THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF IVASHCHENKO v. RUSSIA
\n(Application no. 61064\/10)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n13 February 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n13\/05\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Ivashchenko v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Helena J\u00e4derblom, President, Having deliberated in private on 23 January 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 61064\/10) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by aRussiannational, Mr Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivashchenko (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 18 October 2010.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Ms\u00a0M.\u00a0Dubrovina, a lawyer practising in Novorossiysk, Russia. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr\u00a0G.\u00a0Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that actions by customs officials had constituted unlawful and disproportionate interferences with his correspondence, private life and freedom of expression and that the domestic remedies were ineffective.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 October 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Krasnodar.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant had a presscard issued to him as a photographer, stating that he was a \u201ccorrespondent at Agency.Photographer.ru\u201d. According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, he also prepared various texts for publication in print and Internet media outlets on an occasional basis.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Events on 27 August 2009<\/strong><\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0In August 2009 the applicant and Ms D. travelled to Abkhaziato prepare a report with photographs on, as he described it, \u201cthe life of this unrecognised republic\u201d.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 August 2009 they returned to Russia,arriving on foot atthe Adler customs checkpoint. The applicantpresented his Russian passport, presscard and a customs declaration, stating that he had electronic information devices (a laptop and flash memory cards) in his luggage. The laptop was his own property, however, he also used it for professional purposes.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant and D. were examined by Officer K. In his report to his superior, drawn up at 10.40 a.m. on 27\u00a0August 2009, he stated that in view of the applicant\u2019s answers to questions and because of his behaviour, neither of which have been specified to the Court, there was a need to verify the information contained in the applicant\u2019s customs declaration by way of an \u201cinspection procedure\u201d (see paragraph31 below) in respect of the items in his bag and backpack and to \u201capply the measure for minimising risk as per profile no.\u00a055\/1000000\/11062008\/00228 …\u201d.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have submitted to the Court a written statementfrom K., which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cFollowing the customs control measure of an interview and given [D.\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s] behaviour and the nature of their professional activities, a supposition\/assumption (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) arose that they might have banned printed and\/or audio- and video-material with extremist content in their bags… Since [the applicant] noted in his declaration that he had electronic storage devices, I made a written report to the acting chief officer of the customs checkpoint concerning the need for carrying out an inspection of [the applicant\u2019s] bags in the framework of the risk management system and for involving OfficerB., an IT specialist. The inspection was approved by the chief officer by way of his handwritten approval on my report … The chief officer issued an order for an inspection and authorised B. and myself to use the sampling procedure … The above-mentioned supposition\/assumption was based on the presence of a folder labelled \u201cExtremist\u201d in the laptop …Data from it was copied on the same day [on the spot] … to DVD RW disks, which were then sealed in a plastic bag … [The applicant], B. and two attesting witnesses were present … The sampling report contained a detailed description of the data that was copied, including the names of the folders that had been copied, their number and the number of files in each folder …The copying was carried out by Officer B. I did not open or copy any electronic folders or files … I did not read any \u2018correspondence\u2019 (personal correspondence or other text material) …An order to carry out a forensic examination was issued on 8\u00a0September 2009 … because on 27 August 2009 we had no information about the relevant expert organisations for that type of forensic examination…\u201d<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have also submitted a written statement from Officer\u00a0B., whichreadsas follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn accordance with the order for an inspection [no. …], which required sampling and which also indicated \u2018other\u2019, I copied data from [the applicant\u2019s] laptop to six DVD RW disks … because we had no other type of disks or electronic storage devices … Since the laptop\u2019s hard drive was some 160\u00a0Gb and at the time we had no means for fast copying, I decided only to copy folders with strange names. I did not read any \u2018correspondence\u2019 (personal correspondence or other text material) from the laptop.\u201d<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, after finding in the directory of the laptopan electronicfolder entitled \u201cExtremism (for RR[1])\u201d, which contained a number of photographs, the customs officer decided to copy it and some other folders from the laptop for further examination by an expert, who could determine whether they contained any information of an extremist nature.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The folder contained seven subfolders and 180 files. The applicant made a note in the record, stating that the material had been copied onto rewritable DVD disks (thus technically allowing the data to be modified, including by way of adding data).\u00a0According to the applicant, the folder had some photographs and a PDF copy of an article entitled \u201cHow to incite hatred?\u201d on anti-extremism legislation. The article, written by Ms V., was published in the Russian Reporter magazine in June 2009 and was accompanied by photographs taken by the applicant. The author of the article discussed the controversies and difficulties relating to the interpretation and application of Russian anti-extremism legislation, with reference to four criminal cases under Article 282 of the Criminal Code. According to the applicant, the material that was copied included documents and text concerning two ethnic groups (the Yazidis and the Meskhetian Turks), who were allegedly under pressure from the Krasnodar regional administration. For instance, a folder named \u201cIsolation\u201d contained texts describing the social problems facing thirty-seven Yazidi families (with references to their personal details), who had been discriminated against by the regional administration.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0It can be seen from the record of the sampling that thirty-four folders (containing some 480 subfolders with over 16,300 electronic files) were copied. The folders had the following names (mostly in Russian): In motion, Miscellaneous, Desktop, Foto_projects, On the road, Isolation, Drawings, 1\u00a0May, 9 May, 14 February, Law, Extremism (for RR).<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0It appears that the data from the laptop was first copied to a mobile or external hard drive and then recopied to six DVDs. According to the Government, the information was then deleted from the external hard drive. The original data in the laptop was not deleted and remained intact.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, his laptop remained with Officer B. for several hours. Allegedly, the officer read through the applicant\u2019s correspondence in the ICQ messaging program and copied some 26\u00a0gigabytes of data, including the applicant\u2019s personal correspondence, personal photographs and FTP[2]-type passwords.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted the following written statement by Ms D. to the Court:<\/p>\n \u201cAt 10 a.m. we presented ourselves at the border control and presented our passports … We were then taken to the customs control area … There thecustoms officers asked [the applicant] to hand over his presscard; so they were aware that he had one … Officer K. interviewed us about the purpose of our visit to Abkhazia and our professional and civic activities … I heard an FSB borderofficer tell the customs officers about the need for a \u2018special check\u2019 of our electronic storage devices … Seeing a laptop in [the applicant\u2019s] bag, the customs officers expressed theirintention to copy all the available information … I was interviewed (again) about my civic activities, my political views and about [the applicant\u2019s] professional activities …the type of work done and the publications …\u201d<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 September 2009 the applicant was informed that a report had been commissioned from a criminal forensics expert to determine whether the data copied from his laptop had any prohibited \u201cextremist\u201d content.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0In November 2009 the expert organisation returned the DVDs to the customs office, stating that it was not possible to carry out the examination, although it gave no reasons. In December 2009 a report was sought from another expert organisation. Apparently, it concluded that the data contained no extremist material. According to the applicant, the DVDs with his data were handed over to him in November 2011.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Judicial review<\/strong><\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime, the applicant brought judicialreview proceedings under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cCCP\u201d), challenging the adverse acts and actions of the customs officials.