FIRST SECTION
\nCASE OF CHRISTIAN BAPTIST CHURCH IN WROC\u0141AW v. POLAND
\n(Application no. 32045\/10)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n5 April 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n05\/07\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Christian Baptist Church v. Poland,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, President, Having deliberated in private on 13 March 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 32045\/10) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by the Christian Baptist Church – II Local Community in Wroc\u0142aw (II Zb\u00f3rKo\u015bcio\u0142a Chrze\u015bcijan Baptyst\u00f3wwe Wroc\u0142awiu\u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe applicant church\u201d), on 9 June 2010.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant church was represented by Ms D. Bober,and subsequently by Ms D. Przybylska-F\u0105fara, lawyers practising in Wroc\u0142aw. The Polish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant church alleged,in particular, a violation of Articles 6 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 February 2015 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant is a legal entity, a local community of the Christian Baptist Church in the Republic of Poland operating on the basis of the Act of 30\u00a0June\u00a01995 on Relations Between the Republic of Poland and the Christian Baptist Church Act (ustawa o stosunku Pa\u0144stwa Polskiego do Ko\u015bciola Chrze\u015bcijan Baptyst\u00f3w w RP \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe 1995 Act\u201d) with its seat in Wroc\u0142aw.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Background to the case<\/strong><\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0The case concerns a property with a four-storey building and another building dedicated to sacral purposes in Wroc\u0142aw. Before World War II the property was used by the Baptist Commune belonging to the Bund Evangelisch-Freikirchlicher Gemeinden in Deutschlandoperating on the territory of the German Reich. The property number was 1077\/42. It measured 0.785 ha.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 September 1946 the Wroc\u0142aw Governor (Wojewoda Wroc\u0142awski) decided that the property in question should become subject to the applicant church\u2019s management (przej\u0119cie w zarz\u0105d) on the basis of section 2(4) of the 1946 Decree on abandoned property(dekret o maj\u0105tkach opuszczonych i poniemieckich \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe 1946 Decree\u201d).<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0In 1956 the applicant church lodged a request to be registered in the land and mortgage register as the owner of the property and the request was granted. The property was registered under the number 945.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0April 1959 the Minister of the Economy announced a new interpretation of section 2(4) of the 1946 Decree.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 June 1959 the District Residential Buildings Board for Wroc\u0142aw-Krzyki (Dzielnicowy Zarz\u0105d Budynk\u00f3w Mieszkalnych) decided that all kinds of property which were subject to the church\u2019s management were to pass into the ownershipof the State and ordered that the applicant church transfer the property in question to the State. The order did not concern the part of the property which was dedicated exclusively to sacral purposes.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 August 1966 a new land-register entry 35905 was opened for the property no. 1077\/42. The land-register entry 945 was however not closed.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0In 1968 the property was registered under the land-register number 35905 was given a new plot number 9 and its area was recalculated. The new measurement was 0.371 ha. It appears that the plot number 9 constituted only a part of the previous property number 1077\/42 and comprised only the building dedicated to sacral purposes.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The remaining part of the original property number 1077\/42, which comprised the four-storey building, was given new plot numbers 39 and\u00a033\/5. It measured 0.325 ha and a new land-register entry 63650 was opened for it. In 1977 the State was registered as the owner of this property and, after the reform of the local governments of 1990, the property was transferred to the City of Wroc\u0142aw.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The present application concerns the right to the property referred to above in paragraph 14.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Administrative proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 9\u00a0May 1996 the applicant church requested that the Wroc\u0142aw Governor issue a decision confirming the applicant church\u2019s ownership of the property in question. It relied on the newly enacted1995 Act (see paragraphs47-50 below).<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 12\u00a0September 1996 the Wroc\u0142aw Governorrefused to issue a decision which would confirm that the property in question belongedto the applicant church. The Governor found that the applicant church had failed to satisfy a requirement laid down in section 39 of the 1995 Act, specifically that it had not possessed the property in question on the day of entry into force of the Act relied upon. The Governor further held that:<\/p>\n \u201c…in the circumstances of the case,section 40 of the Act likewise cannot be applied because the property in question is located on territory which was not part of Poland before 1 September 1939. The fact that the property was owned by an organisational unit of the Baptist Church operating in the German Reich does not constitute a basis to claim return of ownership because its ownership was transferred to the State under the [1946 Decree].\u201d<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0September 1996 the applicant church appealed against this decision to the Minister of the Interior and Administration.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 18\u00a0February 1998 the applicant church sent a letter to the Minister, specifying that the time-limits laid down in the Code of Administrative Proceedings had been exceeded and requested that the Minister issue a decision.