yet been taken. There was a presumption to the effect that documents and other materials in the office of a private lawyer were subject to legal professional privilege. In such cases the court would first go through the material in order to examine what could be made available to the prosecuting authority for it to search. The City Court also informed the parties that it was about to complete this task, having examined each document.It also reiterated its disagreement with the applicant\u2019s view that before carrying out its perusal of the material it ought to consider anew whether there were reasonable grounds for suspicion against him, failing which its examination of the material would be unlawful, and that in the absence of such grounds it ought to return all the material to him with the seals intact.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Appeal proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 August 2011 the applicant appealed against the City Court\u2019s decision of 22 July 2011 not to examine the merits of his request to quash what was in his view a \u201cseizure\u201d, and to return the material.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 November 2011 the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett)dismissed the appeal.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The High Court, as had the City Court, reiterated that the relevant procedure for the search and seizure of material allegedly subject to legal professional privilege had been thoroughly examined by the Supreme Court in Rt.2011 page 296 (see paragraphs14 above and 38-39below). The City Court was at the time in the process of sorting out which documents could be lawfully searched by the prosecuting authority, and there had been no decisions on seizure taken.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0From the above it was apparent, in the High Court\u2019s view, that the applicant was not at that stage of the procedure entitled to have the question of whether to maintain the \u201cseizure\u201d in force (sp\u00f8rsm\u00e5let om opprettholdelse av beslaget) under Article 208 reviewed (see paragraph 37 below), and it could not see how him disputing the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion in his case could lead to a different result. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision contained no statements suggesting that the procedure should be different in such cases. Nor could the High Court find that there were other grounds, even if regard were had to Articles 6, 8, 10 and 13 of the Convention, as invoked by the applicant, suggesting that the accused had a wider right to judicial review in cases where he or she disputed the grounds for suspicion.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The High Court also noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure contained several provisions conferring on the accused a right to judicial review in respect of enforcement measures taken in the form of search and seizure, inter alia could a decision by a court to the effect that documents were to be handed over to the prosecution authorities after perusal of the documents in accordance with Article 204 (see paragraph 37 below)\u2013 which was what the City Court was doing at the time \u2013 be appealed against. The High Court considered that the Convention did not give the applicant any rights to have the legality of searches and seizures judicially reviewed beyond what followed from the Code of Criminal Procedure. The search had been authorised by the City Court on 10 March 2010, finding that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion against the applicant. The applicant had not filed any timely appeals against the decision and the search had been effectuated.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0From the reasoning above it alsofollowed that the applicant\u2019s alternative submission that he ought to havea right to judicial review of whether there wasa legal basis for an \u201congoing search\u201d(om det er grunnlag for en \u201cp\u00e5g\u00e5ende ransaking\u201d) could not succeed.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0It was also clear that the accused did not on a general basis have a right to judicial review of the reasons for the charges brought against him, whether there were reasonable grounds for suspicion or not, regardless of the use of any enforcement measures. The existence of such reasons could be examined again but then only in connection with, for instance, future investigative measures where the latter were required. The Convention provisions relied on could not lead to any different result.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0Against this background, the High Court concluded thatthe City Court\u2019s procedure had suffered from no defects. Its decision of 22 July 2011 had been based on a correct approach to the handling of the material gathered at the applicant\u2019s premises.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 December 2011 the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court (H\u00f8yesteretts ankeutvalg), whose jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the High Court\u2019s procedure and interpretation of the law, rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal in both respects.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Further proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The handing over of materials<\/em><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 January 2012 the City Court held a hearing (see paragraph 14 above) on the issue of which materials could be sent to the prosecuting authority for it to search. In the court records it was registered that the court had informed the parties that it was desirable if a decision could be reached as soon as possible and preferably within a month. In a decision of 11\u00a0May 2012, it ruled that 1,264 documents collected from the data carriers could be handed over. The applicant accepted the decision with respect to 858 of the documents, but appealed in respect of the remaining 406 and some of the paper documents.The prosecuting authority also appealed.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 September 2012 the High Court dismissed the prosecuting authority\u2019s appeal and rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal except for one issue relating to a bank account transcript.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 October 2012 the Supreme Court quashed the High Court\u2019s decision insofar as it had rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal (Rt.2012 page 1639). It found, in essence, that the High Court had applied a too narrow understanding of what was lawyer\u2019s work (egentlig advokatvirksomhet) that could bring legal professional privilege into play.