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0By a judgment of 25 January 2010 the Prikubanskiy District Court of Krasnodar dismissed his claims. The court held as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cLaptops, storage devices, photo- and video-cameras should be considered as \u2018goods\u2019 within the meaning of Article 11 of the Customs Code. All goods should be presented for checking by customs, as required under Article 14 of the Code … The customs authorities are authorised to take samples of goods for examination … and to use technical devices to speed up the checks … The data from the applicant\u2019s laptop was copied for the purposes of examination in compliance with Presidential Decree no.\u00a0310 on combating fascism and political extremism … In the circumstances, the fact that the samples taken for examination constituted all the relevant data was justified …\u201d<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the first-instance court\u2019s assessment had not takeninto account the requirements relating to Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention, in particular, the requirement that any interference by a public authority had to be shown to be \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. He mentioned the Court\u2019s case-law relating to the seizure of printed material and electronic devices, an actionwhich adversely affectsthe maintenance of professional secrecy. The applicant also argued as follows:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Decree no. 310 was not possible without actually reading someone\u2019s correspondence and other personal information, thereby interfering with the constitutional right to the protection of the secrecy of correspondence and other communications. Article 55 of the Constitution only permitted restrictions on people\u2019s rights on the basis of a federal statute; the decree in question was secondary legislation (\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439\u0430\u043a\u0442) and could not lawfully introduce additional limitations on constitutional rights;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The trial court had mentioned that laptops, flash memory cards and the like were \u201cgoods\u201d for the purposes of customs legislation. However, the sampling had been carried out in respect of the information they contained rather than the carriers or containersof the information (\u201cthe goods\u201d). Access to that information, however, was only allowed on the basis of a court order, as stated in Article 23 of the Constitution;<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0In his \u201cwritten explanations\u201d to the appeal court, the applicant insisted that in Chapter 25 proceedings a public authority had the burden of proving that its acts were lawful and justified. However, the first-instance court had not required the customs authority to cite a specific legal provision authorising its officials to examine electronic data. According to the applicant, the customs authority representative had refused at the hearing to explain the specific content of the risk profile concerning the applicant, referring to the fact that the information in question was classified and was for internal use only. However, a 2004 Instruction by the Federal Customs Authority only authorised a customs inspection where the risk profile in question provided for that type of measure (see also paragraph 37 below).<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 April 2010 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the judgment, essentiallyreproducing the lower court\u2019s reasoning as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cUnder Articles 403 and 408 of the Customs Code, customs authorities fulfill the tasks and functions assigned to them by federal and other legislation … and have the authority to apply measures prescribed by the Customs Code for ensuring compliance with customs legislation …<\/p>\n Article 11 of the Customs Code defines goods (for the purposes of customs legislation) as movable property which is being transferred across the customs border. This includes laptops, memory flash cards, photo-cameras, video-cameras, printed material and the like. Article 14 of the Code provides that all such goods should be subject to customs clearance and customs control. Article 123 of the Code provides that goods should be declared when being transferred across the customs border. Article 124 of the Code provides that the declaration is made by way of presenting a written declaration or otherwise … The transfer of goods by individuals for personal use is prescribed by Chapter 23 of the Customs Code, and Government decree no.\u00a0715 of 27 November 2003 and no. 718 of 29\u00a0November 2003. Article 13 of the Code provides that goods which are prohibited frombeing transferred to Russia must be removed from Russia.<\/p>\n By a letter of 16 July 2008 the Federal Customs Authority listed the goods which are banned from Russian territory … By a letter of 3 May 2006 the Authority listed the goods that must be declared to customs.<\/p>\n The procedure for and the types of customs checks are described in Chapters 34-37 of the Code. Article 358 of the Code provides that customs checks are based on the principle of selectiveness and, as a rule, should be limited to such forms of control as are sufficient for ensuring compliance with customs legislation … When selecting the form of control, the risk management approach is applied, which is based on the effective use of resources for preventing violations of the legislation …Risk is defined as a probability of non-compliance with customs legislation.<\/p>\n When carrying out a customs check, the customs authority is allowed to take samples of goods which are needed for further assessment. The relevant procedure is defined in Article 383 of the Code and Customs Authority order no. 1519 of 23\u00a0December 2003. When carrying out a customs check, the authority is allowed to use technical means to limit the time of such checks; the list and procedures for their use are defined in Article 388 of the Code and in Customs Authority order no. 1220 of 29 October 2003 …<\/p>\n Order no. 677 of 10 November 1995 by the Customs Authority (\u2018On preventing the transfer of prohibited printed, audio- and video-material across the customs border\u2019) does not contradict the current customs legislation and has not been revoked because the current Customs Code contains Article 13 concerning bans and limitations on the transfer of goodsacross the customs border …<\/p>\n In view of the above, the court agrees with the first-instance court that the customs inspection was authorised and carried out within customs control procedures and that the data was copied in line with Russian Presidential Decree no. 310 of 23\u00a0March 1995 …Article 2 of the decree clearly requires the customs authority to \u2018arrest and bring to liability persons who disseminate printed, cinematographic, audio-, photo- or video-materials which are aimed at being propaganda in favour of fascism, at inciting social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity; and to take measures for seizing printed material of that kind\u2019…<\/p>\n Article 383 of the Code concerning the minimal amount of samples was complied with because the information taken for sampling was not homogenous. Thus when the samples were taken, it was necessary to take the full amount of information from the device …<\/p>\n In addition, it is noted that under Article 10 of the Customs Code, information received by customs officials may be used exclusively for the purposes of customs legislation …<\/p>\n Customs officials are not authorised to disclose that information or transfer it to third persons, except as set down in the Code or other legislation …\u201d<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant does not appear to have been prosecuted subsequently in criminal, administrative or other proceedings in connection with the data obtained from his laptop by the customs authorities.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Constitution of the Russian Federation<\/strong><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0Article 23 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Constitution provides that everyone has the right to the privacy of his or her correspondence, telephone communications and postal, telegraphic or other messages. Restrictions may be imposed on that right by a court decision.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0Article 29 protects freedom of expression and prohibits incitement to social, racial, national or religious hatred. Everyone has the right to freely search for, receive, transmit, produce and disseminate information by lawful means.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0Article 55 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution provides that individuals\u2019 rights and freedoms may be limited by a federal statute in so far as that is necessary to protect the constitutional structure, morals, health, the rights and freedoms of others, and to ensure the country\u2019s national security and defence.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Customs Code of the Russian Federation of 28 May 2003 (in force until 2010)and related legal Acts<\/strong><\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0Article 11 of the Customs Code defined \u201cgoods\u201d as any movable or immovable property being transferredacross the customs border. By Article 130 of the Civil Code, all items that are not immovable property (for instance, money) should be recognised asbeing movable property.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0All goods and vehicles had to be presented forcustoms controlsin accordance with the procedure and methods prescribed by the Customs Code; customs requirements in the course of a check could not impede the transfer of goods or vehiclesacross the border to an extent that exceeded what was necessary as a minimum for ensuring compliance with customs legislation (Article\u00a014 of the Customs Code).Article 13 of the Customs Code provided that goods prohibited from entering Russia were to be removed from the country without delay, unless otherwise provided for by the Code or other federal statutes.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0Article 358 of the Code provided for the principles guiding the customs control process, namely that it was based on the selectiveness principle and, as a rule, had to be limited to such formsas were sufficient for ensuring compliance with customs legislation. When choosing a specific form of control, the customs authority was to be guided by the risk management system, which defined a risk as a probability of non\u2011compliance with customs legislation. The system was based on the effective use of the resources at the disposal of the customs authority for preventing violations of customs legislation, violations which, inter alia, could affect \u201cimportant public interests which the customs authorities [were] empowered to protect\u201d. The customs authorities had to apply risk assessment methods for determining the level of scrutiny in customs checks.