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 1\u00a0July 1998 the Minister replied that the length of the proceedings was attributable to amendments of the 1995 Act and informed the applicant church that the relevant decision would be issued by 15\u00a0August 1998.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0This time-limit was not respected and therefore, on 12\u00a0January 1999, the applicant church lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court a complaint in respect of the alleged inactivity of the administrative authority.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 March 1999, before examination of the applicant church\u2019s complaint, the Minister of the Interior and Administration issued a decision, annullingthe challenged decision and orderingthe return of the case to the Governor. The Minister ordered that, when re-examining the case, the Governor should take into account the amended section 4 of the 1995 Act.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the fact that the Minister had issued a decision, on 28\u00a0April 1999 the applicant church withdrew the complaint of 12\u00a0January 1999 concerning the inactivity of the administrative authority.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0After remittal of the case, on 24 March 1999, the Governor ofLower Silesia(Wojewoda Dolno\u015bl\u0105ski)asked the Wroc\u0142aw Commune whether there was any property available which could be granted to the applicant church in return for the property in question. It appears that the Governor\u2019s letter was left without reply.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 29\u00a0May 1999 the Governor requested from the Minister of the Interior and Administration an official interpretation of the amended section 4 of the 1995 Act \u201cin view of the many doubts as regards the proper interpretation of this provision\u201d.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 June 2000 the Minister replied that, since the administrative authorities were bound by provisions of law binding on the day of decision, it was irrelevant that the applicant church\u2019s original request had been lodged when section 4 of the 1995 Act had had different wording.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 21\u00a0July 2000 the applicant churchasked the Governor to issue a decision in its case, pointing out that the time-limits laid down in the Code of Administrative Proceedings had been exceeded.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On 20\u00a0October 2000 the applicant church lodged a complaint (za\u017calenie) with the Minister of the Interior and Administration that the Governor had exceeded the statutory time-limits and had failed to issue a decision on the merits or to justify the delay in the proceedings.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 7\u00a0December 2000 the applicant church lodged a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court about the alleged inactivity of the Governor.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 March 2001 the Minister of the Interior and Administration found the applicant church\u2019s complaint of 20 October 2000 well founded and ordered the Governor to issue a decision on the merits before 30\u00a0April\u00a02001.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0On 30\u00a0April 2001 the Governor stayed the proceedings.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0On 7\u00a0July 2001 the applicant church appealed against the decision to stay the proceedings.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0On 17\u00a0December 2001 the Minister of the Interior and Administration allowed the appeal, finding that the proceedings should not have been stayed, annulled the challenged decision and returned the case to the Governor.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 12\u00a0March 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court examined the applicant church\u2019s complaint against the inactivity of the administrative authority and ordered the Governor of Lower Silesia to issue a decision on the merits within the time-limit of thirty days.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 21\u00a0June 2002 the Governor\u2019s office gave a decision and refused to return the property in question to the applicant church. It found that the applicant church, although registered as owner under the land-register number 945 and treated in the past by the administrative authorities as owner, had never in fact owned the property, which had only been left under the applicant church\u2019s administration (oddane w zarz\u0105d).<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0On 12\u00a0July 2002 the applicant church appealed.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0September 2002 the Minister of the Interior and Administration annulled the challenged decision and returned the case for re-examination to the Governor. The Minister found, among other things, that the Governor had had no right to question the validity of the entry in the land register.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0On 23\u00a0February 2003 the applicant church complained to the Governor about the delay in the proceedings.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0On 8\u00a0February 2007 the Governor\u2019s office gave a procedural decision in which it held that owing to the particularly complicated nature of the case, the decision on the merits could not be issued within the statutory time-limits and set a new deadline for decision of 30\u00a0June 2007.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0On 18\u00a0June\u00a02007 the Governorof Lower Silesia gave a decision on the merits and refused to return to the applicant church the property in question. The Governor relied on the amended 1995 Act and found that the applicant church had failed to satisfy the requirements laid down in section\u00a04 of the Act, namely that it could not be a legal successor of the Church which had not operated on the territory of Poland before 1\u00a0September 1939.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0On 11\u00a0July 2007 the applicant church appealed.