THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF ANGIROV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
\n(Application no. 30395\/06)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nThis judgment was revised in accordance with Rule 80 of the Rules of Court in\u00a0a\u00a0judgment of 9October 2018
\nSTRASBOURG
\n17 April 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Angirov and Others v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Helen Keller, President, Having deliberated in private on 27 March 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 30395\/06) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by twenty-four Russian nationals, whose names and dates of birth are listed in the Appendix, on 8 July 2006.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were represented by Mr D. Agranovskiy, a lawyer practising in the Moscow Region. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr\u00a0G.\u00a0Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 November 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Events leading to the applicants\u2019 arrest and prosecution<\/strong><\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were members of the National Bolsheviks Party.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 December 2004 a group of about forty Party members, including the applicants, entered the waiting area of the President\u2019s Administration building in Moscow and locked themselves in an office on the ground floor.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0They asked for a meeting with the President, the deputy head of the President\u2019s Administration Mr Surkov, and the President\u2019s economic advisor Mr\u00a0Illarionov. They waved placards with \u201cPutin, resign!\u201d (\u00ab\u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d, \u0443\u0439\u0434\u0438!\u00bb) written on them through the window and distributed leaflets with a printed address to the President that listed ten aspects in which he failed to respect the Russian Constitution, and a call for his resignation.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0The intruders stayed in the office for one hour and a half until the police broke through the door and arrested them.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Criminal proceedings against the applicants<\/strong><\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 December 2004 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicants\u2019 custody.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 and 16 February 2005 the applicantswere charged with participation in mass disorders, an offence under Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. According to the statement of the charges, at 12.30 p.m. on 14\u00a0December 2004 forty Party members had effected an unauthorised entry into the reception area of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. They had pushed away the guards at the entrance, knocked over two metal detectors and occupied room no. 14 on the ground floor. They had locked themselves in and blocked the door with a heavy safe. Until the arrival of the police, the Party members, including the applicants, had waved anti\u2011President placards through the office window, thrown out leaflets and chanted slogans calling for the President\u2019s resignation. They had stayed in the office for approximately one hour, destroyed office furniture and equipment and damaged the walls and the ceiling.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 June 2005 thirty-nine persons, including the applicants, were committed for trial before the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 June 2005 the Tverskoy District Court held a preliminary hearing. The court ordered, in particular, that all defendants should remain in custody pending trial.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0The trial started on 8 July 2005. Hearings were held on 11, 14, 27 and 29\u00a0July, 1, 3, 10, 12, 15, 19, 22, 23, 29 and 31 August, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27 and 30 September, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 17 and 24\u00a0October and 15, 16, 17, 18, 21 and 22 November 2005. Hearings often continued until late in the evening.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicants, the fast pace of the trial, coupled with the remand centre regulations prohibiting visits on weekends and allowing counsel to see no more than one client per day, prevented them from having a sufficient number of consultations with their counsel.On 1, 2 and 5\u00a0September 2005 the applicants asked the court that hearings be held less frequently. They complained that they were tired because on the hearing days they had to get up early. They could not consult a doctor as they left for the courthouse before the facility doctor\u2019s opening hours. They also often left the detention facility before breakfast and returned after supper. They did not therefore receive regular food. Nor could they have a walk in the exercise yard. Finally, they did not have sufficient time for meetings with counsel or relatives. The court rejected their requests and continued to schedule hearings almost every day.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 September 2005 counsel unsuccessfully complained, relying on Article 6 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention, that because of the frequent hearings they did not have sufficient time to meet with the defendants and prepare their defence.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0While in the courtroom the defendants were held in four metal cages. Counsel tables were placed at a distance of about 1.5 to 2 m from the cages. Police guards were stationed between the cages and the counsel tables. The applicants submitted a courtroom plan and photographs confirming that arrangement.