THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF TSUKANOV AND TORCHINSKIY v. RUSSIA
\n(Applications nos. 35000\/13 and 35010\/13)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n17\u00a0April 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Tsukanov and Torchinskiy v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Helen Keller, President, Having deliberated in private on 27 March 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in two applications (nos. 35000\/13 and 35010\/13) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by two Russian nationals, Mr FilippIgorevichTsukanov and Mr ArtemAleksandrovichTorchinskiy (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on 20 May 2013.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were represented by Mr K. Terekhov, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 March 2014 the applications were communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Theapplicants were born in 1984and 1979 respectively and live in Moscow.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper RossiyskayaGazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo \u201cpickets\u201d (\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0435\u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u044b) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo \u201cpickets\u201d was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three\u2011day notification period for other types of (group) events.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants decided to hold their own solo \u201cpickets\u201d and at around 9 a.m. positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818\/09 and 14 others, \u00a7\u00a7 206-15, 7 February 2017).<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) in respect of each applicant.A record of administrative arrest (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had beenactuallyapprehendedat 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had beenactually apprehended at 9.30 a.m.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0At the police station both applicants were accused oforganisingand holding agroup public event without prior notification, in breach of Article\u00a020.2 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, \u201cCAO\u201d). The administrative offence records indicate that the offenceswere committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant was released at 1.20 p.m. The second applicant was released at 1.10 p.m.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369thCourt Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR)at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a \u201cpicket\u201d involving fifty people. That \u201cpicket\u201d was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter \u201cPEA\u201d). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369thCourt Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB\u00a020,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0Both applicants appealed, insisting thateach of themhad held a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant also pointed out that he had been arrested earlier than indicated in the arrest record.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 February and 11 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments concerning the second and the first applicant respectively.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 \u00a7 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233at the time).<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0For a summary of domestic law and practice concerning regulations relating to the conduct of public events, liability for breaches committed in their course and administrative escorting and arrest, see Lashmankin and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 216-312, and Novikova and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a025501\/07 and 4 others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a047-85, 26 April 2016.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0Since 6 January 2013 Moscow City Law no.\u00a010 of 4 April 2007 provides that the distance between solo demonstrations should be no less than fifty meters. It also specifies that simultaneous demonstrations should be treated as solo demonstrations provided that they do not have a common goal and organisation (section 2.3).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0 JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0Given their common factual and legal background, the Court decides that the two applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their arrest had been unlawful and not \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d. The Court considers it appropriate to examine this complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 1, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; …\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that theirarrest and detention had not been recorded. The police had not made administrative arrest records. Nor had they mentioned in the administrative offence records that the applicants had been escorted to the police station. The applicants\u2019 arrest had therefore been unlawful. Moreover, given that they had not committed any offence, their arrest had not had any legitimate purpose under Article 5 \u00a7 1.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had been escorted to the police station and then administratively arrested for the legitimate purpose of drawing up an administrative offence record. While Russian law did not establish a maximum length of time for escorting to a police station, administrative arrest was limited to three hours. That requirement had been respected in the applicants\u2019 cases, as their administrative arrest had not exceeded three hours: from 10.30 a.m. to 1.20 p.m. as regards the first applicant and from 10.30 a.m. to 1.10 a.m. as regards the second applicant. All procedural requirements prescribed by law had therefore been respected.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the expressions \u201clawful\u201d and \u201cin accordance with a procedure prescribed by law\u201d in Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention essentially refer back to national law and state the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. However, the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention under domestic law is not always the decisive element. The Court must in addition be satisfied that detention during the period under consideration was compatible with the purpose of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which is to prevent individuals from being deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary fashion. Furthermore, the list of exceptions to the right to liberty secured in Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention is an exhaustive one, and only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his liberty (see Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, \u00a7 25, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011IV).