THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF AGARKOVA v. RUSSIA
\n(Application no. 29951\/09)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n15 May 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n15\/08\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Agarkova v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Helena J\u00e4derblom, President, Having deliberated in private on 17 April 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 29951\/09) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Russian national, Ms Zoya Ivanovna Agarkova (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 26 February 2009.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr A. Koss, a lawyer practising in Kaliningrad. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were initially represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged, in particular,that the investigation into the circumstances of her son\u2019s death had not been effective for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 May 2012 the above complaint was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Kaliningrad.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Death of the applicant\u2019s son and investigation thereof<\/strong><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 January 2007 the applicant\u2019s son, Mr Pavel Agarkov, was taken to the Kaliningrad Emergency Hospital (\u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0439\u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439\u043f\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0449\u0438\u0433. \u041a\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430) with a severe head trauma. He lapsed into a coma a week later, and died on 1 February 2007.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 February 2007 the Moskovskiy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Kaliningrad (\u201cthe District Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) received a pre-investigation inquiry file containing evidence of the elements of a crime under Article\u00a0111 \u00a7\u00a04 of the Criminal Code (intentional infliction of serious bodily harm causing the victim\u2019s death).<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0The pre-investigation inquiry established that at about 5\u00a0a.m. on 17\u00a0January 2007 the applicant\u2019s son had started a fight with a certain V. In the course of the fight the applicant\u2019s son had inflicted several blows on V. with a wooden baseball bat. On the third blow the bat had struck a wall and had broken into two pieces. The applicant\u2019s son had continued to beat V. with his bare hands and kick him with his feet. V. had then managed to pick up a fragment of a broken bat and had hit the applicant\u2019s son several timeson the head, causing the latter the physical injuries thatresultedin his death on 1\u00a0February 2007.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 15\u00a0February 2007 an investigator of the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against V., being of the opinion that V. had acted in necessary self-defence.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 February 2007 the District Prosecutor set aside the above decision. Criminal proceedings into the death of the applicant\u2019s son were instituted on the same day (criminal case no.\u00a0030292\/07).<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 March 2007 V. confessed to having inflicted on the applicant\u2019s son bodily injuries which caused his death. On the same day a preventive measure in the form of an undertaking not to leave the town and to behave properly was imposed on him.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 March 2007 V. was charged with homicide committed as a result of exceeding the limits of necessary self-defence (Article 108 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). He was questioned as an accused and fully acknowledged his guilt in relation to the actions with which he was charged.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 March 2007 two fragments of the baseball bat were seized and examined by the investigator.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 March 2007 the applicant was admitted to the proceedings as an aggrieved party.She was questioned by the investigator the same day, but could not submit any information regarding the circumstances of her son\u2019s death. During her additional questioning as a victim on 7 April 2007 she stated that her son had told her that he had been beaten by police officers from the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of Kaliningrad (\u041e\u0412\u0414\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430\u0433.\u00a0\u041a\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430).<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation established that on 17 January 2007 officers from the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of Kaliningrad had arrived at the scene of the incident in order to stop a disturbance of public peace caused by the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s unlawful actions. Upon his arrivalat the police station the police officers, having assessed the victim\u2019s medical condition as critical, called an ambulance for him.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 April 2007 during an on-site verification of his testimony, V. demonstrated with the help of an assistant and an improvised object how the applicant\u2019s son had struck him with a wooden baseball bat, how this bat had broken when it struck the wall, and how he had afterwards inflicted several blows on the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s head with a fragment of this bat.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 April 2007 the forensic medical examination was carried out, establishing that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death had been caused by an open blunt traumatic brain injury accompanied by contused head wounds and bruises, haemorrhages in the soft tissues of the head, fractures of the skull bones, haemorrhages above and under the layers of mater, complicated by brain oedema and compression (forensic medical report no.\u00a039\/696).<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 May 2007 the District Prosecutor approved the bill of indictment and referred the case to the Moskovskiy District Court of Kaliningrad (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) for examination on the merits.