THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF RUBTSOV AND BALAYAN v. RUSSIA
\n(Applications nos. 33707\/14 and 3762\/15)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n10 April 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n10\/07\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Rubtsov and Balayan v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Helena J\u00e4derblom, President, Having deliberated in private on 20 March 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in two applications (nos.\u00a033707\/14 and 3762\/15) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by Russian nationals, Mr Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Rubtsov and Mr Gagik Borikovich Balayan (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on 21 April 2014 and 18\u00a0February 2015 respectively.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were represented by lawyers practising in Moscow, Mr\u00a0F.S. Shishov and Mr\u00a0D.R. Kevorkov respectively. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mr\u00a0G.\u00a0Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention that their detention had been unlawful. The first applicant also complained under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention that he had been held in pre-trial detention and under house arrest without relevant and sufficient reasons.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 2\u00a0June 2016 the above complaints were communicated to the Government and the remainingparts of the applications were declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were born in 1965 and 1966 respectively and live in Moscow.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 33707\/14,Rubtsov v. Russia<\/strong><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, who was one ofthe indirect beneficial owners of a company, arrangedfor it to be soldto another company. On 1\u00a0October 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud through the executionof a sham sales contract. It was alleged, in particular, that the company purchasing the applicant\u2019s company also belonged to the applicant and the price it paid had been unrealistically low.On 3\u00a0October 2013 the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe Taganskiy District Court\u201d)held a hearing to determine a preventive measure in respect of the applicant. The latter arguedthat he should not be detained by reliance on Article 108\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d),which prohibits the remanding in custody of people suspected or accused of offences committed within the sphere of their business activities. The Taganskiy District Court dismissed that argument in the following terms:<\/p>\n \u201c… [the applicant] is suspected of having committed a serious offence aimed at making a profit which was unconnected to any business activity and had been organised by a group of people;[the offence being] punishable with up to ten years\u2019 imprisonment,some of the accomplices have not yet been identified and arrested.\u201d<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 21\u00a0October 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 28\u00a0November 2013 and 27 January 2014 the Taganskiy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention, repeating its previous findings. On 27\u00a0December 2013 and 18 April 2014 respectively the Moscow City Court upheld the above detention extensions on appeal.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 28\u00a0March 2014 the Ostankinskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe Ostankinskiy District Court\u201d) further extended the applicant\u2019s detention. As regards Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP, the District Court stated as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe court dismisses the arguments of the defence and of [the applicant] himself that the offence of which he is accused was committed within the sphere of his business activity because, according to the current bill of indictment, he is accused of having committed an offence motivated by profit with the aim of misappropriating another\u2019s property by way of deception or abuse of trust, using an organised group, and on a particularly large scale. The court therefore concludes that the offence imputed to [the applicant] was not connected to the carrying out of a business activity, which is an independent activity undertaken at one\u2019s own risk with the aim of obtaining regular revenues from the use of possessions, the sale of goods, or the performance of works or services by people registered in such a capacity in accordance with the law.\u201d<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 14\u00a0May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld on appeal the detention extension order of 28\u00a0March 2014. It held that the first-instance court had examined and dismissed with proper substantiation the applicant\u2019s argument that his alleged offence had been committed within the sphere of his business activity.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 10\u00a0April 2015 the Moscow City Court granted bail to the applicant.Upon deposit of the bail sum on 17\u00a0April 2015 theapplicant was released.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 3762\/15,Balayan v. Russia<\/strong><\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 15\u00a0September 2014 a criminal investigation was opened into the misappropriation of the funds of an insolvent bank. On 23\u00a0September 2014 the applicant, who owned the bank, was arrested on suspicion of having transferred money out of the bank\u2019s account by acquiring unsecured promissory notes.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 September 2014 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe Tverskoy District Court\u201d) authorised the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant argued that he should not be detained, inter alia, because he was suspected of an offence committed within the sphere of his business activity. The Tverskoy District Court rejected the argument as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c… the court takes the view that, as can be seen from the evidence in the case, the method and circumstances described in the decision to initiate the criminal investigation, and the actions of [the applicant] in misappropriating the funds in this case are not related to [a business] activity as defined in Article 2 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation\u201d.