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0Forms of customs control includedthe examination of documents, interviews, customs surveillance, customs examinations andinspections (\u0442\u0430\u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439\u0434\u043e\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440) (Article 366 of the Code). The last mentioned was a check that included breaking the seals on goods, opening packaging, containers or other locations where goods were or could be located (Article 372 of the Code). Inspections were to be carried out in the presence of the person declaring the goods, except for some situations such as the moving of goods in international postal dispatches.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0Article 378 of the Code provided that goods and vehicles could be subjected to an expert assessment as part of the customs control procedure where special skills were needed for clarifying matters relating to such a procedure. A customs officer was allowed to take samples of goods for assessment, with the amount being the minimum needed to carry out such an assessment (Article\u00a0383). The person declaring the goods could be present during the sampling and was required to assist the officer carrying out the procedure (ibid.).<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0As specified in the Regulations on Customs Procedures approved by the Russian Government on 2 February 2005, \u201cinspections\u201d entailed the examination of goods in order to prevent or stop violations of Russian legislation or to detect prohibited goods. Such inspections could include the opening or unsealing of containers (paragraph 14 of the Regulations).<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0Order no.\u00a01519 issued by theFederal Customs Authority on 23\u00a0December 2003, in force at the material time, provided further details about inspections but did not refer to the taking of samples of electronic data.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0Decree no.\u00a0310 issued by the President of Russia on 23 March 1995,\u201cOn measures for ensuring consolidated actions by public authorities in the fight against manifestations of fascism and other forms of political extremism in the Russian Federation\u201d,reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cCases of incitement to social, racial, ethnic and religious enmity, as well as the proliferation of fascist ideas, have been growing in the Russian Federation. Anti\u2011constitutional activities by people or groups having extremist views have increased and become more defiant in their nature. Unlawful armed and paramilitary units have been created. There is a growing threat that they will join forces with certain trade unions, commercial or criminal groups.<\/p>\n These processes are extremely dangerous for our society and constitute a threat to the foundations of the constitutional system. They undermine constitutional rights and freedoms, the security of society and the unity of the Russian Federation.<\/p>\n It is unacceptable that the rise of political extremism should impede the forthcoming State and municipal elections and the free expression of voters, influence the resolution of labour disputes or pressure certain State or municipal authorities.<\/p>\n The activities of political extremists (some of whom openly associate themselves with National Socialism, using fascist slogans and symbols or ones that are similar)are deeply insultingto veterans and to the sacred memory that Russians have for the victims of the Great Patriotic War. Such activities are particularly provocative in the year of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany …<\/p>\n As guardian of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and of people\u2019s rights and freedoms, with a view to ensuring the stability of the constitutional structure, public safety, and the maintenance of the unity of the Russian Federation,under Articles 13, 15, 80 and 82 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, I order:<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Within their respective competencies, the Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service, the State Customs Committee, and the State Border Service must arrest and bring to liability persons who are disseminating printed, cinematographic, photo-, audio- or video-materials which are aimed at inciting propaganda in favour of fascism, at inciting social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity; to take measures for seizing such printed material and other materials.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0I invite the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to provide guidance concerning the notions and terminology relating to liability for acts aimed at inciting social, racial, ethnic and religious enmity …\u201d<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0Order no.\u00a0677 issued by the Federal Customs Authority on 10\u00a0November 1995 read at the time as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn order to enforce Decree no. 310 of 23 March 1995 issued by the President of Russia, it is ordered as regards customs procedures that:<\/p>\n 1. The chief officers of regional authorities must take effective measures for preventing the entry of printed, cinematographic, photo-, audio- and video-materials aimed at propaganda in favour of fascism and at inciting social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity. For that purpose it is necessary to assign officers specialised in checking the content of such material from the units that carry out customs inspections of goods and vehicles …<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0… to apply Article 20 of the Customs Code [of 18 June 1993].[3]\u201d<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0With their observations the respondent Government enclosed the Instruction on customs officials\u2019 actions on the application of risk profiles during customs checks, approved by the Federal Customs Authority on 11\u00a0January 2008. It apparently replaced an earlier Instruction issued in 2004 and is no longer valid. At the relevant time the Instructionprovided that a customs inspection could be carried out if there was information about a possible customs offence (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) or if there were justified \u201csuppositions\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) that information that had been declared about certain goods was not correct (section 68). If a customs officer considered it necessary to carry out an inspection on the basis of information received or if he had justified grounds to assume that information that had been declared about goods or vehicles might be incorrect, he had to submit a report to his superior (section 71). The latter then authorised or refused an inspection (section 73).<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0Pursuant to a letter dated 16 July 2008 issued by the Federal Customs Authority, the import of printed, cinematographic, photo-, audio\u2011 and video-materials aimed at Nazi propaganda or at inciting social, racial, ethnic and religious enmity was banned (section 3.1.2).<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Other legislation and documents<\/strong><\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0Section 1 of the Suppression of Extremism Act (Federal Law no.\u00a0114-FZ on Combatting\u00a0Extremist\u00a0Activity, 25 July 2002), as in force at the material time, defined\u00a0extremist activity or extremism as:<\/p>\n – a forcible change of the constitutional foundations of the Russian Federation and breaches of its territorial integrity;<\/p>\n – the public justification of terrorism or other terrorist activities;<\/p>\n – inciting racial, national, religious or social hatred;<\/p>\n – propaganda promoting the exceptional nature, superiority or inferiority of persons on the grounds of their religion, social position, race, nationality or language;<\/p>\n – violations of an individual\u2019s rights and freedoms on account of his or her religion, race, national, social position or social origin;<\/p>\n – obstruction of the exercise of citizens\u2019electoral rights or violations of the secret ballot in voting, combined with violence or threats of the use thereof;<\/p>\n – obstruction of the lawful activities of State authorities, electoral commissions and their officials, non-governmental or religious organisations, combined with violence or threats of the use thereof;<\/p>\n – propaganda for and the public display of Nazi attributes or symbols or attributes or symbols which are similar to Nazi attributes or symbols to the point of becoming undistinguishable;<\/p>\n – public appeals to carry out the aforementioned acts or the mass distribution of manifestly extremist materials, their production or possession with the aim of mass distribution;<\/p>\n – making a public and manifestly false accusationagainst a State official of the Russian Federation or its constituent entities in relation to the commissionof the acts mentioned in section 1 of this Act and which were a crimeduring the exercise of his or her official duties or in connection with those duties;<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0organising and preparing the above acts, as well as incitement to their commission;<\/p>\n – funding the aforementioned acts or any assistance in preparing and carrying them out, including by providing training, printing, material or technical support, telephone or other means of communication or information services.<\/p>\n \u201cExtremist material\u201d was defined as documents or information in other forms which are designed for dissemination, and calls for carrying out extremist activities or justifying the need for such activities, including publications that justify national or racial superiority or justify war crimes or other crimes, which are aimed at the full or partial destruction of an ethnic, national, social, racial or religious group.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a court order is needed to impose restrictions on a citizen\u2019s right to the secrecy of his or her correspondence, telephone or other communications, postal, telegraphic and other messages.A court order is also needed for seizing postal and telegraphic communications.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0Section 8 of the Operational-Search Activities Act (Federal Law no.