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0During its reconsideration of the case, the High Court, on 8\u00a0January 2013, concluded that thirty-six of the disputed 406 documents could be submitted to the prosecuting authority for it to search. On 22\u00a0May 2013 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicant against the High Court\u2019s decision.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The mirror copies<\/em><\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 June 2012 the applicant applied to have some of the material, including the mirror copies, returned to him. The City Court, on 18\u00a0September 2012, refused his application insofar as it concerned the mirror copies, but grantedthe other parts thereof.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed against the decision to the High Court, which on 8 January 2013 ordered that the mirror copies were to be returned to the applicant unless the prosecuting authority promptly (relativt omg\u00e5ende) requested that the City Court examine them. It referred, inter alia, to the general obligation to ensure progress in investigations, as reflected in Article 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 below).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0Upon an appeal by the prosecuting authority, the Supreme Court, on 27 June 2013(Rt. 2013 page 968) agreed with the High Court that the prosecuting authority\u2019s continued possession of and searches on the mirror copies(see paragraph 11 above) had been unlawful. The mirror copies should, like the paper documents, have been placed under seal and transferred to the City Court without the prosecution authority having accessed material on them through keyword-searches. Unlike the High Court, however, the Supreme Court did not for that reason find that the copies should necessarily be returned to the applicant. It quashed the High Court\u2019s decision in order for that court to further assess the prosecuting authority\u2019s submissions that the copies should instead be kept with the City Court, as the High Court had not sufficiently considered that possibility.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The prosecuting authority transferred the mirror copies to the City Court on 2 September 2013.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0When, on 20 May 2014, the High Court contacted the prosecuting authority, its decision concerning the mirror copies having been quashed by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 31 above), the authority responded by informing the High Court of the developments in the criminal case against the applicant (see paragraph 35 below). It moreover stated that the seizure had been lifted on 28 May 2014 and requested that the case therefore be dismissed. The material could be deleted by the court or the data carrier could be handed over to the applicant. The applicant argued that the case should not be dismissed and requested that the High Court examine the merits of his application to have the mirror copies returned, in order for him to have a judicial review of whether his Convention rights had been violated.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0In a letter of 25 June 2014 the High Court set out its views on the matter. It stated, inter alia, that the case concerned the applicant\u2019s application to have the mirror copies returned. This request would be met if the copies were actually returned, which was what the prosecuting authority had proposed. This made it difficult to see why the applicant should have legal standing to require that the courts examine his application. Moreover, the court assumed that the applicant could obtain a review of his Convention claims in other ways. The case as concerned the mirror copies was ultimately dismissed on 22 August 2014. There is no information about the applicant having appealed against this decision.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The criminal proceedings against the applicant<\/em><\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 January 2013 the City Court acquitted the applicant of having obtained credit by way of fraud (l\u00e5nebedrageri) (see paragraph 6 above). On 12 June 2013 the High Court convicted him for having shown gross negligence in that respect.This judgmentbecame final when the Supreme Court\u2019s Appeal Committee refused leave to appeal on 18 October 2013.The charges concerning forgery of documents (ibid.) were dropped on 11\u00a0February 2013. Some of the charges concerning aiding and abetting art fraud (kunstbedrageri) (ibid.) were droppedon 16 February 2011 and the remainder on 21 August 2013.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0Chapters 10 (Witnesses), 13a (Coercive measures \u2013 General)and 15 (Search) of the 1981 Code of Criminal Procedure (straffeprosessloven), as in force at the relevant time, included the following relevant provisions:<\/p>\n Article 119<\/p>\n \u201cWithout the consent of the person entitled to the preservation of secrecy, the court may not receive any statement from clergymen in the state church, priests or pastors in registered religious communities, lawyers, defence counsel in criminal cases, conciliators in matrimonial cases, medical practitioners, psychologists, chemists, midwives or nurses about anything that has been confided to them in their official capacity.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n This prohibition no longer applies if the statement is needed to prevent an innocent person from being punished.<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n Article 170a<\/p>\n \u201cA coercive measure may be used only when there is sufficient reason to do so. The coercive measure may not be used when it would be a disproportionate intervention in view of the nature of the case and other circumstances.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 192<\/p>\n \u201cIf any person is suspected on reasonable grounds of an act punishable under statute by imprisonment, a search may be made of hisresidence, premises or storage place in order to undertake an arrest or to look for evidence or objects that may be seized or on which a registered charge [heftelse] may be created.<\/p>\n A search may be made of any other person\u2019s premises when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such an act, and<\/p>\n 1)the act has been committed or the suspect arrested there,<\/p>\n 2)\u00a0\u00a0the suspect has been there while being pursued onhaving been caught in the act or on finding fresh clues, or<\/p>\n 3)\u00a0\u00a0there are otherwise special grounds to assume that the suspect can be arrested, or that there may be found evidence or objects there that may be seized or on which a registered charge may be created.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 195<\/p>\n \u201cIf any person is suspected on reasonable grounds of an act punishable under statute by imprisonment, hemay be subjected to a personal search if there are grounds to assume that it may lead to the discovery of evidence or of objects that may be seized or on which a registered charge may be created.