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 10\u00a0November 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that his alleged offences had been committed within the sphere of his business activity. In particular, the Moscow City Court held as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c… the action of committing an offence by using another\u2019s funds and taking on obligations to the Bank\u2019s clients without any intention to comply with them, cannot be considered to be a business activity.\u201d<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Code of Criminal Procedure<\/strong><\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 108 \u00a7 1, detention on remand could be ordered by a court in respect of people suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence punishable by more than three years\u2019 imprisonment, provided that it was not possible to apply a less restrictive preventive measure. People suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence punishable by shorter terms of imprisonment could still be remanded in custody in exceptional circumstances, notably if they had no permanent place of residence, if their identity had not been established, or if they had breached a previously imposed preventive measure or had absconded.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 9\u00a0April 2010 a new Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 entered into force:<\/p>\n \u201c1.1. The preventive measure of detention on remand shall not be applied to a person suspected or accused of having committed offences set down in Articles\u00a0159 [fraud], 160 [misappropriation of funds], 165 [causing of pecuniary damage by way of deception or abuse of trust] [of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation], if these offences have been committed within the sphere of that person\u2019s business activity, […] and none of the [exceptional] circumstances indicated in […Article 108] \u00a7 1 […] is present.\u201d<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0Since 29\u00a0November 2012 an amendment to Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 has been in force which also includes people suspected or accused of the various types of fraud introduced by new Articles 159.1-159.6 of the Criminal Code.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Practice of domestic courts<\/strong><\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0By Ruling no. 15 of 10\u00a0June 2010 the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Russia amended its earlier Ruling no. 22 of 29\u00a0October 2009 \u201cOn the Practice of the Application by the Courts of Preventive Measures in the Form of Detention on Remand, Bail and House Arrest\u201d. In particular, itadded the following paragraph:<\/p>\n \u201c4.1. […] the offences laid down by Articles 159, 160 and 165 of the Criminal Code of Russia should be considered as having been committed within the sphere of business activity if they were committed by people carrying out a business activity or participating in a business activity and the offences were directly related to that activity.<\/p>\n In determining whether an activity is a business activity, the courts should be guided by Article 2 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, according to which a business activity is an independent activity carried out at one\u2019s own risk with the aim of obtaining regular revenues from the use of possessions, the sale of goods, or the performance of works or services by people registered in such a capacity in accordance with the law.\u201d<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 December 2013 the Plenary of the Supreme Court issued a new ruling (no. 41) \u201cOn the Practice of the Application by the Courts of Preventive Measures in the Form of Detention on Remand, Bail and House Arrest\u201d. The new ruling repealed the previous ones (see paragraph\u00a018 above) andheld as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c7.\u00a0\u00a0… when deciding on the question of the detention on remand of a person suspected or accused of offences set down in Articles 159-159.6, 160 and 165 of the CCRF, a court should always establish the sphere of activity in which the offence was committed. […]<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0In determining whether an activity is a business activity, the courts should be guided by Article 2 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, according to which a business activity is an independent activity carried out at one\u2019s own risk with the aim of obtaining regular revenues from the use of possessions, the sale of goods, or the performance of works or services by people registered in such a capacity in accordance with the law.<\/p>\n […] the offences set down in Articles 159-159.6, 160 and 165 of the CCRF should be considered as having been committed within the sphere of a business activity if they have been committed by a person carrying out a business activity independently or participating in the business activity of a legal entity, and the offences are directly connected with the said activity. Such people include individual businessmen who commit the offences while carrying out their business activity or managing their possessions used for the performance of the business activity, as well as members of the management of a commercial company while using their powers to direct the company or while the company is carrying out its business activity.\u201d<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 15\u00a0November 2016 the Plenary of the Supreme Court issued Ruling no. 48 \u201cOn the Practice of the Application by the Courts of Legal Provisions Regulating Criminal Liability for Offences Committed in the Sphere of Business and Economic Activities\u201d. The Plenary of the Supreme Court reiterated that when the national courts were to rule on the detention on remand of a person suspected or accused of offences set down in Articles 159\u00a0\u00a7\u00a71-4, 159.1-159.3, 159.5, 159.6, 160 and 165 of the CCRF, they should always have determined whether or not the offence had been committed within the sphere of a business activity.