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 October 2007 the District Court returned the criminal case to the Prosecutor for re-drafting of the bill of indictment and remedying of deficiencies that prevented examination of the case, in particular, the formulation ofexactly how V.\u2019s actions had exceeded the limits of necessary self-defence.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 December 2007 the chief investigator fromthe Kaliningrad investigative division of the Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee at the Russian Federation\u2019s Prosecutor\u2019s Office for the Kaliningrad Region (\u201cthe Kaliningrad investigative division\u201d) discontinued the criminal proceedings, having arrived at the conclusion that the injuries resulting in the death of the applicant\u2019s son on 1 February 2007 had been inflicted by V. as actions of necessary self-defence. The decision was not supported by reference to any evidence.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 January 2008 the Deputy Head of the Kaliningrad investigative division set aside the above decision and ordered a fresh investigation.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0Subsequently, between 23\u00a0February 2008 and 29 October 2009 the criminal proceedings were discontinued and resumed on nine occasions. Three of the decisions, namely those of 23\u00a0February, 23\u00a0May and 30 June 2008, repeated word for word the previous decision of 29\u00a0December 2007. The following sixdecisions, namely the decisions of 22\u00a0November 2008 and 8\u00a0January, 20 February, 15 July, 29\u00a0August and 29 October 2009, reached the same conclusion, relying on:<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0forensic medical report no. 39\/696 of 23\u00a0April 2007 (see paragraph\u00a017 above);<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by V. submitting that on 17 January 2007 he had had a fight with the applicant\u2019s son and had administered to the latter at least two blows to the head with a piece of broken baseball bat, following which he had called the police, who had taken the applicant\u2019s son to the police station;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by witnesses T. and P. who were present at the scene of the fight and confirmed V.\u2019s statements;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by police officer Erk, who arrived at the scene and saw the applicant\u2019s son squatting down, with blood streaming from his head and a bruise below his eye; he submitted that the applicant\u2019s son, V., T. and P. had been taken to the police station, following which an ambulance had been called for the applicant\u2019s son as his head was bleeding; no violence had been used against the latter;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by duty officer Tr., who had received information about the fight and had seen the applicant\u2019s son brought to the police station in a state of alcoholic intoxication, with a lacerated wound in the region of one eye and several abrasions, following which an ambulance had been called to take him to hospital; he submitted that nobody in his presence had subjected the applicant\u2019s son to any beatings;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0similar statements by duty officer Ser.;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by operative agent Mir., who saw the applicant\u2019s son at the police station with injuries to his body; he submitted that he had not seen anybody beating the applicant\u2019s son at the police station;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by witness F., who arrived at the police station having been told that the applicant\u2019s son had been taken there; however, she had then been informed that the latter had been taken to hospital to be treated for his injuries; she further submitted that in the hospital the applicant\u2019s son told her that he had been beaten up by the police in the entrance to V.\u2019s house;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by witness G., who had accompanied the applicant\u2019s son in his car to the scene of the fight; he submitted that the applicant had told him that he had a score to settle with a man called \u201cErik\u201d who had cooperated with the police; he had seen the applicant\u2019s son knock on a window and enter the building with a baseball bat in his hands; about fifteen minutes later he had seen the police arrive at the exit from the building; the applicant\u2019s son had been walking unassisted, he had not been handcuffed, but had been holding his head; one of the police officers had been holding a plastic bag containing two fragments of the baseball bat; the applicant\u2019s son had got into the police car and been taken to the police station; he had not seen anybody hitting the applicant\u2019s son or threatening him;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by the applicant, who submitted that her son had told her that he had been beaten up by the police;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by witness Min., who had heard about the fight from V.;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by witness Mot., who had heard about the fight from T.;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by neighbours Sukh. and Tishch., who knew nothing about the events in question;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by witness Gor., the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s partner, who hadbeen told by the applicant\u2019s son that he had been beaten by the police;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0statements by witness Ven., who was receivingtreatment in the hospital at the time when the applicant\u2019s son was admitted and who submitted that the latter had told him that he had sustained the injuries through being beaten with a baseball bat;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0the police station\u2019s registration log, which contained no mention of the applicant\u2019s son being arrested on the 17 January 2007;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0expert report no. 366, according to which V. had an abrasion on his right forearm which could have been caused on 17 January 2007 by a blow from a hard blunt object;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0expert report no. 250 on the examination of asample of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s skinfrom the left half of the parietal region of the head containing well-defined diffuse microinclusions of iron;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0expert report no. 52 of 2 July 2008 stating that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s open blunt brain injury had beencaused by a combination of traumatic impacts in the region of the head which could have resulted from the circumstances described by V., that is to say by the infliction of multiple blows by a baseball bat fragment in the region of the head.