THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF STOMAKHIN v. RUSSIA
\n(Application no. 52273\/07)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n9 May 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n08\/10\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Stomakhin v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Helena J\u00e4derblom, President, Having deliberated in private on 3 April 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 52273\/07) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Russian national, Mr Boris Vladimirovich Stomakhin (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 7 November 2007.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr A.G. Manov, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin,Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and then by Mr V. Galperin, his successor in that office.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged thathis conviction for articles in his newsletter,of which he had been the founder, owner, publisher and editor\u2011in-chief and which he had distributed at various public events, had violated his right to freedom of expression and to peaceful assembly, as guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 June 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Vsesvyatskaya.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0At the material time the applicant was a journalist at a Lithuanian weekly publication.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0He was also acivil activist. As was later established by the domestic courts, since approximately the summer of 1998 the applicant had identified himself as a member of an informal liberal democratic movement, Revolyutsionnoye Kontaktnoye Obyedineniye (\u201cthe Revolutionary Contact Union\u201d \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe RKO\u201d).Also, in the period from 2000 until 2004 the applicant was the founder, owner, publisher and editor-in-chief of a monthly newsletter entitled Radikalnaya Politika (\u201cRadical Politics\u201d).He determined the contents of the newsletter and published his own articles in it, as well as articles by people with similar views and excerpts from official and non-official sources of information and the mass media. He, himself, prepared each issue of the newsletter at hishome address by typing it up on his personal computer, and thenhad it printed out and reproduced in multiple copies. The exact number of copies of each issue is unknown. The applicant then distributed the newsletter in person or through other unidentified individuals by selling it or giving it out for free at various places in Moscow.The articlestouched, to a great extent, on the events in the Chechen Republic.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Published issues of Radikalnaya Politika<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Issue no. 1 (27) of January 2003<\/em><\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0An article headlined \u201cFrom the interview given by M.Udugov[1] to the Kavkaz Center press agency\u201d (\u201c\u0418\u0437 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0432\u044c\u044e \u041c. \u0423\u0434\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0430\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u201d) mentioned the large-scale hostage-taking at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October 2002[2] referring to it as \u201cthe action of Movsar Barayev\u2019s heroic Chechen rebels in Moscow\u201d (\u201c\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f\u0433\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445\u0447\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0446\u0435\u0432\u041c\u043e\u0432\u0441\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0411\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0435\u0432\u0430\u0432\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u0435\u201d). It stated, in particular:<\/p>\n \u201cRussia has clearly demonstrated that it is at war and permanently in danger of being hit by retaliatory blows, because its rulers have perpetrated a despicable attack on a sovereign State and are killing innocent civilians there. Even the western community is compelled to admit that Putin\u2019s Russia is waging a war aimed at the physical extermination of Chechens as an ethnic group.\u201d<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0An article entitled \u201cInsanity[defence] of Budanov[3][is] a guarantee of victory for Basayev[4]\u201d (\u201c\u041d\u0435\u0432\u043c\u0435\u043d\u044f\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u0411\u0443\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u2013 \u0437\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0433\u043f\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0434\u044b\u0411\u0430\u0441\u0430\u0435\u0432a\u201d) commented on the case of a high-ranking Russian officer who was standing trial on charges of torture and murder for the strangulation of an 18-year-old Chechen woman and, in particular, on thejudgment of the first-instance court by which the defendant had been found not guilty by reason of temporary insanity. The article, of which the applicant was one of the authors,stated, in particular:<\/p>\n \u201c…The whole of Chechnya is filled now with the same Budanovs \u2013 maniacs, bloodthirsty sadists, murderers and degenerates in epaulettes. Russia\u2019s whole occupying army consists of those Budanovs.\u201d<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0It also stated that:<\/p>\n \u201c…The fact that a [someone who posed a] danger [to] society, an insane maniac was in command of a regiment … sets a new task before the revolutionary-democratic forces of Russia. From now on we should require immediate compulsory psychiatric examination of all commanders of the military and naval forces, service personnel of the Ministry of the Interior, the borderguard, the police and the FSB, starting from a captain and finishing with the Commander-in-Chief \u2013 V.V.Putin.\u201d<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0It also appealed:<\/p>\n \u201cLet dozens of Chechen snipers take up their positions in the hills and the city ruins and hundreds and thousands of aggressors perish from their holy bullets! No mercy! Death to the Russian invaders!\u201d<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0An article headlined \u201cAccomplices to the murderers of the Chechen people\u201d (\u201c\u041e \u0441\u043e\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0445 \u0443\u0431\u0438\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0447\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430\u201d), authored by a third person,commented onthe hostage-taking at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October 2002 and contained the following paragraph:<\/p>\n \u201cI, as a national of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya(CRI), who is daily suffering from the Russian State Terror, can understand the reasons which pushed Chechen patriots to this extraordinary act. It had been brought about by the continuing attacks by Russia on the Chechen State and [the Chechen] people. There are no documents condemning the mass murder of nationals of the CRI, to say nothing of Russia\u2019s aggression against the Chechen State … Chechen patriots, reduced to a state of despair by Russia\u2019sTerror, were compelled to commit this guerrilla act in Moscow, the capital of Russia. In so doing they pursued their sole goal, namely to alert the international community to the total genocide of the Chechen people being cynically committed by the Russian invaders\u201d.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The same article mentioned the \u201cnational liberation struggle of the Chechen people against the colonial expansion of Russia\u201d.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0In an article headlined \u201cThe Chechen resistance is alive! Maskhadov has visited Dzhokhar and Argun\u201d expressions such as \u201cPresident Maskhadov\u201d, \u201cPresident of the CRI\u201d, \u201cCommander-In-Chief of the CRI Maskhadov\u201d, \u201cthe capital of the CRI, Dzhokhar\u201d were used.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0In an article headlined \u201cIn memoriam, Salman Raduyev[5]\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438\u0421\u0430\u043b\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0430\u0420\u0430\u0434\u0443\u0435\u0432\u0430\u201d) the applicant wrote:<\/p>\n \u201cChechen heroes are leaving… Dudayev, Atteriyev, Khattab and today \u2013 Raduyev. As if they would be devoured by a scary black noisome abyss. And the name of this abyss is Russia.\u201d<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0In the same article the applicant stated:<\/p>\n \u201c…Salman Raduyev fought against Russia to his last breath, without making compromises with the murderers of his people. His life was an example of how one should fight against Russia. His death has become an example, amongst a million of such examples, of the immeasurable scoundrelism and perfidy of Russia, the pathological falsity and criminality of Russia as a State, as a civilisation, as a subject of history.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Salman Raduyev is the brightest page [in the history] of the heroic Chechen Resistance movement. He was a hero of an entire generation, not only in Chechnya, but also in Russia. His life and death are a guarantee that damned imperial Russia will be destroyed and the Chechens and all other peoples oppressed by it will finally obtain freedom. We will avenge you, Salman!\u201d<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0In an article entitled \u201cA new joke by Vova\u201d (\u201c\u041d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f\u0448\u0443\u0442\u043a\u0430\u0412\u043e\u0432\u044b\u201d) the applicant stated:<\/p>\n \u201cLawful convictions issued by the Sharia court of the CRI against national traitors are being executed rigorously.\u201d<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0In the same issue of the newsletter the applicant reproduced information from the website regions.ru regarding a police operation by a unit of the regional Department of the Interior aimedat setting free Uzbek nationals who had been held in slavery by Russian nationals. The applicant headlined that article with the words \u201cRussians have slaves and dare to squawk something about Chechens\u201d (\u201c\u0420\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0435\u0449\u0435\u0441\u043c\u0435\u044e\u0442\u0447\u0442\u043e-\u0442\u043e\u0432\u044f\u043a\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0432\u0430\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0447\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0435\u0432\u201d).<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0In the same issue the applicant published an article headlined \u201cOrthodox [believers] went completely nuts\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0435\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0441\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0445\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043b\u0438\u201d) in which information had been given about some unidentified \u201cOrthodox theologians\u201d who,in a booklet called \u201cFoundations of the Orthodox Faith\u201d had allegedly claimed that \u201cJesus Christ [had been] crucified not by Jews but by Chechens\u201d.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Issue no. 9 (35) of September 2003<\/em><\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0In an article headlined \u201c\u2018Chechen syndrome\u2019 inside out\u201d (\u201c\u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439\u0441\u0438\u043d\u0434\u0440\u043e\u043c\u043d\u0430\u0432\u044b\u0432\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0442\u201d), the applicant wrote:<\/p>\n \u201c…Most importantly, we realised with our hearts and skin that Freedom is, indeed, the most precious thing that a man has, the most precious treasure, the only thing worth dying for. And if [an individual is] lucky[,he or she will] take with [him or her]self to the other world at least some enemies, as selfless Chechen women do when they put on their \u2018shaheed belts\u2019. The life of a human is in any event brief and fragile and is only worth living if you are free. Otherwise it is better to die at once. As these Chechen women die.\u201d<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0He went on as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c…In supporting Chechnya at war, demonstrating our solidarity with Basayev, openly supporting Movsar Barayev in Moscow on the days of the \u2018Nord-Ost\u2019 [theatre siege], we crossed a line, a certain border, past which all connections to our past and the environment and people among which we had been born and grown up and lived broke down; we had trustingly considered ourselves to be part of them, until we read on a foreign, enemy website, and saw with our own eyes, all the awful details of the atrocities committed by [our] people in a tiny neighbouring mountain country. Hence, the Rubicon has been crossed, the choice has been made and there is no room to back off \u2013 we no longer have any other family than all peoples oppressed by \u2018our\u2019Empire, than partisans fighting to be freed from its yoke, than famous warlords like Basayev and political parties which claim monetary compensation[from Russia] for their occupation and return of the territories Russia has annexed…\u201d<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0In the same article the applicant stated:<\/p>\n \u201c…It is the bloody cannibalistic atrocity of this State towards a tiny and helpless mountain people that first brought this thought into our conscience: Russia must be destroyed forever, a State doing similar things to an entire nation should not exist at all!\u201d<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0An article headlined \u201cChechnya shielded the Caucasus\u201d (\u201c\u0427\u0435\u0447\u043d\u044f\u0437\u0430\u0441\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0438\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e\u044e\u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u201d),authored by a third person, stated:<\/p>\n \u201c…Maskhadov, Basayev, Khattab[6] and other heroes of the Chechen resistance courageously and firmly got in the way of Russia\u2019s aggression and, in fact, saved not only the independence of Chechnya but also its very existence, as well as the existence of other States in the Caucasus…\u201d<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0In an article entitled \u201cNo comments\u201d the applicant stated:<\/p>\n \u201c…Putin\u2019s cheap propaganda can jabber as long as it wishes that Maskhadov is a bandit and that he is responsible for the \u2018Nord-Ost\u2019 [theatre siege] and the recent explosions in Tushino[7]. Anyone who shows at least some interest in contemporary Chechnya knows that it is Maskhadov who is the legitimate President of Chechnya. And until he is re-elected in accordance with the constitution of the CRI, and not the Russian constitution, any other \u2018presidents of Chechnya\u2019 are out of the question. Lawful elections of the president of the CRI under the constitution of the CRI of 1992 will only be possible when the CRI army, headed by Commander-in-Chief Maskhadov, defeats occupying Russia\u2019s illegal armed groups of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Security Service, and chucks them out of the territory of independent Ichkeriya…\u201d<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Issue no. 2 (40) of February-March 2004<\/em><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0In an article headlined \u201cRetribution-2\u201d (\u201c\u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u0435\u0437\u0434\u0438\u0435-2\u201d) the applicant stated:<\/p>\n \u201c…Retribution for genocide will take place sooner or later. If we live up to it, we will be its witnesses and it would be good to become its punishing sword. Until then we are only capable of organising lamentably small candlelightvigils to commemorate all those killed and tortured in Chechnya, Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland \u2013 from the White (Baltic) to the Black Seas\u2013 by our State which has become frenzied because of blood. It is impossible to live with this heavy burden in the soul, as the terrible knowledge of Russia\u2019s history requires retribution from all those who remain conscious. It is possible that the hands which hold a commemoration candle today will hold a gun tomorrow \u2013 it is hard to believe that but Lordhelp us to live in the happy time when this happens. For the time being we don\u2019t have any other weapons, except for the alarm bell of our words.<\/p>\n …We remember and grieve for all those killed and tortured by \u2018our\u2019Empire, hated by us. However, a better gift to all Chechens being exterminated will be not [to have] yet another meeting with candles to commemorate their genocide, but each blow struck \u2013 even though they are still weak, for now \u2013 against the criminal State which is killing them and depriving us of our freedom, mutilating our souls, striving to turn us into butchers and binding us with blood. \u2018Less words and more action\u2019 \u2013 this is the slogan of slogans of the day! Particularly given that there is much to be done for the radical anti-imperial opposition in the country!\u201d<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The article also read:<\/p>\n \u201c…let Russia spit blood for yesterday\u2019s and today\u2019s genocide of the Chechen people \u2013 it serves it right, it deserved it. Let our commemoration candles at the meetings of 23 February turn into flaming torches, in whose purgatorialflames this rotten block, lying in the way of humankind, will burn!