FIRST SECTION
\nCASE OF SEPCZY\u0143SKI[1] v. POLAND
\n(Application no. 78352\/14)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n26 April 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Sepczy\u0144ski[2] v. Poland,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Ale\u0161 Pejchal, President, Having deliberated in private on 3 April 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 78352\/14) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article\u00a034 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Polish national, MrArturSepczy\u0144ski[3] (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 26November 2014.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Polish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms\u00a0J.\u00a0Chrzanowskaof the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 13\u00a0October 2015 the complaints under Article 3 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Conventionwere communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee. After having considered the Government\u2019s objection, the Court rejected it.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in \u0141om\u017ca.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s accident and deprivation of liberty<\/strong><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 7August 2010 the applicant had a motorcycle accident in which he broke his right arm and right thigh. Between 13 and 22\u00a0December 2010 the applicant underwentan arthroscopy on his right knee. Between 25\u00a0January and 15February 2011 the applicant underwent rehabilitationtreatment in \u0141om\u017caRegional Hospital and during this stay no dysfunction was diagnosed in his right foot.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Subsequently, between 28 March and 26 July 2011,he was detained in Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre. While in prison, he was examined three times (on 1 and 18 April and on 13 May 2011) by an orthopaedist, who observed that the applicant required physical therapy in the light of a limitation of his knee-joint movement, the atrophy of a thigh muscle, and an injury to a peroneal nerve. On 11 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a neurologist who likewise found atrophy of the thigh muscle and impairedbending of the right foot, which he attributed toan injury to the peroneal nerve. The applicant never received any physical therapy during his imprisonment, insteadbeing offered only nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medicines.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Civil proceedings against the State Treasury<\/strong><\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date, but not later than 27 March 2012, the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury\/Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre for infringement of his personal rights, claiming that the prison healthcare system had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care during his detention and, moreover, that the cells had not met the minimum spatial requirement of 3 square metres per person and had been mouldy and infested with insects. He requested 200,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation, the equivalent of approximately 48,300 euros (EUR).<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 27March 2012 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court (S\u0105dOkr\u0119gowy) exempted the applicant from the court fees.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 January 2014 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court granted the applicant PLN\u00a023,000(approximately EUR\u00a05,550) and dismissed the remainder of his action. The court held, particularly on the basis of the medical expert opinion, that the applicant had had a motorcycle accident and had required physical therapy as recommended by the prison orthopaedist. However, he had not been given any, either in prison or outside, which had resulted in a deterioration of his health. The court established that, due to the lack of physical therapy, the applicant had suffered atrophy of the thigh muscle and foot drop affecting hisright foot. The court compared this finding with the fact that upon his arrival the applicant had not been suffering from foot drop, the pain in his knee had not been severe, and his right leg muscles had been workingmore effectively. The court emphasised that the applicant had not been offered proper treatment despite a worsening of his symptoms. These changes in his physical condition would not have been irreversible, but the break in the therapy had entailed a prolonged rehabilitation process. The court stated that the rehabilitation process for the applicant would be long and arduous,a situation which could have been avoided had the defendant acted appropriately. The court held that the applicant had suffered physical pain of significant seriousness, which, in turn, had hadnegative psychological consequences.The court therefore found the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation for lack of adequate medical care partly justified. The claim concerning the alleged overcrowding and inadequate sanitary conditions was dismissed in full. The court also ordered the applicant to reimburse PLN\u00a03,186 (EUR\u00a0766) for the costs of the defendant\u2019s legal representation and PLN\u00a010,932 (EUR\u00a02,628) in court fees (in total: PLN\u00a014,118 (EUR\u00a03,394)).<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not lodge an appeal against the first-instance judgment.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0Following the defendant\u2019s appeal against the judgment, on 12\u00a0September 2014 the Bia\u0142ystok Court of Appeal (S\u0105dApelacyjny) amended the judgment, reduced the compensation granted to the applicant to PLN\u00a013,000 (EUR\u00a03,095), and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s findings of fact and law. The applicant was not ordered to pay the court fees for the proceedings before that court. This court pointed out that in the experts\u2019 opinions it was not specified, even approximately, what the effects of the negligence might be, how much longer the rehabilitation process would take, or how much stronger the pain had become in comparison to pain experienced previously by the applicant.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Medical care in detention<\/strong><\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of domestic law concerning medical care in prisons and remand centres are set out in the Court\u2019s judgments in S\u0142awomirMusia\u0142v.\u00a0Poland, no. 28300\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a048 and 51-53, 20\u00a0January 2009;Kaprykowski v. Poland, no. 23052\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a036-39, 3 February 2009; andBujak v.