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicants, in the courtroom they could confer with their counsel only during short (two to five minutes)breaks in the hearings. The guards allowed only two counsel to approach the cages at the same time. Given that there were thirty-nine defendants and twenty-four counsel, the defendants could not effectively discuss the case with their counsel. The guards remained near the cages all the time and could hear the applicants\u2019 consultations with their counsel.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The defendants asked the judge that conditions be provided in the courtroom for their confidential consultations with counsel. The prosecutor objected, claiming that the defendants could meet their counsel in private in the detention facility. The judge rejected the defendants\u2019 request, finding that the courtroom was not designed for confidential consultations with counsel. The defendants\u2019 meeting with counsel could be held in \u201csome other places\u201d.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0During the trial the applicants and their co-defendants stated that they had taken part in a peaceful protest against President Putin\u2019s politics. They had come to the President\u2019s Administration to meet the officials and hand over a petition that listed the President\u2019s ten failures to comply with the Constitution and contained a call for his resignation. They had entered the waiting area and, as the guards had attempted to stop them and had threatened them with violence, had locked themselves in an office on the ground floor. They had chanted slogans and distributed leaflets thereby expressing their opinion about important political issues. They denied destroying any furniture or offering resistance to the police. They claimed that the furniture had been destroyed by the guards and the police officers who had arrested them.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The guards and the police officers testified that the defendants had forced their passage into the building by knocking down two metal detectors and had locked themselves up in one of the offices. They had resisted the attempts to force the door. After the door had been forced, the witnesses had seen that the furniture in the office had been damaged. As the defendants had refused to leave the office, they had been dragged out by force.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0Counsel for the defendants asked the guards questions about the names and positions of the persons who had given orders during the arrest operation, the number of persons involved in the arrest operation, the witnesses\u2019 exact positions and duties and about the substance of the orders they had received from their superiors. The witnesses refused to reply referring to the confidential nature of that information.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0Counsel asked the judge to take measures provided by law, such as a fine, in order to compel the witnesses to reply to the questions. They also asked that the questioning be continued in camera, given that confidential information was to be discussed. They argued that the questions were relevant and important for the defence because it was necessary to understand whether the police and the guards had acted within their powers. The judge rejected their requests, finding that there was no reason to believe that State secrets would be revealed during the questioning of the witnesses. In any event, the questions put by the defence were irrelevant.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 December 2005 the Tverskoy District Court found the applicants and their co-defendants guilty of participation in mass disorders. It held as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c[The defendants], acting in conspiracy, committed serious breaches of public safety and order by disregarding established norms of conduct and showing manifest disrespect for society… They effected an unauthorised entry into the reception area of the President of the Russian Federation\u2019s Administration building and took over office no. 14 on the ground floor… They then blocked the door with a heavy metal safe and conducted an unauthorised meeting, during which they waved the National Bolsheviks Party flag and placards, threw anti-[Putin] leaflets out [of windows] and issued an unlawful ultimatum by calling for the President\u2019s resignation, thereby destabilising the normal functioning of the President\u2019s Administration and preventing its reception personnel from performing their service duties, namely … reception of members of the public and examination of applications from citizens of the Russian Federation…<\/p>\n While performing the above disorderly acts [the defendants] … destroyed and damaged property in the offices of the reception area of the President\u2019s Administration building…\u201d<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the defendants had voluntary compensated the pecuniary damage caused by their actions and taking into account their positive references, the court sentenced the majority of them to various terms of imprisonment (ranging from one year and six months to three years) conditional on two or three years\u2019 probation. They were immediately released. Eight defendants, including five applicants (Mr Osnach, Mr\u00a0Reznichenko, Ms\u00a0Ryabtseva, Mr Tonkikh and Ms Chernova), were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from two years to three years and six monthswithout remission. The court found that those defendants could not be released on probation, taking into account their active role in the commission of the offence, negative references and the fact that some of them had been earlier charged with administrative or criminal offences which however did not result in convictions.