\u201d<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0In the same article the applicant wrote:<\/p>\n \u201c…As to the writing of inscriptions on the walls of buildings, fences and bus stops, one cannot overestimate the importance of those acts. From today on and until 14\u00a0[March 2004[8]] we have to strike persistently at one point: slaves, become free for at least a moment, do not participate in fake\u2018elections\u2019! We need not campaign among the limited circle of revolutionaries, human-rights activists, extremists, and members of radical and marginal social groups \u2013 they already know everything. Each direct and open appeal to …the people other thanpoliticised consumers of …TV cud [\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0432\u0430\u0447\u043a\u0438] is an open and powerful blow to the regime and will hasten its end…\u201d<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0In the same article the applicant alsoissued the following call:<\/p>\n \u201c…We have to accumulate, hate and keep record of their crimes \u2013 the endless list of all those \u2018sweep operations\u2019, \u2018identity checks\u2019, \u2018counter-terrorist operations\u2019, gagging laws, unlawful searches and politically motivated criminal prosecutions. It would also be good to make lists of all those who carried out a particular \u2018sweep operation\u2019 in a particular village, who instituted criminal proceedings, on whose information and on which date. It is known from the historical perspective that those people are most of all afraid of personal responsibility, which they would not be able to shift on to their commanders who had given illegal orders. One day executioners in uniforms and narks without uniforms in Moscow, as well as in Chechnya, will be held accountable to us for everything…\u201d<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0An article headlined \u201cKremlin looters\u201d (\u201c\u041a\u0440\u0435\u043c\u043b\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u044b\u201d),authored by a third person,criticised the actions of the Russian Army in the Chechen Republic and, in particular, accused them of a large-scale extra\u2011judicial executions of civilians during a \u201csweep\u201d operation in a Chechen village in 1995. It also stated:<\/p>\n \u201cIn Chechnya the Russian Army stopped existing as a military force of the State, having, once and for all, turned itself into a frenzied gang of looters and murderers; a herd intoxicated with drugs.\u201d<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0In his \u201ceditorial note\u201d to the \u201cDeclaration of the Committee \u20182008: a free choice\u2019\u201d the applicant stated:<\/p>\n \u201cWe, [the RKO] and Radikalnaya Politika,are united with the Committee and prepared to cooperate with them. Obviously, we are much more radical than them. We consider that we should not wait until 2008[9] and be worried about the Constitution but call on the people to overthrow and liquidate Putin\u2019s regime as soon as possible. We also don\u2019t consider it possible to preserve the contemporary Russian Federation as an integral State. However, we are for a common ground with all our allies, even those who are much more moderate.\u201d<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Issue no. 3 (41) of March 2004<\/em><\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0On the front page the following statement was published on behalf of the \u201ceditorial team\u201d:<\/p>\n \u201cZelimkhan Yandarbiyev[10] died a hero and he will remain [a hero] in the memory of humankind, historians and grateful future generations. He fought the bloody Rusnya[11] as long as he could\u201d.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0In an article headlined \u201cThe price to be paid for genocide\u201d (\u201c\u0420\u0430\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0433\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0434\u201d) the applicant wrote:<\/p>\n \u201cThe explosion in the Moscow metro[12] is justified, natural and lawful… Chechens have a moral right to blow up everything they want in Russia, after what Russia and Russians have done to them; no objections regarding humanism or love forhumankind can be accepted.\u201d<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0In the same article the applicant stated:<\/p>\n \u201cIt has been ten years since the Russian Federation and its people [began] a totally destructive genocidal war against the Chechen people, who before the war numbered only one million people\u201d.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0In an article headlined \u201cWill Russia be allowed to participate in the Summer Olympics in Athens?\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0443\u0441\u0442\u044f\u0442 \u043b\u0438 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044e \u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044e\u044e \u043e\u043b\u0438\u043c\u043f\u0438\u0430\u0434\u0443 \u0432 \u0410\u0444\u0438\u043d\u0430\u0445?\u201d) theapplicantwrote:<\/p>\n \u201cRussia\u2019s bloody attack on the CRI led to, among millions of other similar bloody consequences, Russia\u2019s security forces\u2019 killing of the ex-President of the CRI, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who had helped his people to repel this attack.\u201d<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Other articles<\/em><\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0In eight issues of the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter, in a column entitled \u201cThe Good News\u201d (\u201c\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0438\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438\u201d), the applicant published information which he had copied from various news agencies\u2019 websites, such asInterfax, or websites like strana.ru and KMNews.ru.The information mostly concerned eventssuch as deaths of federal servicemen or law-enforcement officers in the Chechen Republic; violent attacks and assaults on public officials or police officers in various regions of Russia;and so forth.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s participation in public events<\/strong><\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 February 2004 the applicant took part at an unauthorised meeting, where he displayed banners with slogans condemning the current political regime, such as: \u201cZakayev is not a terrorist, unlike Putin and Co.\u201d (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0435\u0432 \u043d\u0435 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442, \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0442 \u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0430 \u0438 \u041a), \u201cEurope! DonotbetraytheChechenresistance!\u201d (\u0415\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0430! \u041d\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0439\u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435\u0441\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435!), \u201cRussianinvaders \u2013getoutofChechnya\u201d (\u0420\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435\u043e\u043a\u043a\u0443\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0442\u044b \u2013 \u0432\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0427\u0435\u0447\u043d\u0438!), \u201cWhenwilltheChechenpeoplebefreedandrehabilitated?\u201d (\u041a\u043e\u0433\u0434\u0430\u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0441\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0440\u0435\u0430\u0431\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0447\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439\u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434?) andalsoaflagwiththewords \u201cRadicalParty\u201d.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 March 2004, while participating in a meeting at Pushkin Square in Moscow, the applicant, personally and with the participation of an unidentified person, disseminated issues nos.\u00a02 (40) and 3 (41) of the Radikalnaya Politikanewsletter and informed people interested in it about the forthcoming issues, how to subscribe and other waysto financially support the newsletter, of which he was the editor-in-chief.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Criminal proceedings against the applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Pre-trial investigation<\/em><\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 December 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicanton suspicion that the views expressed in the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter amounted to appeals to extremist activities and incitementto racial, national, social and other hatred.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0A psychological-linguistic expert examination of the texts published by the applicant was carried out. In a report of 13 April 2004 the expert stated, in particular, that the impugned texts contained negative emotional assessments of Russia\u2019s servicemen; of people of Russian ethnicity; and of Orthodox believers. The report further mentioned that, by criticising Russia\u2019s actions in the Chechen Republic, the texts gave negative assessments of Russia, as a State; of the existing political regime; of Russia\u2019s army as a part of themachinery of the State. The report also pointed out numerous expressly negative words and expressions used by the applicants when describing Russia. It also mentioned that the impugned texts positively assessed and justified the actions and activities of a number of Chechen separatist leaders and fighters; terrorist attacks, including explosions, within the territory of Russia.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 April 2004 the applicant was formally charged with the above-mentioned offences and on an unspecified date the case was transferred to the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) for trial.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Conviction of the applicant at the first level of jurisdiction<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings before the trial court<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0At the trial, the applicant pleaded not guilty. He confirmed that he had been the editor-in-chief and publisher of theRadikalnaya Politikanewsletter but argued that he had printed the newsletter only for himself and had not distributed it. He further argued that he had merely expressed his opinion regarding various political events in Russia, and, in particular, his civic position regarding the ongoing armed conflict in the Chechen Republic. In his words, he had never called for extremist activities or violent overthrow of the existing political regime in Russia; he had only called fora change of the leadership in the country.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court called and examined a number of witnesses, who submitted that they had bought the applicant\u2019s newsletter or seen him distribute it for free in public. It also examined the expert who had drawn up the report of 13 April 2004. The expert confirmed his conclusions made in the report. A number of witnesses on the applicant\u2019s behalf were also called and examined.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The trial court further examined other pieces of evidence, including the expert report of 13 April 2004; written complaints from eight private individuals in which they had stated that the applicant\u2019s articles had aimed at inciting hatred and had contained insulting language in respect of Russians, Orthodox believers and law-enforcement officers; reports of seizure of issues of the applicant\u2019s newsletter; reports of a search of the applicant\u2019s flat and seizure of his computer;a report on the applicant\u2019s forensic psychiatric examination, which confirmed that he was fully able to understand the meaning of hisactions and to control them.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court examined the applicant\u2019s arguments and those raised by his defence counsel and dismissed them as untenable on the facts of the case, with reference to the witness statements and other pieces of evidence.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Judgment of 20 November 2006<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0In a judgment of 20 November 2006 the District Court found the applicant guilty of \u201chaving publicly appealed to extremist activities through the mass media\u201d (Article 280 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Criminal Code) and of having committed \u201cactions aimed at inciting hatred and enmity as well as at humiliating the dignity of an individual or group of individuals on the grounds of ethnicity, origin, attitude towards religion and membership of a social group, through the mass media\u201d (Article\u00a0282 \u00a7 1 of the Russian Criminal Code).<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0The trial courtestablished the circumstances of the case, as summarised in paragraphs6-7 above, and referred to the texts mentioned in the expert report of 13 April 2004 (see paragraph39 above). It considered that the impugned texts had hada clear extremist leaning and incited actions prohibited by the Suppression of Extremism Act (see paragraph 69below). In particular, in those texts the applicant had called forextremist acts, such as a forcible overthrow of the constitutional order and the President of Russia; had called for a breach of the territorial integrity of Russia; had justified and glorified terrorist acts; had called for violence against the Russian people and abased their dignity; and had incited religious discord by arguing that the Orthodox faith had beeninferior and by insulting its followers. In those texts the applicant had used insulting language in respect of Russia as a State, the political regime in the country, andservicemen of Russia\u2019s armed and security forces.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0More specifically, the District Court observed that in various issues of his newsletter the applicant had represented the conflict in the Chechen Republic as a war between two States \u2013 Chechnya and Russia; had approved of terrorist attacks carried out in Russia, and of the actions of criminals and terrorists aimed at the extermination of the Russian people as a nation. In this respect, the District Court referred to the applicant\u2019s relevant texts in issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraph 16above) and in issue no. 9 (35) (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above), stating that in those texts, while \u201cmentioning a number of persons implicated in terrorist and extremist activities\u201d, the applicant had used words and expressions aimed at creating positive public opinion about those persons and their criminal acts.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court also pointed out that \u201cthe texts of the applicant\u2019s articles contain[ed] positive assessment of the bombings in Russia perpetrated by Chechen terrorists as well as the acts of Chechen snipers from illegal armed groups who kill[ed] Russia\u2019s servicemen in Chechnya\u201d. In this respect, it quoted an extract from issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraph\u00a011above) and extracts from issue no. 3 (41) (see paragraphs 31-32 above).<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The trial court went on to note that the applicant had qualified Russia\u2019s actions in the Chechen Republic as aggression and had considered the RussianArmy tobe an occupying force. Accordingly, he \u201c[had]negatively assessed Russia\u2019s actions and those of Russia\u2019sarmed forces; similarly negatively [the applicant had] assessed Russia as a State, the Russian Army as a part of themachinery of the State and Russia\u2019s servicemen as a social group\u201d. The District Court continued to state that, on the other hand, the applicant \u201c[had] represented the events in the Chechen Republic as a war waged by Russia against the Chechen people (the Chechen ethnic group) and as genocide against the Chechen people\u201d. The court corroborated these findings with reference to relevanttexts published in issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraphs 8 and12 above) and in issue no. 3 (41) (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above).<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court also observed that the applicant had justified and positively assessed the acts of Chechen rebel fighters, and that he had regarded the Chechen Republic as an independent State with its own President (A.\u00a0Maskhadov), capital (Dzhokhar), constitution, armed forces and Commander-in-Chief, courts (Sharia courts) and legislation. In particular, in issue no. 1 (27), the applicant had interpreted the events in the Chechen Republic as \u201ca national liberation struggle of the Chechen people against the colonial expansion of Russia\u201d (see paragraph 13 above), referred to \u201clawful convictions of the Sharia court of the CRI\u201d (see paragraph\u00a017 above), and mentioned \u201cPresident Maskhadov\u201d, \u201cPresident of the CRI\u201d, \u201cCommander-In-Chief of the CRI Maskhadov\u201d, \u201cthe capital of the CRI, Dzhokhar\u201d (see paragraph 14 above). Also, in issue no. 3 (41) the applicant published a \u201cdecree by President Maskhadov\u201d and in the article \u201cNo\u00a0comments\u201d he praised \u201cPresident Maskhadov\u201d as \u201cthe legitimate President of Chechnya\u201d (see paragraph 24 above).<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court further referred to the texts in eight issues of the applicant\u2019s newsletter published in the column entitled \u201cGood news\u201d (see paragraph 35 above). It pointed out that the applicant had represented bad events in a positive way, that is to say as actions approved by the authors and by the applicant himself and as an example to be followed. The court pointed out that another example to be followed, according to the applicant, had been actions of Chechen women putting on \u201cshaheed belts\u201d; in the latter respect, the court quoted a relevant extract from the article \u201c\u2018Chechen syndrome\u2019 inside out\u201d (see paragraph 20 above).<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court went on to observe that \u201cin all issues of his newsletter … [the applicant had] wilfully made use of insulting characteristics, negative emotional assessments and attitudes towards ethnic, racial, national, religious and social groups\u201d. In particular, in respect of Russia as a State he had employed such negative emotional references as metaphors \u201cscary noisome abyss\u201d, \u201cbloody cannibalistic atrocity\u201d, \u201crotten block\u201d; humiliating characteristics \u201cimmeasurable scoundrelism, perfidy, pathological falsity\u201d and negative attitudes aimed at destruction (the metaphor \u201cto spit blood\u201d), which, according to the trial court, was a clear indication of an attitude aimed at inciting bloodshed. The court corroborated these findings with reference to relevant extracts from issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraph15 above), issue no. 9 (35) (see paragraph 22 above) and issue no.