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0In its review of 18\u00a0January 2017 of the national courts\u2019 practice as regards the application of preventive measures, the Plenary of the Supreme Court stressed the courts\u2019 obligation to establish whether or not the offence had been committed within the sphere of a business activity. The Plenary of the Supreme Court noted that the national courts had not always provided reasons for their finding that a particular offence had not been committed within the sphere of a business activity. The Plenary of the Supreme Court further mentioned that sometimes the national courts had ignored the defence arguments on the matter,which had led to the unlawful placement in custody of people who should not have been detained and even to extensions of the detention of such people.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0By its Ruling no. 33 of 3\u00a0October 2017, the Plenary of the Supreme Court again brought to the attention of the national courts the need to assess in detail all the arguments and supporting evidence relating to offences allegedly committed in the business sphere and the applicability of Article\u00a0108\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01.1 of the CCrP.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of the Court, the Court decides to examine the applications in a single judgment, given their similar factual and legal background (see\u00a0Kazakevich and other \u201cArmy Pensioners\u201d cases v. Russia, nos. 14290\/03 and 9 others, \u00a7 15, 14 January 2010).<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their detention was unlawful under Article 5 of the Convention. In particular, they claimed that by virtue of Article 108\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01.1 of the CCrP, they should not have been placed in custody because the offences imputed to them had been committed within the sphere of their business activities. However, the national courts dismissed their argument under Article 108\u00a01.1 of the CCrP without providing any reasons. The first applicant also complained about his excessively long and unreasonable pre-trial detention. The applicants invoked Article 5 of the Convention which provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: […]<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; […]<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. […]\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 detention was lawful. In particular, Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP was not applicable to the applicants because their offences were clearly unrelated to business activities. They referred to the explanations given by the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Russia in its respective rulings (see paragraphs18-19above).<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the same rulings of the Supreme Court of Russia, the applicants asserted that they had performed the actions imputed to them while managing the business activity of their commercial enterprises. In particular, the first applicant was accused of fraud in relation to the sale of shares by a commercial company in which he was a majority shareholder.The second applicant was charged with fraud in relation to the purchase of promissory notes executed byhis bank. The applicants claimed that their alleged offences had been committed within the sphere oftheir business activity and that,by virtue of Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP,they should therefore not have been placed in detention on remand.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes thatthe present cases focus on the issue of the applicability of Article 108\u00a0\u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP. It should be mentioned thatnone of the exceptional circumstances enumerated in Article\u00a0108\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the CCrP (see paragraph\u00a015 above)wasreferred to by the national authorities to justify the inapplicability of Article 108\u00a0\u00a7 1.1of the CCrP to the applicants\u2019 situations. The sole disagreement between the parties was the questionof whether or not the applicants\u2019 alleged offences had been committed within the sphere of their business activities.If they were, the applicants could not have been detained by virtue of Article\u00a0108 \u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP which, as noted above, prohibited theremanding in custody of people suspected or accused ofoffences committed within the sphere of business activities. The provision itself did not define the concept of a \u201cbusiness activity\u201d. Two months after Article\u00a0108 \u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP entered into force, the Supreme Court of Russia instructed the national courts to be guided by the definition of a \u201cbusiness activity\u201d given by the Civil Code of Russia (see paragraph\u00a018 above).<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP, together with the Supreme Court\u2019s instruction regarding the concept of a \u201cbusiness activity\u201d was included in Russian criminal procedure only in 2010. Thus, at the material time of the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention (2013-2014), the legal rule as a whole was relatively recent and the pertinent case-law was arguably not abundant. It was up to the national courts to dissipate any interpretational doubts regarding the rule\u2019s application (see Rekv\u00e9nyi v.\u00a0Hungary [GC], no. 25390\/94, \u00a7 34, ECHR 1999\u2011III,Navalnyye v. Russia, no.\u00a0101\/15, \u00a7 55, 17 October 2017).<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is not its task to replace the national authorities, which are better placed to interpret national legislation, to examine all the circumstances of a case and to take all the necessary decisions, including those in respect of detention on remand (see, for instance, Murray v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1994, \u00a7 66, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0300\u2011A;B\u0105k v. Poland, no. 7870\/04, \u00a7 59, 16 January 2007;and Kotov v.\u00a0Russia [GC], no.\u00a054522\/00, \u00a7 122, 3 April 2012). It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in those domestic courts\u2019 detention decisions that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0152, ECHR 2000\u2011IV, andSta\u0161aitis v. Lithuania, no.\u00a047679\/99, \u00a7 82, 21 March 2002).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the national courts rejected the applicants\u2019 argument that their offences had been committed within the business sphere. However, even if they did refer to or cite Article 2 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code of Russia and its definition of a \u201cbusiness activity\u201d, they did not distil the constituent elements of that concept and did not compare those to the particular facts of the applicants\u2019 cases (see, by contrast, W\u0142och v. Poland, no.