\u00a0144-FZ of 12 August 1995) provides that operational-search activities involving interference with the constitutional right to the secrecy or privacy of correspondence, postal, telegraphic and other communications transmitted by means of a telecommunications network or mail services can be conducted on the basis of a court order. It can be allowed following the receipt of information (1) that a criminal offence has been committed, is ongoing, or is being plotted; (2) about\u00a0persons conspiring to commit, who are committing, or have committed a criminal offence; or (3) about events or activities endangering the national, military, economic or ecological security of the Russian Federation.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THEGOVERNMENT\u2019S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had not complied with the six-month rule under Article 35 \u00a71 of the Convention because there was no evidence that he had dispatched his application form within eight weeks of the Court\u2019s letter acknowledging receipt of his initial letter.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that he had dispatched his application form on 16 December 2010.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0As confirmed by the stamp on the envelope, the application\u2019s first letter was dispatched to the Court on 18 October 2010, which was less than six months after the appeal decision in his case (see paragraph 23 above). The application form was dispatched to the Court on 16 December 2010, which was within the time-limit set by the Court in its letter confirming receipt of the applicant\u2019s initial communication. The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the customs authorities had unlawfully and without any valid reasons examined the data contained on his laptop and in storage devices, and had copied electronic datarelating to both his personal life and professional activities.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the customs officials\u2019 actions had amounted to \u201cinterference by a public authority\u201d with both his \u201cprivate life\u201d and his \u201ccorrespondence\u201d within the autonomous meaningsarising from Article 8 of the Convention. That \u201cinterference\u201d had been unlawful because there had been no criminal investigation in respect of him and no court order, in breach of Article 23 of the Constitution, Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 8 of the Operational-Search Activities Act of 1995 (see paragraphs 25, 40and 41 above). The domestic courts had failed to make any substantive findings on the matter of legality and had carried out no proportionality assessment in respect of the impugned \u201cinterference\u201d.\u00a0It could not be reasonably accepted that the contested measures had been lawfully authorised by the Customs Code (namely Article 372) since that only concerned an \u201cinspection\u201d of \u201cvehicles, cargo and goods\u201d (see paragraph 28 above). The situation complained of had not fallen in any of the above categories. In particular, the electronicdata on the applicant\u2019s laptop was not \u201cgoods\u201d within the ordinary meaning of that term under the Civil Code or the Customs Code.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the various pieces of legislation applied to him, even read together, did not satisfy the \u201cqualityoflaw\u201d requirement arising from the Court\u2019s case-law regarding \u201cinterferences\u201d under both Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. In particular, Presidential Decree no.\u00a0310 of 23 March 1995 (see paragraph 35 above) was not a piece of primary legislation (namely a federal statute) but had less legal value, which was not sufficientunder the Constitution (see paragraphs 25 and 27 above) for a lawful \u201cinterference\u201d with fundamental rights and freedoms. Moreover, the decree was worded in vague and exceedingly wide terms and, in any event, could not have guided the customs authority\u2019s actions in a situation such as the applicant\u2019s, that is in relation to electronic data.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cinterference\u201d had not been shown to pursue any legitimate aim and had not been convincingly demonstrated as being \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d. The applicant had not been subject to any criminal prosecution and had crossed the border lawfully. As of 27 August 2009 the authorities had not advanced any argument pertaining to the need to ascertain whether the applicant\u2019s laptop contained any \u201cextremist material\u201d. That explanation had only been put forward subsequently. The customs authority\u2019s actions had been motivated merely by the discovery of a folder named \u201cExtremism\u201d on the applicant\u2019s laptop. Thatdid not justify the steps takeninitially to access the laptop. The respondent Government had not specified what part of the data constituted a threat to national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country. The copying of the applicant\u2019s data had not been selective and had included a variety of personal and professional data.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant noted that it was possible to challenge the actions of public officials by way of a judicial review under Chapter 25 of the CCP, which had been done. However, the domestic courts had not proceeded to an adequate assessment of the adverse impact that the officials\u2019 actions had had on the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his private life and correspondence or his right to freedom of expression. In particular, they had not carried out an assessment of whether the officials\u2019 actions had been proportionate to any particular legitimate aim.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acceptedthat the inspection and copying of the applicant\u2019s materials had constituted \u201cinterference by a public authority\u201d with the applicant\u2019s \u201cprivate life\u201d. However, they denied that there had been any reading or copying of the applicant\u2019s \u201ccorrespondence\u201d. The photographs taken by the applicant and which had given rise to the copying procedure could not pass for such \u201ccorrespondence\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The customs officers had not read any personal correspondence and had not copied any email, Facebook or Skype passwords. The applicant had failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of any \u201cinterference\u201d in that regard.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the customs inspection ofthe applicant\u2019s bagsand the \u201csampling\u201d of \u201cgoods\u201d had not been random as they had been carried out after examining his customs declaration and with regard to his conduct and answers to the officer\u2019s questions. Those acts had given rise to a reasonable suspicion \u201cregarding the applicant\u2019s compliance with the legislation in force\u201d. Theensuing actions had been based on a specific risk profile, which had then justified the application of certain measures. Every risk profile contained objective criteria, which could determine the need for taking certain measures in each particular case. The customs inspection and the sampling of data from the applicant\u2019s laptop had been a necessary measure to minimise the risk emerging from the specific risk profile.In addition, the customs officer had made a report to his supervising officer before inspecting the applicant\u2019s luggage.<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The presence of the folder with photographs and entitled \u201cExtremism\u201dhad been a legitimate reason for further actions on the part of the customs officers, including the copying of electronic data concerning the photographs.It had not been possible for the officers to take another course of action and the law had required them to obtain an expert conclusion as to the presence of \u201cextremist material\u201d. The applicant had raised no objection relating to the copying or to its extent. The applicant had only voiced a concern that further information, not related to him, could be added to the DVDs containing his photographs.\u00a0The subsequent use of the copied information had been strictly limited to the needs of the expert examination.<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also argued that Russian law contained a number of safeguards against abusive or arbitrary actions on the part of customs officers. The Russian Constitution expressly limited interferences with the inviolability of people\u2019s private lives to situations where it was necessary for a legitimate aim and which was prescribed by a federal statute (such as the Customs Code). The inspection andcopying of the applicant\u2019s materials had been authorised by Articles 372 and 383 of the Customs Code and had been further detailed in related legal acts, including orders issued by the Federal Customs Authority. Those provisions conferred corresponding and sufficiently fettered powers on customs officers without any need for a court order, which would be required in the case of interference with someone\u2019s \u201ccorrespondence\u201d.<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The Customs Code contained provisions limiting the use of private information and provided for liability for breaching those limitations. The same limitations were also imposed on experts examining \u201csamples\u201d.<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted some statistical data for 2009-11 aimed at demonstrating (by contrast to the Court\u2019s findings in Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a04158\/05, \u00a7\u00a084, ECHR 2010 (extracts)) that the inspection and sampling procedures in relation to suspicions of the presence of extremist or other prohibited material in electronic form had been rarely applied (for instance, various types of materials relating to Jehovah Witnesses or Scientology, various types of goods or materials showing Nazi symbols or those resembling them in various contexts).<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicant had had effective remedies at his disposal in respect of his complaints. The judicialreview procedure under Chapter 25 of the CCP was capable of remedying violations of individual rights. The applicant\u2019s case had been examined by the courts on the merits. They had dealt with matters relating to legality and had concluded that the customs officials\u2019 actions had not breached his rights. The Government enclosed fourteen judgments from various Russian courts in casesthat had been lost by the customs authorities (such asthe unlawful levying of customs fees, an unlawful refusal to release an international postal package or the unlawful retention of a vehicle). The Government argued that the absence of a requirement to obtain a court authorisation was counterbalanced by the availability of a judicial review under Chapter 25 of the CCP, which was essential for ascertaining the legality of the public officials\u2019 actions. It was also possible to claim compensation under Article 1070 of the Civil Code for damage caused by the actions of public officials.