\u00a02 (40) (see paragraph26above).<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court also considered that in the article headlined\u201cInsanity of Budanov, a guarantee of victory for Basayev\u201d, \u201cthe applicant [had] insult[ed…] servicemen of the RussianArmy and law-enforcement officers by launching an appeal to act criminally against them\u201d. In particular, the court stated that \u201cin that article [the applicant gave] an emotional and negative description of the servicemen of the RussianArmy as a social group\u201d (see paragraph 9 above) and \u201c[made] an appeal for actions against [army] servicemen …, such as requiring an immediate compulsory psychiatric examination of its commanders\u201d (see paragraph 10above). In support of its relevant findings, the District Court also relied on an extract published in issue 2 (40) (see paragraph 29 above).<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0It went on to state that \u201cby publishing and disseminating the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter[the applicant had] wilfully acted with a view to stirring up enmity and conflict, including armed conflict, on national, racial and religious grounds between citizens living in the European and Asian parts of the country and people living in the Caucasus\u201d. In this respect, the trial court referred to the applicant\u2019s \u201ceditorial note\u201d published in issue no. 2 (40) (see paragraph 30 above), observing that in that publication the applicant had \u201cdemonstrated a negative attitude towards the existing political system and Russia as a State\u201d. The trial court pointed out that \u201cthe stance taken by [the applicant] concerning the liquidation of the existing State regime (\u201cPutin\u2019s regime\u201d) presuppose[ed] not only actions in conformity with the constitution but also the possibility of deviating from it (\u201cto overthrow the regime, without really caring about the Constitution\u201d)\u201d.<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The court further noted that in the article \u201cRetribution-2\u201d the applicant had referred to \u201cthe following acts aimed against the State and the existing political regime in Russia: organisation of meetings concerning events in the Chechen Republic, participation in those meetings, writing inscriptions on the walls of buildings, fences and bus stops\u201d with the contents reflected in the relevant extracts of that article (see paragraph\u00a025 above). The court also stated that \u201cthe applicant [had] also suggested carrying out other unlawful acts against the State and the political regime in the texts of his newsletters but [had] failed to specify which\u201d.<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court then observed that in various issues of his newsletter the applicant had \u201cintentionally appealed for records to be kept of such acts as \u2018sweep operations\u2019, \u2018identity checks\u2019, \u2018counter-terrorist operations\u2019, \u2018unlawful searches and politically motivated criminal prosecutions\u2019, which he [had] qualified as \u2018crimes\u2019 and the persons who [had] carried them out as \u2018executioners in uniforms\u2019 and \u2018narks without uniforms\u2019\u201d. The court referred, in particular, to the applicant\u2019s appeal made in the relevant extract from the article \u201cRetribution-2\u201d (see paragraph\u00a028 above).<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The trial court went on to note that in the article \u201cOrthodox [believers] went completely nuts\u201d (see paragraph 19above)the applicant had made use of a heading carrying a negative and emotional assessment of the followers of the Orthodox denomination (\u201cwent nuts\u201d). However, in the court\u2019s words,\u201cthe content of the article [did] not correspond to its title, because it concern[ed] an isolated case (a statement that \u201cJesus Christ was crucified not by Jews but by Chechens\u201d, contained in a booklet called \u201cFoundations of the Orthodox Faith\u201d); this isolated case [was] generalised from and represented as a typical situation of Orthodox believers by virtue of using the impugned heading\u201d. In the same vein, the District Court pointed out that in issue no.\u00a01 (27) the applicant had reproduced information concerning certain Uzbek nationals held in slavery by certain Russian citizens (see paragraph 18 above). The court noted that the applicant had entitled that article \u201cRussians have slaves and dare squawk something about Chechens\u201d and had represented an isolated fact to the readers as typical and characteristic of all Russians, whereby he had \u201cmade a negative and emotional assessment (\u2018to squawk\u2019) in respect ofRussian citizens as a nation\u201d.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, in issues nos.\u00a01 (27) and 9 (35) the applicant hadargued that \u201cOrthodox people[\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0439\u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434] hadbeen inferior by using insulting characteristics and negative emotional assessments of believers, discriminatory expressions in respect of the Orthodox denomination as a religion and stating that this religion, practised by Russians, should be abolished, thereby abasing the national dignity of the people practising [it]\u201d. According to the trial court, statements regarding the inferiority of the Orthodox faith had been made by the applicant in an attempt to stir upinter\u2011ethnic and racial conflicts in society so as to cause indignationin societyand eventually to call for a change of the existing political regime. The court did not specify which particular articles in the above-mentioned issues contained those characteristics and assessments.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the court referred to the fact that \u201cat an unauthorised meeting on 23 February 2004 the applicant [had] called on individuals to support his movement by openly displaying banners with slogans condemning the regime\u201d (see paragraph36 above) and during the meeting of 10 March 2004, \u201cto continue to commit crimes aimed at incitement to hatred and enmity among the population, abasement of dignity of anindividual or group of individuals on the grounds of gender, nationality, language, origin or religious beliefs and membership of a social group, the applicant, personally and with a participation of an unidetified person, had distributed issues nos.\u00a02 (40) and 3 (41) of the Radikalnaya Politikanewsletter and had informed the persons interested in it about the forthcoming issues, howto subscribe and other waysto financially support the newsletter, of which he had been the editor-in-chief\u201d. In the trial court\u2019s view the applicant thus had called for extremist activities to be supportedby way of their financing on a charitable basis.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that in the relevant articles he had made no appeals to extremist activities, and, in particular, that he had not calledfor the overthrow of the constitutional ordernor stirred up inter-ethnic discord; and that he supported the constitutional order, the Russian Constitution and the Chechen people\u2019s right to self-determination and had merely availed himself of the right to freedom of expression. The trial court noted, with reference to the expert report of 13 April 2004, that the language used by the applicant in the impugned texts enabled the court to conclude that the applicant\u2019s actions had constituted criminaloffences and that he had clearly abused his right to freedom of expression secured by the Russian Constitution.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court furthermore dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that he had been the author of only some of the articles held against him whereas the others had been written by other individuals. The court observed in this connection that the applicant had been the editor-in-chief of the newsletter and, in this capacity, had had the power to shape its editorial direction and he had been responsible for its content.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the punishment to be imposed on the applicant, the District Court had regard to the state of his health and the fact that he had no criminal record, had positive references and had a dependant mother. At the same time it stressed the \u201chigh social danger\u201d posedby the applicant\u2019s offences and his personality and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The court also prohibited the applicant from practising journalism for three years to run concurrently.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Appeal proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed, referring, among other things, to Article 10 of the Convention and stating that as the editor-in-chief of the impugned newsletter he had expressed in it his personal views concerning political events in Russia and his attitude, as a citizen of that country, to the war in the Chechen Republic. He had not made any appeals for extremist activities and had not declared the superiority of any one religion over another. Nor had he called for the overthrow of the constitutional order, but he had expressed the view that the Government should be changed. The applicant further pointed outthat the number of copies of the newsletter in question had been so miniscule that the statements published therein hadpresented no public danger. He also argued that the measure of punishment imposed on him was excessively severe, given, in particular, the fact that he had no criminal record and had positive references from the place where he lived.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 May 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. It stated, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s newsletter had been a mass medium despite the low number of copies produced. It also considered that the first-instance court had correctly established the facts and assessed the adduced evidence and that the punishment imposed on the applicant had been justified in the circumstances of the case.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was released on 21 March 2011 after he had served the prison sentence in full. In his submission, numerous requests by him for release on parole had been refused.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Constitution of Russia<\/strong><\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0Article 29 of the Constitution of Russia states as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Freedom of thought and speech shall be guaranteed to everyone.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Propaganda or agitation inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and enmity shall not be allowed. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic supremacy shall be prohibited.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Nobody can be forced to express [her or his] views and convictions or to renounce them.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone shall have the right freely to seek, receive, transmit, produce and disseminate information by any lawful means. The list of [items of ] informationwhich constitute State secrets shall be established by a federal law.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Freedom of mass communication shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited.\u201d<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Criminal Code<\/strong><\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0Article 280 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code of Russia (\u201cthe Criminal Code\u201d), as in force at the relevant time, provided as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Public appeals for extremist activities shall be punishable by a fine of up to 300,000 Russian roubles [RUB], or an amount equivalent to the convicted person\u2019s wages or other income for a period of up to two years, or by an arrest for a period of four to six months, or by deprivation of liberty for a period of up to three years;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The same acts committed through the mass media shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a period of up to five years, accompanied by a withdrawal of the right to hold certain posts or carry out certain activities for a period of up to three years.\u201d<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0Article 282 of the Criminal Code, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Actions aimed at inciting hatred or enmity and humiliating the dignity of an individual or a group of individuals on the grounds of gender, race, ethnic origin, language, background, religious beliefs or membership of a social group, committed publicly or through the mass media, shall be punishable by a fine of RUB 100,000 to RUB 300,000, or an amount equivalent to the convicted person\u2019s wages or other income for a period of one to two years, by withdrawal of the right to hold certain posts or carry out certain activities for a period of up to three years, by compulsory labour of up to 180 hours or by correctional labour of up to one year, or by deprivation of liberty of up to two years…\u201d<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Suppression of Extremism Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0Federal Law of 25 July 2002 no. 114-FZ on Suppression of Extremist Activities (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439\u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d 25 \u0438\u044e\u043b\u044f 2002 \u0433. \u2116\u00a0114-\u0424\u0417 \u00ab\u041e\u00a0\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0438\u044d\u043a\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439\u0434\u0435\u044f\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Suppression of Extremism Act\u201d), as in force at the relevant time, provided as follows:<\/p>\n Section 1: Basic concepts<\/p>\n \u201cFor purposes of the present Federal Law the following basic concepts shall apply:<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Extremist activity (extremism) is:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0activity of non-governmental, religious or other organisations, the media, editorial boards or individuals, consisting in planning, directing, preparing and committing acts aimed at:<\/p>\n \u2013 forcible change of the constitutional foundations of the Russian Federation and breach of its territorial integrity;<\/p>\n \u2013 undermining the national security of the Russian Federation;<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n \u2013 carrying out of terrorist activities or public justification of terrorism;<\/p>\n \u2013 inciting racial, ethnic, religious or social discord associated with violence or calls to violence;<\/p>\n \u2013 humiliation of dignity on the grounds of ethnic origin;<\/p>\n \u2013 creation of mass disorder, commission of disorderly acts or acts of vandalism out of ideological, political, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity, or out of hatred or enmity towards a social group;<\/p>\n \u2013 propaganda of exceptionality, superiority or inferiority of citizens because of their attitude towards religion, social position, race, ethnic origin, religion or language;<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n \u2013 creation and\/or dissemination of printed, audio, audio-visual and other materials (works) designed for public use and containing at least one of the elements listed in this section;<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0public appeals to carry out the above-mentioned activities as well as public appeals and addresses inciting [people] to carry out the above-mentioned activities, giving grounds or justifying the carrying-out of the above-mentioned acts;<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0financing of the above-mentioned activities or other assistance in planning, organising, preparing and carrying out the above-mentioned acts, including by providing financial support… or otherfacilities…\u201d<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE INSTRUMENTS AND MATERIALS<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Committee of Ministers Recommendation No.\u00a0R\u00a0(97)\u00a020<\/strong><\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 October 1997 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation No. R (97) 20 on \u201chate speech\u201d and the appendix thereto. The recommendation originated in the Council of Europe\u2019s desire to take action against racism and intolerance and, in particular, against all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance. The Committee of Ministers recommended that the member States\u2019 governments be guided by certain principles in their action to combat hate speech. The relevant one reads as follows:<\/p>\n Principle 5<\/p>\n \u201cNational law and practice should allow the competent prosecution authorities to give special attention, as far as their discretion permits, to cases involving hate speech. In this regard, these authorities should, in particular, give careful consideration to the suspect\u2019s right to freedom of expression given that the imposition of criminal sanctions generally constitutes a serious interference with that freedom. The competent courts should, when imposing criminal sanctions on persons convicted of hate speech offences, ensure strict respect for the principle of proportionality.