\u00a027785\/95, \u00a7\u00a0114, ECHR 2000\u2011XI). In respect of the first applicant, who was suspected of defrauding his partners by arranging the sale of their company to him alone, the national courts simply stated that his offence was not connected with his business activity, without any apparent analysis. In respect of the second applicant, whose private bank had allegedly acquired unsecured promissory notes to transfer the money out of the bank\u2019s account, the national courts refused to apply Article\u00a0108\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01.1, referring to the \u201cmethod and circumstances\u201d of his alleged offence (see paragraphs 13-14 above), again without any further explanation. Based on the above, the Court considers that the national courts failed to explain their decision not to apply Article\u00a0108\u00a0\u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP in the light of the specific facts of the applicants\u2019 cases.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not deny that there may have existed reasons why the national courts did not consider the applicants\u2019 alleged offences as having been committed in the sphere of their business activities. However, even if such reasons existed, they were not set out in the relevant domestic decisions (see, mutatis mutandis, Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977\/96, \u00a7 86, 26\u00a0July 2001). The Court also notes in this respect the latest recommendations of the Supreme Court of Russia to the national courts to pay special attention to and examine in detail the arguments and supporting evidence on the matter of the applicability of Article 108\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01.1 of the CCrP (see paragraphs 20-22 above).<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0The first-instance courts\u2019 failure to explain the reasons for the inapplicability of Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP prevented the applicants from filing a meaningful appeal in that respect (see Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801\/97, \u00a7 37, 1 July 2003, andIgnatenco v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 36988\/07, \u00a7\u00a077, 8 February 2011). As a result, the applicants\u2019 allegations that their alleged offences fell within the sphere oftheir business activitiesand that Article 108 \u00a7 1.1 of the CCrP was therefore applicable to their situations remained unexplored by the national courts.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the absence of reasoning in a detention order may demonstrate its arbitrariness and therefore give rise to a violation of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention (see Sta\u0161aitis, cited above, \u00a7 67). At the same time, Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention is mostly concerned with the existence of a lawful basis for a detention within criminal proceedings, whereas the possible justifications for such detention fall under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention (see Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, no.\u00a05829\/04, \u00a7\u00a0165, 31\u00a0May 2011).<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the detention orders in the present case had a legal basis and contained at least some reasoning, even if, as the applicants argued, that reasoning was flawed or insufficient. Thus, it cannot be said that the applicants\u2019 detention was unlawful under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. As for the relevance and sufficiency of the reasons given by the national courts, the Court considers it more appropriate to examine the matter under Article 5 \u00a7 3 (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no.\u00a023755\/07, \u00a7 61, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has established (see paragraph 30 above), the national courts provided little or no explanation with reference to the specific facts of the applicants\u2019 cases as to why they refused to apply Article 108\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01.1 of the CCrP, which could arguably have shielded them from detention on remand. Thus, the Court considers that the authorities failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above finding, the Court considers it unnecessary to assess separately the first applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention concerning the relevance and sufficiency of the reasons given by the domestic courts for his continued detention.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed pecuniary damage (loss of salary) in the amount of 6,480,000 of Russian roubles (about 97,000 euros (EUR)). He also claimed EUR 1,500,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant claimed EUR 100,000 for pecuniary damage (loss of income) and another EUR 100,000 for non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government requested that, if a violation of the Convention were to be found, just compensation in accordance with the Court\u2019s case\u2011law be awarded to the applicants.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants\u2019 claims in respect of pecuniary damage have not been sufficiently substantiated and, therefore, rejects these claims. On the other hand, it awards each of the applicants EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not claim any costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court does not award them any sum on that account.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe applications admissible;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention in respect of both applicants;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there is no need to examine separately the first applicant\u2019s complaint about excessive and unreasonable length of his pre-trial detention under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicants\u2019 claims for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 April 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Helena J\u00e4derblom
\nBranko Lubarda,
\nHelen Keller,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nPere Pastor Vilanova,
\nGeorgios A. Serghides,
\nJolien Schukking, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n