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0On 6\u00a0February 2008 the Minister of the Interior and Administration upheld the challenged decision.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0On 11\u00a0March 2008 the applicant church lodged a complaint with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0On 12\u00a0September 2008 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant church\u2019s complaint.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0On 10\u00a0November 2008 the applicant church lodged a complaint against the Regional Administrative Court\u2019s judgment with the Supreme Administrative Court.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0On 13\u00a0October 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant church\u2019s complaint. The judgment was served on the applicant church\u2019s lawyer on 6\u00a0January 2010.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Relations Between the Republic of Poland and the Christian Baptist Church Act of 30 June 1995 (ustawa o stosunku Pa\u0144stwa Polskiego do Ko\u015bcio\u0142a Chrze\u015bcijan Baptyst\u00f3w w RP \u2013 hereinafter\u201cthe 1995 Act\u201d)<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0At the time the applicant church lodged the first request for return of the property, section\u00a04 of the 1995 Actprovided as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe [Baptist] Church and its legal entities are the legal successors of Baptist local communities [zb\u00f3r]and organisations operating on the current territory of the Republic of Poland before 1 September 1939.\u201d<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0On 30\u00a0May 1998 a new version of Article 4 of the 1995 Act came into force. Section\u00a04 after amendments provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe (Baptist) Church and its legal entities are the legal successors of Baptist local communities and organisations operating on the territory of the Republic of Poland before 1 September 1939.\u201d<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0Section\u00a039 of the 1995 Act, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1. Properties or parts thereof which on the day of entry into force of this Act are in the possession of the Church or its legal entities become ipso iure their property if:<\/p>\n 1) they were in the possession of the legal entities referred to in section 4 of the Act;<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0Section\u00a040 of the 1995 Act provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1. Proceedings for the return of the nationalised property or parts thereof, which is not in the possession of the Church or its legal entities referred to in section\u00a039 paragraph 1, (1) are instituted upon the request of the Church or its legal entities notwithstanding the legal basis and method of nationalisation; the above does not concern property nationalised after 1945 for which compensation was paid …\u201d<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Decree of 8 March 1946 on abandoned property(dekret o maj\u0105tkach opuszczonych i poniemieckich \u2013 \u201cthe 1946 Decree\u201d)<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0Article 2(4) of the 1946 Decree providedthat the ownership of the abandoned property of German and Gda\u0144sk public legal entities was transferred ex legeto the \u201crelevant Polish legal entities\u201d.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Resolution of the Supreme Court of 19 December 1959<\/strong><\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 December 1959 the Supreme Court issued a resolution of seven\u00a0judges (I CO 42\/59) in which it held that organisational units of religious communities operating on the territory of the People\u2019s Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) could not be considered\u201crelevant legal entities\u201d within the meaning of Article 2\u00a7 4 of the 1946 Decree, because in the Polish legal system they had no \u201cpublic\u201d nature.<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 8 November 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0Following a constitutional complaint lodged by the Christian Baptist Church in Gda\u0144sk, on 8 November 2005, the Constitutional Court issued a judgment in which it found that section 7(1) of the Act of 26 June 1997 amending the 1995 Act was consistent with Articles 2 and 64\u00a7 2 of the Polish Constitution and was not inconsistent with Article 25\u00a7\u00a73 and 5 of the Constitution. This judgment was issued in identical circumstances to those inthe applicant church\u2019s case. The Constitutional Court found among other things that even though section 4 of the 1995 Act had been amended in the course of the administrative proceedings for return of property, the amendment had had no influence on the outcome of the proceedings.<\/p>\n The relevant parts of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cPursuant to the amended section 4 of the 1995 Act the [Baptist] Church and its legal entities are the legal successors of Baptist churches [zbory], local communities and organisations operating on the territory of the Republic of Poland before 1 September 1939.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n The complainant \u2013 the Christian Baptist Church in Gda\u0144sk is indeed a legal entity, but in the light of documents and the hearing held it is indisputable that the property in question was owned by the Bund Evangelisch Freikirschlicher Gemeinden in Deutschland[\u201cthe Union\u201d]and not by the Christian Baptist Church or its legal entities (including the Baptist community). During the hearing the complainant made a statement that the Union referred to above was a legal entity of corporate nature which owned properties like churches and other immovable properties including the property which is the subject matter of the present proceedings. This Union continues to operate on the territory of the German Federal Republic. The complainant \u2013 the Christian Baptist Church in Gda\u0144sk \u2013 said that before 1 September 1939 the Union did not have (as such) a legal personality. Likewise, the claimant was not able to prove itself to bea legal successor of the Union referred to above.