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime, the applicant repeatedly challenged the adequacy of the investigation alleging the involvement of police officers in the death of her son. In particular, she complained about the failure of the investigator to inform her of the decisions taken in the case and to explain the possible avenues for appeal. She further complained about the refusal of her requests for information about the exact time when V.\u2019s call was registered at the police station, the exact time when her son was brought to the police station and when the ambulance was called for him. The applicant also sought to have clarified the reasons why her son had not been questioned about the circumstances of the incident duringthe week before he lapsed into a coma, to obtain an expert examination of the bloodstains on his clothes which could have clarified whether he had been standing up or lying down when he sustained his injuries, and an expert examination which could have clarified the origin of metal particles found in the wounds of her son.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0In response to her complaints, the District Court on 18\u00a0August, 5\u00a0September, 26\u00a0September and 12 December 2008 found the investigator\u2019s refusals and lengthy inactivity unlawful and unjustified and ordered him to remedy the above deficiencies by conducting a thorough and comprehensive investigation.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 December 2008 the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s clothes were seized from the applicant for expert examination.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 September 2009 the District Court found the investigator\u2019s inactivity unlawful, having noted that when taking the decision of 15\u00a0July 2009 the investigator had failed to comply with his own ruling of 10\u00a0July 2009 granting the applicant\u2019s requests.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 January 2010 the Deputy Head of the Investigative Committee at the Russian Federation\u2019s Prosecutor\u2019s Office for the Kaliningrad Region set aside the decision of 18 January 2008(see paragraph\u00a021 above) as having been taken in violation of the criminal procedure. As a result, all the evidence obtained after 18 January 2008 was found inadmissible.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 January and 22 January 2010 forensic biological and forensic trace examinations of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s clothes were ordered, which duly established that the latter had been in an upright position, or close to such a position, when the bloodstains appeared on his clothes (report no.\u00a032 of 12\u00a0February 2010).<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 January 2010 a forensic medical examination by an expert commission was ordered. The examination established that the open blunt traumatic brain injury inflicted on the applicant\u2019s son had been caused by at least five traumatic impacts, and that it could have arisen in the circumstances indicated by the accused V. during his questioning on 7\u00a0March 2007 and the on-site verification of his testimony on 6 April 2007 (see paragraphs 11 and 16 above) (report no.\u00a013 of 9 February 2010).<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0On unspecified dates the applicant and the witnesses were questioned for a second time and confirmed their previous statements.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0Between 14 February 2010 and 21 February 2012 the criminal proceedings were discontinued on five occasions on the grounds of absence of the constituent elements of a crime under Article 108 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code in the actions of V., and were subsequently resumed.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 May 2012 the District Court found the decision of 21 February 2012 unlawful and unsubstantiated. The District Court also found unlawful the investigator\u2019s failure to notify the applicant of the procedural decisions taken in reply to her requests.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 July 2012 the acting head of the Moskovskiy District of the Kaliningrad investigative division set aside the decision of 21\u00a0February 2012.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 August 2012 the investigator for the Moskovskiy District from the Kaliningrad investigative division discontinued the criminal proceedings. The decision noted that the investigation had identified the constituent elements of a crime under Article 108 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code in the actions of V. However, since the crime belonged to the category of minor crimes and had been committed over two years earlier, in 2007, V. was to be exempted from criminal liability pursuant to Article 78 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Criminal Code (exemption from criminal liability due to expiration of statutory time-limits for criminal prosecution).<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 December 2012 the acting head for the Moskovskiy District of the Kaliningrad investigative division took the decision to resume the proceedings in view of the necessity of conducting psycho-physiological expert examinations \u2212usinga polygraph\u2212 of the police officers who had brought the applicant\u2019s son to the police station so as to verify the veracity of their statements.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0According to information contained in the case file, the proceedings were still pending in December 2012.