<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that both applicants were first taken to the police station in accordance with Article 27.2 of the CAO and then, once at the police station, administratively arrested in accordance with Article 27.3 of the CAO (see paragraph 9 above).<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the escorting procedure, the record of administrative escorting stated that both applicants had been taken to the police station for the purpose of drawing up an administrative offence record. Article 27.2 of the CAO provides that a suspected offender could be escorted to a police station for the purpose of drawing up an administrative offence record only if such a record could not be compiled at the place where the offence had been discovered. The Government have not argued that in each applicant\u2019s case this was impossible, and no obstacles to drawing up the record on the spot may be discerned from the documents in the case file (see, for similar reasoning, Navalnyy and Yashinv. Russia, no. 76204\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 68 and 93, 4\u00a0December 2014, and, mutatis mutandis, Novikova and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 182-83).<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicants\u2019 administrative arrest, neither the Government nor the domestic authorities provided any justification as required by Article 27.3 of the CAO, namely that it was an \u201cexceptional case\u201d,and\/or that it was \u201cnecessary for the prompt and proper examination of the administrative case and to secure the enforcement of any penalty to be imposed\u201d. In the absence of any explicit reasons given by the authorities for arresting the applicants, the Court considers that their administrative arrest was unlawful (see, for similar reasoning, Frumkin v. Russia, no.\u00a074568\/12, \u00a7\u00a0150, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0For these reasons the Court is not satisfied that the escorting of the applicants to the police station and their administrative arrest complied with Russian law so as to be \u201clawful\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1.\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of that provision in respect of each applicant.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained of the lack of a prosecuting party at the court hearings in the administrative proceedings against them. They also argued that the trial courts had not been \u201cestablished by law\u201d having no jurisdiction in their cases. The applicants relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.\u201d<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to the contested proceedings, because the applicants had been charged with an administrative rather than a criminal offence. They further argued that the applicants had not raised the jurisdictional issue before the trial court and\/or the appeal court and therefore had not exhausted domestic remedies. The Government also mentioned that the CAO did not provide for mandatory participation of a public prosecutor in each case concerning an administrative offence. Their submissions in that respect were similar to those made in Karelin v. Russia (no. 926\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 46-48, 20 September 2016).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the charges against them, which they argued to be criminal within the meaning of Article 6, had been examined by a justice of the peace instead of a district court as provided by the domestic law. They argued that even though they had not raised this issue before the domestic courts, the latter should have examined this type of matter propriomotu. The applicants further submitted that in the absence of a prosecuting party, the trial judge had taken the role of prosecution and had collected and presented incriminating evidence, including by way of calling and questioning police officers. The court was therefore not \u201cimpartial\u201d within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0First, the Court accepts the Government\u2019s argument that the applicants did not comply with the exhaustion requirement in respect of their argument relating to the jurisdictional issue. It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Lashmankin and Others, cited above, \u00a7 510).<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0Second, the Court has previously found that Article 6 of the Convention was applicable under its criminal limb to proceedings involving charges under Article 20.2 of the CAO punishable by a fine (see Mikhaylova v. \u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046998\/08, \u00a7 69, 19\u00a0November 2015). In addition, it is noted that the relevant offence became punishable by compulsory labour as an alternative statutory sentence at the time of the events in the present cases.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint relating to the lack of a prosecuting party at the court hearings in the administrative-offence proceedings is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously found that the lack of a prosecuting party in the context of oral hearings resulting in the determination of administrative charges constitutes a serious shortcoming in breach of objective impartiality requirement of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see Karelin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-84). It notes that the essential factual and legal elements of the present case and the case of Karelin (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 59-68) are similar. The parties\u2019 submissions in the present case disclose no reason for the Court to depart from its earlier judgment.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the objective impartiality requirement in relation to each applicant.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, in view of the above conclusions and also in the absence of any specific submissions from the applicants,it is not necessary to examine separately whether the same lack of a prosecuting party, taken alone or in combination with other procedural shortcomings, also had an adverse effect on and entailed a violation of the principle of equality of arms or the requirement of adversarial procedure in the circumstances of the case.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE11 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantscomplained that the precipitated termination of theirsolo demonstrations, their escorting to the police station, their retention there and their convictions for an administrative offence amounted to an unlawful and disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of peaceful assembly.