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants appealed. They complained, in particular, that their defence rights had been substantially curtailed. They also submitted that when determining the sentences the trial court had unlawfully taken into account the defendants\u2019 respective roles in the commission of the imputed offence, given that the charges brought against them were identically phrased and that the role and actions of each defendant had not been detailed.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 March 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld the conviction on appeal, finding that the charges had been brought in accordance with the procedure provided by law and the defence rights had been respected.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0Participation in mass disorder accompanied by violence, riots, arson, destruction of property, use of firearms or explosives or armed resistance to the authorities is punishable by three to eight years\u2019imprisonment (Article\u00a0212 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Criminal Code).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their arrest, the detention pending trial and the sentence imposed on them at the end of the criminal proceedings had violated their right to freedom of expression under Article\u00a010 of the Convention and their right to freedom of assembly under Article 11 of the Convention. These Articles read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 10<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 11<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantssubmitted that their protest action had been a peaceful one. The participants had entered the President\u2019s Administration building with the aim of handing over a petitionaddressed to the President\u2019s Advisor and of drawing his attention to human rights violations in Russia. They had not destroyed any property; the property had been in fact damaged by the arresting police officers. The participants in the protest had moreover compensated the damage in full. In those circumstances, their arrest, remand in custody for a year and the sentences imposed on them had been disproportionate to any legitimate aim.They had been persecuted for their political opinion and their membership of an opposition association.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants, together with other members of the National Bolsheviks Party, had effected a forcible and unauthorised entry into the premises of the President\u2019s Administration, had held an unauthorised assembly there, had voiced unlawful demands for the President\u2019s resignation, had hampered the normal functioning of the President\u2019s Administration and had destroyed State property there. Their protest had not been peaceful and had amounted to a criminal offence of mass disorder. They had been therefore lawfully prosecuted for participation in mass disorder involving destruction of State property. Their arrest, detention and conviction had pursued the legitimate aimof investigating criminal offences and punishing those responsible and had been necessary in a democratic society.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already examined the case of the applicants\u2019co-protestor and co-defendant Ms Taranenko and found that her pre-trial detention and the penalty imposed on herat the end of it amounted to an interference with her rights under Article 10 of the Convention interpreted in the light of Article 11 and that that interference was not necessary in a democratic society. In particular, the Court found that the actions of the police in arresting the protesters and removing them from the President\u2019s Administration\u2019s premises might be considered as justified by the demands of the protection of public order. However, bearing in mind the length of the detention pending trial and the exceptional seriousness of the penalty imposed on Mr Taranenko, the pre-trial detention and the sanction were not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see Taranenko v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a019554\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 68-97, 15 May 2014).<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court sees no reason to\u00a0reach a different conclusion in the present case. For the reasons stated in detail in Taranenko (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a076-79), it finds that the arrest of the protesters, including the applicants, and their removal from the President\u2019s Administration\u2019s premises by the police may be considered as answering a \u201cpressing social need\u201d. On the other hand, for the reasons also stated in Taranenko (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a090-97), the Court finds that, although a sanction for the applicants\u2019 actions might have been warranted by the demands of public order,the lengthy period of detention pending trial and the long prison sentences imposed on them were not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Indeed, like Ms Taranenko, the applicants in the present case were also remanded in custody for a year and were convicted either to long suspended prison sentences or to long prison sentences without remission which were actually served. It is significant in this connection that none of the applicants was accused of any use or threat of violence against individuals or infliction of any bodily harm to anyone. Nor did the domestic courts establish whether any of the applicants had personally participated in damaging State property or had committed any other reprehensible act. It is also significant that before the end of the trial the defendants compensated all the pecuniary damage caused by their protest action.