\u201d<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0General Policy Recommendation No. 15 of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance<\/strong><\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 December 2015 the Council of Europe\u2019s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) adopted General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on combating hate speech. In its relevant part, the recommendation reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI):<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Recommends that the governments of member States:<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0take appropriate and effective action against the use, in a public context, of hate speech which is intended or can reasonably be expected to incite acts of violence, intimidation, hostility or discrimination against those targeted by it through the use of the criminal law provided that no other, less restrictive, measure would be effective and the right to freedom of expression and opinion is respected, and accordingly:<\/p>\n a. ensure that the offences are clearly defined and take due account of the need for a criminal sanction to be applied;<\/p>\n b. ensure that the scope of these offences is defined in a manner that permits their application to keep pace with technological developments;<\/p>\n c. ensure that prosecutions for these offences are brought on a non-discriminatory basis and are not used in order to suppress criticism of official policies, political opposition or religious beliefs;<\/p>\n d. ensure the effective participation of those targeted by hate speech in the relevant proceedings;<\/p>\n e. provide penalties for these offences that take account both of the serious consequences of hate speech and the need for a proportionate response;<\/p>\n f. monitor the effectiveness of the investigation of complaints and the prosecution of offenders with a view to enhancing both of these;<\/p>\n g. ensure effective co-operation\/co-ordination between police and prosecution authorities…\u201d<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0The Explanatory Memorandum to the recommendation, in its relevant part, provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c16.\u00a0\u00a0…the assessment as to whether or not there is a risk of the relevant acts occurring requires account to be taken of the specific circumstances in which the hate speech is used. In particular, there will be a need to consider (a) the context in which the hate speech concerned is being used (notably whether or not there are already serious tensions within society to which this hate speech is linked): (b) the capacity of the person using the hate speech to exercise influence over others (such as by virtue of being a political, religious or community leaders); (c) the nature and strength of the language used (such as whether it is provocative and direct, involves the use of misinformation, negative stereotyping and stigmatisation or otherwise capable of inciting acts of violence, intimidation, hostility or discrimination); (d) the context of the specific remarks (whether or not they are an isolated occurrence or are reaffirmed several times and whether or not they can be regarded as being counter-balanced either through others made by the same speaker or by someone else, especially in the course of a debate); (e) the medium used (whether or not it is capable of immediately bringing about a response from the audience such as at a \u201clive\u201d event); and (f) the nature of the audience (whether or not this had the means and inclination or susceptibility to engage in acts of violence, intimidation, hostility or discrimination).\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his conviction for views expressed in his newsletter which he had distributed at various public eventshad violated his right to freedom of expression and to peaceful assembly, as guaranteed by Articles10and 11 of the Convention. These Articles read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 10<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 11<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties<\/strong><\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantargued thatthe domestic authorities had arbitrarily expanded the list of charges on which he had been convicted by including in their number actions that had not constituted a criminal offence, such as his participation in peaceful demonstrations and meetings. He also contended that the severity of his sentence had rendered the interference with his relevant rights disproportionate.He pointed out that the circulation of his newsletter had only included copies which he had printed out himself and whose number had been negligible. Therefore, in the applicant\u2019s view, his actions had posed no danger to the public and should not have entailed such a severe punishment.<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government suggested that the applicant\u2019s conviction had been justified under Articles 10\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 and 11\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0They argued, with reference to the findings of the expert report (see paragraph 39above) and those of the domestic courts (see paragraphs\u00a045-61 and64above), that the impugned texts in the applicant\u2019s newsletter had contained public calls for extremist activities and had clearly aimed at inciting hatred, enmity and humiliating the human dignity of an individual or a group of individuals on the grounds of ethnic origin, attitude towards religion and membership of a social group. Such speech had been clearly prohibited by the relevant provisions of domestic law and hadbeen punishable under Articles 280 and 282 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs\u00a067-69 above). All those provisions hadbeen accessible to the applicant and had enabled him to foresee the consequences which his actions would entail. The Government thus insisted that the measure complained of had been \u201cprescribed by law\u201d.<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0They further stressed that it had not been the applicant\u2019s membership of an unregistered and thus informal movement or his participation in two unauthorised meetings that had lain at the heart of his conviction, but rather the publicationof inflammatory hatefulstatements in the newsletter as well as exhibiting posters with xenophobic texts at public events in whichhe had called other individuals to support his movement and to commit extremist actions, such as overthrow using force of the fundamentals of the constitutional order, a breach of Russia\u2019s territorial integrity, undermining national security and terrorist activities.The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s actions had breached the domestic legislation aimed at protecting national security, territorial integrity and public order and concluded that his conviction had been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d, within the meaning of Articles 10 \u00a7 2 and 11 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, for the protection of \u201cthe interests of Russiannationals and the fundamentals of Russia\u2019s constitutional order\u201d.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that whilst the applicant relied on two Convention provisions \u2013 Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention \u2013 his complaint mainly concerned his criminal conviction for publication and dissemination of texts that were found to have contained appeals to extremist activities and to have incited hatred and enmity on various grounds. The applicant\u2019s membership of an unregistered movement and his participation in unauthorised meetings were not the grounds for his conviction and were only relied on by the domestic courts as a general background to his case and factual elements showing the dissemination of the impugned information. The Court therefore considers it appropriate to examine the present case from the standpoint of Article 10 of the Convention (see, for a similar approach,Karademirci and Others v. Turkey, nos.\u00a037096\/97 and 37101\/97, \u00a7 26, ECHR 2005\u2011I; G\u00fcl and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 4870\/02, \u00a7 34, 8 June 2010;Palomo S\u00e1nchez and Others v.\u00a0Spain [GC], nos. 28955\/06 and 3 others, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2011; and Novikova and Others v. Russia, nos. 25501\/07 and 4 others, \u00a7 91, 26 April 2016).<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/em><\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/em><\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0It is not in dispute between the parties that the applicant\u2019s conviction constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Such interference will infringe the Convention unless it satisfies the requirements of Article 10 \u00a7 2. It should therefore be determined whether it was \u201cprescribed by law\u201d, whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and whether it was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d in order to achieve those aims.<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0\u201cPrescribed by law\u201d<\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s conviction was based on Articles 280 \u00a7 2 and 282 \u00a7 1 of the Russian Criminal Code. It thus accepts that the resultant interference with the applicant\u2019s relevant rights may be regarded as having been \u201cprescribed by law\u201d.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0\u201cLegitimate aim\u201d<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant\u2019s actions had breached the domestic legislation aimed at protecting national security, territorial integrity and public order. They also submitted that the disputed measure had been necessary for the protection of \u201cthe interests of Russian nationals and the fundamentals of Russia\u2019s constitutional order\u201d (see paragraph\u00a077above).<\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that whilst referring to the need to protect \u201cthe interests of Russian nationals\u201d, the Government did not specify which individuals, groups of individuals or sectors of the population they sought to protect so as to engage the aim of \u201cthe protection of the … rights of others\u201d enshrined in Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. At the same time the Court notes that, as isapparent from the first-instance judgment as upheld on appeal, the domestic courts considered that a number ofthe impugned statements had been directed against such groups as the Russian people, Orthodox believers and Russia\u2019s servicemen and law-enforcement officers (see paragraphs 53 and 57-58above). The Court is therefore prepared to assume that the interference in question was designed to protect those groups and thus pursued the aim of \u201cprotection of the … rights of others\u201d.<\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that the Government\u2019s reference to the fundamentals of Russia\u2019s constitutional order and to the breach by the applicant of the legislation aimed at protecting national security, territorial integrity and public order,corresponded to the aims of protecting \u201cnational security\u201d, \u201cterritorial integrity\u201d and \u201cpublic safety\u201d and preventing \u201cdisorder or crime\u201d established by the above-mentioned provision.<\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the concepts of \u201cnational security\u201d and \u201cpublic safety\u201d in Article 10 \u00a7 2, that permit interference with Convention rights, must be interpreted restrictively and should be brought into play only where it has been shown to be necessary to suppress the release of information for the purposes of protecting national security and public safety (see Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698\/01, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2007\u2011V, and G\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015f and Others v. Turkey, no. 49085\/07, \u00a7 37, 19 January 2016). It has also previously stressed the sensitivity of the fight against terrorism and the need for the authorities to stay alert to acts capable of fuelling additional violence (see, among other authorities, \u00d6zt\u00fcrk v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a022479\/93, \u00a7\u00a059, ECHR 1999\u2011VI; Erdo\u011fdu v. Turkey, no.\u00a025723\/94, \u00a7 50, ECHR 2000\u2011VI; and Leroy v. France, no. 36109\/03, \u00a7\u00a036, 2 October 2008).<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0In the Russian context, the Court has on a number of occasions noted the difficult situation in the Chechen Republic, which obtained at the relevant time and called for exceptional measures on the part of the State to suppress the illegal armed insurgency there (see, among many other authorities, Khatsiyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 5108\/02, \u00a7 134, 17 January 2008; Akhmadov and Others v. Russia, no. 21586\/02, \u00a7 97, 14 November 2008; and Kerimova and Others v. Russia, nos. 17170\/04, 20792\/04, 22448\/04, 23360\/04, 5681\/05 and 5684\/05, \u00a7 246, 3 May 2011). The Court therefore accepts that in the period when the applicant was tried and convicted, matters relating to the conflict in the Chechen Republic were of a very sensitive nature and required particular vigilance on the part of the authorities (see Dmitriyevskiy v. Russia, no. 42168\/06, \u00a7\u00a087, 3\u00a0October 2017).<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts, accordingly, that the applicant\u2019s conviction can be seen as having pursued the aims of protecting the rights of others as well as protecting national security, territorial integrity and public safety and preventing disorder and crime.<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0\u201cNecessary in a democratic society\u201d<\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0The general principles for assessing whether an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression has been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201dare well-settled in the Court\u2019s case-law and have been reiterated in a number of cases. The Court has stated, in particular, that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual\u2019s self-fulfilment. Subject to Article 10\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02, it is applicable not only to \u201cinformation\u201d or \u201cideas\u201d that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no \u201cdemocratic society\u201d(see, among the recent authorities,Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369\/10, \u00a7 124, ECHR 2015; Pentik\u00e4inen v. Finland [GC], no. 11882\/10, \u00a7 87, ECHR 2015; Perin\u00e7ek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510\/08, \u00a7 196, ECHR 2015 (extracts); and B\u00e9dat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925\/08, \u00a7 48, ECHR 2016).<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, there is little scope under Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest (see S\u00fcrek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682\/95, \u00a7 61, ECHR\u00a01999-IV). Furthermore, the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government than in relation to a private citizen or even a politician. In a democratic system the actions or omissions of the government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of public opinion. Moreover, the dominant position which the government occupies makes it necessary for it to display restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where other means are available for replying to the unjustified attacks and criticisms of its adversaries (Ceylan v. Turkey [GC], no. 23556\/94, \u00a7 34, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011IV).<\/p>\n 90.\u00a0\u00a0The adjective\u201cnecessary\u201d implies the existence of a \u201cpressing social need\u201d, which must be convincingly established (see, for instance,Erdo\u011fdu, cited above, \u00a7 53). Admittedly, it is first of all for the national authorities to assess whether there is such a need capable of justifying that interference and, to that end, they enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. However, the margin of appreciation is coupled with supervision by the Court both of the law and the decisions applying the law, even those given by independent courts.The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a \u201crestriction\u201d is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (see, among many other authorities, Karata\u015f v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a023168\/94, \u00a7 48, ECHR 1999\u2011IV).<\/p>\n 91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s supervisory function is not limited to ascertaining whether the national authorities exercised their discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith. It has rather to examine the interference in the light of the case as a whole and to determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it were \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d and whether the measure taken was \u201cproportionate\u201d to the legitimate aim pursued. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities, basing themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts, applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Chauvy and Others v. France, no. 64915\/01, \u00a7\u00a070, ECHR\u00a02004\u2011VI).<\/p>\n 92.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant was prosecuted in criminal proceedings and punished for publishing texts which, as the domestic courts found, hadcontained appeals to extremist activities, and, in particular, statements amounting to appeals to violence, justification and glorification of terrorism as well as statements inciting hatred and enmity on various grounds (see paragraphs 45-59 and 64above).The Court reiterates in that connection that tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify violence, hatred or intolerance provided that any \u201cformalities\u201d, \u201cconditions\u201d, \u201crestrictions\u201d or \u201cpenalties\u201d imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, mutatis mutandis,G\u00fcnd\u00fcz v. Turkey, no. 35071\/97, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2003\u2011XI).It certainly remains open to the relevant State authorities to adopt, in their capacity as guarantors of public order, measures, even of a criminal-law nature, intended to react appropriately and without excess to such remarks (see, for instance,Erdo\u011fdu, cited above, \u00a7 62). Moreover, where such remarks incite violence against an individual, a public official or a sector of the population, the State enjoys a wider margin of appreciation when examining the need for an interference with freedom of expression (see, among many other authorities, \u00d6zt\u00fcrk, cited above, \u00a7 66; and Ceylan, cited above, \u00a7 34).