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the nature and scope of the applicants\u2019 arguments and the authorities\u2019 reliance on the PEA\u2019s rules relating to group events, the Court finds it appropriate to examine this case under both Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, which read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 10<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority …<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime …\u201d<\/p>\n Article 11<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly …<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others…\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that they had participated in a spontaneous public protest against a draft statute prohibiting adoption of Russian children by United States nationals. The date of the examination of the draft law by the State Duma had been announced two days before. Given the minimum three-day notification period, there was no time to submit a notification before the protest. Those people who wanted to protest against the adoption of that law had no other choice but to hold solo \u201cpickets\u201d which did not require prior notification of the authorities. Although the protesters, including the applicants, had positioned themselves at a distance of more than fifty meters from each other, the authorities had regarded their solo demonstrations as a single public event, had stopped it, arrested the participants and fined them for participating in a public event held without prior notification.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicants had acted unlawfully by holding a public event without the authorities\u2019 approval. Its dispersal had therefore been lawful and justified. They disputed that the event held by the applicants could be qualified as genuinely spontaneous. The date of the examination of the draft law had indeed been announced two days before, making it impossible to submit a notification within the statutory time-limit. However, on that date the State Duma had examined the draft law at thesecond reading, while three readings were necessary for a law to be adopted. There had been sufficient time to organise a public event in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law before the third and final reading of the draft law by the State Duma. The facts of the present case had not disclosed special circumstances such as would warrant an immediate demonstration as the only adequate response. The applicants had therefore been lawfully fined for participating in a public event held without prior notification. The amount of fines had been reasonable.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The parties agreed that the termination of the applicants\u2019 participation in the event, their escorting to the police station, their retention there and their administrative conviction constituted an interference with their right to freedom of peaceful assembly and their right to freedom of expression.\u00a0Such interference constitutes breach of Articles\u00a010 and 11 of the Convention unless it is prescribed by law, pursues one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2 of each Article and is \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the \u201clawfulness\u201d requirement, the Court refers to its findings under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in paragraph 28 above relating to the applicants\u2019 escorting to the police station and retention there. The applicants submitted no convincing argument that other elements of the \u201cinterference\u201d as described in paragraph\u00a043 above had had no basis in the domestic law. Thus, the Court will focus in the present case on the arguments pertaining to other aspects of the applicable test, while having regard to the specific arguments raised by the parties.<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Solo demonstration<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0First of all, the Court has taken note of the applicants\u2019submission thatboth attempted to stage solo demonstrations, which happened to coincide as to the venue (the object being picketed) and the timing.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court refers to its findings made in Novikova and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 193 and 197-99) in relation to the PEA which, irrespective of a statutory distance requirement and compliance with it by simultaneous solo demonstrators, empowered courts to classify post factum a situation as a group event(the \u201creclassification rule\u201d under section 7(1.1) of the PEA) and, by implication, to punish for non-compliance with the prior notification procedure applicable to such event. In the Court\u2019s view, the intended statutory purposes (such as affording the authorities an opportunity to take timely and adequate measures to ensure the requisite order for running a given civic initiative and to secure public safety and protection of the rights of the event participants and others) would, normally, be fully attainable through the reasonable application of a distance requirement, without any \u201cpressing social need\u201d \u2013 relating to the pursuance of any particular legitimate aim such as the mentioned one \u2013 forapplyingthe \u201creclassification rule\u201d and for the related enforcement of the prior notification procedure.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0It is noted that there was no specific statutory distance requirement in Moscow prior to January 2013 (see paragraph 18 above). At the same time, the Court has no reason to doubt that each applicant was merely standing with a banner atsome \u2013 apparently, non-negligible \u2013 distance from other protestersin so far as it was practicable in the vicinity of the object being picketed, the State Duma; each applicant\u2019s expressive conduct was peaceful and non-disruptive. The domestic courts considered the situation as a singlegroup event in the form of a static demonstration. However, no compelling considerations relating to public safety, prevention of disorder or protection of the rights of others were at stake and relied upon whenusing this factual assertion for convicting each applicant specifically on account of the non-observance of the notification procedure and also when attributing an active role to at least one of them (see paragraphs 10, 12, 13 and 16 above). The only relevant consideration was the need to punish the unlawful conduct solely arising from the non-observance of the notification procedure. This was not sufficient in the absence of any aggravating element to justify the interference with the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of expression in the circumstances of the case.