FOURTH SECTION<\/p>\n
DECISION<\/p>\n
Application no.61462\/16
\nLaima ZIZEVI\u010cIEN\u0116
\nagainst Lithuania<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 8\u00a0January 2019 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, President,
\nEgidijus K\u016bris,
\nIulia Antoanella Motoc, judges,
\nand Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 14 October 2016,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
THE FACTS<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Ms Laima Zizevi\u010dien\u0117, is a Lithuanian national, who was born in 1964 and lives in \u0160ilut\u0117. She was represented before the Court by Mr D. Cvetkovas, a lawyer practising in Klaip\u0117da.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The Lithuanian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnyt\u0117-\u0160irmen\u0117.<\/p>\n
A.\u00a0\u00a0The circumstances of the case<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0Developments concerning the plot of land of 0.06 hectares<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0In April 1988 the authorities decided to allocate a plot of land of 600\u00a0sq. m. (hereinafter referred to also as \u201cthe plot\u201d) to the applicant for construction of an individual house. The applicant was obliged to submit details of the project for the residential house on the plot to an architect.<\/p>\n
5.\u00a0\u00a0In April 1992 the applicant asked the authorities to sell her the plot and in June 1992 it was decided to allow the applicant to purchase the 0.06\u00a0hectares of land that she had been using for a price of 2,092 Russian roubles. This amount was debited from the applicant\u2019s account.<\/p>\n
6.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 September 1993 the mayor of \u0160ilut\u0117 revoked the decision made by the authorities in 1988 (see paragraph 4 above) and provided the applicant, as the owner of an uncompleted residential house, with the same plot of 0.06 hectares of land.<\/p>\n
7.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 September 1993 the applicant\u2019s then husband agreed that his wife should sell the house and the other buildings on the plot. On the same day, the applicant sold the house, which was 51% finished, a cellar, a garage and a garden storage shed (viralin\u0117) to J.P. The purchase agreement indicated that the applicant had received 9,573 Lithuanian litai (LTL\u00a0\u2011\u00a0approximately 2,773 euros (EUR)) before concluding the agreement. There is no information in the case-file, whether the mayor of \u0160ilut\u0117 was informed about the sale of the buildings or whether the purchase agreement was registered in the Centre of Registers.<\/p>\n
8.\u00a0\u00a0On the same day, 10 September 1993, the applicant and the mayor concluded a lease agreement for the plot for three years on the basis of the mayor\u2019s decision (see paragraph 6 above). It appears that this lease was not renewed.<\/p>\n
9.\u00a0\u00a0In February 1996 the authorities decided to allow J.P. to purchase 0.0602\u00a0hectares of land, including 0.06 hectares at issue, under and near the buildings he had purchased from the applicant. J.P. purchased the land on 27 March 1996, and it was registered in his name on that date in the Centre of Registers.<\/p>\n
10.\u00a0\u00a0In September 1998 J.P. sold the land and the buildings to A.\u010c.<\/p>\n
11.\u00a0\u00a0In June 1999 J.P., acting on the authority of A.\u010c., sent a letter to the local notary asking that a notice be forwarded to the applicant, asking her to vacate the residential house and the garage. It was indicated that the applicant had to move within three months, otherwise court proceedings would be commenced (see paragraphs 17 and 18 below).<\/p>\n
12.\u00a0\u00a0In November 1999 the \u0160ilut\u0117 Region Municipality decided to approve the margins and sizes of certain plots of land that were used by certain persons and the allocated plot of land, amounting to 0.06 hectares, was approved for purchase by the applicant. It was indicated that the plot was designated for residential use.<\/p>\n
13.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 May 2000 the applicant concluded the purchase of the plot from the State, which was located at the same address as the land that J.P. had purchased previously. The agreement was concluded with the Klaip\u0117da County Administration. The applicant paid nothing at that time because the amount she had paid in 1992 (which was still being held by the authorities\u00a0\u2011\u00a0see paragraph 5 above) was converted into LTL 523 (approximately EUR\u00a0151) and covered the price of the land. The applicant then asked the Centre of Registers to register the plot in her name; she indicated that it was designated for residential use. The plot was registered in the applicant\u2019s name on 15 May 2000.<\/p>\n
14.\u00a0\u00a0In 2003 A.\u010c. sold the land and the buildings to A.Z., whose heir resold them to D.D. in 2012.<\/p>\n
