FIRST SECTION
\nCASE OF \u017dIROVNICK\u00dd v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC
\n(Application no. 10092\/13 and six other applications \u2013 see list appended)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n8 February 2018<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of \u017dirovnick\u00fd v. the Czech Republic,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n Armen Harutyunyan, President, and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n Having deliberated in private on 16 January 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in seven applications (nos. 10092\/13, 20708\/13, 22455\/13, 61245\/13, 51482\/13, 22520\/14 and 13258\/15) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) bya Czech national, Mr Albert \u017dirovnick\u00fd (\u201cthe applicant\u201d) on different dates (see the Annex).<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr Patrik Altner, a lawyer practising in Prague. The Czech Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr V.A. Schorm, of the Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 October 2015 the applications were communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1968 and is serving a prison sentence in M\u00edrov Prison.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 10092\/13<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Main proceedings (no. 37 C 51\/2004)<\/em><\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 April 2004 the applicant initiated civil proceedings for protection of his personality rights (\u201cthe main proceedings\u201d) against the Czech Republic in the person of the Ministry of Justice (no. 37 C 51\/2004). On 28\u00a0March 2008 the Prague Municipal Court (m\u011bstsk\u00fd soud) dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. The Prague High Court (vrchn\u00ed soud) dismissed an appeal by the applicant on 20 October 2008 and the Supreme Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed soud) dismissed an appeal on points of lawon 15 April 2010.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Compensation proceedings (no. 17 C 204\/2007)<\/em><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 June 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act (Act no. 82\/1998) from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings.As the Ministry did not deal with the applicant\u2019s request within the six-month statutory time-limit, he brought a civil action on 18\u00a0December 2007 (proceedings no. 17 C 204\/2007).<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 December 2009 the Prague 2 District Court (obvodn\u00ed soud) acknowledged that there had been delays in the main proceedings and awarded the applicant 30,000 Czech korunas (CZK) (1,140 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and dismissed the rest of the claim.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 15\u00a0September 2010 the Prague Municipal Court amended the lower court\u2019s judgment by dismissing the whole financial claim, leaving the rest of the judgment intact. It found that the applicant had not suffered any non-pecuniary damage on account of the unreasonable length of the proceedings.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 November 2011 the Supreme Court, upon an appeal on points of law by the applicant, quashed the Municipal Court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case toit. On 11 April 2012 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for financial compensation but acknowledged that his right to have his case heard within a reasonable time had been violated in the main proceedings. Given the high number of lawsuits brought by the applicant, the court concluded that the finding of a violation was sufficient redress for the non-pecuniary damage caused to him. The court also saw no need to award him damages on account of the length of the compensation proceedings, as the applicanthad requested, considering thattheyhad not been unreasonably long.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 August 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant, stating, inter alia:<\/p>\n \u201cThe Supreme Court pointed out in its previous cassation judgment in this case that, without providing any further reasons, it cannot be concluded that the fact that a plaintiff has initiateda large number of disputes …means that the presumption of non-pecuniary damage caused by excessively long proceedings has been rebutted.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n The fact that an injured person has instigateda large number of judicial disputes can have an impact on his approach to a particular set of proceedings; for example, he may fail to respond to the court\u2019s requests on time, pay court fees on time, remedy shortcomings in his submissions on time and such like, thus he may not pay proper attention to the proceedings. Such conduct may show that the subjectmatter of the proceedings is of lesser importancefor the injured person and it may be taken into consideration under the criterion of the injured person\u2019sconduct…. Nonetheless, even if there are no such circumstances on the part of the injured person, it is not possible to wholly ignore the fact that the plaintiff has initiateda large number of judicial disputes. It puts him in a different position as regards the perception of the degree of damage caused by the excessive length of one of the disputes compared to the position of a person participating in only one or only a few judicial proceedings (compare,in similar terms, the European Court of Human Rights inadmissibility decision in the case ofHavelka v. the Czech Republic, of 20 September 2011, applications nos. 7332\/10, 42666\/10 and 61523\/10, and the decision of the Supreme Court of 4\u00a0June\u00a02013, no. 30 Cdo 1042\/2013).<\/p>\n As to the appellant\u2019s complaint that the court of appeal should have taken the length of the compensation proceedings themselves into account when determining redress, it must be admitted that the base amount of compensation can indeed be increased if compensation proceedings are themselves excessively long and a plaintiff requests an increase in compensation on those grounds (part VI. of the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion of 13 April 2011, no. Cpjn 206\/2010 …). However, in its judgment of 14\u00a0November 2011, no. 30 Cdo 3340\/2011, the Supreme Court added that if in the proceedings concerned the procedure under Article 118 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) has been followed, the application of the possibility to increase compensationis limited by the rules for submitting new facts and modifying the initial action in the proceedings before the court of first instance; the same applies in similar fashion to appeal proceedings (see Article 205a \u00a7 1 and Article 2016 \u00a7 2 of the CCP). Thus, an injured person has to raise an objection about the length of compensation proceedings pending the effects of concentration in the particular proceedings. In the present case, the appellant raised a claim for compensation for the length of the compensation proceedings only in the course of the proceedings before the appellate court, in a submission of 11 April 2012 (file page 128)…so it was an inadmissible new claim.