<\/p>\n A personal search may be made of individuals other than the suspect when the suspicion relates to an act punishable under statute by imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, and special circumstances warrant the making of such a search.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 197<\/p>\n \u201cWithout the written consent of the person concerned, a search under Articles 192, 194 and 195 may only be made on the basis of a court decision.<\/p>\n If delay entails any risk, the decision may be made by the prosecuting authority. In the event of a search of editorial offices or the like, the decision shall be made by the public prosecutor, and only if it is probable that the investigation will be substantially impaired by waiting for a court decision.<\/p>\n Any decision pursuant to the first or second paragraph shall as far as possible be in writing and specify the nature of the case, the purpose of the search, and what it shall include. An oral decision shall be noted down in writing as soon as possible.\u201d<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0Chapters 16 (Seizure and surrender order), 18 (Investigation) and 26 (Interlocutory appeal) contain the following relevant provisions:<\/p>\n Article 203<\/p>\n \u201cObjects that are deemed to be significant as evidence may be seized until a legally enforceable judgment takes effect. The same applies to objects that are deemed to be liable to confiscation or to a claim for surrender by an aggrieved person.<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n Article 204<\/p>\n \u201cDocuments or any other items whose contents a witness may refuse to testify about under Articles 117 to 121 and 124 to 125, and which are in the possession either of a person who can refuse to testify or of a person who has a legal interest in keeping them secret, cannot be seized. In so far as a duty to testify may be imposed in certain cases under the said provisions, a corresponding power to order a seizure shall apply.<\/p>\n The prohibition in the first paragraph does not apply to documents or any other items that contain confidences between persons who are suspected of being accomplices to the criminal act [in question]. Nor does it prevent documents or any other items being removed from an unlawful possessor to enable them to be given to the person entitled thereto.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 205<\/p>\n \u201cA decision relating to the seizure of an object that the possessor will not surrender voluntarily may be taken by the prosecuting authority. The decision shall as far as possible be in writing and specify the nature of the case, the purpose of the seizure, and what it shall include. An oral decision shall as soon as possible be rendered in writing. The provisions of Article 200, first paragraph, shall apply correspondingly.<\/p>\n When the prosecuting authority finds that there are special grounds for doing so, it may bring the question of seizure before a court. The provisions of the second to the fourth sentences of the first paragraph of this Article and of Article 209 shall apply correspondingly to the court\u2019s decision relating to seizure. The provisions of the first and third paragraphs of Article 208 shall also apply when seizure has been decided on by the court pursuant to this paragraph.<\/p>\n Documents or any other item in respect of which the possessor is not obliged to testify except by special court order may not be seized without a court order unless such a special order has already been made. If the police wish to submit documents to the court for a decision as to whether they may be seized, the said documents shall be sealed in a closed envelope in the presence of a representative of the possessor.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 206<\/p>\n \u201cWithout a decision of the prosecuting authority a police officer may effect a seizure when hecarries out a decision for search or arrest, and otherwise when delay entails a risk. Seizures may be effected by any person when the suspect is caught in the act or is being pursued when so caught or on finding fresh clues.<\/p>\n The seizure shall immediately be reported to the prosecuting authority. If the latter finds that the seizure should be maintained, it shall issue a written decision containing such information as specified in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 205.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 207<\/p>\n \u201cAll objects seized shall be accurately recorded and marked in such a way as to avoid confusion.<\/p>\n As far as possible, a receipt shall be given to the person who had the object in his possession.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 208<\/p>\n \u201cAny person who is affected by a seizure may immediately or subsequently demand that the question of whether it should be maintained be brought before a court. The prosecuting authority shall ensure that any such person shall be informed of this right.<\/p>\n The provision of the first sentence of the first paragraph shall apply correspondingly when any person who has voluntarily surrendered any object for seizure demands that it be returned.<\/p>\n The decision of the court shall be made by an order.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 226<\/p>\n \u201c…<\/p>\n The investigation shall be carried out as quickly as possible and in such a way that no one is unnecessarily exposed to suspicion or inconvenience.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 377<\/p>\n \u201cAn interlocutory appeal may be brought against a court order or decision by any person who is affected thereby unless it may be the subject of an appeal under Chapter 23 or may serve as a ground of such an appeal by the said person, or it is by reason of its nature or a specific statutory provision unchallengeable.<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 March 2011 (Rt. 2011 page 296) the Supreme Court made a decision concerning a search of the home and office of a lawyer suspected of having committed together with clients, inter alia, fraud. It stated that although the procedures relating to search and seizure of documents that were allegedly covered by legal professional privilege had not been solved expressly in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in practice Article 205 \u00a7 3 had been applied by analogy, in line with its decision of 14 October 1986 (Rt.\u00a01986 page 1149). By way of this analogy, such documents should not be immediately examined by the police. Instead they should first be submitted to the City Court for that court to decide whether they may in principle be seized (as had also been stated in Rt. 2008 page 645) \u2013 following which they would be made available to the prosecution for search \u2013 or whether they would be exempt from seizure due to legal professional privilege \u2013 following which they would be returned to the lawyer without having been searched.Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the primary competence to decide on seizures lay with the prosecuting authority; it was, accordingly, also for that authority to first search materials with respect to whether they could have evidentiary value. The court\u2019s examination of legal professional privilege was in reality a step in the search-process; only after the court\u2019s initial filtering had been completed could the prosecution authority begin its proper searching of the material for evidence.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The Supreme Court added that the procedure would have to be somewhat different if the City Court found that a document fell within legal professional privilege, but the exception in Article 204 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure \u2013 for documents that contain confidences between individuals who are suspected of being accomplices to the criminal act \u2013 could come into play (see paragraph 37 above). In these situations the City Court would also have to examine the relevance of the document as part of its examination of what should be made available to the prosecution.Lastly, the Supreme Court examined Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. It had already (in Rt. 2008 page 158, where reference had been made to Sallinen and Others v. Finland, no. 50882\/99, 27 September 2005) been established that Article 8 applied to searches and seizures of a lawyer\u2019s materials. As to the proportionality-test, the Supreme Court noted that the case before it concerned evidence in relation to a suspicion that a lawyer and a client had cooperated in serious financial crime. Even where the exception in Article\u00a0204 \u00a7 2 applied, it would not be a matter of making a complete exception from the duty of confidentiality, only from the rule that documents containing confidences between lawyers and clients could not be seized. It would be for the court to decide on which documents that were subject to legal professional privilege, and, where Article 204 \u00a7 2 applied, which documents that were to be seized.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 August 1996 (Rt. 1996 page 1081) the Supreme Court found that an individual affected by a decision to authorise a search was entitledunder Article 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appeal against that decision also after documents had been collected and brought to the City Court in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 205 (see paragraph\u00a037 above).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities\u2019search at his premises, including the collection of material, and that they subsequently kept it absent a formal decision on seizure,had entailed a violation of his rights to respect for his private life, his home and his correspondence as provided in Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust \u201call domestic remedies\u201d in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, and that his application should therefore be declared inadmissible.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, they maintained that the applicant had not appealed against the City Court\u2019s decision of 10 March 2010, in which the search had been authorised (see paragraph 7 above). Secondly, he had been entitled to appeal, under Article 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph\u00a037 above), against the prosecuting authority\u2019s decision to seize documents that had been made available to it by the City Court.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also set out that according to the case-law of the Supreme Court (Rt. 1996 page 1081; see paragraph 40 above), the applicant could have challenged the authorities\u2019 impugned possession of the collected documents as long as the search was in progress. Moreover, they argued that a distinction had to be made between documents seized on an \u201cindividual\u201d and a \u201ccollective\u201d level, respectively. Under Article 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 above), the applicant could have challenged the \u201ccollective seizure\u201d that had been made when the police had removed the documents from the applicant\u2019s premises, although an \u201cindividual seizure\u201d of documents could only have been carried out subsequent to the City Court\u2019s examination of which documents could lawfully have been seized.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed and submitted in particular that it would have been pointless to appeal against the decision to authorise the search after the police had already been at his premises and removed material, and added that at that time he had wanted to cooperate with the police. Moreover, it had not been only the initial authorisation of the search, but the continued possession of the documents without a formal seizure decision, that had been the subject of his complaint. There had not been any review procedure available because no formal decision on seizure had been given.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that parts of the applicant\u2019s complaintunder Article 8 of the Convention relate to the initial authorisation of the search on 10\u00a0March 2010 and the circumstances when the police were at his premises and removed the material on 23 March 2010 (see paragraphs 7-8 above). It accepts the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant could have appealed against the authorisation of the search also after the documents had been removed from his premises and were to be submitted to the City Court for it to decide what was to be made available to the prosecution authority. Accordingly, insofar as the applicant\u2019s complaintrelate to the extent of the search and collection of documents \u2013 for example by arguing that the police could have used keywords to search for documents instead of mirror copying the whole data carriers \u2013 the Court finds it inadmissible because domestic remedies have not been exhausted.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0However, parts of the applicant\u2019s complaint are directed against the prosecuting authority and the City Court\u2019s possession of the collected material subsequent to its removal from his premises, and in particular to the fact that the applicant could not avail himself of legal remedies in order to have that continued possession and the question of reasonable grounds for suspicion judicially reviewed until a formal decision on seizure had eventually been made.