\u00a0Poland,no. 686\/12, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a051-52, 21 March 2017.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Provisions regulating the State Treasury\u2019s liability in tort<\/strong><\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of domestic law concerning civil-law provisions which regulate the State Treasury\u2019s liability in tort are set out in the Court\u2019s ruling in Orchowski v.Poland, no.17885\/04, \u00a7\u00a078, 22\u00a0October 2009.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Court fees<\/strong><\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0Under Polish law, everyone except public authorities and institutions is obliged to pay a court fee when lodging a claim with the competent civil court. As a case progresses, a party is obliged to pay additional court fees when lodging any further appeals.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0Article98 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe costs of litigation necessary for the effective conduct of a case are borne by the unsuccessful party to the proceedings. The costs of litigation comprise the court fees referred to above, legal fees paid to professional legal representatives, and various other items of expenditure incurred in connection with the proceedings, such as transport costs and loss of earnings as a result of participation in the hearings.\u201d<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0Article 100 of the Code, as far as relevant, reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn case of partial granting of the claims, the costs shall be mutually cancelled out or proportionally divided.\u201d<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0An exception to this general principle is provided for in Article\u00a0101 of the Code. Pursuant to this provision:<\/p>\n \u201cThe court may not order the losing defendant to pay the costs of litigation if he or she did not cause the proceedings to be instituted and acknowledged the claim at a first hearing.\u201d<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of operation of the general principle whereby the unsuccessful party bears the litigation costs, as referred to above, is also mitigated by Article 102 of the Code. This provision enshrines the principle of equity in respect of litigation costs and stipulates that:<\/p>\n \u201cThe court may order the losing party to pay only a part of the litigation costs, or may exempt it altogether from the obligation to pay these costs, where the particular circumstances of the case justify such a decision.\u201d<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The amounts of court fees in civil cases are regulated in the Law of 28\u00a0July 2005 on Court Fees in Civil Cases (Ustawaokosztachs\u0105dowych w\u00a0sprawachcywilnych). Article 13(1) provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIn cases concerning proprietary interests a proportionate fee shall be collected; it shall amount to five percent of the value of the claim or of subject of an appeal, but not less than PLN\u00a030 and not more than PLN\u00a0100,000.\u201d<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0Lawyers\u2019 fees at the material time were determined by the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 28\u00a0September 2002 on lawyers\u2019 fees and on the rules of covering the costs of free legal aid by the State Treasury (rozporz\u0105dzenieMinistraSprawiedliwo\u015bciz dnia28wrze\u015bnia2002\u00a0r. w\u00a0sprawieop\u0142atzaczynno\u015bciadwokackieorazponoszeniaprzezSkarbPa\u0144stwakoszt\u00f3wnieop\u0142aconejpomocyprawnejudzielonej z\u00a0urz\u0119du). Section\u00a06 read:<\/p>\n \u201cThe minimum fees are, depending on the amount in dispute:<\/p>\n 1) up to PLN\u00a0500 – PLN\u00a060;<\/p>\n 2) more than PLN\u00a0500 up to PLN\u00a01,500 – PLN\u00a0180;<\/p>\n 3) more thanPLN\u00a01,500up toPLN\u00a05,000-PLN\u00a0600;<\/p>\n 4) more than PLN\u00a05,000 up to PLN\u00a010,000 – PLN\u00a01,200;<\/p>\n 5) more than PLN\u00a010,000up to PLN\u00a050,000 – PLN\u00a02,400;<\/p>\n 6) more than PLN\u00a050,000up to PLN\u00a0200,000 – PLN\u00a03,600;<\/p>\n 7) more than PLN\u00a0200,000 – PLN\u00a07,200.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the inadequate medical care which had been provided by the prison healthcare system during his detention in Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre amounted to treatment contrary to Article3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0The Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. In their opinion, the domestic courts had acknowledged that there had beena breach of the applicant\u2019s rights guaranteed by the Convention and he had been awarded proper compensation for the damage he had sustained. Additionally, the Government noted that the applicant had not appealed against the first\u2011instance judgment, which had deprived him of victim status. The Government requested that the application be declared inadmissible under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention and rejected in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted all possible remedies for this complaint, because he had not lodged an appeal against the judgment of the first-instance court, including the court\u2019s decision on the court fees which he was to pay.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Victim status<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it falls, firstly, to the national authorities to redress any violation of the Convention. In this regard, the question of whether an applicant can claim to be the victim of the alleged violation is relevant at all stages of the proceedings under the Convention. A decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive him of his status as a \u201cvictim\u201d for the purposes of Article34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance\u2012 and then afforded redress for \u2012the breach of the Convention (G\u00e4fgen v.Germany [GC], no.22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a0115, ECHR\u00a02010 with further references).<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant sued the State, claiming that the defendant had failed to provide him with adequate medical care during his detention in Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre. The Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court acknowledged that the lack of physical therapy had causeda deteriorationin the applicant\u2019s health, as well as physical and mental suffering (see paragraph 10 above). The Regional Court\u2019s findings were confirmed on appeal (see paragraph 12 above).<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is therefore satisfied that the national authorities have acknowledged a breach of the Convention in the relevant part regarding the lack of adequate medical care, which is the core element of the applicant\u2019s complaint before the Court.