<\/p>\n 93.\u00a0\u00a0In its assessment of the interference with freedom of expression in cases concerning expressions alleged to stir up or justify violence, hatred or intolerance, the Court takes into account to a number of factors, which have been summarised in the case of Perin\u00e7ek (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 205-08).The Court will examine the present case in the light of those principles, with a particular regard tothe context in which the impugned statements were published, their nature and wording, their potential to lead to harmful consequences and the reasons adduced by the Russian courts to justify the interference in question.<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0\u201cPressing social need\u201d<\/p>\n 94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will first examine whether the interference complained of corresponded to a \u201cpressing social need\u201d and whether the reasons adduced by the domestic courts in that respect were \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d.<\/p>\n 95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observesthat thetexts in questionconcernedthe ongoing conflict in the Chechen Republic, and, in particular, the governmental policies in that region, or events that had happened within and outside the territory of the Chechen Republic that had been linked to that conflict. It is thus clear that, as such, those statements were part of a debate on a matter of general and public concern, a sphere in which restrictions on freedom of expression are to be strictly construed (see paragraph89 above).<\/p>\n 96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further takes into account that the impugned comments were made against the background of the difficult situation prevailing in the Chechen Republic at the time, where separatist tendencies in the region led to serious disturbances between Russia\u2019s federalarmed and security forces and the Chechen rebel fighters and resulted in a heavy loss of life in that region as well as in deadly terrorist attacks in other regions of Russia. The Courthas always been mindful of the difficulties linked to the prevention of public disorder and terrorism (see Karata\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 51; Leroy, cited above, \u00a7\u00a038; and Sayg\u0131l\u0131 and Falakao\u011fluv. Turkey (no. 2), no. 38991\/02, \u00a7\u00a025, 17\u00a0February 2009) andhas acknowledged, in particular, that in situations of conflict and tension particular caution is called for on the part of the national authorities when consideration is being given to the publication of opinions which advocate recourse to violence against the State lest the media become a vehicle for the dissemination of hate speech and the promotion of violence (see, for instance,Erdo\u011fdu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a062).Yet, a fair balance should be struck between the individual\u2019s fundamental right to freedom of expression and a democratic society\u2019s legitimate right to protect itself against the activities of terrorist organisations (see Zana v. Turkey, 25\u00a0November 1997, \u00a7 55, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011VII, and Leroy, cited above, \u00a7 37).<\/p>\n 97.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the wording of the texts in question, the Court considers that the impugned statements can be divided into three groups. It will examine each group separately (see, for a similar approach, Tara and Poiata v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 36305\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a027-33, 16 October 2007).<\/p>\n (\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0First group of statements<\/p>\n 98.\u00a0\u00a0The first group comprises the extracts quoted in paragraphs8,9,11\u201117, 20-26, 29-32 and 35 above.<\/p>\n 99.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, those extracts promote, justify and glorify terrorism and violence. They reveal an intention to romanticise and idealise the Chechen separatists\u2019 cause, referring to a \u201cnational liberation struggle of the Chechen people against the colonial expansion of Russia\u201d for \u201cindependent Ichkeria\u201d (see paragraphs13and24 above).At the same time theystigmatise the other party to the conflict andrepresent it as absolute evil by the use of such labels as \u201ca scary black noisome abyss [whose] name …is Russia\u201d, \u201cimmeasurable scoundrelism and perfidy of Russia\u201d, \u201cdamned imperial Russia\u201d, and \u201cbloody Rusnya\u201d,alongside references to \u201cRussia\u2019s aggression\u201d, \u201catrocities\u201d and \u201cgenocide of the Chechen people\u201d (see paragraphs12,15-16,21-23, 25-26 and 31 above). The Chechen separatist warlords actively involved in the armed resistance and perpetrators of terrorist attacks against civilians are venerated and praised as \u201cheroes\u201d and \u201cpatriots\u201d, who showed \u201can example of how one should fight against Russia\u201d (see paragraphs 12, 15-16, 20, 23 and 31above), whereas federal servicemen and law-enforcement officers participating in the counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic are brutalised and dehumanised, being portrayed as \u201cmaniacs, bloodthirsty sadists, murderers and degenerates in epaulettes\u201d (see paragraph 9 above) as well as \u201ca frenzied gang of looters and murderers\u201d and \u201ca herd intoxicated with drugs\u201d (see paragraph 29 above).<\/p>\n 100.\u00a0\u00a0Some of the extracts in question reject democratic principles, by inviting the readers \u201cnot … [to] worry about the Constitution\u201d, and openly call to violent uprising and armed resistance (see paragraphs 11, 22, 25-26and 30). They communicate to the readers the general idea that recourse to violence and terrorism is necessary and justified measures of self-defence in the face of the aggressor, stating, in particular, that \u201cRussia … is … permanently in danger of being hit by retaliatory blows, because its rulers have perpetrated a despicable attack on a sovereign State and are killing innocent civilians there\u201d (see paragraph 8above) and that \u201cChechens have the moral right to blow up everything they want in Russia, after what Russia and Russians have done to them, no objections regarding humanism or love for humankind can be accepted\u201d (see paragraph32above).<\/p>\n 101.\u00a0\u00a0The impugned statements approve of terrorist methods and violent acts as a form of struggle (see paragraphs 20 and 35 above)or openly praiseterrorist attacksthat had taken the lives of dozens of innocent civilians (see paragraphs8,12, 21 and 32 above). In the latter respect, it is also of relevance that the articles commenting on the saidterrorist attacks were published within only few months (see paragraphs8, 12, 21 and 24 above) or even weeks (see paragraph 32above) after those events, when, most likely, the traumatic memories were still fresh and thus painful for the deceased victims\u2019 relatives as well as for the survivors of the attacks. Publication, in this context, of articles justifying and glorifying that deadly violence constituted a particularly cynical attack on the victims\u2019 dignity (cf.\u00a0Leroy, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 43 and 45). It is also clear that such a context warranted an enhanced degree of regulation of such statements by the authorities (see Perin\u00e7ek, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0250).<\/p>\n 102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that it matters little in the circumstances of the present case thatthe applicant was the author of only some of the incriminated texts, whereas others were written by other persons. It was established by the domestic courts and remained undisputed by the applicant before the Court, that he, being the owner andeditor-in\u2011chief of the newsletter, prepared each issue of the newsletter and determined its content (see paragraphs7 and 61above), with the result that he was vicariously subject to the \u201cduties and responsibilities\u201d that mass media\u2019s editorial and journalistic staff undertake in the collection and dissemination of information to the public and which assume an even greater importance in situations of conflict and tension (see S\u00fcrek (no. 1), cited above, \u00a7\u00a063; S\u00fcrek v. Turkey(no. 3) [GC], no. 24735\/94, \u00a7 41, 8 July 1999; and Sayg\u0131l\u0131 and Falakao\u011flu(no. 2), cited above, \u00a7\u00a029). Moreover, it is obvious that the applicant associated himself with the views expressed in the impugned extracts, including approval of terrorists and their methods (see paragraphs21, 41 and51above).<\/p>\n 103.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant argued that, by publishing the impugned statements in his newsletter, he was merely expressing his critical views and civic position regarding the conflict in the Chechen Republic, the Court notes the following. Whilst the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government than in relation to a private individual or even a politician (see, among many other authorities, Ceylan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a034; S\u00fcrek v. Turkey(no. 4) [GC], no. 24762\/94, \u00a7 57, 8 July 1999; and S\u00fcrek and \u00d6zdemir v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23927\/94 and 24277\/94, \u00a7 60, 8\u00a0July 1999), and the mere fact that \u201cinformation\u201d and \u201cideas\u201d offend, shock and disturb does not suffice to justify the interference with one\u2019s right to freedom of expression(see paragraph 88 above), the impugned statements went far beyond the acceptable limits of criticism and amounted to glorification of terrorism anddeadly violence.<\/p>\n 104.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the reasons adduced by the Russian courts to justify the applicant\u2019s conviction in respect of the statements under examination, the Court observes that the trial court, as upheld by the appellate court, found that the impugned texts contained words and expressions which had positively assessed, justified and aimed at creating a positive public opinion about persons implicated in terrorist activities; their criminal acts and terrorist attacks, and that they had thus justified and glorified terrorists and their acts (see paragraphs46-48and 51above). The national courts furthermore noted that the impugned texts had referred to the Chechen Republic as an independent State, with its own president, political and legal system; had interpreted the events in the Chechen Republic as a war between two separate States, and that they had thus aimed at breaching the territorial integrity of Russia (see paragraphs 46 and 50above). They also pointed out that some publications had openly called for violence and envisaged a possibility of deviating from the Constitution, thereby clearly inciting bloodshed and the overthrow by force of the political regime and constitutional order of Russia (see paragraphs 46,52 and 54above).In addition, the domestic courts, as the texts of their decisions reveal, considered that the impugned statements had incited hatred and enmity against Russia\u2019s servicemen and law-enforcement officers as a \u201csocial group\u201d by ascribing to them insulting characteristics and making negative emotional assessments of them (see paragraphs 46 and 53above).<\/p>\n 105.\u00a0\u00a0In the latter respect, in so far as the domestic courts considered that the impugned statements, inter alia,incited hatred againstRussia\u2019s servicemen and law-enforcement officers by describing them as \u201cmaniacs, bloodthirsty sadists, murderers and degenerates in epaulettes\u201d (see paragraph 9 above) as well as \u201ca frenzied gang of looters and murderers\u201d and \u201ca herd intoxicated with drugs\u201d (see paragraph 29 above), the Court observes that the impugned statements were made in two articles, one of which commented on the case of a high-ranking officer of the Russian Army, who at that time was standing trial on charges of torturing and killing an 18-year-old Chechen woman (see paragraph 9above), whilst the other one accused Russia\u2019s security forces of extra-judicial executions of civilians during a \u201csweep\u201d operation in a Chechen village (see paragraph 29above). The articles then expressed the view that \u201cRussia\u2019s whole…army consist[ed] of such [criminals]\u201d and that it \u201c[had] stopped existing in Chechnya as a military force of the State, having turned into a frenzied gang of looters and murderers\u201d. In other words, the articles vehemently accused Russia\u2019s servicemen and law-enforcement officers participating in the counter\u2011terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic of serious abusesand excesses. It is in this context that the said words and expressions were employed.<\/p>\n 106.\u00a0\u00a0In the above connection, the Court considers it important to note that, firstly, those accusations may not have been without foundation. The facts of acts of particular seriousness, such as extrajudicial executions, mass murders, tortures, enforced disappearances, or similar, committed by representatives of Russia\u2019s armed and security forcesduring the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic have been established by the Court in a significant number of cases which have been brought to its attention and where violations of various Convention provisions have been found (see, for instance, Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942\/00 and 57945\/00, 24\u00a0February 2005;Estamirov and Others v. Russia, no. 60272\/00, 12\u00a0October 2006;Chitayev v. Russia, no. 59334\/00, 18 January 2007; Goncharuk v.\u00a0Russia, no. 58643\/00, 4 October 2007; Sadykov v. Russia, no.\u00a041840\/02, 7\u00a0October 2010; Khatsiyeva and Others, cited above; Akhmadov and Others, cited above; Esmukhambetov and Others v. Russia, no. 23445\/03, 29 March 2011).Secondly, civil servants acting in an official capacity are subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than ordinary citizens (see Mam\u00e8re v. France, no. 12697\/03, \u00a7 27, ECHR 2006\u2011XIII), the more so when such criticism concerns the whole public institution \u2013 Russia\u2019s armed and security forces in the present case \u2013 rather than identifiable civil servants. Admittedly, a certain degree of immoderation may fall within those limits, given that Article 10 protects not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they are conveyed (see, among many other authorities, G\u00fcl and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a041).<\/p>\n 107.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, however, the Court is unable to reach a conclusion that, albeit immoderate, the statements under examination remained within the limits of the acceptable criticism of the federal armed and security forces\u2019 actions in the Chechen Republic. In its view, just as the other statements in the group under examination, they seek to stigmatise and dehumanise the other party to the conflict. By generalising and labelling all the members ofRussia\u2019s armed and security forces as \u201cmaniacs\u201d, \u201cmurderers\u201d and otherwise criminally minded persons, the texts in question stir up a deep-seated and irrational hatred towards them in a clear attempt to justify and advocate violent actions against them (see paragraphs 11and 35above). In the light of the tenor of the phrases used, and with due regard to the sensitive context of the fight against terrorism and, in particular, the counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic (see paragraph\u00a096 above),the Court is prepared to accept that the impugned statements (see paragraphs9and 29above) incited hatred againstthe members of the federal armed and security forcesand exposed them to a possible risk of physical violence, and that, from this standpoint, the domestic courts\u2019 conclusion in that respect was based on \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d considerations.<\/p>\n 108.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic courts also found that some of the extracts under examination promoted separatism as they had, inter alia, referred to \u201cPresident Maskhadov\u201d as the \u201clegitimate President of Chechnya\u201d and \u201cthe Commander-in-Chief of the CRI\u201d and had reproduced his \u201cdecrees\u201d (see paragraph 50above). The Court has previously held that expressions that merely refer to someone, who is considered to be an outlaw, as \u201cthe people\u2019s leader\u201d, \u201cpresident\u201d, \u201cesteemed\u201d or similar, by themselves, do not incite violence (see Belge v. Turkey, no. 50171\/09, \u00a7 34, 6 December 2016, and the authorities cited therein), and therefore the use of such expressions is in itself insufficient to justify an interference with the freedom of expression. In the present case, however, the above-mentioned expressions were employed in the context of glorification of the Chechen separatists\u2019insurgence and armed resistance as well as the violent methods used by them (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above). Seen in this perspective, the reasons put forward by the Russian courts in support of their conclusions appear to be in keeping with the principles set forth in the Court\u2019s case-law.<\/p>\n 109.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that, in so far as this group of the impugned statements was concerned, the interference with the applicant\u2019s right of freedom of expression met a \u201cpressing social need\u201d and the reasons adduced by the authorities were \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d.<\/p>\n (\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Second group of statements<\/p>\n 110.\u00a0\u00a0The second group includes extracts quoted in paragraphs10,27,28,33, 34 and 36 above.