15.\u00a0\u00a0In November 2013 the applicant asked the National Land Service (\u201cthe NLS\u201d) to explain how the same plot could have been sold to two people under different legal provisions and at different times. The NLS replied in December 2013 that State-owned land could only be sold, for purposes other than agriculture, to citizens who were the owners of residential buildings, citizens who had been allocated plots of land in towns before 7 February 1992 for the construction of individual houses, and \u201cother persons\u201d. The NLS indicated that the applicant had sold the unfinished residential building, a garage and a garden storage shed to J.P. (see paragraph 7 above). Even though she was no longer the owner of the buildings, in 2000 the applicant purchased the plot (see paragraph 13 above). It had not been verified whether the applicant had been the owner of the buildings on the plot because the latter had originally been allocated to her in 1988 (see paragraph 4 above), that is before 7 February 1992. J.P., on the other hand, had been allowed to purchase the same plot as the owner of the buildings on it. J.P.\u2019s plot had been registered at the Centre of Registers together with the buildings on it (see paragraph 9 above) and the applicant\u2019s plot had not been marked on the cadastral map nor had it been indicated that it had had buildings on it. Both land purchase agreements (J.P.\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s) had been approved by a notary. The issue of which purchase agreement was valid and which was to be annulled was not within the NLS\u2019s competence and the matter had to be resolved in court.<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0Court proceedings concerning the plot<\/p>\n
16.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 May 2014 the applicant started court proceedings. She asked for a renewal of the time permitted to lodge her claim as she was outside the limitation period. She also asked the court to revoke the purchase agreement concluded between her and J.P. in 1993 and the subsequent agreements concluded by J.P. and other persons in 1998, 2003 and 2012 (see paragraphs\u00a07, 10 and 14 above). The applicant asked for the revocation of the decision taken by the authorities in 1996 by which J.P. had been allowed to purchase the plot (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant argued that J.P. had not registered the 1993 purchase agreement within three months, meaning the purchase procedure had not been completed and the subsequent purchase agreements had to be voided. The applicant also submitted that she had been deceived into selling the buildings because she had thought that the purchase agreement concluded was intended as security to ensure the return of a sum loaned to her then husband by J.P. She also stated that she had only found out about a breach of her rights in 2013, when she had received the NLS\u2019s reply to her query (see paragraph 15 above). Finally, she submitted that she had been living at the same address since 1988 and had been using the plot. None of the purported buyers of the plot and buildings had sought to defend their property rights, which she thought reflected negatively on them in the case.<\/p>\n
17.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 April 2015 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Courtdismissed the applicant\u2019s claim because she had missed the limitation period established in domestic law by a substantial margin (the limitation period was three years under the old Civil Code and ten years under the new one\u00a0\u2011\u00a0see paragraph 25 below). The applicant\u2019s argument that she had only found out about the breach of her rights in 2013, when she had received the reply from the NLS (see paragraph 15 above), was not accepted. The court held that the applicant had sold her property in 1993, which was the most significant date in her case (see paragraph 7 above). The court was not convinced by the argument that the applicant had not understood the consequences of the agreement in 1993. Moreover, she had been asked in 1999 to vacate the house (see paragraph 11 above), and thus she must have understood that other people had rights over the property in question. As regards the registration of the purchase agreement, the court held that the three-month period was not applicable because J.P. had bought a house that was only partially built.<\/p>\n
18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed. On 18\u00a0January 2016 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance decision. The court held that the limitation period started to run from the date on which the right to bring an action accrued. When a person stated that he or she had found out about a breach later on, the court had to examine at what point a diligent person would have found out about that breach (see paragraph 28 below). In the case at hand, the applicant had stated that she had found out about the breach of her rights in 2013 after receiving the NLS\u2019s reply (see paragraph 15 above). She had also stated that none of the buyers had asked her to move in over twenty years. The court disagreed with her position. It found that in 1998 J.P. had informed the applicant that he was selling the buildings and that the applicant had agreed to this. Also, J.P. had indicated that he had asked the applicant to vacate the buildings several times. The court also found that she had received a notice approved by a notary on 24 June 1999, which stated that she had to move from the house and vacate the garage (see paragraph\u00a011 above); therefore she should have understood that other persons had a claim on the property. The circumstances indicated by the applicant that, after the receipt of a notice in 1999, no further action had been taken did not mean that the applicant had not had an obligation to be diligent. If she had thought that her rights were being breached, she could have initiated an action to end the breach at that time. The court indicated that the applicant was not of an advanced age, she had