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Whether there was \u201cinterference by a public authority\u201d with the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 8 of the Convention<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0Correspondence<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the customs officers\u2019 actions had constituted an \u201cinterference\u201d with his \u201ccorrespondence\u201d with the meaning of Article 8 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and, first and foremost, under Article 23 of the Russian Constitution, which required a court order for that type of \u201cinterference\u201d with correspondence or \u201cother communications\u201d (see paragraph 25 above).<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0First of all, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is related to data contained on his laptop. There is no evidence that the applicant\u2019s flash memory cards were inspected or that any data was copied from them.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0Second, it can be accepted that the applicant\u2019s laptop allowed for access to his ICQ conversations with other people. However, it has not been specified whether accessto that program was protected by a password or whether no such password was technically required. The applicant has not specified what other \u201ccorrespondence\u201d, such as emails, was readily accessible for reading on the laptop (see Posevini v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a063638\/14, \u00a7 75, 19 January2017). It does not appear that the applicant was required to disclose any password. As regards the applicant\u2019s submission concerning \u201cthe copying of his passwords\u201d, it has notbeen specified, and the Court does not have sufficient information at its disposal on this point, how it was technically practicable to \u201ccopy\u201d passwords for such accounts as those needed for email, Facebook or Skype.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously held that the search and \u201cseizure\u201d of electronic data constituted an interference with the right to respect for \u201ccorrespondence\u201d within the meaning of Article 8\u00a0of the Convention (see, in respect of legal entities, Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, no.\u00a074336\/01, \u00a7 45, ECHR 2007\u2011IV; Vinci Construction and GTM G\u00e9nie Civil et Servicesv. France, nos. 63629\/10 and 60567\/10, \u00a7 63, 2 April 2015; and S\u00e9rvulo & Associados – Sociedade de Advogados, RLand Others v.\u00a0Portugal, no.27013\/10, \u00a7 76, 3 September 2015; see Robathin v. Austria, no.\u00a030457\/06, \u00a7 39, 3 July 2012).In the circumstances of the present case and noting insufficient elements to conclude that the applicant\u2019s \u201ccorrespondence\u201d was adversely affected by the customs officers\u2019 actions, the Court finds it more appropriate to focus on the notion of \u201cprivate life\u201d (see below; see also Trabajo Rueda v. Spain, no. 32600\/12, \u00a7 32, 30\u00a0May 2017).<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0Private life<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the concept of \u201cprivate life\u201d is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person. The notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees (see\u00a0Pretty v. the United Kingdom,no.\u00a02346\/02, \u00a7 61, ECHR 2002-III). This Article also protects a right to identity and personal development, and the right to establish relationships with other human beings and the outside world. It may include activities of a professional or business nature. There is, therefore, a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of \u201cprivate life\u201d. There are a number of elements relevant to a consideration of whether a person\u2019s private life is concerned in measures effected outside a person\u2019s home or private premises. In this connection, a person\u2019s reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, though not necessarily conclusive, factor (see\u00a0P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a044787\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 56-57, ECHR 2001-IX).<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously held, in the context of a search on the street, that irrespective of whether in any particular case correspondence or diaries or other private documents are discovered and read or other intimate items are revealed in the search, the use of the coercive powers conferred by legislation to require an individual to submit to a detailed search of his person, his clothing and his personal belongings amounts to a clear interference with the right to respect for private life (see Gillan and Quinton, cited above, \u00a7\u00a063).<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0In a recent case, the Court considered that there had been an \u201cinterference\u201d with the applicant\u2019s right to respect for her \u201cprivate life\u201d on account of the search of her bag and seizure of a notebook from it because it was believed to contain information relevant to the criminal investigations against her (see Cacuci and S.C. Virra & Cont Pad S.R.L. v. Romania, no.\u00a027153\/07, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a070-71, 17 January 2017; see also Amarandei and Others v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a01443\/10, \u00a7 216, 26 April 2016).<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0In Gillan and Quinton(cited above), the Court also made the following findings as regards the context of the search to which passengers submit at airports or at the entrance to a public building, essentially for security reasons:<\/p>\n \u201c64. … [The Court] does not need to decide whether the search of the person and of his bags in such circumstances amounts to an interference with an individual\u2019s Article\u00a08 rights, albeit one which is clearly justified on security grounds, since for the reasons given by the applicants the situations cannot be compared. An air traveller may be seen as consenting to such a search by choosing to travel. He knows that he and his bags are liable to be searched before boarding the aeroplane and has a freedom of choice, since he can leave personal items behind and walk away without being subjected to a search. The search powers under section 44 are qualitatively different. The individual can be stopped anywhere and at any time, without notice and without any choice as to whether or not to submit to a search.\u201d<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant\u2019s complaint is not related to being asked questions during the initial customs procedure or about customs officers looking inside his bags. The thrust of his complaint was and remains about the search of his laptop, which lasted several hours, allegedly without any reasonable suspicion of any offence or unlawful conduct; the copying of his personal and professional data, followed by its communication for a specialist assessment; and the retention of his data for some two years. In the Court\u2019s view, those actions went beyond what could be perceived as procedures that were \u201croutine\u201d, relatively non-invasive and for which consent was usually given. The applicant could not choose whether he wanted to present himself and his belongings to customs and a possible customs inspection (compare Gillan and Quinton, \u00a7\u00a064).<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court emphasises that the present case concerns the context of customs controlsfor \u201cgoods\u201d carried by a person arriving at customs to declare items rather than the context of security checks, in particular those that may be carried out in relation to a person and his or her effects prior to admission to an aircraft, train or the like(see also, by way of comparison, Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos.\u00a039692\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7 59, ECHR 2012; Gahramanov v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no.\u00a026291\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 40-41, 15 October 2013, and, mutatis mutandis, Saadi v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 64 and 74, ECHR 2008, and Bowler International Unit v. France, no. 1946\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 40-47, 23 July 2009, under other Articles of the Convention and Protocols to it).In the Court\u2019s view, by submitting his effects to customs controls a person does not automatically and in all instances waive or otherwise forgo the right to respect for his or her \u201cprivate life\u201d or, as the case may be in other applications, his or her \u201ccorrespondence\u201d.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, in view of the above observations, the Court considers that it is open to the applicant to rely on the right to respect for his \u201cprivate life\u201d and that there has been an \u201cinterference\u201d under Article 8 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0An interference is justified by the terms of paragraph 2 of Article\u00a08 only if it is \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d,seeks to pursue one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and is \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d in order to achieve the aim or aims.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the \u201cinterference\u201dwas justified<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates thatthe expression \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d requires that the impugned measure should have \u201csome basis\u201d in domestic \u201claw\u201d, which should be understood in its \u201csubstantive\u201d rather than \u201cformal\u201d sense. In a sphere covered by the written law, the \u201claw\u201d is the enactment in force as the competent courts have interpreted it (see\u00a0Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Colas Est and Others v. France, no.\u00a037971\/97, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2002\u2011III). The \u201claw\u201d may encompass enactments of lower ranking statutes and, for instance, regulatory measures taken by professional regulatory bodies under independent rule-making powers delegated to them by Parliament (see Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224\/03, \u00a7 83, 14\u00a0September 2010).