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the only issue which remains to be determined with regard to this complaint is whether the authorities provided sufficient redress.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR\u00a05,550, considering that amount to be adequate. That court also ordered the applicant to pay the equivalent of EUR\u00a03,394 towards the cost of the proceedings (see paragraph 10above). However, upon an appeal lodged by the defendant, the Bia\u0142ystok Court of Appeal changed the amount of compensation to the equivalent of EUR\u00a03,095 (see paragraph 12 above), meaning that the compensation was wholly consumed by the court fees.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant can still claim to be a victim of a violation of the substantive aspect of Article\u00a03 on account of lack of adequate medical care. It therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s preliminary objection alleging that the applicant had lost his victim status.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted all available domestic remedies because he did not lodge an appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that only those remedies which are effective and adequate are to be exhausted (Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 45, ECHR 2006-II). It notes that although it was the judgment of the court of first instance that ordered the applicant to pay the court fees, it also awarded him significantly higher compensation than that awarded by the Court of Appeal. The fees at that point constituted approximately sixty percent of the amount awarded.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0It should be noted that it was only after the Court of Appeal\u2019sjudgment that the fees became higher than the compensation awarded, but at that time the applicant had no remedy against the level of the fees ordered by the Regional Court.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore dismissesthe Government\u2019s objection concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies with regard to the complaint under Article\u00a03 of the Convention.<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusions as regards admissibility<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further finds that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article\u00a03 of the Convention of inadequate medical care during his detention in Bia\u0142ystok Detention Centre, which resulted in a deterioration of his health.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government refrained from taking a position with regard to the merits of the case under Article\u00a03 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has held on many occasions, Article\u00a03 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see Kud\u0142av. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 90, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011XI, and the authorities cited therein).<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0However, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Kud\u0142av.\u00a0Poland, cited above, \u00a7 91, and the authorities cited therein).<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his or her human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142av.\u00a0Poland, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094, and the authorities cited therein).<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant was examined by an orthopaedist shortly after his arrival in the Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre and on two further occasions, and also by a neurologist (see paragraph 7 above). His condition and his treatment needs were therefore known to the authorities of the Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre. Despite the doctors\u2019 recommendations and the worsening of his symptoms, the applicant never received physical therapy andwas thus deprived of proper medical care throughout his detention.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the domestic courts, relying on a report by an independent expert, confirmed that the applicant had not received adequate medical care during his detention. In particular, he had not been provided with the requisite physical therapy. This led to a deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health (atrophy of the right thigh muscle and right foot drop), which, although not constituting permanent damage, was considered by the domestic courts to be a source of significant physical and psychological suffering for the applicant. The courts also established that because of the lack of physical therapy, the overall rehabilitation process was of longer duration, although it was not specified how much longer (see paragraph12 above).<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was aware that his health was deteriorating and at the same time witnessed the authorities\u2019 inactivity in providing him with physical therapy. This must have been a source of additional distress and anxiety for him, as he could not foresee whether therapy would be ever provided, and whether the lack of it would have any lasting effects on his health.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s opinion the lack of adequate medical treatment in Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre, in particularthe fact that the applicant\u2019s medically confirmed needs were never addressed by the prison authorities, which resulted ina deterioration of his health, as referred to above, undermined the applicant\u2019s dignity and caused suffering beyond that inevitably associated with the deprivation of his liberty.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s continued detention without adequate medical treatment amounted to degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE1 OF PROTOCOL NO.\u00a01 TO THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions had been breached. He referred to Article 1 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 to the Convention, which reads:<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant allegedthat the amount of the court fees he had been ordered to pay had fullyabsorbed the compensation he had been granted, which meant that he had been deprived of his award.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government raised a preliminary objection that the matter of the decision on the costs of the proceedings in which the applicant sought compensation did not fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention, since it did not affect the applicant\u2019s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. In the Government\u2019s opinion, the applicant did not have a specific property right to the adjudicated compensation as the first-instance court\u2019s ruling was not final.