secondary education, and she had been working as a supermarket manager at the time of concluding the agreement in 1993. The court found that the applicant should have been aware of a possible breach of her rights in 1993, and in any case on 24 June 1999, upon receipt of the notice to vacate, at the latest. However, she had only started court proceedings on 2\u00a0May 2014 and had missed the limitation period for submitting her claim (see paragraph 16 above). The court further stated that it could renew the limitation period if it had been missed for important reasons. In the applicant\u2019s case, however, the court held that the applicant\u2019s arguments that she had been deceived in concluding the purchase agreement with J.P. had been unfounded. The applicant had not been prevented from defending her rights within the time\u2011limit prescribed by law.<\/p>\n
19.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lodged two appeals on points of law but on 18 and 21\u00a0April 2016 the Supreme Court dismissed them as not raising important legal issues.<\/p>\n
3.\u00a0\u00a0Criminal proceedings against J.P.<\/p>\n
20.\u00a0\u00a0In February 1995 the applicant was questioned as a witness in a criminal case against J.P. During her questioning, she indicated that her then husband had taken a loan of LTL 20,000 (approximately EUR 5,792) from J.P.\u2019s company in September 1993. The applicant and her husband secured the loan by mortgaging the residential house that was located on the plot. The applicant claimed that J.P. had informed her that in order to secure the loan, a purchase agreement had to be concluded. As the residential house had been registered in the applicant\u2019s name, she signed the purchase agreement. The loan had not been repaid on time, and J.P.\u2019s business partner informed the applicant that the house had to be sold. The house was registered under J.P.\u2019s name. The applicant also indicated that at some point in time two women had come to the house and asked about buying it, but J.P. needed to recoup the sums loaned so the applicant could not agree to transfer the house to them.<\/p>\n
21.\u00a0\u00a0In March 1996 the authorities decided to terminate the criminal case against J.P. in part. The authorities established that J.P. had provided loans to citizens and that those citizens had had to effectively mortgage their properties by concluding purchase agreements with J.P. In the event that the loans were not repaid, J.P. registered the purchase agreements and the properties became his. The applicant was one of the persons whose property became J.P.\u2019s property after a failure to repay the loan. The authorities found that no unlawful actions had been committed by J.P. on that account.<\/p>\n
22.\u00a0\u00a0In August 1996 J.P. was found guilty of unlawful use of foreign currency by the Kretinga District Court. This decision did not concern the loan the applicant\u2019s husband had taken from J.P. in Lithuanian national currency.<\/p>\n
4.\u00a0\u00a0Further developments concerning the plot<\/p>\n
23.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 May 2018 the NLS invited the applicant to come to a meeting on 25 May 2018 and to express her opinion on the possible revocation of the land purchase agreement of 2000 (see paragraph 13 above) and the opportunity to receive equitable compensation.<\/p>\n
24.\u00a0\u00a0In the minutes of the meeting of 25 May 2018 it was indicated that the applicant had been informed about the meeting in writing and by telephone but she had failed to appear. In those circumstances, the NLS had been unable to revoke the purchase agreement of its own motion.<\/p>\n
B.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant domestic law and practice<\/p>\n
25.\u00a0\u00a0Article 84 of the old Civil Code, which was in force until 30 June 2001, provided that the general limitation period was three years. The new Civil Code, which came into force on 1 July 2001, extended the general limitation period to ten years (Article 1.125).<\/p>\n
26.\u00a0\u00a0The limitation period begins to run from the date on which the right to bring an action accrues. A person has the right to bring an action from the date on which he or she becomes aware, or should have become aware, of a breach of his or her right (Article 86 of the old Civil Code and Article\u00a01.127 \u00a7\u00a01 of the new Civil Code).<\/p>\n
27.\u00a0\u00a0The expiry of the limitation period before lodging a claim is a valid ground to dismiss a claim (Article 1.131 \u00a7 1 of the new Civil Code).<\/p>\n
28.\u00a0\u00a0The Supreme Court has held that in order to properly assess when the limitation period begins to run, the objective moment in time at which a person\u2019s rights were breached has first to be determined. Sometimes the objective and subjective moments in time coincide. The limitation period starts to run from the date the person became aware of a breach of his or her rights. In cases where a person has stated that he or she did not become aware of the breach of his or her rights on the day of the breach, the court dealing with the case has to ascertain whether there is any evidence indicating the contrary or whether, having regard to the nature and time of the breach, the claimant became aware of it any later than a prudent and careful person would have done in the same situation. If a person has not been diligent enough in that regard, the limitation period has to start running from the date the person should have become aware of the breach of his or her rights. The subjective understanding of a breach is connected with the person \u2013 he or she has to provide relevant evidence showing when he or she became aware of the breach (see for example, the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 21 June 2013 (no. 3K-3-362\/2013)).<\/p>\n