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0On these points, the Court has had regard to the Government\u2019s arguments that the documents when removed from the applicant\u2019s premises had been \u201ccollectively seized\u201d and that the applicant could have lodged an application for a review of this \u201ccollective seizure\u201d under Article 208 (see paragraph 37 above). Yet, the Court has noted that in the instant case, the applicant\u2019s complaints to the City Court, starting with that of 16 February 2011 (see paragraph 12 above), were not \u2013 by particular reference to Rt.\u00a02011 page 296 (see paragraphs 38-39 above) \u2013 examined on the merits (see paragraphs 14-15 above). On 9 November 2011 the High Court upheld that decision upon appeal, and on 20 December 2011 the Supreme Court\u2019s Appeals Leave Committee rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal against the High Court\u2019s decision (see paragraphs 17-23 and 24, respectively). The High Court expressly held that Article 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not afford the applicant the right to legal review of the question of whether to uphold the \u201cseizure\u201d at that stage of the proceedings (see paragraph 19 above). The reason was that the prosecuting authority had not formally issued a decision on a seizure. Nor could, according to the High Court, the applicant succeed in his submission that he had been entitled to a review of whether there had been grounds for an \u201congoing search\u201d (see paragraph 21 above).<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0Based on the above, the Court finds that the applicant must be considered to have exhausted domestic remedies in so far as his complaint to the Court addresses the prosecuting authority\u2019s and the City Court\u2019s continued possession of the material collected at his premises and the decisions taken in relation to his complaints that this continued possession could not be examined on their merits in the absence of a formal decision on seizure. Exhaustion extends to his submission that he could not apply for review of whether reasonable suspicion still existed.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaint in so far as it relates to the authorisation of the search, decided by the City Court on 10 March 2010, which led to the materials being collected, should be declared inadmissible because the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. For the remainder of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 8, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the remainder of this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. Insofar as domestic remedies have been exhausted, the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 8 must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not dispute that there had been an \u201cinterference\u201d with the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his \u201cprivate life\u201d, his \u201chome\u201d and his \u201ccorrespondence\u201d under Article 8 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s complaints(as outlined in paragraphs 41 and 45 above) relate to the procedure provided under domestic law in respect of search and seizure and recognises the existence of an interference.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0It was moreover common ground that the handling of the material collected at the applicant\u2019s premises pursued a legitimate aim, as they were adopted for the purpose of \u201cthe prevention of disorder and crime\u201d. The Court will therefore examine whether the interference was \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d and \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d, in line with Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that even if the initial authorisation of the searchhad at first been in accordance with the law, the prosecuting authority\u2019s subsequent \u201cindefinite\u201d possession of the material, absent a formal decision to seize, had not. He further maintained that it had not been in accordance with the law to refuse him a judicial review of the legality of that continued possession, regardless of whether the material had been in the prosecuting authority\u2019s or the City Court\u2019s possession. The formal distinction between \u201csearch\u201d and \u201cseizure\u201d, and the legal situation described by the Supreme Court in its decision of 13 March 2011 (Rt. 2011 page 296), had not been foreseeable to him.<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the interference concerning the material on the applicant\u2019s data carriers had been unnecessarily burdensome. The prosecuting authority, having had modern technology to hand, could have extracted only those documents believed to have had evidentiary value, for example by way of a keyword search. Since the prosecutor had not done so, hundreds of the applicant\u2019s clients had been exposed to unnecessary serious risk. Under no circumstances had it been necessary to mirror copyall the contents of the data carriers, which had contained a vast volume of private documents as well as business-related documents.<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also submitted that the prosecuting authority\u2019s preliminary search using keywordsearches on the data carrier had beenunjustified. This method, the applicant alleged, had been in direct conflict with the procedure prescribed in Article 205 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 above), in which only the City Court had the authority to review documents covered by legal professional privilege.<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant hadnothad safeguards available under domestic law to refute the grounds on which the suspicion against him had rested. The charges had not provided him with the details of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Therefore, he had been deprived of the opportunity to refute the accusations and to provide counter-evidence.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the impugned measures had clearly had a legal basis in domestic law. The search had been justified with reference to Article 192 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which had provided that \u201ca search may be made of his residence, premises or storage place in order to … look for evidence or objects that may be seized\u201d (see paragraph 36 above). The legal basis for seizures had been Article 203, which had provided that \u201cobjects that are deemed to be significant as evidence may be seized until a legally enforceable judgment takes effect\u201d (see paragraph 37).