\u201d<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court concluded this part of its reasoning with a statement that:<\/p>\n \u201cEven assuming that on the basis of section 4 of the amended 1995 Act the property has been acquired ex lege (although the Constitutional Court does not share this opinion), acquiring the property in question ex lege is excluded because of the lack of the legal succession. It follows that the [Constitutional] Court does not share the complainant\u2019s view presented at the hearing that there were statutory conditions for return of the property.\u201d<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court further held that it was indisputable that the property in question had been taken over by the State on the basis of the 1946 Decree (see paragraph 51 above) and had not been in the possession of the Baptist Church or its legal entities. The Constitutional Court noted the resolution of the Supreme Court of 19 December 1959 (see paragraph 52 above) in which the Supreme Court held that that organisational units of religious communities operating on the territory of the People\u2019s Republic of Poland could not be considered \u201crelevant legal entities\u201d within the meaning of Article 2\u00a74 of the 1946 Decree and therefore the property of these organisational units had become the property of the State. The Constitutional Court concluded this part of its reasoning by a statement that \u201cthe claimant likewise did not acquire the property in question on the basis of the [1946 Decree].\u201d<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0Subsequently the Constitutional Court examined the issue whether the claimant had a \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d to acquire the rights to the property in question and found that it was not the case. The relevant parts of its reasoning read as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe legal construction of return of nationalised property provided for in the [1995] Act consists of several steps …; the governor [Wojewoda] has a wide range of assessment of factual circumstances and methods of [restoring] of property. The sole fact of being a legal successor within the meaning of section 4 of the 1995 Act constitutes only a basis for a request for the return of property, but does not oblige the governor to issue a positive decision. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view, a legitimate expectation to acquire property does not always appear on the final step of the proceedings consisting of several steps. Consequently, it must be found that although the [Baptist] Church might expect a favourable decision, that expectation could not be classified as \u201clegitimate\u201d, which [would thus] enjoy legal protection.<\/p>\n In the present case however the most important and decisive argument is the lack of status of legal successor on the part of the complainant. As found above, the complainant does not fulfill the basic statutory condition allowing it to claim return of property… It follows that even on the basis of section 4 [of the 1995 Act] in its version before the amendment the complainant had no basis to reasonably expect to be granted the property. The amendment of section 4 had therefore no decisive [zasadniczy] impact on the complainant\u2019s legal situation. To explain the issue in simple words: the complainant commenced proceedings to be granted rights to property that neither the complainant nor its legal predecessors ever owned.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant church maintained that the situation in issue infringed its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies<\/strong><\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicant church had not exhausted all the remedies afforded by Polish law in that it had failed to lodge a constitutional complaint under Article 79 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution questioning the compatibility with the Constitution of the provisions on which the decisions in its case were based. They admitted however that the constitutionality of the relevant provision had been already examined in the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 8 November 2005 (see paragraph 53 above) after a constitutional complaint lodged by the Baptist Church of the Gda\u0144sk Community in an identical factual situation. The Government concluded that had the applicant church lodged an identical constitutional complaint, the proceedings would most probably have been discontinued in view of the fact that the matter had already been examined.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant church argued that it should not be required to lodge a constitutional complaint and to challenge the constitutionality of section 4(2) of the 1995 Act since the matter had already been examined by the Constitutional Court in the judgment relied on by the Government.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the constitutionality of section 4(2) of the 1995 Act was indeed a subject matter of the Constitutional Court\u2019s examination. The Constitutional Court found that section 4(2) of the 1995 was consistent with Articles 2 and 64 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances the Court holds that it would be unreasonable to require the applicant church to lodge a constitutional complaint alleging the incompatibility of the same legal provisions with the same constitutional provisions in similar factual circumstances.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s plea of inadmissibility on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further contended that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was not applicable to the present case. They maintained thatthe applicant church had no existing possessions that would be protected under this provision. Likewise, in the Government\u2019s opinion the applicant church had no \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d to be granted the property in question.