<\/p>\n 111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that these extracts describe the Russian authorities\u2019 actions in the Chechen Republic as \u201ca totally destructive genocidal war against the Chechen people\u201d (see paragraph 33 above). They expose the practices used by Russia\u2019s security forces, such as the \u201ckilling of the ex-President of the CRI, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev\u201d (see paragraph\u00a034 above) and invite the readers to \u201caccumulate, hate and keep record of [the Russian authorities\u2019] crimes [in the Chechen Republic] \u2013 the endless list of all those \u201csweep operations\u201d, \u201cidentity checks\u201d, \u201ccounter-terrorist operations\u201d, gagging laws, unlawful searches and politically motivated criminal prosecutions\u201d to eventually hold those responsible \u201caccountable … for everything\u201d (see paragraph 28 above). It is also suggested that \u201can immediate compulsory psychiatric examination\u201d of the servicemen and officers of the armed and security forces in Russia is necessary (see paragraph 10 above). Some of the extracts furthermore advance political claims in the form of an appeal to abstain from participation in the presidential election that was to be held in March 2004, and to carry out a campaign to that effect (see paragraph 27 above), or in the form of slogans printed on posters (see paragraph 36 above).<\/p>\n 112.\u00a0\u00a0These statements were amongst those which the domestic courts relied on to justify the applicant\u2019s conviction for public appeals to extremist activities and incitement of hatred and enmity. According to the domestic courts, the above-mentioned extracts showed that the applicant had regarded Russia\u2019s actions in the Chechen Republic as aggression, war waged by Russia against the Chechen people, and genocide of the latter (see paragraph 49above). The domestic courts also referred to the above-mentioned statements as an example of the applicant\u2019s \u201cacts aimed against the State and the existing political regime in Russia\u201d, those acts being keeping \u201crecord of [the Russian authorities\u2019] crimes [in the Chechen Republic]\u201d and \u201corganisation of meetings concerning the events in the Chechen Republic, participation in those meetings, writing inscriptions on the walls of buildings, fences and bus stops\u201d (see paragraphs55-56above), or displaying banners \u201cwith slogans condemning the regime\u201d (see paragraph\u00a059above).The domestic courts, as the texts of their decisions reveal, also considered that by requiring \u201can immediate compulsory psychiatric examination\u201d of federal servicemen and law-enforcement officers the impugned statements, in fact, made \u201can appeal to act criminally against them\u201d and incited hatred against them (see paragraph 53above).<\/p>\n 113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot accept such reasoning as \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d to justify the interference with the applicant\u2019s right of freedom of expression, in so far as the statements under examination are concerned. It reiterates in this connection that it is an integral part of freedom of expression to seek historical truth, and that a debate on the causes of acts of particular gravity which may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity should be able to take place freely (see Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, no. 40984\/07, \u00a7 87, 22 April 2010). Moreover, it is in the nature of political speech to be controversial and often virulent (see Perin\u00e7ek, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0231) and the fact that statements contain hard-hitting criticism of official policy and communicate a one-sided view of the origin of and responsibility for the situation addressed by them is insufficient, in itself, to justify an interference with freedom of expression (see, for instance,S\u00fcrek and \u00d6zdemir, cited above, \u00a7 61).<\/p>\n 114.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s opinion, the views expressed in the impugned extracts cannot be read as an incitement to or justification of violence, nor can they be construed as instigating hatred or intolerance. Although those extracts are admittedly quite virulent in their language and contain strongly worded statements, the Court discerns no elements in them other than a criticism of the Russian Government and their actions during the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, which however acerbic it may appear does not go beyond the acceptable limits given the fact that those limits are particularly wide with regard to the government (see paragraph103 above).Itis also of relevance that the appeal to abstain from participation in the election of the President of Russia (see paragraph 27 above), was published in an issue for February-March 2004.That was, the Court notes, during the electoral campaign \u2013 a period where it was particularly important that opinions and information of all kinds were permitted to circulate freely (see D\u0142ugo\u0142\u0119cki v. Poland, no. 23806\/03, \u00a7 30, 24 February 2009).<\/p>\n 115.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the domestic court considered that a requirement of \u201can immediate compulsory psychiatric examination\u201d of Russia\u2019s servicemen and law-enforcement officers amounted to an appeal to act criminally and incited hatred against them, the Court considers that the authorities did notassess this statement in the light of the article, as a whole; they focused on that statement taken out of its context and failed to examine which idea it sought to impart.<\/p>\n 116.\u00a0\u00a0The above-mentioned statement was made in an article that, as the Court has observed above, commented on the case of a high-ranking officer of the RussianArmy who at that time was standing trial on charges of torturing and killing an 18-year-old Chechen woman (see paragraph\u00a09 above). The article, inter alia, ferventlycriticised a first-instance court\u2019s judgment by which that officer had been absolved of criminal liability on the grounds of temporary insanity. The article also suggested that the fact that an insane officer had been in command of a regiment necessitated a compulsory psychiatric examination of other officers and servicemen of Russia\u2019s armed and security forces (see paragraph10 above).Against this background, the phrase at issue cannot be regarded as an appeal to any criminal act, or as incitement to hatred against federal servicemen or law\u2011enforcement officers. Rather, itcan be seen asa scathing criticism of thejudicial response to the murder of a young woman by a high-ranking military officer who had been, furthermore, a representative of the State seconded to the Chechen Republic to maintain constitutional order in the region and called upon to protect the interests of civilians. It is also an expression of concern that a mentally unstable person had been placed in command of a regiment, and an emotional appeal to take necessary measures with respect to the personnelof the federal armed and security forces to prevent similar incidents in the future.<\/p>\n 117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found in paragraph107 above that, in the sensitive context of the fight against terrorism and, in particular, the counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic, and in the light of the tenor of the phrases used, a number of other statements from the same article could be regarded as inciting hatred against the members of Russia\u2019s armed and security forces.However, in the light of its considerations in the previous paragraph, the Court cannot reach the same conclusion with regard to the extract under examination, which, as has been noted above, is merely concerned with criticism of the State and the actions of thefederal armed and security forces as a part ofthe machinery of the State. It stresses in this connection that it isvitally important that the domestic authorities adopt a cautious approach in determining the scope of \u201chate speech\u201d crimes and strictly construe the relevant legal provisions in order to avoid excessive interference under the guise of action taken against \u201chate speech\u201d, where such charges are brought for a mere criticism of the Government, State institutions and their policies and practices.<\/p>\n 118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that, in reaching their conclusions, the domestic courts failed to take account of all facts and relevant factors. Therefore their reasons cannot be regarded as \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d. It follows that the interference with the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression did not meet \u201ca pressing social need\u201d as regards this group of statements.<\/p>\n (\u03b3)\u00a0\u00a0Third group of statements<\/p>\n 119.\u00a0\u00a0The last group encompassestexts quoted in paragraphs18 and\u00a019above.<\/p>\n 120.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic courts observed that the texts in question concerned isolated cases of alleged abuses committed respectively by certain ethnic Russians and Orthodox believers, whereas the applicant had used headings that had contained generalised negative statements representing those two situations as typical and characteristic of allRussians and Orthodox believers respectively, thereby inciting hatred and enmity against the relevantgroups of population (see paragraph 57above).<\/p>\n 121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently held that attacking or casting in a negative light an entire ethnic or religious group by, for instance, linking the group as a whole with a serious crime, is in contradiction with the Convention\u2019s underlying values, notably tolerance, social peace and non\u2011discrimination (see Perin\u00e7ek, cited above, \u00a7 206, and the authorities cited therein). Also, whereas there is little scope under Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of public interest, a wider margin of appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion (see Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25\u00a0November 1996, \u00a7 58, Reports 1996\u2011V).<\/p>\n 122.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, as was established by the national courts, the applicant, in essence, accused ethnic Russians of keeping slaves, and linked Orthodox believers to some very controversial statements. In the light of its approach to such broadattacks on ethnic and religious groups, the Court sees no reasons to depart from the conclusions of the domestic courts and finds their considerations in this respect to be \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d to justify the interference with the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression, as regards the impugned texts.<\/p>\n 123.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, in so far as the domestic courts considered \u2013 with a mere reference to unspecified texts in issues nos. 1 (27) and 9 (35) of the applicant\u2019s newsletter \u2013 that he \u201c[had abased] the national dignity of people practising [the Orthodox] religion\u201d by using \u201cinsulting characteristics and negative emotional assessments of believers\u201d and \u201cdiscriminatory expressions in respect of the Orthodox denomination\u201d (see paragraph\u00a058above), the Court finds this reasoning deficient. Indeed, when reaching this conclusion, the courts failed even to refer to any particular texts which, according to them, had had discriminatory or humiliating connotations, let alone to assess those texts in the light of the Court\u2019s relevant standards. Their assessment therefore was not in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n (\u03b4)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/p>\n 124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus concludes that,in so far as the statements mentioned in paragraphs 98 and 119 above were concerned, the interference with the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression met a \u201cpressing social need\u201dfor the protection of the rights of others, as well as national security, territorial integrity and public safety and for the prevention of disorder and crime. However, the need for the restriction was not convincingly demonstrated as regards the statements mentioned in paragraph 110above, and also, in so far as the domestic courts referred to some unspecified texts in issues nos. 1 (27) and 9 (35) of the applicant\u2019s newsletter (see paragraph\u00a0123above).<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0Proportionality<\/p>\n 125.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will now proceed to examine whether the applicant\u2019s conviction was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and whether the reasons adduced by the domestic courts in that respect it were \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d.<\/p>\n 126.\u00a0\u00a0It reiterates in this connection that the Contracting States do not enjoy unlimited discretion to take any measure they consider appropriate for protecting the legitimate interests established in Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention and for punishing illegal conduct intertwined with expression. That discretion goes hand in hand with European supervision by the Court, whose task is to give a final ruling on whether the penalty was compatible with Article 10 (see Taranenko v. Russia, no. 19554\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 81 and 87, 15\u00a0May 2014). In the assessment of the proportionality of an interference, the nature and severity of the penalties imposed are factors to be taken into account (see, for instance, Ska\u0142ka v. Poland,no. 43425\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 41-42, 27\u00a0May 2003; and Fatullayev, cited above, \u00a7 102). The Court must exercise the utmost caution where the measures taken by the national authorities are such as to dissuade the applicants and other persons from imparting information or ideas contesting the established order of things (see Taranenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a081).<\/p>\n 127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found above that a number of the impugned statements glorified terrorism and advocated and promoted violence and hatred and that, thus, there was a need for a restriction of the applicant\u2019s right of freedom of expression to protect the interests secured by Article\u00a010 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention as invoked by the Government, including the rights of others as well as national security, territorial integrity and public safety and preventing disorder and crime. Consequently, an appropriate sanction would be compatible with the Court\u2019s standards under Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention (cf. Ska\u0142ka, cited above, \u00a7 41).<\/p>\n 128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant was sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonmentand bannedfrom practising journalism for three years. He served this sentence in full. The Court leaves open the question whether a ban on the exercise of journalistic activities, as such, is compatible with Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 129.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, a deprivation of liberty coupled with a ban on practising journalism, particularly for such a long period, for speech, even if criminal,cannot but be regarded as an extremely harsh measurewarrantingvery convincingconsiderations with due regard to the particular circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the domestic courts limited their justification of the sanctions in questionwith reference to the applicant\u2019s \u201cpersonality\u201d and the \u201csocial danger\u201d posed by his offence (see paragraph 62above).Whilst those considerations may be \u201crelevant\u201d, they cannot be regarded as \u201csufficient\u201d to justify the exceptional severity of the penalty imposed on the applicant.<\/p>\n 130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore discerns no reasons that would enable it to conclude that the applicant\u2019s sentencewas rendered necessary byany particular circumstances of his case. It observes in this connection that the applicant had no criminal record and thus had never been convicted of any similar offence. Had he been so convicted, it would have been more acceptable had the courts chosen to impose a harsh sentence on him in order to make it more dissuasive in the face of his intransigence (see Ska\u0142ka, cited above, \u00a7 39, and Goughv. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a049327\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 174-76, 28 October 2014).<\/p>\n 131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that the potential impact of the medium of expression concerned is an important factor in the consideration of the proportionality of an interference (see Murphy v. Ireland,no. 44179\/98, \u00a7\u00a069, ECHR 2003\u2011IX (extracts)). In this connection, it notes, firstly, that it does not appear that at the time of the events under examination, the applicant was a public, well-known or influential figure (see, by contrast, Osmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 50841\/99, 11 October 2001). It is also noteworthy that the impugned statements were printed in a self-published newsletter, the number of copies of which, as was pointed out by the applicant and not disputed by the Government, was very low (see paragraphs 63-64 and 74 above). Those copieswere distributed by the applicant in person or through his acquaintances at public events in Moscow only to those individuals who expressed their interest (see paragraph37 above). It is thus clear that the circulation of the newsletter at issue was insignificant. Moreover, it cannot be said that the incriminated statements were disseminated in a form that was impossible to ignore (see Perin\u00e7ek, cited above, \u00a7 253, and, by contrast,Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, no.\u00a01813\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 56-57, 9 February 2012), or in any other way that enhanced the message they were conveying (see, by contrast, F\u00e9ret v. Belgium, no.