<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0Articles 192 and 203 had been clearly accessible. As to foreseeability, the provisions had been formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0On the question of proportionality, the Government submitted that the reasons adduced to justify the impugned measures had been relevant and sufficient. The use of a coercive measure had been necessary to obtain evidence in the criminal proceedings against the applicant for crimes of which he had been later convicted, and had not in any way been arbitrary. Moreover, the Code of Criminal Procedure afforded adequate and effective safeguards against abuse. Seizure could only be decided when there was a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed (Article 203) and when it was necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued (Article 170a). Furthermore, it was the prosecuting authority and not the police that decided whether or not an object should be seized (Article 205), except in matters of urgency (Article 206). A written report had to be drawn up after the search, with accurate information about the seized objects. The seizure decision could be brought before the courts. Pursuant to Article 204 documents which contained information covered by legal professional privilege could not be seized.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0In most cases, search and seizure were carried out within a fairly short time. In the present case, almost three years had passed from the initial search until the seized objects had been returned. However, this delay hadbeen caused by the applicant, not the authorities; the delay had in large part been caused by the legal proceedings instigated and the appeals lodged by the applicant. The Government lastly pointed out that the search had been carried out with an independent witness present.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Was the interference \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d?<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0As to the question of whether the measure was in accordance with the law, the Court\u2019s case-law has established that a measure must have some basis in domestic law, with the term \u201claw\u201d being understood in its \u201csubstantive\u201d sense, not its \u201cformal\u201d one. In a sphere covered by statutory law, the \u201claw\u201d is the enactment in force as the competent courts have interpreted it. Domestic law must further be compatible with the rule of law and accessible to the person concerned, and the person affected must be able to foresee the consequences of the domestic law for him or her (see, for example, Roman Zakharovv. Russia [GC], no. 47143\/06, \u00a7 228, ECHR\u00a02015; andK.S. and M.S v. Germany, no. 33696\/11, \u00a7 34, 6 October 2016). The Court reiterates, moreover, that in the context of searches and seizures, the domestic law must provide some protection to the individual against arbitrary interference with Article 8 rights. Thus, the domestic law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in and conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures (see Sallinen and Others, cited above, \u00a7 82). Furthermore, \u201c[g]iven that search and seizure represent a serious interference with rights protected under Article 8, they must be based on a law that is particularly precise\u201d (ibid., \u00a7 90).<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0Basis in Norwegian law<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that Article 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including its third paragraph, which prescribed the procedure of placing documents under seal and bringing them to the City Court for it to sort out whether they could be searched for evidence did not expressly regulate searches of lawyer\u2019s offices (see paragraphs 37 above). However, from the decision in Rt. 2011 page 296 it is apparent that the application by analogy when faced with questions of possible confidential documents due to legal professional privilege had been a practice of long standing (see paragraph 38 above).<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0Based on the above, the Court is satisfied that the procedure followed in the instant case had a basis in domestic law.<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0\u201cQuality\u201d of the law<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0As to the requirements that the law be accessible and foreseeable, the Court finds that these have been met, insofar as the analogous application of Article 205 \u00a7 3 to cases such as the present one had been a common practice of long standing (see paragraphs 38and 63 above). The Court cannot, accordingly, agree with the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the way the domestic courts had drawn a distinction between search and seizure and had found that a \u201cseizure\u201d \u2013as that term had to be interpreted when used in Article 208 \u2013 had not been decided, effectively making the applicant\u2019s application for reviewunder Article 208 premature (see paragraphs 37and 54 above).<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the domestic law\u2019s compatibility with the rule of law, the Court has taken note of the presumption that there will be confidential documents among the material collected if a lawyer\u2019s harddisks are copied and his or her papers are taken in circumstances such as those in the present case (see paragraph 15 above). In the context of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court has held that the fundamental rule of respect for lawyer-client confidentiality may only be derogated from in exceptional cases and on condition that adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse are in place (see, for instance, M v. the Netherlands, no. 2156\/10, \u00a7 88, ECHR 2017 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case, the Court has taken note of Article 197 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a court\u2019s decision in which an authorisation to carry out a search has been granted, \u201cshall as far as possible be in writing and specify the nature of the case, the purpose of the search, and what it shall include\u201d (see paragraph 36 above). The search was thus subject to prior judicial authorisation, which included an examination of whether reasonable suspicion existed.<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it is undisputed that the applicant could have appealed under Article 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 above) against the decision in which the search of his premises had been authorised, and that he could have done so also after the documents and data carriers in question had been removed from his premises (see paragraphs40, 44 and 46 above). In addition, the material was to be placed under seal and thus made inaccessible before it arrived with the City Court, pursuant to Article\u00a0205\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(see paragraph 37 above).