\u201d<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 April 2014 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) dismissed a constitutional complaint (\u00fastavn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost) by the applicant.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime, the applicant initiated proceedings for compensation (no. 23 C 149\/2012) for non-pecuniary damage for the excessive length of the first set of compensation proceedings (no.\u00a017\u00a0C\u00a0204\/2007). He later began proceedings for compensation for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the second set of compensation proceedings too (no. 22 C 204\/2015).<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 20708\/13<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Main proceedings (no. 18 C 84\/2006)<\/em><\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 September 2003 the applicant brought a civil action against the Czech Republic\u2013Ministry of the Interior before the Prague 7 District Court under the State Liability Act. He claimed compensation for an allegedly illegal search of his house on 6 March 2001.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 November 2004he was asked to remedy shortcomings in his action, which he did on 16 November 2004.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 March 2005 the District Court decided the case was not in its jurisdiction and referred it to the Prague 2 District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the Prague Municipal Court upheld the jurisdiction decision on 20 December 2005.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 January 2007 the District Court appointed a legal representative for the applicant. On 6 June and 20 September 2007 and 4\u00a0January 2008 the applicant supplemented his action.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 March 2008 the District Court asked the Prague 3 District Court to send it the criminal case file concerning the house search at issue.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0The District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action on 21\u00a0December 2009 after a hearing on 16\u00a0December 2009.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 October 2011 the Prague Municipal Court upheld that decision.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 January 2012 the applicant appealed on points of law. On\u00a07\u00a0February 2012 he filed a constitutional complaint, which was rejected as premature by the Constitutional Court on 29 May 2012. The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on points of law on 11 November 2015, referring, inter alia, to a decision by the Court on the same matter, which had found the complaint manifestly ill-founded (see \u017dirovnick\u00fd v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 7022\/06, 5 October 2010).<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicantsubsequently renewed hiscomplaint to the Constitutional Court but it was dismissed on 15 March 2016.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Compensation proceedings (no. 30 C 178\/2009)<\/em><\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 June 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings (no. 18 C 84\/2006). As the Ministry did not deal with his request within the six-month statutory time-limit, on 9 December 2007 he brought a civil action before the Prague\u00a07 District Court seeking CZK 8,315.84 (EUR 318) in compensation.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 January 2012 the District Court dismissed the action, considering that the main proceedings had not been unreasonably long.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 December 2012 the Prague Municipal Court upheld the judgment, finding that although the main proceedings had lasted an unreasonably long time the applicant could not be awarded compensation because of the lack of significance of the proceedings for him. According to the court,the applicant had abused his right of access to a court by initiating a very large number of legal disputes against the State.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 February 2015 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. It noted that even if the applicant had abused his right of access to a court, unreasonably long proceedings might still cause him damage which had to be compensated for by at least a finding of a violation.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 September 2015 the Municipal Court modified the District Court\u2019s judgment by finding a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time in the operative part of the judgment. The court refused to deal with a new complaint by the applicant about the length of the compensation proceedings.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 November 2015 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which is apparently still under consideration.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime, the applicant initiated proceedings for compensation (no. 12 C 301\/2011) for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the initialcompensation proceedings and then proceedings for compensation for delays in that second case (no.\u00a022\u00a0C\u00a0141\/2015).<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 22455\/13<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Main proceedings (no. 34 C 126\/2004)<\/em><\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 September 2003 the applicant brought an action for damages against the Czech Republic\u2013Ministry of the Interior before the Prague 7 District Court, alleging that he had suffered damage in connection with a \u201cterrorist attack\u201d on his family by police officers on 6 March 2001.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 July 2004 the case was referred to the Prague Municipal Court as the court competent to deal with it at the first instance.