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant church maintained that it had possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 1. In this connection it submitted that the State had treated it as the owner of the impugned property for several years after 1946 and that in 1959 the property had been nationalised in violation of the law in force at that time. The 1995 Act was passedwith a view to compensating the loss suffered by churches. According to the applicant church the 1995 Act in its original wording had granted it the right to compensation and ithad lodged its application at the relevant time. The further amendments to the 1995 Act had deprived the applicant church of its ability to obtain the compensation sought. The applicant church concluded that it had an asset protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles<\/em><\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee the right to acquire property (see Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70, p. 23, \u00a7 48, and Slivenko v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no.\u00a048321\/99, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2002-II).<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0An applicant can allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 only in so far as the impugned decisions related to his or her \u201cpossessions\u201d within the meaning of this provision. \u201cPossessions\u201d can be either \u201cexisting possessions\u201d or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. By way of contrast, the hope of recognition of a property right which has been impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered a \u201cpossession\u201d within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfillment of the condition (see Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], no. 42527\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 82-83, ECHR 2001-VIII, and Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no.\u00a039794\/98, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2002-VII).<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cannot be interpreted as imposing any general obligation on the Contracting States to restore property which was transferred to them before they ratified the Convention. Nor does Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1 impose any restrictions on the Contracting States\u2019 freedom to determine the scope of property restitution and to choose the conditions under which they agree to restore property rights of former owners (see Jantner v. Slovakia, no.39050\/97, \u00a7 34, 4 March 2003).<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0The hope that a long-extinguished property right may be revived cannot be regarded as a \u201cpossession\u201d; nor can a conditional claim which has lapsed as a result of a failure to fulfill the condition. In particular, the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the exclusion of certain categories of former owners from such entitlements. Where categories of owners are excluded in this way, their claims for restitution cannot provide the basis for a \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d attracting the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Gratzinger and\u00a0Gratzingerova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-74).<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0However, in certain circumstances, a \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d of obtaining an \u201casset\u201d may also enjoy the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Thus, where a proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim, the person in whom it is vested may be regarded as having a \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d if there is a sufficient basis for the interest in national law, for example where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming its existence (see Kopeck\u00fd v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912\/98, \u00a7 52, ECHR\u00a02004-IX). However, no legitimate expectation can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant\u2019ssubmissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts (see Kopeck\u00fd, cited above, \u00a7 50).<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case<\/em><\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that on 9 May 1996the applicant church,which claimed to be a legal successor of the Baptist communities which had operated before 1\u00a0September 1939 on the current territory of Poland, lodged a request to be issued with a decision confirming its ownership of property and a building situated in Wroc\u0142aw on the basis of sections 39, 40 and 4(2) of the 1995 Act (see paragraph 16 above). On 12 September 1996 the administrative authority of first instance dismissed the applicant church\u2019s request, holding that the applicant church had failed to satisfy the statutory requirements to be granted property (see paragraph17 above). The applicant church appealed and, before the appeal was examined, the relevant provisions of the 1995 Act were amended (see paragraph 48 above). The applicant church consequently claimed that it was the amendment referred to above which had played a decisive role in the dismissal of its request.<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0In this respect the Court notes that a constitutional complaint concerning identical circumstances was examined by the Constitutional Court, which in its judgment of 8 November 2005 found that the complainant\u2013 the Christian Baptist Church in Gda\u0144sk \u2013 could not claim to have had a legitimate expectation to be granted property because (i) the legal construction of return of property required a governor to issue a decision of constitutive nature; lodging a request did not in any way guarantee a positive outcome to a case and (ii) the complainant could not be granted property because it did not fulfill the basic legal requirement laid down in the relevant provisions, that is to say it was not a legal successor of the previous owner. The Constitutional Court added that the amendment of section 4(2) of the 1995 Act had not significantly changed the situation of the complainant since it lacked the necessary feature authorising it to claim property both before and after the 1997 amendment (see paragraph 56 above).