\u00a015615\/07, \u00a7 76, 16 July 2009). On the contrary, it is clear that the above-mentioned factorsin the present case significantly reduced the potential impact of the impugned statements on the rights of others, national security, public safety or public order (cf.\u00a0Ok\u00e7uo\u011flu v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a024246\/94, \u00a7 48, 8 July 1999; Gerger v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 24919\/94, \u00a7\u00a050, 8 July 1999; and Karata\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a052).<\/p>\n 132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus concludes that the applicant\u2019s punishment was not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.<\/p>\n (iii)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/p>\n 133.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, and particularly bearing in mind the authorities\u2019 failure to demonstrate convincingly \u201cthe pressing social need\u201d for an interference with the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression in respect of a number of the impugned statements (see paragraph124 above) as well as the severity of the penalty imposed on him, the Court finds that the interference in question was not \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n 134.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 135.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained under Article 6 of the Convention thatvarious irregularities in the criminal proceedings against him had rendered them unfair.In his view, his conviction had been based on insufficient and inadmissible evidence. In particular, the courts had taken into account the expert report of 13 April 2004, andhad rejected an alternative expert report submitted by the defence.Also, the courts had incorrectly assessed statements by a number of prosecution witnesses and referred, in convicting the applicant, to a statement by a witness who had lodged an anonymous complaint, and to a statement by another witness who had been biased against the applicant. At the same time, in the applicant\u2019s view, the courts had failed to give appropriate weight to the statements of the defence witnesses. The applicant also disputed the establishment of facts by the trial court, stating that its relevant findings had not been substantiated with sufficient evidence.<\/p>\n 136.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations, stating that the applicant\u2019s case had been attended by sufficient procedural guarantees andthat, overall, the criminal proceedings against him had met the \u201cfairness\u201d requirement, within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact and law allegedly committed by national courts unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, whilst Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are primarily matters for regulation by national law and national courts (see, among many other authorities, Ziembi\u0144ski v. Poland (no. 2), no. 1799\/07, \u00a7 49, 5 July 2016).<\/p>\n 138.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s allegations do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the fair trial guarantees, within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 139.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 140.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, which represented his lossof earnings for the five years in which he was in prison. He also claimed EUR 300,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 141.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of pecuniary damage as purely speculative and unsubstantiated. They also disputedthe applicant\u2019s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage as excessive and argued that, should the Court find a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights in the present case, a finding of a violation would constitute a sufficient just satisfaction.<\/p>\n 142.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the claim for pecuniary damage has not been substantiated; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it finds that the applicant suffered non-pecuniary damage on account of the violation of his right to freedom of expression and that that damage cannot be compensated by a mere finding of a violation. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 12,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that should be chargeable on that amount.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 143.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 3,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. He pointed out that he had not paid those as he did not havethe financial means to do so.<\/p>\n 144.\u00a0\u00a0The Government invited the Court to reject this claim in the absence of any evidence that the above-mentioned costs had actually been incurred.<\/p>\n 145.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the applicant\u2019s submissions on the issue, the Court rejects the claim.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 146.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares, unanimously, the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, unanimously,that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds, by four votes to three,<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention,EUR12,500 (twelve thousand five hundredeuros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage,to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Dismisses, by six votes to one,the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 May 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Helena J\u00e4derblom ______________<\/p>\n In accordance with Article 45 \u00a7 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 \u00a7 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0concurring opinion of Judge J\u00e4derblom joined by Judge Keller;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0concurring opinion of Judge Keller;<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pastor Vilanova.<\/p>\n H.J. CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE J\u00c4DERBLOM JOINED BY JUDGE\u00a0KELLER<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0I agree with the majority that there has been a violation of Article\u00a010. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion in paragraph 119 that the headline of one article with the wording \u201cRussians have slaves and dare to squawk something about Chechens\u201d (see paragraph\u00a018), and another with the wording \u201cOrthodox [believers] went completely nuts\u201d (see paragraph 19), constituted broad attacks on ethnic and social groups and therefore the domestic courts\u2019 considerations were relevant and sufficient to justify the interference with the applicant\u2019s right to freedom of expression, as regards the impugned texts.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The article in connection with the first headline reproduced information from the website \u201cregions.ru\u201d regarding a police operation to liberate Uzbek nationals who had been held in slavery by Russian nationals (see paragraph 18).<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The article connected to the second headline contained information about some unidentified \u201cOrthodox theologians\u201d who, in a booklet, had allegedly claimed that \u201cJesus Christ [had been] crucified not by Jews but by Chechens\u201d (see paragraph 19).<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic courts (see paragraphs 57 and 64)\u00a0found that the statements in the headlines were unacceptable generalisations about all Russians and Orthodox believers respectively.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0If the statements are read in isolation it is difficult not to regard them as offensive vis-\u00e0-vis these groups. However, the headline of a text, such as an article in a newsletter or newspaper, which is not reproduced in isolation elsewhere (for example on a newspaper placard) but only in direct connection with the running text of the article is a different matter. In such cases the reader can be expected to continue reading the article after his or her attention was caught by the headline. Therefore the headline should be assessed together with the article as a whole.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Such an assessment may lead to the conclusion that the headline as such is unacceptable, but in the present case I cannot agree that the headlines are unacceptable, for the following reason. Admittedly both headlines are stereotyping groups of people as having very negative characteristics. However, the ensuing articles make it clear that there had been specific events where individuals of these groups had performed certain acts, the description of which by the applicant clearly fell within his freedom of expression (the veracity of those incidents was not questioned by the domestic courts). In my opinion, in the context of the contents of the running texts of the articles, the statements in the headlines fell outside the scope of what could be accepted as criminal speech.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KELLER<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0I agree with the majority of my colleagues that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. However, I write separately because I believe that the Court should have followed different reasoning in reaching this conclusion.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The present case is important, as it is the first time that this Court has had to decide on a case which stems from the application of the Suppression of Extremist Activities Act (see paragraph 69 of the judgment), and will thus be the starting point of a body of case-law which will serve as a reference not only in future cases concerning Russia, but for all other Member States as well.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0In this opinion I will argue, first, that the majority\u2019s methodology of classifying all the statements individually is ill-suited to this case, and that a holistic assessment of the applicant\u2019s expressions would have been more appropriate (II.); second, that if such a methodology was to be used, the majority should have been more careful in classifying some of the applicant\u2019s expressions as incitement to or glorification of violence (III.); third, that the potential impact of the applicant\u2019s expressions should have been assessed before delving into a proportionality analysis (IV.); and, finally, that the ban on journalism imposed on the applicant was not \u201cprescribed by law\u201d and was therefore not compatible with Article 10 of the Convention, regardless of its proportionality (V.).<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0Classification of statements<\/strong><\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0I cannot agree with the rigid classification of statements made by the Court in paragraphs 98, 110 and 119 of the present judgment, neither in principle nor in its specific form.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0I believe that the Court should have followed a different approach in this case. Instead of making an individual assessment of each statement, the Court should have focused on the domestic court\u2019s decision, which considered the applicant\u2019s expressive activity holistically. This would have been the correct approach, given the role of this Court and the hazards that these classification might pose to the case-law.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Assessing the statements individually, classifying some as hate speech, some as glorification of violence and others as legitimate political speech, entails a new assessment of the facts that comes close to putting this Court in a fourth-instance position (see, for example, Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433\/09, \u00a7 197, ECHR 2012). All expressions must be considered in the context in which they are made. Identical statements can have different meanings depending on the person producing them, the intended audience, or the audience reached by the statements, as well as the general context, among others. The domestic courts may have considered that some of the statements in paragraph 98 (which the Court finds to glorify violence) were problematic only because they were accompanied by those in paragraph 110 (which the majority considers innocuous), or vice versa. The rigid classification adopted by the Court prevents an analysis of the actual decision taken by the Russian courts, and leads the majority to undertake a proportionality analysis of a decision that did not exist and that we must second-guess \u2013 that is, the Court assesses the five-year sentence and the three-year ban on journalism as if it had been imposed only by virtue of the statements contained in paragraphs\u00a098 and\u00a0119. In reality, the Court cannot know what statements were essential to the domestic courts in imposing the sanctions.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Additionally, and relatedly, classifying statements in this way could lead to doctrinal confusion that might obscure, rather than clarify, the future application of this precedent. Such classification presupposes that each of these statements can be assessed independently. This could have problematic implications, where the Court may feel compelled to decide future cases by comparing individual statements to those in each of our categories. Not only would this exercise be extremely difficult, it might lead to problematic conclusions. The context in which these particular statements were made was particularly exceptional and delicate, thus rendering a future comparison, in a different context, particularly difficult. Ultimately, undertaking this classification may generate implications that are hard to foresee at the present time, especially as more countries within the Council of Europe are dealing with separatist tensions.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0For the purposes of the present judgment, I think it would have been sufficient to conduct a more holistic assessment of the applicant\u2019s activities and state that only some of them amount to glorification of violence, while others represent legitimate political speech that is protected by the Convention. I agree with the majority that some of the statements made by the applicant did amount to glorification of or incitement to violence. For example, the statements quoted in paragraph 30 (calling for an overthrow of the constitutional system) or paragraph 32 (justifying a bomb attack in the Moscow metro that resulted in 41 deaths) justify some sort of interference with the applicant\u2019s Article 10 rights, provided that such interference is lawful and proportionate. However, I also agree with the majority that the lengthy prison sentence and the ban on journalistic activities were not proportionate. In addition, I believe that the sentence would not have been proportionate even in the absence of a ban on journalism, which I consider to be unlawful for different reasons (see Section V.).<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0Misclassification of the statements<\/strong><\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0As I argued above, the individual assessment of almost thirty statements extracted from their context, such as that undertaken by the majority, risks arbitrariness. Since this was nonetheless the approach taken by the majority, I would like to express my disagreement with the majority\u2019s assessments of some statements as \u201cpromot[ing], justify[ing] and glorify[ing] terrorism and violence\u201d (see paragraph 99 of the judgment). My disagreement further serves to illustrate that such disagreement is almost inevitable when a court enters this sort of micro-management of individualised expressions, and is a reason for refraining from such a wide\u2011ranging task.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0One example of what I consider a misclassification is set out in the separate opinion of Judge J\u00e4derblom, which I joined. However, other examples can be found. For example, the fragment cited in paragraph 8 of the present judgment, which the majority considers to \u201cclearly and unequivocally promote, justify and glorify terrorism and violence\u201d (see paragraph\u00a099 of the judgment):<\/p>\n \u201cRussia has clearly demonstrated that it is at war and permanently in danger of being hit by retaliatory blows, because its rulers have perpetrated a despicable attack on a sovereign State and are killing innocent civilians there. Even the western community is compelled to admit that Putin\u2019s Russia is waging a war aimed at the physical extermination of Chechens as an ethnic group.\u201d<\/p>\n The majority reads this fragment as \u201ccommunicat[ing] to the readers the general idea that recourse to violence and terrorism is necessary and justified measures of self-defence in the face of the aggressor\u201d (see paragraph 100). However, reading this fragment in isolation does not obviously convey the idea that the author is calling for violence. While the statement does refer to Chechnya as a sovereign state and does characterise Russian actions as a \u201cdespicable war,\u201d neither of these elements could be considered, on their own, to be glorification or incitation of violence.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0Another example is the extract in paragraph 13, which only mentions the \u201cnational liberation struggle of the Chechen people against the colonial expansion of Russia\u201d, and which is also considered by the majority to constitute promotion, justification and glorification of violence (see paragraphs 98 and 99 of the judgment). Again, this fragment considers Chechnya a nation and Russia a colonial invader. It might even, as the majority suggest, \u201creveal an intention to romanticise and idealise the Chechen separatists\u2019 cause\u201d (see paragraph 99). However, this Court has held that even separatist speech containing identical words, namely \u201cstruggle\u201d and \u201cliberation\u201d, was protected insofar it \u201cdid not constitute an incitement to violence, armed resistance or an uprising\u201d (see, for example, Gerger v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a024919\/94, \u00a7 50, 8 July 1999; Erdal Ta\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a077650\/01, \u00a7 38, 19 December 2006). Classifying this individual statement as glorification of violence would depart from that case-law and create a dangerous precedent. However, when it is read in conjunction with the other statements, the majority might be right to consider that this passage was an incitement to violence. This, once again, proves the difficulty this Court will have in making individualised assessments of statements.