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, and especially bearing in mind the length of the pre-trial detention and the exceptional seriousness of the sanctions involved, the Court finds that the interference in question was not necessary in a democratic society.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention interpreted in the light of Article 11 in respect of each applicant.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted a number of complaints under Article 6 of the Convention referring to various aspects of their trial. They relied on Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 3 (a) \u2013 (d) of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;<\/p>\n (d)\u00a0\u00a0to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him…\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the proceedings in their criminal case had fallen short of important guarantees of a fair hearing.They referred, in particular, to their confinement in metal cages during the court hearings and the intensive schedule of those hearings, and alleged that they had not had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and for confidential consultations with their counsel. They also complained that they had not been informed in sufficient detail about the nature and cause of the accusations against them as the charges had been identically phrased and the role and actions of each defendant had not been detailed. They further complained that their relatives and members of Parliament had not been permitted to represent them during the trial. The also alleged that the trial court had not taken measures to make witnesses reply to the questions put to them by the applicants\u2019 counsel. Lastly, the applicants complained that the assessment of evidence by the domestic courts had been biased.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the charges against all the defendants had been worded identically because they had been charged with participating in mass disorders. They had acted concertedly and with premeditation to achieve a common result. The role and personality of each of them had been however taken into account in the different sentences imposed on them. The Government further argued that the applicants\u2019 complaints about the lack of adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and for confidential consultations with their counsel had been unsubstantiated. The schedule of the court hearings had not been excessively intensive and there had been spare days when the applicants could rest, meet with their counsel and prepare their defence. The applicants had engaged professional counsel; they were not entitled under the domestic law to be represented by a relative or a member of Parliament in addition to being represented by a professional lawyer. The witnesses had been informed of their obligation to give testimony and about the legal provisions imposing liability for false testimony or refusal to testify.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an accused\u2019s right to communicate with his lawyer without the risk of being overheard by a third party is one of the basic requirements of a fair trial in a democratic society; otherwise legal assistance would lose much of its usefulness (see Sakhnovskiy v. Russia, no.\u00a021272\/03, \u00a7\u00a097, 5 February 2009, with further references).<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the courtroom security arrangements used in the present case were similar to those which the Court had criticised in the cases of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedevv. Russia (nos. 11082\/06 and\u00a013772\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0646\u201147, 25\u00a0July 2013) and Yaroslav Belousovv. Russia(nos. 2653\/13 and 60980\/14, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0145-54, 4 October 2016). Like in those two cases, the courtroom arrangements in the present case(see paragraphs 15 to 17 above) made it impossible for the applicants to have confidential exchanges with their legal counsel, to whom they could only speak during short breaks and in close proximity to the police guards. It is significant that the use of the security installation was not warranted by any specific security risks or courtroom order issues but was a matter of routine. The trial court did not seem to recognise the impact of those courtroom arrangements on the applicants\u2019 defence rights, and did not take any measures to compensate for those limitations. Such circumstances prevailed for the entire duration of the first-instance hearing, which lasted for five months and during whichmost of the communication between the applicants and their lawyers took place in the courtroom (see paragraphs 12 to 14 above).<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that during the first-instance hearing the applicants suffered from unnecessary restrictions of their right to confidential communication with their lawyers, and that the secrecy of their communications was interfered with in a manner incompatible with Article\u00a06 \u00a7 3 (c) of the Convention. There was therefore a breach of Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention on that account.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0In view of this finding, the Court does not consider it necessary to address the remainder of the applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and\u00a03 of the Convention (see Yaroslav Belousov, cited above, \u00a7 154).