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation to pay court fees \u2013 and the corresponding regulation \u2013 is covered by the second paragraph of Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1, as the fees are \u201ccontributions\u201d within the meaning of that provision (Perdig\u00e3o v.Portugal [GC], no.24768\/06, \u00a761, 16\u00a0November 2010). However, there remains thequestion of whether and to what extent the order to pay the court fees concerned can be considered to have amounted to an interference with the applicant\u2019s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, as the money the applicant was ordered to pay in court fees fully absorbed the compensation awarded for the lack of adequate medical care, which amounted to a \u201cpossession\u201d within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an applicant may allege a violation of Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01 only in so far as the impugned decisions relate to his or her \u201cpossessions\u201d within the meaning of that provision. \u201cPossessions\u201d can be \u201cexisting possessions\u201d or claims that are sufficiently established to be regarded as \u201cassets\u201d. A claim may be regarded as an asset only when it is sufficiently established to be enforceable (see, for example, Stran Greek Refineries and StratisAndreadis v.Greece, 9 December 1994, \u00a7\u00a059, Series\u00a0A no. 301\u2011B). As the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation in the present case was acknowledged in the amount awarded to him by the final judgment of Bia\u0142ystok Court of Appeal of 12September 2014, the Court considers that this claim was sufficiently established to qualify as an \u201casset\u201d protected by Article1 of Protocol No.\u00a01.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s preliminary objection.<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article35 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further finds that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention that the compensation he had received had been whollyconsumed by the court fees he had been ordered to pay.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that,should the Court find that the order to pay the court fees out of the granted compensation fell within the scope of Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the interference in the instant case was proportionate and did not constitutea violation of the applicant\u2019s property rights.<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the court\u2019s decision on costs in a final judgment depended on the outcome of the proceedings, in particular the extent to which the applicant had won the case. They submitted that the applicant had claimed compensationof a very significant amount, althougha party to civil proceedings who requests exemption from court fees is obliged to bring claims of a balanced amount. Relying on the Court\u2019s case Kupiec v.Poland (no.16828\/02, 3 February 2009), the Government argued that applicants who deliberately inflate the value of their claims for compensation cannot be expected to be exempted entirely from the payment of court fees or from the requirement to contribute a reasonable amount toward the costs of taking the action. They stressed that the applicant\u2019s successin the proceedings amounted toonly six and a half percent of his claim. The decision on court fees met the requirements of transparency, predictability and accessibility.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s opinion, the obligation to pay the court fees imposed on the applicant was necessary and proportionate, since it resulted from a lack of prudence and restraint on the applicant\u2019s part as to the amount of the claim. They furthermore argued that States enjoyed wide margin of appreciation in introducing legislation to secure the payment of \u201ccontributions\u201d.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government noted that the instant case differs from Perdig\u00e3o (cited above), because the applicant did not initiate the proceedings in the context of deprivation of property and was a party to civil proceedings as opposed to a public-law dispute.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0As to whether there was interference<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has held in other cases, a substantial reduction in the amount of a claim resulting from the duty to pay the costs of proceedings constitutes an interference with the right to peaceful enjoymentof possessions (see Perdig\u00e3o, cited above, \u00a7 61, and Klauz v. Croatia, no.\u00a028963\/10, \u00a7\u00a0109, 18\u00a0July 2013).<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court sees no reason to depart from that finding in the present case.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the interference pursued public interest<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0Article 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure embodies the \u201closer pays\u201d rule, according to which the unsuccessful party must pay the successful party\u2019s costs (see paragraph 16 above). According to Article 100 of that Code, when a party partly succeeds in the proceedings, the court may order that party to reimburse the corresponding part of the other party\u2019s costs (see paragraph 17 above).<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0According to Article 13 (1) of the Law of 28 July 2005 on Court Fees in Civil Cases, the amount of a court fee is dependent on the amount of theclaim, as it constitutes a percentage thereof. Therefore, the higher amount the plaintiff seeks, the higher the court fee will be.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the rules described above, the Court notes that it had already dealt with establishing whether such rules pursue a legitimate aim (seeKlauz, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a084-85, cited above) and sees no reason to depart from its findings.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, according to the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 28\u00a0September 2002 on lawyers\u2019 fees and on the rules of covering the costs of free legal aid by the State Treasury, in civil cases those fees are, as a matter of principle, calculated in proportion to the value of the subject matter of the dispute (see paragraph 21 above). Therefore, the higher amount the plaintiff seeks, the higher the defendant\u2019s representative\u2019s fees will be.