<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that this reasoning made by the Constitutional Court following a constitutional complaint filed by the Christian Baptist Church in Gda\u0144sk may also be applied to the present case. Indeed, similarly to the case of the Christian Baptist Church in Gda\u0144sk, the applicant church failed to show either in the proceedings before the domestic authorities or before this Court that the property in question had been owned before 1\u00a0September 1939 by an entity referred to in section 4 of the 1995 Act in its original wording. The Court notes in this connection that the applicant church could have lodged a separate constitutional complaint if it considered that its legal situation differed significantly from that of the Christian Baptist Church in Gda\u0144sk. However, the applicant church chose not to do it. On the contrary, it submitted that the matter had already been examined by the Constitutional Court and it would not have been reasonable to expect that it to lodge an identical constitutional complaint.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0For these reasons and in view of the decisions of the domestic administrative authorities referred to above and the Constitutional Court\u2019s finding that the provisions of the 1995 Act either in its original wording or after the 1997 amendmentcould not constitute for the Christian Baptist Church in Gda\u0144ska basis for its legitimate expectation to be granted the property requested (see paragraph 56 above), the Court finds that similarly to the Christian Baptist Church in Gda\u0144sk alsothe applicant church in the circumstances of the present case did not have any \u201cexisting possessions\u201d or \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and that, therefore, this provision is not applicable to the present case (see Nadbiskupija Zagrebacka v. Slovenia (dec.) no. 60376\/00, 27 May 2004).<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicant church\u2019s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol\u00a0No. 1 must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, as incompatible ratione materiaewith the Convention and protocols thereto.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE ALLEGED UNFAIRNESS OF THE PROCEEDINGS<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant church complained that the prolonged examination of its request had led to a situation in which the final decision had been given after the amendment to the 1995 Act, which had had to be applied retroactively and had deprived it of the right to claim restoration of its property. It relied on Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7 1 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant churchcomplained that the proceedings in its case had been unfair because in their course the relevant law had been amended which had resulted in an unfavourable decision refusing the applicant church a right to claim back the property in question.<\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the amendment of the 1995 Act had been a direct consequence of entry into force of the Polish Constitution of 2\u00a0April 1997 which stipulates that all churches and other religious organisations have equal rights. The amendment had therefore been necessary and proportionate because it had aimed at equalising the situation of all churches in Poland. Without the amendment the applicant church would have been placed in a more favourable position vis-\u00e0-vis other churches and religious organisations in Poland. They further submitted that in order to counterbalance that amendment, churches had been given the possibility to be restored property which had served sacral purposes and property to extend their farm holdings. The Government further argued that the first administrative decision in the applicant church\u2019s case hadbeen issued before the amendment of the 1995 Act and already by that time the administrative authority had found that the applicant church could not be considered a legal successor of the previous owner of the property in question. Thus, the amendment to the 1995 Act had not deprivedthe applicant church of any \u201cassets\u201d. They concluded that the administrative decisions had been subsequently examined by the administrative courts which had not found unlawfulness in the decisions given by the Governor of Lower Silesia and the Minister of the Interior and Administration.<\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has previously found that applicability to current awards of compensation and to pending proceedings cannot in itself give rise to a problem under the Convention since the legislature is not, in theory, prevented from intervening in civil cases to amend the existing legal position by means of an immediately applicable law (see Zielinski and\u00a0Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], nos. 24846\/94 and\u00a034165\/96 to 34173\/96, \u00a7\u00a057, ECHR 1999\u2011VII, Scordino v. Italy (no 1) [GC], no.\u00a036813\/97, \u00a7\u00a0131 CEDH 2006\u2011V, OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, nos. 42219\/98 and 54563\/00, \u00a7\u00a061, 27 May 2004). It has constantly held that, under Article\u00a06 of the Convention, the legislature is not precluded in civil matters from adopting new retrospective provisions to regulate rights arising under existing laws in so far as there appear to be compelling grounds in the general interest (see National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 23 October 1997, \u00a7 112, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011VII).<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the first decision was indeed given by the administrative authority on 12\u00a0September 1996, that is to say before the amendment to section 4 of the 1995 Act came into force. By that decision the applicant church\u2019s request to be granted the property was refused, because, according to the Wroc\u0142aw Governor, it did not satisfy the requirements laid down in sections 39 and\u00a040 of the 1995 Act (see paragraphs 49 and 50 above). The Court considers that the legislative change was justified by the compelling grounds since it was aimed at harmonisation of the legal situation of all churches (see paragraph 78 above). What is more, it was made at the early stage of the proceedings (see, by contrast, Papageorgiou v. Greece, 22\u00a0October 1997, \u00a7\u00a038, Reports 1997\u2011VI)which distinguishes the case from other cases dealt with by the Court in which the legislative changes altered the course of proceedings which had been pending for years and in which an enforceable judgment had been adopted (see Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 9 December 1994, \u00a7 49, Series A no. 301\u2011B; and Tarbuk v. Croatia, no. 31360\/10, \u00a7 54, 11 December 2012).Furthermore, as noted above (see paragraph 72), the legislative amendment did not deprive the applicant church of any \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d to acquire property, because that expectation had not been generated even under the original wording of the 1995 Act. The present case must be distinguished from the circumstances in the case of Scordino v.