<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the phrase \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d (as well as \u201cprescribed by law\u201d in Article 10) requires the impugned measure to be compatible with the rule of law, which is mentioned in the preamble to the Convention and inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8 of the Convention. The \u201claw\u201d must thus be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects, that is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual \u2013 if need be with appropriate advice \u2013 to regulate his conduct.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0For domestic law to meet these requirements it must afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention. In matters affecting fundamental rights it would be contrary to the rule of law, one of the basic principles of a democratic society enshrined in the Convention, for a legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise (see, under Article 8 of the Convention in the context of secret measures of surveillance and data gathering by public authorities, Malone v. the United Kingdom, 2\u00a0August 1984, \u00a7 67, Series A no. 82 and Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341\/95, \u00a7\u00a055, ECHR 2000-V, and under other Articles of the Convention and\/or in other contexts: Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a030985\/96, \u00a7 84, ECHR 2000-XI; Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748\/98, \u00a7\u00a030, ECHR 2004\u2011I; Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. [GC], cited above, \u00a7 82; Gillan and Quinton, cited above, \u00a7\u00a077; and Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a057818\/09 and 14\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a0411, 7\u00a0February 2017).The level of precision required of domestic legislation \u2013 which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality \u2013 depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see, for example, Hashman and Harrup v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25594\/94, \u00a7 31, ECHR 1999\u2011VIII).<\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection, the existence of sufficient procedural safeguards may be particularly pertinent, having regard to, to some extent at least and among other factors, the nature and extent of the interference in question (see P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001\u2011IX). In various contexts of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court has emphasised that measures affecting human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review in a timely fashion the reasons for the decision and the relevant evidence (see Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963\/99, \u00a7 123, 20 June 2002; X\u00a0v. Finland, no. 34806\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 220-222, ECHR 2012 (extracts);Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722\/11, \u00a7 184, ECHR 2013; and Kotiy v. Ukraine, no. 28718\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 68-70, 5 March 2015; see also Milojevi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia, nos. 43519\/07 and 2 others, \u00a7 64, 12 January 2016).<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0The above considerations under the heading of \u201cquality of law\u201d may overlap with similar issues analysed under the heading of \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d (see Ustinova v. Russia, no. 7994\/14, \u00a7\u00a044, 8\u00a0November 2016).The Court reiterates that where a wide margin of appreciation is afforded to the national authorities, the procedural safeguards available to the individual will be especially material in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the regulatory framework, remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, the Court must examine whether the decision-making process leading to measures of interference was fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by the Convention (see, in the context of decisions relating to town and country planning policies, Chapman v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238\/95, \u00a7 92, ECHR 2001\u2011I, and in other contexts: Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC],no.\u00a036022\/97, \u00a7\u00a099, ECHR 2003\u2011VIII;Fern\u00e1ndez Mart\u00ednezv. Spain [GC], no. 56030\/07, \u00a7\u00a0147, ECHR 2014 (extracts); see alsoLiu v. Russia (no. 2), no. 29157\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 85-86, 26\u00a0July 2011; Gablishvili v. Russia, no. 39428\/12, \u00a7\u00a048, 26 June 2014;Yefimenko v.\u00a0Russia, no. 152\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 146-50, 12\u00a0February 2013, and Lashmankin and Others, cited above, \u00a7 418).<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0As regards specifically searches and seizures or similar measures (essentially in the context of obtaining physical evidence of certain offences), it is pertinent to assess whether the reasons adduced to justify such measures were relevant and sufficient and whether the proportionality principle has been adhered to (see Camenzind v. Switzerland, 16\u00a0December 1997, \u00a7 45, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011VIII, with further references).As regards the latter point, the Court must firstly ensure that the relevant legislation and practice afford individuals \u201cadequate and effective safeguards against abuse\u201d; notwithstanding the margin of appreciation which the Court recognises the Contracting States have in this sphere, it must be particularly vigilant where the authorities are empowered under national law to order and effect searches without a judicial warrant (see also Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 34529\/10, \u00a7 220, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). If individuals are to be protected from arbitrary interference by the authorities with the rights guaranteed under Article 8, a legal framework and very strict limits on such powers are called for. Secondly, the Court must consider the particular circumstances of each case in order to determine whether, in the concrete case, the interference in question was proportionate to the aim pursued (see Camenzind, cited above, \u00a7 45).<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the principles to the present case<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the requirement that an \u201cinterference\u201d should be \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d, the Court reiterates at the outset that in the first place it is for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see\u00a0Kruslin v. France, 24 April 1990, \u00a7\u00a029, Series A no. 176\u2011A;\u00a0Kopp v. Switzerland, 25 March 1998, \u00a7\u00a059,\u00a0Reports\u00a01998-II; and\u00a0Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433\/09, \u00a7\u00a0140, ECHR 2012; see also\u00a0Delfi AS\u00a0v. Estonia\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a064569\/09, \u00a7 127, ECHR 2015).<\/p>\n (\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0Formal legality<\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0First of all, as to formal legality (meaning compliance with rules of domestic law), the Court dismisses as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s assertion that (i) the impugned measures were in breach of Russian law if there was no ongoing criminal investigation or measures under the Operational-Search Activities Act, and\/or (ii) in the absence of a prior judicial authorisation (see paragraphs 25, 40 and 41 above). The applicant\u2019s second argument concerned the allegedly unforeseeable application of the provisions concerning customs inspections of \u201cgoods and vehicles\u201d and the customs procedure for the \u201csampling of goods\u201d to the examination and copying of electronic data from his laptop.<\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic courts shed no light on the question of the applicability of Article 23 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Constitution,which protects the right to the secrecy or privacy of \u201ccorrespondence\u201d or \u201cother messages\u201d and requires a court decision for imposing restrictions on that right. Nor did the courts make any other specific findings relating to the applicant\u2019s rights as protected by Article 23 of the Constitution or Article 8 of the Convention. In the absence of any domestic findings, the Court is unable to reach any conclusion as regards formal compliance with Russian law on that account.<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, it is noted that the domestic courts merelyreferred to Article 11 of the Customs Code, whichdefines goods for the purpose of customs legislation as movable property that is being transferred across the customs border, to then conclude that such items as laptops, flash memory cards, cameras, video-cameras, printed material and the like fell within the notion of \u201cgoods\u201d (see paragraphs 21, 23 and 28 above).This served as a basis for then asserting that such \u201cgoods\u201d could be lawfully subjected to the sampling procedure, without any further consideration ofthe context in which the customs control concerned thenon-material digital contents (electronic dataamounting to information or images, for instance) accessed by way of \u201copening\u201d a \u201ccontainer\u201d (the laptop) (see paragraphs 31 and 33 above). Before the Court the Governmentattempted to supplement that consideration by references to further provisions of Russian law, such as the Civil Code. However, those provisions were not part of the domestic assessment and, in any event, do not seem to provide a sufficiently sound legal basis for copying electronic data in the customs context.Having regard to the reasoning of the domestic decisions, the Court is not satisfied that the combined reading of the relevant provisions of the Customs Code (a \u201cfederal statute\u201d within the meaning of Article 55 of the Constitution, cited in paragraph 27 above) and other legal rules constituted a foreseeable interpretation of national law and provided a legal basis for the copying of electronic data contained in electronic documents located in such a \u201ccontainer\u201d as a laptop.