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0As a final example, the majority includes the expressions enumerated in paragraph 14 of the judgment as being among those that \u201cpromote, justify and glorify terrorism and violence\u201d (see paragraphs 98 and\u00a099). These expressions mention Chechen \u201cresistance\u201d and imply the existence of Chechnya as a nation; I disagree that this is sufficient to consider them as glorification of violence. This would be inconsistent with previous case-law (see Gerger, cited above, \u00a7 50, which explicitly points to the word \u201cresistance\u201d as not constituting in itself an incitement to violence). Moreover, the majority provides no reason for including paragraph 14 in the enumeration of paragraph 98 (see the reasons given in paragraphs 99-109, with no mention whatsoever of paragraph 14).<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0The impact of the applicant\u2019s expressions<\/strong><\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The impact of statements is also a critical element in the assessment of interference with freedom of speech. The majority assesses the impact of the applicant\u2019s publications at the stage of performing a proportionality analysis (see paragraph 131 of the judgment). This is consistent with the Court\u2019s case-law, insofar it has held that \u201cthe potential impact of the medium of expression concerned is an important factor in the consideration of the proportionality of an interference\u201d (see Murphy v. Ireland, no.\u00a044179\/98, \u00a7\u00a069, ECHR 2003\u2011IX [extracts]). However, I believe that the impact of the statements should also have been considered when addressing the question of whether there was a \u201cpressing social need\u201d for interference with the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0I consider that there is no \u201cpressing social need\u201d to interfere with speech that has no or negligible impact. This is in line with previous case\u2011law. In Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v.\u00a0Bulgaria, the Court found that statements that posed \u201cno real foreseeable risk of violent action or of incitement to violence or any other form of rejection of democratic principles\u201d did not justify banning a political association\u2019s meetings (see Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v.\u00a0Bulgaria, nos. 29221\/95 and 29225\/95, \u00a7\u00a0111, ECHR 2001\u2011IX).[13] Because the impact of the statements was so negligible, the Court in Stankov did not perform a proportionality analysis.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The medium through which statements are made is important when assessing their impact. The Court has held that, in some cases, the medium through which individuals express themselves may change the very nature of their expressions (see Karata\u015f v. Turkey [GC], no. 23168\/94, \u00a7\u00a052, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011IV). In Karata\u015f the Court held that the impact of the statements made by the applicant, through the medium of poetry, did not amount to an incitement to violence, despite their aggressive tone (ibid.).<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, it can be argued that some of the applicant\u2019s statements could be considered an incitement to or glorification of violence, and that they had a certain impact which posed a risk to wider society. Whilst the number of copies distributed by the applicant was admittedly low, according to the domestic courts eight individuals lodged complaints against him (see paragraph 43 of the judgment). This suggests that the applicant\u2019s problematic statements had at least some impact that would justify interference by the State and criminal sanctions against him.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0It would have been more correct for the Court to engage in this analysis before delving into the proportionality analysis, so as not to create a precedent that allows for interference with any kind of expression, regardless of its potential impact.<\/p>\n V.\u00a0\u00a0Ban on journalism<\/strong><\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has left open the question of \u201cwhether a ban on the exercise of journalistic activities, as such, is compatible with Article 10 of the Convention\u201d (see paragraph 128 of the judgment). The Court did find that the joint application of the ban and the deprivation of liberty was contrary to the Convention (see paragraph 129). While I do not necessarily object to deciding the issue of the ban on narrow grounds, leaving open the question of whether any such ban would be incompatible with Article\u00a010, I\u00a0do consider that more attention should have been paid to the circumstances of this particular ban.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0Article 280 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code of Russia establishes, among other things, the penalty of \u201cwithdrawal of the right to hold certain posts or carry out certain activities for a period of up to three years\u201d which the domestic courts applied to the applicant in this case (see paragraph 68). The majority accepts that, since the applicant\u2019s conviction was based upon this Article, \u201cthe resultant interference with the applicant\u2019s relevant rights may be regarded as having been \u2018prescribed by law\u2019\u201d (see paragraph 81).<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0In my opinion, the quality of Article 280 \u00a7 2 as \u201claw\u201d for the purposes of justifying an interference, such as a three-year ban on journalistic activities, is problematic. This Court has consistently held that \u201cthe expression \u2018in accordance with the law\u2019 [in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention] not only requires that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects\u201d (see Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341\/95, \u00a7\u00a052, ECHR 2000\u2011V; see also Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748\/98, \u00a7\u00a030, ECHR 2004\u2011I). In particular, an interference with one of those Articles has been found when \u201c[domestic] law d[id] not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and conditions of exercise of the authorities\u2019 discretionary power in the area under consideration\u201d (see Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a027798\/95, \u00a7 62, ECHR 2000\u2011II). As the Court\u2019s Article 7 case-law makes clear, not only must the prohibited conduct be described in a way that its prosecution is foreseeable, the penalties that might be imposed for it should be precise enough as to be foreseen (see Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no.\u00a021906\/04, \u00a7 140, ECHR 2008). This is also true for \u201claws\u201d restricting Article 10, which should allow a \u201ccitizen … to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail\u201d (see Rekv\u00e9nyi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390\/94, \u00a7\u00a034, ECHR 1999\u2011III).<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, I do not think that the \u201cwithdrawal of the right to hold certain posts or carry out certain activities for a period up to three years\u201d fulfils the minimum foreseeability of a \u201claw\u201d for Article 10 purposes. Indeed, anything anyone does may be considered an \u201cactivity\u201d. The law also fails to clarify adequately to what \u201ccertain posts\u201d may refer. Nor does it make clear what may aggravate or mitigate the penalties. Article 280 \u00a7 2 is, effectively, a blank cheque that allows anything from the mildest to the most severe sanctions.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0Such a broad, almost absolute, concession of discretion upon State authorities cannot constitute a legitimate basis for interference as severe as a general ban of the practice of journalism. This is all the more relevant when we note that a ban on practicing journalism is in itself a very far-reaching prohibition, given that a wide array of expressive activities could be considered \u201cjournalism\u201d.<\/p>\n VI.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0While I agree with my colleagues that the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 10 have been infringed, I write to caution the Court against the dangers of micro-managing the classification of statements.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0Additionally, the impact of such statements should be considered first when assessing the \u201cpressing social need\u201d. Only if the impact warrants interference should the Court proceed to a proportionality analysis, where it may once again take into consideration the impact of the statements.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, I am concerned about the vague and broad wording of Article 280 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code of Russia, which was used to justify imposing criminal sanctions on the applicant. This law is ultimately little more than a blank cheque which allows the domestic authorities to impose a wide array of sanctions, without providing much clarity or foreseeability to potential defendants.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PASTOR\u00a0VILANOVA<\/strong><\/p>\n (Translation)<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0I fully endorse the Court\u2019s finding of a violation of Article 10 in this case. I also agree with the fact of awarding the applicant the sum of EUR\u00a012,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and making no award in respect of pecuniary damage. In contrast, I voted against point 4 of the judgment\u2019s operative provisions, in which, inter alia, reimbursement of the fees incurred in respect of the applicant\u2019s lawyer was refused.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0For reference, the applicant\u2019s representative stated in his claim for just satisfaction that the applicant had not paid the costs incurred as he did not have the financial means to do so. The sum of EUR 3,000 was claimed under this head.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The Government opposed the claim, alleging that there was no evidence of payment of these expenses.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepted the Government\u2019s claims and dismissed, by a very large majority, the claim in respect of professional fees. In the majority\u2019s view, this claim was not payable, having regard to the information provided by the applicant (see paragraph 142 of the judgment).<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0It has been found that an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses in so far as it is shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurredand are reasonable as to quantum (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a023755\/07, \u00a7\u00a0130, ECHR 2016, and, more recently, Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no.\u00a072508\/13, \u00a7 370, ECHR 2017).The reality of a representative\u2019s fees is established if the applicant has paid them or is liable to pay them (see Luedicke, Belkacem and Ko\u00e7 v.\u00a0Germany\u00a0(Article\u00a050), 10 March 1980, \u00a7 15, Series A no.\u00a036; Artico v.\u00a0Italy\u00a0(13 May 1980, \u00a7 40, Series A no.\u00a037); Airey v. Ireland\u00a0(Article 50), 6\u00a0February 1981, \u00a7 13, Series A no\u00a041; \u017ddanoka v. Latvia, no. 58278\/00, \u00a7\u00a0122, 17 June 2004; and Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], cited above, \u00a7\u00a0372).<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0However, the applicant\u2019s claim was perfectly compatible with the Court\u2019s case-law, which does not make the reimbursement of lawyers\u2019 fees conditional on their prior payment. Although payment has not been made, the applicant remains indebted to his lawyer. The reality of the debt was, in my view, indisputable. It arises from a letter presented by the applicant\u2019s lawyer requiring payment for his work and emphasising that his client is insolvent. It must be borne in mind that the applicant has spent five years in prison and it is therefore unlikely that he was in receipt of any resources throughout that long period. His claim is fully reasonable and justified. It follows that the costs incurred ought to be reimbursed to him by the other party, even allowing for adjustment of the amount by this Court if necessary.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the majority has, in my humble opinion, incorrectly applied the case-law that was used to support its refusal.<\/p>\n [1].\u00a0\u00a0Movladi Udugov is said to have been the First Deputy Prime Minister of the self-proclaimedChechen Republic of Ichkeria (\u201cCRI\u201d \u2013 the title of the republic used by the Chechen rebel separatists), also responsible for the information support of the first armed conflict in the Chechen Republic (December 1994\u00a0\u2013\u00a0August 1996) from the side of the separatist fighters.
\nBranko Lubarda,
\nHelen Keller,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nPere Pastor Vilanova,
\nAlena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1,
\nMar\u00eda El\u00f3segui, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n
\nJ.S.P.<\/p>\n
\n[2].\u00a0\u00a0During the second armed conflict in the Chechen Republic (August 1999\u00a0\u2013\u00a0April 2009), on the evening of 23 October 2002 a group of terrorists belonging to the Chechen separatist movement (over 40 people), led by Movsar Barayev \u2013 a Chechen militia leader \u2013 armed with machine-guns and explosives, took hostages in the Dubrovka theatre (also known as the \u201cNord-Ost\u201d theatre, from the name of a musical that was performed there at that time) in Moscow. For three days more than 900 people were held at gunpoint in the theatre\u2019s auditorium; the theatre building was booby-trapped and eighteen suicide bombers were positioned in the hall among the hostages. The terrorists demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Chechen Republic and direct negotiations involving the political leadership of the federal authorities and the separatist movement. On 26 October 2002 the Russian security forces started storming, having pumped an unknown narcotic gas into the main auditorium through the building\u2019s ventilation system; as a result of the rescue operation the majority of the hostages were released (over 730 people); 129 hostages died (for more details, see Finogenov and Others v. Russia, nos. 18299\/03 and 27311\/03, ECHR\u00a02011 (extracts)).
\n[3].\u00a0\u00a0Yuriy Budanov was a Russian military officer in the rank of colonel in command of a regiment during the second armed conflict in the Chechen Republic (officially known as \u201ca counter terrorist operation\u201d). From 2001 to 2003, in several rounds of the proceedings, Russian courts tried him on the charges of kidnapping, rape (later withdrawn by the prosecution) and murder ofan 18-year-old Chechen woman. The case attracted wide public and mass media attention. At the first round of proceedings, in a judgment of 31 December 2002, the first-instance court found the defendant not guilty by reason of temporary insanity; he was committed to a psychiatric hospital for further evaluation. That decision was set aside by an appellate court and eventually he was convicted and sentenced to 10\u00a0years of imprisonment. He was released on parole in 2009. On 10 June 2011, Mr\u00a0Budanov was shot dead in Moscow by an unknown perpetrator.
\n[4].\u00a0\u00a0Shamil Basayev is considered to have been one of the leaders of the Chechen rebel separatist movement, who masterminded and led a number of guerrilla attacks on the Russian security forces and civilians, including the seizure of a school in Beslan in September 2004 (see Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 26562\/07 and 6 others, ECHR\u00a02017 (extracts)).
\n[5].\u00a0\u00a0Salman Raduyev is considered to have been one of the most radical and notorious Chechen rebel separatist warlords in the period between 1994 and 1999. He is believed to have led a number of guerrilla campaigns against the Russian security forces and civilians, such as the large-scale Kizlyar hostage taking in 1996. In 2001 he was tried on a number of charges, including terrorism, hostage-taking, organisation of illegal armed formations, and given a life prison sentence. He died in prison in 2002.
\n[6].\u00a0\u00a0Khattab is said to have been a guerrilla field commander who participated in a number of attacks on the Russian security forces during the armed conflicts in the Chechen Republic.
\n[7].\u00a0\u00a0On 5 July 2003 two Chechen women blew themselves up at a rock festival at the Tushino airfield near Moscow.The attack killed 11 people on the spot, while at least 60\u00a0people were injured and four of them later died in hospital.
\n[8].\u00a0\u00a0The date of the election of the President of Russia.
\n[9].\u00a0\u00a0The year of the election of the President of Russia.
\n[10].\u00a0\u00a0Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was a Chechen writer and politician who served as acting president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya between 1996 and 1997. He was killed in 2004 in Qatar; two officers of the Russian intelligence services were tried and convicted for that murder by the Qatar authorities.
\n[11].\u00a0\u00a0\u201cRusnya\u201d is a pejorative denomination for Russians.
\n[12].\u00a0\u00a0On 6 February 2004 a man from the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia blew himself up on a train in the Moscow metro. The attack killed 41 people on the spot; 250 people were, reportedly, wounded.
\n[13].\u00a0\u00a0The Court found a violation of Article 11in Stankov, although the analysis was explicitly conducted \u201cin the light of Article 10\u201d (\u00a7 85).<\/p>\n