COMPLAINTS<\/p>\n
29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention that she had been deprived of a fair hearing because the domestic courts dismissed her complaint solely on the basis of the limitation period. She also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the State erred in transferring the same plot to two persons and thus breached her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.<\/p>\n
THE LAW<\/p>\n
30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that her right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions \u2013 the plot \u2013 had been violated as a result of an error of the domestic authorities and of the refusal of the domestic courts to examine her claim because of the expiry of the limitation period. She relied on Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 to the Convention.<\/p>\n
In so far as relevant, these provisions read as follows:<\/p>\n
Article 6<\/p>\n
\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n
Article1 of Protocol No. 1<\/p>\n
\u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/p>\n
(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n
31.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had been fully aware from the beginning that she had undertaken an obligation to use the plot for residential purposes. She must have been aware that she could not use the buildings, if not in 1993, then by 1999 at the latest, when she had been asked to vacate them (see paragraphs 7 and 11 above). The courts had taken into consideration different dates on which the applicant should have become aware of the alleged breach of her rights (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). As the applicant had sold the buildings on the plot in 1993, she ought to have disclosed that circumstance before being allowed to purchase the plot in 2000 (see paragraph 13 above). It was the Government\u2019s view that, by failing to disclose that essential circumstance, the applicant had acted in bad faith.<\/p>\n
32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had not been prevented in any way from lodging a claim and her claim had been examined by the domestic courts. The decisions of the domestic courts had been well-reasoned and not arbitrary and the applicant had been able to submit the evidence and arguments which she thought necessary to protect her interests. It was the Government\u2019s view that the limitation period in the applicant\u2019s case had not been applied automatically and that the applicant\u2019s submissions had been carefully considered.<\/p>\n
33.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Government claimed that the fact that the applicant paid the money for the plot well before concluding the purchase agreement concerning the land did not attract the application of Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 to the Convention.<\/p>\n
(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/p>\n
34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the authorities had sold the same plot to two different persons and registered both of their titles at the Centre of Registers. When the applicant had tried to resolve the situation, the courts had refused to examine the substance of her claim because the limitation period had expired. The applicant submitted that the plot still officially belonged to two persons and that the situation had not been resolved. The authorities\u2019 proposal to resolve the situation by revocation of the land purchase contract concluded between her and the State (see paragraph 23 above) had been inappropriate because, according to her, it could not resolve the substance of the dispute.<\/p>\n
35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed that the agreement for the sale of buildings in 1993 (see paragraph 7 above) had been fictitious. In this connection, the applicant found it to be of a certain importance that J.P. had been convicted for the unlawful use of foreign currency (see paragraph 22 above).<\/p>\n
2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/p>\n
(a)\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 6 of the Convention<\/p>\n
36.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, the Court notes that the applicant alleged that the courts had refused to examine her claim because of the expiry of the limitation period.<\/p>\n
37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the role played by limitation periods is of major importance when interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which, in its relevant part, declares the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States (see Dacia S.R.L. v. Moldova, no.\u00a03052\/04, \u00a7 75, 18 March 2008, and Bogdel v. Lithuania, no. 41248\/06, \u00a7\u00a080, 26 November 2013). The Court also reiterates that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Court\u2019s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention. This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules of a procedural nature, such as time-limits governing the submission of documents or lodging of appeals (see Dumitru Gheorghe v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a033883\/06, \u00a7 26, 12April 2016 and the references therein).<\/p>\n