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0The casefile contains no information regarding further developments in the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Applicant\u2019s attempts to have criminal proceedings instituted against police officers<\/strong><\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 December 2007 the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers allegedly involved in the death of her son.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 June 2008 the chief investigator of the Kaliningrad investigative division issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against officers Erk., K., Tr. and Ser. of Kaliningrad\u2019s Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior under Articles\u00a0285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of power by an official, actions of a public official which clearly exceed his or her authority).<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 July 2008 the Deputy Head of the Kaliningrad investigative division set aside the above decision and ordered a fresh pre-investigation inquiry. In particular, the investigator was instructed to assess the actions of the police officers under Articles 125 (leaving without help a person in danger) and 306 (knowingly false accusation) of the Criminal Code.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 July 2008 the investigator of the Kaliningrad investigative division again issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against officers.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 September 2008 the District Court found the above decision unlawful. The District Court established that no fresh inquiry had been conducted and that the instructions given in the decision of 14 July 2008 had not been complied with.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 November 2008 the Kaliningrad Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the decision of 26 September 2008 on appeal.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 February 2010 the Kaliningrad investigative division\u2019sinvestigator refused to open criminal proceedings against the police officers under Articles 125, 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime were absent in their actions.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 August 2010 the District Court found the above decision lawful. The applicant did not appeal.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Civil claim for damages<\/strong><\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 December 2008 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Finance seeking compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage caused to her by the failure of the domestic authorities to investigate her son\u2019s death.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0On 31 March 2009 the Tsentralniy District Court of Kaliningrad dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 May 2009 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0For a summary of relevant domestic law see Keller v. Russia (no.\u00a026824\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 54-56 and 67-71, 17 October 2013).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained about the failure of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation into the death of her son. She relied on Articles2, 6 and 13 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the complaint should be examined solely under Article 2 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. …\u201d<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the investigation had been ineffective.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the domestic authorities had taken and continued to take all the procedural actions necessary in order to investigate the case effectively. The investigationhad been started without delay and had been conducted in compliance with the domestic law. During the proceedings, preliminary investigation authorities\u2019theories had beenexamined, criminal proceedings instituted and an investigation carried out within the scope of which the applicant\u2019s submissions had been examined with the involvement of experts, including forensic medical and other examinations carried out by such experts.The applicant had had sufficient access to the case file and had been able effectively to participate in the proceedings. Judicial review of the adopted procedural decisions had been carried out in response tothe applicant\u2019s complaints within the statutory time\u2011limits.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles<\/em><\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 2 \u00a7 1 of the Convention enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, \u00a7 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011III). This implies the putting in place of effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 115, Reports 1998\u2011VIII).<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0More specifically, where death occurs under suspicious circumstances, leaving room for allegations to be made of the intentional taking of life, the State must ensure some form of effective official investigation (see \u0160ilih v. Slovenia [GC], no. 71463\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 156-57, 9\u00a0April 2009).<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0This is not an obligation of results to be achieved, but of means to be employed. The authorities must have taken all reasonable steps to secure the evidence concerning the incident. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a046477\/99, \u00a7\u00a071, ECHR 2002\u2011II).<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case<\/em><\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes, first of all, that criminal proceedings into the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death were instituted on 26\u00a0February 2007, almost a month after he died from the severe head trauma received on 17\u00a0January 2007. Following the institution of criminal proceedings the investigation authorities took a number of procedural measures aimed at discharging their positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention (see paragraphs 11-17 above). They established, in particular, that the injuries whichresulted in the death of the applicant\u2019s son – open blunt traumatic brain injury accompanied by contused head wounds and bruises, haemorrhages in the soft tissues of the head, fractures of the skull bones, haemorrhages above and under the layers of mater, complicated by brain oedema and compression – had been inflicted by a certain V. during a fight. In May 2007 they referred the case against V. \u2212on the charge of homicide committed as a result of exceeding the limits of necessary self-defence \u2212to the District Court for trial.