<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that they had been exhausted by the fast pace of the first-instance hearing. In particular, because of the busy hearing schedule they had not had enough sleep, regular food or outdoor exercise, had been unable to consult a doctor or meet relatives.Article 3 reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that first-instance hearing ended on 8 December 2005. The applicants lodged their application with the Court on 8 July 2006, that is to say more than six months later. The Court considers that the applicants did not comply with the six-month time-limit. It follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected, in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 1,000,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the claims were excessive.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicants EUR 12,500each in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court refers to its settled case-law to the effect that when an applicant has suffered an infringement of his rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position in which he would have been had the requirements of that provision not been disregarded, and that the most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be the reopening of the proceedings, if requested (see, mutatis mutandis, \u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221\/99, \u00a7 210 in fine, ECHR 2005\u2011IV, and Sakhnovskiy, cited above, \u00a7 112). This applies to the applicant in the present case. The Court notes, in this connection, that Article 413 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a basis for the reopening of the proceedings if the Court finds a violation of the Convention.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not claim costs and expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to make an award under this head.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaints concerning the alleged violations of the right to fair trial and alleged interference with the applicants\u2019 rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there is no need to examine the remaining complaints under Article 6 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay each applicant, within three months,EUR 12,500 (twelve thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent Stateat the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 April 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Fato\u015f Arac\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Helen Keller <\/p>\n APPENDIX<\/p>\n
\nPere Pastor Vilanova,
\nMar\u00eda El\u00f3segui, judges,
\nand Fato\u015f Arac\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n\n\n
\n No.<\/strong><\/td>\n Name<\/strong><\/td>\n Year of birth<\/strong><\/td>\n Place of residence<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 1.<\/td>\n Mr Vladimir Valeryevich Angirov<\/td>\n 1985<\/td>\n Volgograd<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n Mr Aleksey Vladimirovich Kolunov<\/td>\n 1983<\/td>\n Moscow<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n Mr Kirill Viktorovich Manulin<\/td>\n 1985<\/td>\n Moscow<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n Mr Sergey Yevgenyevich Reznichenko<\/td>\n 1982<\/td>\n Moscow<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 5.<\/td>\n Ms Natalya Yuryevna Chernova<\/td>\n 1980<\/td>\n Moscow<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 6.<\/td>\n Mr Ivan Stanislavovich Korolev<\/td>\n 1982<\/td>\n Moscow<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 7.<\/td>\n Mr Semen Viktorovich Vyatkin<\/td>\n 1984<\/td>\n Yekaterinburg<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 8.<\/td>\n Mr Aleksey Sergeyevich Zentsov<\/td>\n 1982<\/td>\n Novosibirsk<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 9.<\/td>\n Ms Lira Nikolayevna Guskova<\/td>\n 1982<\/td>\n Kazan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 10.<\/td>\n Mr Ivan Fedorovich Drozdov<\/td>\n 1984<\/td>\n the Moscow Region<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 11.<\/td>\n Mr Vladimir Yaapovich Lind<\/td>\n 1981<\/td>\n St Petersburg<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 12.<\/td>\n Mr Mikhail Michaylovich Gangan<\/td>\n 1986<\/td>\n Samara<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 13.<\/td>\n Mr Damir Safayevich Valeyev<\/td>\n 1983<\/td>\n Moscow<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 14.<\/td>\n Mr Aleksey Petrovich Devyatkin<\/td>\n 1987<\/td>\n Nizhny Novgorod<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 15.<\/td>\n Mr Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Korolev<\/td>\n 1985<\/td>\n Moscow<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 16.<\/td>\n Mr Denis Leonidovich Kumirov<\/td>\n 1984<\/td>\n Samara<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 17.<\/td>\n Ms Yelena Michaylovna Mironycheva<\/td>\n 1982<\/td>\n Nizhny Novgorod<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 18.<\/td>\n Mr Denis Sergeyevich Osnach<\/td>\n 1982<\/td>\n the Kaliningrad Region<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 19.<\/td>\n Mr Yulian Sergeyevich Ryabtsev<\/td>\n 1983<\/td>\n Nizhniy Novgorod<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 20.<\/td>\n Mr Yuriy Viktorovich Staroverov<\/td>\n 1982<\/td>\n Nizhniy Novgorod<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 21.<\/td>\n Mr Aleksey Konstantinovich Tonkikh<\/td>\n 1973<\/td>\n Orenburg<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 22.<\/td>\n Mr Vladimir Konstantinovich Tyurin<\/td>\n 1984<\/td>\n Moscow<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 23.<\/td>\n Mr Maksim Leonidovich Fedorovykh<\/td>\n 1980<\/td>\n the Sverdlovskiy Region<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 24.<\/td>\n Mr Sergey Yuryevich Ryzhikov<\/td>\n 1983<\/td>\n Moscow<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n