<\/p>\n (\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Protection against arbitrariness and adequate safeguards<\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, however,that the main thrust of the applicant\u2019s grievance before the Court essentially relates to insufficient legal protection against an arbitrary interference as regards both the authorisation and carrying out of the intrusivemeasures (for a summary of the relevant principles, see paragraphs 73-74 above). In the Court\u2019s view and for the reasons presented below, the safeguards provided by Russian law have not been demonstrated as constituting an adequate framework for the wide powers afforded to the executive which could offer individuals adequate protection against arbitrary interference.<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0Administrative procedure<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts the Government\u2019s submission that the powers to carry out the inspection and sampling procedures were, indeed, confined to the specific context of customs controls and were limited to people crossing the border of the Russian Federation.The Court has also taken note of the Government\u2019s submission that it was the chief officer of the customs unit who was empowered to authorise an examining officer to carry out an inspection and sampling.However, the Court is not satisfied that there was a clear requirement at the authorisation stage that the inspection and, first and foremost, the copying be subjected to a requirement of any assessment of the proportionality of the measure (compare Gillan and Quinton, cited above, \u00a7\u00a080, where stop-and-search powers were additionally subject to prompt confirmation by the Secretary of State and judicial review).<\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the risk-profiling approach adopted by Russian customs and the related 2008 Instruction (see paragraphs 30 and37 above), the Government may be understood to be suggesting that that approach furnished safeguards against arbitrary \u201cinterference\u201d on the part of the customs officers. For its part, the Court refers in this connection tothe appeal court\u2019s finding in the applicant\u2019s case that the customs control had to be based on the principle of selectiveness and, as a rule, had to be limited to such forms of control as were sufficient for ensuring compliance with customs legislation. It was also stated that when carrying out a customs check, the customs authority was allowed to take samples of goods which were needed for further assessment.However, both the domestic court decisions and the Government\u2019s submissions before the Court are limited to general assertions about the risk-profiling approach and do not specify how it was applied to the applicant. In fact, when carrying out their review of the customs officers\u2019 actions, the courts did not even refer to the above\u2011mentioned Instruction. Moreover, the reference to risk management (including risk profiling) does not address the matter of the extensive copying of the data from the applicant\u2019s laptop, which is at the heart of the present complaint. The Court does not overlook that the domestic courts pointed out that extensive copying was \u201cneeded\u201d because of the diverse nature of the \u201cgoods\u201d to be sampled, which was electronic data in the present case. In the Court\u2019s view, it is usual for an electronic device to contain various types of electronic files (text, photographs, videos and others) and that the contents may vary even within the same type of file. In addition to the above\u2011mentioned considerations relating to the legal basis in this case, it is evident that the usual approach to the sampling by customs of \u201cgoods\u201d was not adequate as regards electronic data (see also paragraph 80 above).<\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0Next, it is noted that the applicant pointed out that the \u201cinterference\u201d had been unjustified since he had not been subject to any ongoing criminal investigation or any measures under the Operational-Search Activities Act. However, the Court is not convinced that in order to avoid arbitrariness it was indispensable for the customs officer to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity stricto sensu (as being in breach of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), that is some objective basis for suspecting the particular person of \u201ccriminal\u201d activity in the particular circumstances of a given situation taken as a whole. By way of comparison, the Court reiterates that it is also possible to envisage a justified interference with Article\u00a08 rights by way of search-and-seizure or comparable measures in contexts other than those of a criminal investigation, in relation to unlawful conduct punishable under other procedures (see, for instance, DELTA PEK\u00c1RNY a.s. v.\u00a0the Czech Republic, no. 97\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a080-83, 2\u00a0October 2014).<\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0However, it does not appear that the comprehensive measureused in the present case had to be based on some notion of a reasonable suspicion that someone making a customs declaration has committed an offence, namely one arising from the anti-extremist legislation pertinent to the present case. Indeed, the Russian Customs Code linked its various procedures to the need for \u201censuring compliance with customs legislation\u201d. The present case concerns one specific context where imputed \u201cnon\u2011compliance\u201d is related to the ban set out in Presidential Decree no.\u00a0310 of 23 March 1995 read together with the Federal Customs Authority\u2019s order no.\u00a0677 of 10\u00a0November 1995 and Article 13 of the Customs Code of 2003 (see paragraphs29,35-36 above).The apparent lack of any need for a reasonable suspicion relating to an offence was exacerbated by the fact that the domestic authorities, ultimately the courts on judicial review, did not attempt to define and apply such notions as \u201cpropaganda for fascism\u201d, \u201csocial, racial, ethnic or religious enmity\u201d to any of the ascertained facts. It is also noted that the presidential decree seems to relate to measures such as the \u201carrest and bringing to liability\u201d of persons \u201cwho [were] disseminating\u201d material with the above content. It has not been suggested that any separate instructions or guidance was made available to customs officers in relation to dealing with situations involving potential prima facie \u201cextremist material\u201d and for dealing with electronic data in that context.<\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of the present case the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s submission thatthe fact that the applicant was returning from a disputed area constituted in itself a sufficient basis for proceeding with the extensive examination and copying of his electronic data on account of possible \u201cextremist\u201d content.<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0In situations when a person is at customs after arriving in the country (a fortiori, through such ports of entry as customs pointsfor vehicles or those arriving on foot, as in the present case), bearing in mind the margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State in the customs context, it is particularly pertinent to ascertain whether post factum judicial remedies were available and provided adequate safeguards.<\/p>\n –\u00a0\u00a0Judicial review<\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0Althoughthe exercise of the powers to inspectandsamplewas amenable to judicial review under Chapter 25 of the Russian CCP, the width of those powers was such that the applicant faced formidable obstacles in showing that the customs officers\u2019 actions were unlawful, unjustified or otherwise in breach of Russian law (compare Gillan and Quinton, cited above, \u00a7\u00a080).<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its findings under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article\u00a011 in Lashmankin and Others(cited above, \u00a7\u00a0356), which also concerned the judicialreview procedure under Chapter 25 of the CCP. In particular, the Court stated as follows:<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The scope of judicial review was limited to examining the lawfulness of the impugned administrative act or measure. In accordance with Chapter\u00a025 of the CCP, the sole relevant issue before the domestic courts was whether the contested act or measure was lawful. \u201cLawfulness\u201d was understood as compliance with the rules of competence, procedure and contents. The Supreme Court expressly stated that the courts had no competence to assess the reasonableness of the authorities\u2019 acts or decisions made within their discretionary powers. It followed that the courts were not required by law to examine the issues of \u201cproportionality\u201d and \u201cnecessity in a democratic society\u201d, in particular whether the contested decision answered a pressing social need and was proportionate to any legitimate aims pursued, principles which lie at the heart of the analysis of complaints relating to Article\u00a011 of the Convention.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The analysis of the judicial decisions made in the case of Lashmankin and Others showed that they failed to recognise that the cases involved a conflict between the right to freedom of assembly and other legitimate interests and to perform a balancing exercise. The balance appeared to be set in favour of protection of other interests, such as rights and freedoms of non-participants, in a way that made it difficult to turn the balance in favour of the freedom of assembly. The Court concluded that in practice Russian courts had not applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 11 and did not apply the \u201cproportionality\u201d and \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d tests.<\/p>\n 90.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, that assessment is applicable to the context of the adverse decisions and actions taken by the customs authorities in relation to the copying of electronic data, as challenged by the applicant in the judicialreview proceedings.After examining the parties\u2019 submissions, the Court finds no reason to depart from the above assessment (see, in the same vein, Polyakova and Others v. Russia, nos. 35090\/09 and 3\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0110-14, 7 March 2017 as regards judicialreview challenges in relation to family visits to convicted prisoners; and Ustinova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52 in relation to an exclusion order in respect of a foreign national). In particular, the Court notes that in addition to having different subjectmatter from the present case, several examples of the favourable domestic judgments supplied by the Government (see paragraph 58 above) were confined to findings of formal unlawfulness relating to non-observance of certain formal requirements of domestic law, for instance relating to the competence of a customs authority, compliance with certain procedures and time-limits. The decisions contain no particular reasoning corresponding to the matters examined above in the context of Article\u00a08\u00a0of the Convention as regards respect for the applicant\u2019s \u201cprivate life\u201d.