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, however, that in October 2007 the District Court returned the case to the investigation authorities for re-drafting of the bill of indictment and remedying of the deficiencies that prevented the examination of the case, in particular, for formulating how exactly V.\u2019s actions had exceeded the limits of necessary self-defence.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the case was never returned to the District Court for examination on the merits. Instead, between 29\u00a0December 2007 and 29\u00a0October 2009,ten decisions were taken to discontinue the criminal proceedings and were subsequently quashed by supervising authorities as unfounded (see paragraphs 20-22above).Following the applicant\u2019s requests, during this period of almost two years the District Court on several occasions found the investigator\u2019s inactivity unlawful and obliged the investigation authority to remedy the above deficiencies by conducting a thorough and comprehensive investigation (see paragraphs23, 24 and 26above).<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the repeated remittals of the case for further investigation, along with the investigation authority\u2019s reluctance to follow the recommendations of the courts,point to serious defects in the investigation taken as a whole, as these failings adversely affected the capacity of the investigation to collect and assess evidence of relevance for the resolution of the case (see Ryabtsev v. Russia, no. 13642\/06, \u00a7\u00a080, 14\u00a0November 2013, with further references).<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court notes that all the evidence collected as a result of the investigative measures conducted during the above-mentioned two\u2011year period was in any event found inadmissible following the decision of 13 January 2010 (see paragraph 27above), and had therefore to be collected anew.<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that later, between 14 February 2010 and 5\u00a0December 2012, the criminal proceedings were discontinued on six occasions on account ofa lack of the constituent elements of a crime in the actions of V., and subsequently resumed (see paragraphs31-35above).In December 2012 \u2013 that is to say, more than five years after the incident \u2013 the investigation had still not been completed and it cannot be concluded that its overall length was justified by the circumstances of the case.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, the Court reiterates that the effectiveness of an investigation implies a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition. Even where there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities is vital in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in, or tolerance of, unlawful acts (see \u0160ilih, cited above, \u00a7 195). Moreover, with the lapse of time the prospects that any effective investigation can be undertaken will increasingly diminish.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has accordingly been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 2 of the Convention about the death of her son at the hands of the police, and under Articles\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 and 13 of the Convention about various decisions of the domestic authorities preventing her from obtaining an effective investigation into her son\u2019s death.<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as it falls within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government was of the view that if the Court were to find a violation of the Convention, the Court\u2019s judgment in this respect should in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant.<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered distress and anxiety on account of the violation it has found. Ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, it awards the applicant EUR\u00a020,000in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 3,000 for legal fees incurred during the post-communication stage of the proceedings before the Court. She submitted a copy of a legal services agreement with her representative Mr\u00a0A. Koss and requested that the above amount, which is due for payment in respect of the above legal services, be transferred directly to the representative\u2019s bank account. Later the applicant also claimed 60,000\u00a0Russian roubles (RUB) for legal fees incurred in the domestic proceedings (RUB 10,000) and in connection with the preparation of her initial application to the Court (RUB\u00a050,000) by lawyer N.\u00a0Selyavina. These expenses were confirmed by a copy of the legal services agreement with Ms\u00a0N. Selyavina dated 10\u00a0May 2007 and receipts of payment dated 11\u00a0May 2007 and 1 October 2012.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0The Governmentargued that the applicant\u2019s claim should be rejected.<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the requested sums for costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and the proceedings before the Court.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe complaint concerning Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Conventionunder its procedural limb;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR\u00a020,000 (twenty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR\u00a03,780 (three thousandseven hundred and eighty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, out of which EUR\u00a03,000 (three thousand euros)is to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative Mr A. Koss;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 May 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Helena J\u00e4derblom
\nBranko Lubarda,
\nHelen Keller,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nPere Pastor Vilanova,
\nAlena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1,
\nMar\u00eda El\u00f3segui, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n