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0After several decisions on exemption from court fees, the appointment of a legal representative for the applicant and several attempts by the court to procure the related criminal case files, a hearing was held on 28\u00a0March 2008, following which the Municipal Court dismissed the action.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 November 2008 the Prague High Court upheld the judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant on 31 August 2010.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Compensation proceedings (no. 27 C 325\/2007)<\/em><\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 June 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings, no. 34 C 126\/2004. As the Ministry did not deal with the applicant\u2019s request within the statutory time-limit, he brought a civil action before the Prague 2 District Court on 13\u00a0December 2007, seeking EUR 4,229.64 in compensation.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 March 2010 the District Court dismissed his action, acknowledging that the main proceedings had been unreasonably long, but seeing no necessity to award him financial compensation.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 December 2010 the Prague Municipal Court quashed the judgment, finding it non-reviewable for lack of reasoning, and remitted the case to the District Court. In a judgment of 21 March 2012,the District Court founda violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time in the operative part of the judgment and dismissed the action regarding financial compensation. According to the court, the finding of a violation constituted adequate redress. It found that awarding him financial compensation would be against good morals, given the circumstances of the case, namely the applicant\u2019s conduct in the main proceedings, the conduct of the courts, the importance of the subjectmatter of the proceedings for the applicant as well as his character, his relation towards the State and society and his lack of respect for the rights of others.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 December 2012 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 September 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. A subsequent constitutional complaint was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded by the Constitutional Court on 19\u00a0February 2015.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0Following a plea of nullity by the applicant, the Municipal Court on 10 April 2015 quashed its judgment of 6 December 2012 on the grounds that the applicant had not been able to attend a hearing at the court.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 November 2015 the Municipal Court issueda new judgment, modifying the District Court\u2019sjudgment by awarding the applicant CZK\u00a032,400 (EUR 1,200). It found that the length of the compensation proceedings meant that a mere finding of a violation of his rights no longer constituted adequate redress. Having regard to the overall length of the main proceedings, the Municipal Court determined the sum to be awarded to the applicant (CZK 108,000\u2013EUR 4,000) and then adjusted it with regard to the length of the compensation proceedings (+20%), procedural difficulties in the main proceedings (-30%) and the importance of what had been at stake for him (-40%).<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0It appears that the compensation proceedings are still ongoing.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant instituted a furthertwo sets of proceedings related to the compensation claim: one to seek compensation for non-pecuniary damage for delays in the initial compensation proceedings(no.\u00a023\u00a0C\u00a0163\/2012) and one for compensation forthe excessive length of thatsecond set of compensation proceedings (no. 29 C 215\/2015).<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 61245\/13<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Main proceedings (no. 5 Ca 176\/2004, later no. 5 Ca 329\/2006)<\/em><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 October 2004 the applicant brought an administrative action against the Ministry of Justice before the Prague Municipal Court, seeking the annulment of Ministry of Justice Decree no. 345\/1999 on the rules for imprisonment (vyhl\u00e1\u0161ka Ministerstva spravedlnosti, kterou se vyd\u00e1v\u00e1 \u0159\u00e1d v\u00fdkonu trestu odn\u011bt\u00ed svobody) and the internal rules of Plze\u0148 Prison.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 March 2005 the Municipal Court rejected his action for lack of competence.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0Following a cassation complaint (kasa\u010dn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost) by the applicant, the Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed spr\u00e1vn\u00ed soud) quashed the judgment on 20 September 2006 and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. It found that the applicant\u2019s action should have been dismissed (zam\u00edtnuta) rather than rejected (odm\u00edtnuta).<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0After several decisions on the appointment of a legal representative for the applicant in 2007, the Municipal Court dismissedthe actionon 30\u00a0September 2008.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 March 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a cassation complaint by the applicant.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Compensation proceedings (no. 26 C 58\/2008)<\/em><\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 October 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings (no.\u00a05\u00a0Ca\u00a0176\/2004, later no. 5 Ca 329\/2006). As the Ministry did not deal with the applicant\u2019s request within the statutory time-limit, he brought a civil action before the Prague 2 District Court on 10 April 2008, seeking EUR\u00a03,487.77 in compensation.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 May 2009 the District Court dismissed the action, considering that the overall length of the proceedings at issue had not been unreasonable despite one particular delay, particularly because the applicant had in fact known the result of the proceedings after the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019sfirst judgment of September 2006.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 February 2010 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment, holding that a finding of a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights would be sufficient compensation for the one delay in the main proceedings.