<\/p>\n 91.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court observes that the Chapter 25 review in the present case was carried out in the light of the applicable substantive legislation such as the Customs Code, which served as the basis for the \u201cinterference\u201d. The respondent Government has not demonstrated that that legislation added anything to provide the courts with a legal framework for ascertaining whether the \u201cinterference\u201d was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.<\/p>\n 92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is of the view that the circumstances of the present case highlight certain deficiencies in the domestic regulatory framework. The domestic authorities, including the courts, were not required to give \u2013 and did not give \u2013 relevant and sufficient reasons for justifying the \u201cinterference\u201d in the present case. In particular, it was not considered pertinent by the domestic authorities to ascertain whether the impugned measures were in pursuance of any actual legitimate aim, for instance the ones referred to by the Government. It was merely assumed that the identification of possible \u201cextremist material\u201d was required by the 1995 Presidential decree. It was not considered relevant, at any stage and in any manner, that the applicant was carrying journalistic material (see also below under Article 10 of the Convention).<\/p>\n (\u03b3)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion<\/p>\n 93.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the Court concludes in addition to the findings under the heading of formal legality in paragraph 80 above that the respondent Government has not convincingly demonstrated that the relevant legislation and practice afforded adequate and effective safeguards against abuse in a situation of applying the sampling procedure in respect of electronic data contained in an electronic device (compare Gillan and Quinton, cited above, \u00a7 87).<\/p>\n 94.\u00a0\u00a0They are not, therefore, \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d and it follows that there has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 95.\u00a0\u00a0The above findings dispense the Court from having to examine whether the other requirements of the second paragraph of Article 8 have been complied with.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 96.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant arguedthat the situation complained of had also resulted in a separate breach of his freedom of expression, namely his freedom to receive and impart information and ideas.<\/p>\n 97.\u00a0\u00a0Article 10 of the Convention reads in the relevant parts as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers …<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime …\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/em><\/p>\n 98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the customs authority\u2019s actions had amounted to \u201cinterference by public authority\u201d with his freedom of expression, including his freedom to receive and impart information and ideas \u201cregardless of frontiers\u201d. The applicant submitted that when crossing the border he had presented his passport and press card. By copying the data from the laptop, the authorities had also copied his \u201cFTP access passwords\u201d to several professional servers, such as Agency.Photographer.ru.<\/p>\n 99.\u00a0\u00a0The impugned \u201cinterference\u201d had pursued no legitimate aim and had not been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d. The applicant had acted as a journalist and had expressed his opinion by way of taking photographs and preparing texts for publication in print and Internet media outlets. In particular, the applicant had at the time been working on a photoreport concerning the life of ordinary people in Abkhazia and the prospects foreconomic development in the area. That was a matter of considerable public interest, in particular on account of Russia\u2019s financial and military assistance. The national courts had not carried out any proportionality assessment.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/em><\/p>\n 100.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that there had been no \u201cinterference by public authority\u201d under Article 10 of the Convention because at no point on 27\u00a0August 2009 or later had the applicant been found liable for any offence or otherwise; he had not been prohibited from publishing material; the material that had been copied had not been subjected to a confiscation measure; and there had been no disclosure of any confidential sources. The customs officers\u2019 actions had been limited to the inspection and copying of some data on account of a reasonable suspicion that it might contain extremist material. Their actions had had no \u201cchilling effect\u201d vis-\u00e0-vis the journalistic freedom to hold and express opinions. It could not be decisive in the present case and had not been decisive for the customs officers that the applicant was a photojournalist. The applicant had not been approached or threatened because of his professional status. The \u201cregardless of frontiers\u201d phrase in Article 10 had no import in the present case.<\/p>\n 101.\u00a0\u00a0Even it was accepted that there had been \u201cinterference by public authority\u201d, such interference had been relatively insignificant. It had been lawful and had pursued the aims listed in Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. The \u201cinterference\u201d had been proportionate to those aims, in particular, for the same reasons as regards Article 8 of the Convention. The Government submitted that the Court\u2019s case-law relating to the protection of journalistic sources was inapplicable in the present case.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n 102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention is linked to the complaint under Article 8 and that it is admissible. However, having regard to the applicant\u2019s specific allegations and the nature and scope of the Court\u2019s findings under Article 8 of the Convention (see also Gillan and Quinton, \u00a7\u00a090, and Lashmankin and Others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0350-60, both cited above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine it separately on the merits.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 8 AND 10<\/p>\n 103.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained in substance about the manner in which the judicial review in the present case was carried out. The parties have been invited to make submissions under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n 104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the public officials\u2019 actions could be and actually had been challenged by way of a judicial review under Chapter\u00a025 of the CCP. However, the domestic courts had not proceeded to an adequate assessment of the adverse impact that the officials\u2019 actions had had on his right to respect for his private life and correspondence or his right to freedom of expression. In particular, they had not carried out an assessment of whether the officials\u2019 actions had been proportionate to any particular legitimate aim.<\/p>\n 105.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had had access to effective remedies in respect of his complaints. The judicialreview procedure under Chapter 25 of the CCP was capable of remedying violations of individual rights. The applicant\u2019s case had been examined by the courts on the merits. They had dealt with matters relating to legality and had concluded that the customs officials\u2019 actions had not breached his rights. The applicant could also have lodged a civil claim under Article\u00a01070 of the Civil Code.<\/p>\n 106.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the applicant\u2019s specific allegations and, first and foremost, the nature and scope of the Court\u2019s findings under Article 8 of the Convention (see also Lashmankin and Others,cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0350-60), the Court considers that the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention is admissible but that it is not necessary to examine it separately on the merits.<\/p>\n V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 107.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not substantiated a causal link between the alleged sufferingand the violations of the Convention.<\/p>\n 110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR 3,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,805 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and theCourt.<\/p>\n 112.\u00a0\u00a0The Government expressed doubts about the authenticity of the contract between the applicant and his representative, in particular as regards the services allegedly provided at the domestic level. The Government also considered that the fees claimed were excessive and that the postal expenses had been substantiated only in part.<\/p>\n 113.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a01,700 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe complaints under Articles\u00a08, 10 and 13 of the Convention admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that it is not necessary to examine separately the merits of the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat it is not necessary to examine separately the merits of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 1,700 (one thousand seven hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 February 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Helena J\u00e4derblom _______________<\/p>\n [1] Russian Reporter magazine
\nBranko Lubarda,
\nLuis L\u00f3pez Guerra,
\nHelen Keller,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nGeorgios A. Serghides,
\nJolien Schukking, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n
\n[2] File Transfer Protocol
\n[3] Article 20 of the Customs Code of 18 June 1993 provided that it was admissible to prohibit entry of certain goods into Russia, in view of the considerations of national security, protection of public order, morality, human life and health, or other interests of the Russian Federation, on the basis of Russian legislation or international treaties of the Russian Federation.<\/p>\n