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Spontaneous assembly<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0Alternatively, should it be accepted as convincingly established that the applicants did indeed take part in an \u201cassembly\u201d (with each other and\/or others), seen in the context of Article 11 of the Convention, the present case falls within the scope of matters relating to so-called \u201cspontaneous assemblies\u201d. This specific matter was already examined by the Court in Lashmankin and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0443-52) and, as it happens, in relation to the very same factual background. The Court stated, in particular, that the PEA made no allowance for special circumstances, where an immediate response to a current event was warranted in the form of a spontaneous \u201cassembly\u201d within the meaning of Article 11 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicants wanted to protest against a draft law prohibiting the adoption of Russian children by US nationals. The date of the parliamentary examination of the draft law was announced two days before, making it impossible for the protesters to comply even with a three-day notification time-limit for \u201cpickets\u201d (see paragraphs 5-7 above). The failure to inform the public sufficiently in advance of the date of the parliamentary examination of the draft law therefore left the protesters with the option of either foregoing their right to peaceful assembly altogether, or of exercising it in defiance of the administrative requirements (see\u00a0Lashmankin and Others, cited above, \u00a7 453).<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0In the proceedings against each applicant the courts limited their assessment to establishing that he had taken part in a \u201cpicket\u201d held without prior notification and omitted to examine whether there had been special circumstances calling for an immediate response to a current event in the form of a spontaneous assembly and justifying derogation from the strict application of the notification time-limits (see paragraphs 12-13 above). In the absence of proper judicial review of these issues in the CAO cases or separate proceedings, the Court cannot speculate as to whether the facts of the present case disclosed such special circumstances to which the only adequate response was an immediate assembly. For their part, the Governmenthave not given any convincing reason why it should have been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d to make no exceptions to the application of the notification procedure, including its requirement of specific time-limits for notification, where it is impossible to comply with such time-limits. In the Court\u2019s view, the automatic and inflexible application of the notification time-limits without any regard to the specific circumstances of the present case amounted to an interference which was not justified under Article 11 \u00a7 2 of the Convention (see\u00a0Lashmankin and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0473 and 475).<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the findings in paragraphs28, 47and 50 above, the Court considers that the respondent Statebreached the requirements of Article 11 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, seen in the light of Article 10.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention in respect of each applicant.<\/p>\n V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0Each applicant claimed 12,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.Mr Torchinskiy also claimed 10,000 Russian roubles (RUB)in respect of pecuniary damage representing the fine he had paid.<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claims for non-pecuniary damage as excessive. As regards the claim for pecuniary damage, they submitted that the fine had been imposed lawfully on Mr Torchinskiy for an administrative offence.<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that there is a direct causal link between the finding of a violation under Article 11 of the Convention and the fine Mr\u00a0Torchinskiy had paid (see, for similar reasoning, Lashmankin and Others,\u00a7 515, and Novikova and Others,\u00a7 232, both cited above). The Court therefore awards Mr TorchinskiyEUR 144 in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the nature and scope of the violations of Articles\u00a05, 6 and 11 of the Convention in respect of each applicant and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards each applicant EUR 10,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0Each applicant also claimed EUR 8,500 for legal representation before the Court and EUR 32 for postal expenses. The applicants presented copies of legal services agreements and postal bills, and asked that their legal fees for representation be paid directly to the bank account of their representative Mr Terekhov.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the amounts of legal fees for representation before the Court were excessive and unreasonable, and that the postal bills did not contain an indication that the mail was addressed to the Court.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Regard being had to the above criteria and the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award a lump sum of EUR\u00a03,000 relating to the legal representation of both applicants, plus any taxes that may be chargeable, payable to the bank account of Mr Terekhov, and to award each applicant EUR 32 in respect of postal expenses.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe complaints raised under Article 5 \u00a7 1, Article 6 \u00a7 1 as regards the lack of a prosecuting party at the court hearings in the administrative proceedings, and under Article 11 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the applicationsinadmissible;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of each applicant;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the requirement of objective impartiality in respect of each applicant;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention in respect of each applicant;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay, within three monthsthe following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 144 (one hundred and forty four euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to Mr Torchinskiyin respect of pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount, to each applicant in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (iii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants,in respect of the legal representation, payable to the bank account of their representative Mr\u00a0Terekhov;<\/p>\n (iv)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 32 (thirty-two euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount, to each applicant in respect of postal expenses;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 April 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Fato\u015f Arac\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Helen Keller
\nPere Pastor Vilanova,
\nMar\u00eda El\u00f3segui, judges,
\nand Fato\u015f Arac\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n