<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0Following that, if the City Court had completed its examination andfound that one or more documentswere to be made available to the prosecuting authority in order for the authority to search them for information and decide on whether they had relevance as evidence and hence should be seized, a decision to that effect could have been appealed against by the applicant (see paragraph 37 above), according to the High Court in its decision of 9\u00a0November 2011 (see paragraph20above).<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, had the prosecuting authority, following the City Court\u2019s authorisation (see paragraph 69 above), decided to seize any of the documents, the applicant would have had a right to have that decision tried judicially in accordance with Article 208 (see paragraph 37 above).<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0Viewing the system in the Code of Criminal Procedure as a whole, the Court considers that the law afforded sufficient legal safeguards as concerned the search, collection and eventually seizure, both with respect to the extents of these measures \u2013 the amount of documents collected and copied \u2013 and including the protection of legalprofessional privilege. The Court adds that this is so regardless of whether there was any additional judicial action available under the heading of a \u201ccollective seizure\u201d, as argued by the Government in the context of the admissibility question (see paragraph44 above).<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning how domestic law did not afford him a right to bring a judicial action in order to verify whether reasonable grounds for suspicion still existed, Article 8 of the Convention does not prescribe a general requirement that a suspect must have the right to take action on the question of reasonable suspicion during an ongoing investigation, even if the investigation includes a search and seizure process such as that in the present case. It is not for the Court to take position on whether reasonable suspicion against the owner of the material is a condition for seizure under domestic law and whether a review of a seizure under Article 208 would, accordingly, have had to include an examination of those issues at the stage demanded by the applicant in the present case.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0Given the above, the Court is satisfied that the relevant domestic law, as interpreted by the courts, was compatible with the rule of law, accessible and foreseeable (see paragraph 62 above) and provided sufficient safeguards subsequent to the initial authorisation to search the applicant\u2019s premises.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Was the interference \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d?<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0With respect to the question of whether an interference is \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d in pursuit of a legitimate aim, the Court has consistently held that the notion of \u201cnecessity\u201d implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, for example, Paradiso and\u00a0Campanelli v. Italy [GC], no. 25358\/12, \u00a7 181, ECHR 2017 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0When considering the necessity of an interference, the Court must be satisfied that there were sufficient and adequate guarantees against arbitrariness, including the possibility of effective control of the measure at issue (see, for instance,Sommer v. Germany, no. 73607\/13, \u00a7 56, 27\u00a0April 2017; andM.N. and Others v. San Marino, no. 28005\/12, \u00a7 73, 7\u00a0July 2015). Moreover, the Court has previously acknowledged the importance of specific procedural guarantees when it comes to protecting the confidentiality of exchanges between lawyer and client and of legal professional privilege (see, inter alia, Sommer, cited above, \u00a7 56; andMichaud v. France, no. 12323\/11, \u00a7 130, ECHR 2012). It has emphasised that, subject to strict supervision, it is possible to impose certain obligations on lawyers concerning their relations with their clients, for example in the event that there is plausible evidence of the lawyer\u2019s involvement in a crime and in the context of the fight against money-laundering. The Court has further elaborated that the Convention does not prevent domestic law allowing for searches of a lawyer\u2019s offices as long as proper safeguards are provided, for example the presence of a representative (or president) of a bar association (see, for example, Sommer, cited above, \u00a7 56; with references to Andr\u00e9 and Another v. France, no. 18603\/03,24 July 2008 (see, in particular, \u00a7\u00a7 42-43); Roemen and Schmit\u00a0v.\u00a0Luxembourg, no.\u00a051772\/99, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2003-IV; and Xavier Da Silveira\u00a0v. France, no.\u00a043757\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 37 and 43, 21 January 2010).<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court reiterates that the search had been preapproved by the City Court (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant did not appeal against the City Court\u2019s decision, and in so far as his complaints address that decision, they are therefore inadmissible (see paragraphs 7 and 46 above). Furthermore, there is no information that the prosecuting authority may have overstepped any limits drawn up by that court in its decision. The Court cannot, accordingly, find that there have been any violations of Article 8 in this respect. The Court adds in passing that, as there was a reason for the indiscriminate collection of documents, namely that of protecting legal professional privilege, the case differs from that of Miailhe v. France (no. 1), 25 February 1993, \u00a7 39, Series A no.\u00a0256\u2011C.<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0As to the further process, the prosecuting authority applied to the City Court for an authorisation to carry out searches on the mirror copies, a request which was wrongfully granted (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant did not address this issue at the time. However, this procedural error was subsequently rectified whenthe Supreme Court declared in Rt.\u00a02013 page 968 that the prosecuting authority\u2019s handling of those copies had not been lawful and that the courts should instead examine the material (see paragraphs 30-31 above) and, against that background, the Court cannot now find that the domestic authorities violated the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 8 for reason of this original mistake alone.