\u00a0Italy (no 1) (cited above) where the legislative amendment extinguished, with retrospective effect, an essential part of claims for compensation, in very large amounts, that owners of expropriated land could have claimed from the expropriating authorities. The Court agrees with the Government\u2019s submission that in these circumstances the applicant church was not deprived of any \u201cassets\u201d.<\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the applicant church was not deprived of its right to fair trial.<\/p>\n It follows that in the present case there was no violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of the alleged unfairness of the proceedings.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant churchfurther complained of excessive length of the proceedings for return of property. It relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing within a reasonable time …\u201d<\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that they wished to refrain from expressing their opinion on the merits of this complaint. They added however that the proceedings in question had been very complex since they had concerned a difficult legal problem.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court first notes that the period to be taken into consideration started with the appeal lodged by the applicant church on 23 September 1996 (see paragraph\u00a018 above) (see K\u00f6nig v. Germany, 28 June 1978, \u00a7 98, Series A no. 27, Janssen v. Germany, no. 23959\/94, \u00a7\u00a040, 20\u00a0December 2001, and Mitkova v.\u00a0the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no.\u00a048386\/09, \u00a7\u00a049, 15\u00a0October 2015). It ended on 13\u00a0October 2009 when the Supreme Administrative Court gave its judgment dismissingthe applicant church\u2019s complaint (see paragraph\u00a046above).It therefore lasted overthirteen years,in the course of which the case was examined several times by administrative authorities on different levels and by two instances of the administrative courts.<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no.30979\/96, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2000\u2011VII).<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the case might have presented some difficulties for the domestic administrative authorities particularly in view of the fact that it involved complicated issues and concerned property which before 1\u00a0September 1939 hadbeen located outside of the territory of Poland. Also, the introduction of legislative changes to the relevant provisions in the course of the proceedings might have influenced their overall length. In the Court\u2019s view, these reasons are however not capable of explaining such lengthy proceedings. Given that the Government did not provide any other reason to that effect and the fact that the applicant church did not in any way contribute to the length of these proceedings, the Court cannot but find that the applicant church was deprived of its right to a \u201chearing within a reasonable time\u201d.<\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of proceedings.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 90.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant church claimed 2,786,202.04 Polish zlotys(PLN)in respect of pecuniary damage and PLN 300,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 91.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered these amounts excessive<\/p>\n 92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found \u2013 that concerns the excessive length of proceedings only \u2013 and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant church EUR 5,200 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 93.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant church also claimed PLN 16,000 for the costs and expenses, including PLN 8,000 incurred before the domestic courts. It further submitted that the costs of proceedings before the Court had amounted to PLN 3,978.30.<\/p>\n 94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, relying on the Court\u2019s case-law(Zimmermann and\u00a0Steiner v. Switzerland, 13 July 1983, \u00a7 36, Series A no. 66), recalled that a party seeking reimbursement of costs and expenses must prove that they were necessarily incurred and that they were reasonable as to quantum.<\/p>\n 95.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,850 covering costs under all heads.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaints concerning Article 6 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of the alleged unfairness of the proceedings;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of excessive length of proceedings;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant church, within three monthsfrom the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts,to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 5,200 (five thousand two hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 1,850 (one thousand eight hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant church, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant church\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 April 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Abel Campos\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos
\nKristina Pardalos,
\nKrzysztof Wojtyczek,
\nKsenija Turkovi\u0107,
\nArmen Harutyunyan,
\nPauliine Koskelo,
\nJovan Ilievski, judges,
\nand Abel Campos, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n