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0On 22\u00a0November 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court,stating that the finding of a violation should have been set out in the operative part of the judgment.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0In a judgment of 18 April 2012 the Municipal Court founda violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard without unnecessary delays in the operative part of the judgment. It found that the length of the main proceedings had been unreasonable, given that the case had not been complex. However, it found that the finding of a violationwould provide adequate redress, given the lack of importance of what was at stake for the applicant and the fact that he must have known the result of the proceedings as soon as the Supreme Administrative Court had issued its first judgment. The court considered the finding of a violation to be adequate redress, even taking into account the length of the compensation proceedings themselves.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 November 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. On 29 May 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime, the applicant initiated proceedings(no.\u00a015\u00a0C\u00a0244\/2012) for compensation for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the initial compensation proceedings. He later made a claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage from the excessive length of the latter compensation proceedings too (no.\u00a017\u00a0C\u00a0146\/2015).<\/p>\n E.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 61482\/13<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Main proceedings (no. 10 Ca 10\/2005, later no. 10 Ca 400\/2006)<\/em><\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 October 2004 the applicant brought an administrative action against the Prison Service (v\u011bze\u0148sk\u00e1 slu\u017eba) and the Ministry of Justice, challenging decisions on a disciplinary penalty (a reprimand) that had been imposed on him and the failure of the Ministry of Justice to decide on a complaint by him about a violation of regulations by Prison Service staff.<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0After exempting the applicant from court fees, appointing a lawyer to represent him and seeking necessary clarification of the action, on 19\u00a0October 2006 the Prague Municipal Court found the action in respect of the disciplinary decisions inadmissible, severing the part of the action concerning the Ministry of Justice\u2019salleged failure to act.<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 May 2007 the Municipal Court dismissed the latter part of the action, finding that the Ministry had not been obliged to deal with the applicant\u2019s complaint inadministrative proceedings.<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0On 31 January 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a cassation complaint by the applicant.On 21 May 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Compensation proceedings (no. 19 C 85\/2008)<\/em><\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 October 2007 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings (no.\u00a010\u00a0Ca\u00a010\/2005). As the Ministry did not deal with the applicant\u2019s request within the statutory time-limit, he brought a civil action before the Prague 2 District Court on 6 May 2008, seeking EUR 3,412.69 in compensation.<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 May 2009 the District Court dismissed the action, finding that the main proceedings had not been unreasonably long.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 January 2010 the Prague Municipal Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the District Court since it had failed to also consider proceedings no. 10 Ca 400\/2006.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 June 2010 the District Court again dismissed the action, finding that the main proceedings, nos. 10 Ca 10\/2005 and 10 Ca 400\/2006, had not been unreasonably long.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 January 2011 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment. Although, contrary to the District Court, it considered that the main proceeding had been unreasonably long, it held that finding a violation was sufficient redress.<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 January 2013 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. The latter court on 17 June 2013 modified the District Court\u2019s judgment by setting out a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time in the operative part of the judgment. It did not find that the length of the compensation proceedings had been unreasonable.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law,which isapparentlystill ongoing.<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime, the applicant initiated two other cases for compensation for non-pecuniary damage from delayed proceedings: one related to delays in the initial compensation proceedings (no.\u00a015\u00a0C\u00a0139\/2012) and one related to delays in that further compensation proceedings (no. 14 C 154\/2015).<\/p>\n F.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 22520\/14<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Main proceedings (no. 10 C 49\/2008)<\/em><\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 December 2007 the applicant sent a request for compensation of CZK 300,000 (EUR 11,430) under the State Liability Act to the Ministry of the Interior. He stated that he had suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of irregular official conduct by police officers who, on 27\u00a0June\u00a02007, had taken a DNA sample by way of a cheekswab, without authority to do soand under the threat of force.<\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 January 2008 the Ministry rejected the request.On 31\u00a0January2008 the applicant brought an action for damages against the Ministry of the Interior before the Prague 7 District Court.<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 December 2008 the District Court rejected the action as time-barred. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 5 August 2009 the Prague Municipal Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the District Court, finding an erroneous assessment of the statutory limitation period.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 March 2010 the District Court delivereda new judgment, dismissing the action for compensation. It admitted that there had been irregularities in the actions of the police officers when taking the applicant\u2019s DNA samples, but found that he had not suffered any damage.