<\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the applicant\u2019s submission that the prosecuting authority and the domestic courts sat with the material \u2013 making it, seen from the applicant\u2019s side, effectively \u201cseized\u201d \u2013 without taking any decisions that could be subjected to judicial review or would be amenable to appeal, the Court notes that it took some eight months, from 3 May 2010 to 5\u00a0January 2011, for the prosecution to submit the material to the City Court after the applicant had gone through it at the prosecuting authority\u2019s office (see paragraphs 10-11 above). In their submissions, the parties have not specifically focussed on this delay, which therefore is largely unexplained. However, the Court has also taken note of how the City Court in its letter of 11 May 2011 \u2013 of its own motion \u2013 set out that it would ensure an expedite inspection of the documents since considerable time had already passed (see paragraph 14 above). It is thus apparent that the City Court sought to compensate for the delay in the prosecuting authority\u2019s transmission of the material, and on 22 July 2011 \u2013 some six months after it had received the material \u2013 it stated that it was in the process of completing the work (see paragraph 15 above).<\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0The City Court\u2019s conclusion of its perusal of the material submitted to it was interrupted by the applicant\u2019s unsuccessful appeals to the High Court and the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 16 and 24 above). Upon the Supreme Court having rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on 20 December 2011 (see paragraph 24 above), the City Court held a hearing approximately one month later, on 25 January 2012 (see paragraph 25 above). Its decision was made on 11 May 2012 (ibid.), after slightly less than four months, and the applicant applied to the Court approximately one week thereafter (see paragraph 1 above). Furthermore, the Court notes that proceedings on the handing over of material to the prosecution continued at appellate levels after the complaint to the Court had been lodged (see paragraphs 25-28 above), in addition to other proceedings subsequently instigated by the applicant in order to have materials returned to him (see paragraphs 29-34 above).<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the City Court needed some time to scrutinise the large amount of documents brought to it. It notes that the police, by using key-word searches, decided to send 2,309 of the electronic documents to the City Court, and paper files came in addition. The proceedings subsequent to the City Court\u2019s decision on which documents that were to be made available to the prosecution authority, were not characterised by delays. The electronic documents were available to the applicant while the search process was ongoing, in so far as the hard disk and the laptop were returned to him two days after the initial search at his premises (see paragraph 9 above). In the circumstances of the instant case, viewed in conjunction with the scope of the applicant\u2019s complaints, the Court does not therefore find that the extent of the interference of which the applicant was victim exceeded what was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing is sufficient to conclude that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 6 AND 10 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant furtherrelied on Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention. Under Article 6 he argued that his right to be presumed innocent had been infringed because the charges against him had been insufficiently detailed. Under Article 10 he maintained that there had been a breach of his right to possess information. He also made an additional complaint that there had been an unlawful interference with his reputation.<\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0Asto these points, the Court finds that the case, even assuming that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies, discloses no appearances of violations, and, hence, that these complaints are \u201cmanifestly ill-founded\u201d within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore to be declared inadmissible.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant additionally complained that there had been a violation of the right conferred upon him by Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that Article 13 of the Convention had been violated.<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 13 requires that a remedy be available in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as \u201carguable\u201d in terms of the Convention. It does not compel States to allow individuals to challenge domestic laws before a national authority on the grounds of being contrary to the Convention, but seeks only to ensure that anyone who makes an arguable complaint of a violation of a Convention right will have an effective remedy in the domestic legal order (see, for example, De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395\/09, \u00a7 180, ECHR\u00a02017 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the effectiveness of a remedy within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. Nor does the \u201cauthority\u201d referred to in that provision necessarily have to be a judicial authority. Nevertheless, its powers and the procedural guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective. The expression \u201ceffective remedy\u201d used in Article 13 cannot be interpreted as a remedy that is bound to succeed; it simply means an accessible remedy before an authority competent to examine the merits of a complaint (see, for example, M.R.A.and Others v. the Netherlands, no.\u00a046856\/07, \u00a7 114, 12 January 2016).<\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above findings relating to Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention (see paragraphs 82-83 above), the Court considers that the applicant did not have an \u201carguable\u201d claim under Article 13 when examined in conjunction with those provisions. As concerns the complaint under Article 8 in so far as declared admissible (see paragraphs 50-51 above), the Court finds it in the circumstances sufficient under Article 13 to observe that the High Court examined the applicant\u2019s claim under that provision (see, in particular paragraphs 19 and 20 above).<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaints concerning Article 8 of the Convention admissible insofar as they do not relate to the City Court\u2019s decision of 10 March 2010 to authorise the search, and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention;<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 May 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Claudia Westerdiek\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Angelika Nu\u00dfberger
\nErik M\u00f8se,
\nAndr\u00e9 Potocki,
\nS\u00edofra O\u2019Leary,
\nM\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits,
\nGabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,
\nLado Chanturia, judges,
\nand Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n