<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0This rule and the one described in paragraph 62 above, taken together, mean that where a plaintiff succeeds in a civil action only in part, as in the present case, he or she may have to pay a share of the defendant\u2019s costs (including thelawyer\u2019s fees) proportionate to the percentage of the claim that was disallowed. More particularly, where a court finds that a claim for damages against the defendant is well-founded in substance but excessive in quantum, when ordering the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff it may at the same time order the plaintiff to pay the defendant\u2019s costs of proceedings. Where a plaintiff has sought too high an amount, the costs may exceed the sum awarded in damages, the overall financial award being in the defendant\u2019sfavour despite the finding that the plaintiff had sustained a loss which justifieda damages award. The purpose of these rules is to protect defendants from the plaintiffs who bring excessive claims (which otherwise may be well-founded in substance) and thereby unreasonably increase the costs of defendants\u2019 legal representation by a lawyer (see Klauz v.Croatia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a080).<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s opinion, such regulations pursue the public interest, in that they ensure that the parties to the civil proceedings do not inflate their claims unreasonably, which protects the stability and efficiency of the national judicial systems and also protects the State from ill-founded litigation.<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the interference was lawful<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0In its judgment of 20January 2014 theBia\u0142ystok Regional Court based its cost order on Article 100 of the Code of the Civil Procedure. The Court is therefore satisfied that the interference was lawful.<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the interference was proportionate<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0Even taking into account the possibility that the amount of court fees in the instant case was affected by the applicant\u2019s unsuccessful claim for compensation for the alleged overcrowding and inadequate sanitary conditions of detention, the Court sees no reasonable justification for the fact that a successful claim against the State Treasury arising from one of the core provisions of the Convention resulted in court fees higher than the compensation awarded.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court notes that Article 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the domestic courts considerable discretion as regards the apportionment of costs in cases of partial success in proceedings, as they can order the losing party to pay only a part of the litigation costs, or exempt that party altogether from the obligation to pay these costs if the particular circumstances of the case justify such a decision. However, in the present case the domestic courts applied the provisions governing the costs of the proceedings without giving sufficient consideration to the specific circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case, especially the fact that it was concerned with compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of lack of adequate medical care in a detention centre rather than being an ordinary civil-law dispute between private parties.<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant could have claimed a lower amount and thus have limited the costs of the proceedings, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s civil action was in principle allowed, the domestic courts granting part of the amount sought. The amount of compensation the applicant requested was admittedly high, but was not unreasonable, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case. In particular, it was significantly lower than in the case ofKupiecrelied on by the Government.<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the award of costs in the present case had some impact on the applicant\u2019s Convention rights. Firstly, the State took away with one hand what it had awarded with the other (see, mutatis mutandis, Perdig\u00e3o\u00a7\u00a072, cited above,and Klauz\u00a7\u00a096, cited above). Secondly, the procedural sanction for the applicant\u2019s minor procedural misconduct\u2012 namely bringing a somewhat inflated claim\u2012 was so severe that it fully consumed the compensation he was awarded for lack of necessary medical care in the detention centre\u2013 an act prohibited by Article3, which, as stated before, ranks among the most fundamental provisions of the Convention.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, it cannot be said that the domestic courts\u2019 decisions in the present case were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by Article\u00a098 of the Civil Code, which requires that the losing party pay the costs of the proceedings determined in proportion to the value of the claim. Its application in the present case resulted in a restriction which impaired the very essence of the applicant\u2019s right to enjoy his possessions.<\/p>\n There has therefore been a violation of Article1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR\u00a09,150 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this claim was groundless.<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a03,500 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR\u00a03,529 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts.<\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this claim was groundless.<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case\u2011law (see, in particular, Editions Plon v.France, no. 58148\/00, \u00a7\u00a064, ECHR 2004\u2011IV), the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR\u00a01,800(approximately 7,318 Polish zlotys) covering costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings which were necessary to pursue the claim for compensation for inadequate medical care in prison.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe application admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article\u00a01 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three monthsthe following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR\u00a03,500 (three thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable,in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR\u00a01,800 (one thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 April 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Renata Degener\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ale\u0161 Pejchal ______________<\/p>\n [1].\u00a0\u00a0Rectified on 23 May 2019: the applicant\u2019s last name was: \u00ab\u00a0S\u0119pczy\u0144ski\u00a0\u00bb.
\nKrzysztof Wojtyczek,
\nJovan Ilievski, judges,
\nand Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputyRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n
\n[2].\u00a0\u00a0Rectified on 23 May 2019: the applicant\u2019s last name was: \u00ab\u00a0S\u0119pczy\u0144ski\u00a0\u00bb.
\n[3].\u00a0\u00a0Rectified on 23 May 2019: the applicant\u2019s last name was: \u00ab\u00a0S\u0119pczy\u0144ski\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n