<\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 October 2010 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment, although with different reasoning. It considered that the finding of a violation was adequate redress for the damage caused to the applicant.<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0On 28\u00a0February 2013 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. It stated that the Municipal Court \u201cshould not overlook\u201d the Supreme Court\u2019s case-law regarding the statutory limitation of a claim. Consequently, on 20 November 2013 the Municipal Court delivereda new judgment, dismissing the applicant\u2019s action as time-barred.<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 13\u00a0November 2014 the Supreme Court discontinued proceedings on that appeal as the applicant\u2019s lawyer had failed to submit it properly within the statutory time-limit.<\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 October 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected a constitutional complaint by the applicanton the grounds that he was not represented by a lawyer. Italso observed that the applicant did not want to pursue the complaint.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Compensation proceedings (no. 23 C 108\/2012)<\/em><\/p>\n 74.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 December 2011 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings no. 10 C 49\/2008.<\/p>\n 75.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 May 2012 the Ministry rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, finding no delays in the main proceedings and considering their overall length as reasonable. On 30 May 2012 the applicant brought a civil action against the Ministry, seeking EUR 4,549.14 in compensation.<\/p>\n 76.\u00a0\u00a0After several attempts by the court to procure the relevant case file (no. 10 C 49\/2008), a hearing was held on 22 September 2015. The District Court dismissed the action on the same day, finding that the length of the main proceedings had been reasonable in the circumstances of the case.<\/p>\n 77.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, the applicant filed an appeal on 6\u00a0November 2015,which is apparently still ongoing.<\/p>\n 78.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime, the applicant initiated proceedings for compensation for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the initial compensation proceedings (no. 19 C 149\/2015).<\/p>\n G.\u00a0\u00a0Application no. 13258\/15<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Main proceedings (no. 34 C 138\/2006)<\/em><\/p>\n 79.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 November 2006 the applicant brought an action for protection of his personality rights against a newspaper publisher and the Czech Republic\u2013Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 80.\u00a0\u00a0After an amendment of the action and several decisions on exempting the applicant from court fees, on 8 December 2008 the Prague Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings against the Czech Republic.<\/p>\n 81.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 March 2009 the Municipal Court dismissed the action.<\/p>\n 82.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 November 2009 the Prague High Court modified the judgment, awarding the applicant CZK 100,000 (EUR 3,920).<\/p>\n 83.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 December 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the High Court, whichupheld the Municipal Court\u2019s judgment on 15 May 2012.<\/p>\n 84.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 August 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which is apparently still under consideration.<\/p>\n 85.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 August 2012 the applicant lodged a plea of nullity against the High Court\u2019s judgment, asserting that he had not been able to attend a hearing. Apparently, those proceedings are still ongoing.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Compensation proceedings (no. 15 C 184\/2012)<\/em><\/p>\n 86.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 February 2012 the applicant claimed compensation under the State Liability Act from the Ministry of Justice for non-pecuniary damage arising from the excessive length of the main proceedings.<\/p>\n 87.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 August 2012 the Ministry rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, finding no delays in the main proceedings. On 23 August 2012 the applicant brought a civil action against the Ministry, seeking EUR 5,774.37 in compensation.<\/p>\n 88.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 January 2013 the Prague 2 District Court awarded the applicant CZK 54,250 (EUR 2,120) and dismissed the rest of the action. Itconsidered that the main proceedings had been unreasonably long, taking into consideration that they had concerned the applicant\u2019s personality rights.<\/p>\n 89.\u00a0\u00a0On 1 October 2013 the Prague Municipal Court modified the judgment by findinga violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard within a reasonable time but dismissing his claim for financial compensation. Having regard to the fact that the applicant had brought a number of actions, overloading the court system in the Czech Republic by such actions, the court concluded that the finding of a violation constituted adequate redress for non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 90.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 August 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant on points of law. It emphasised that if a plaintiff initiated a large number of legal cases then the strength of his feelings towards the damage caused by the unreasonable length of one of those sets of proceedings was different to someone who had participated in only one or a few sets of proceedings.<\/p>\n 91.\u00a0\u00a0The Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint by the applicant as manifestly ill-founded on 18 December 2014.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Legislation<\/strong><\/p>\n 92.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant domestic law concerning remedies for excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the relevant parts of the State Liability Act no. 82\/1998, are set out in the Court\u2019s decision in the case of Vokurka v.\u00a0the Czech Republic (dec.) (no. 40552\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 11-24, 16 October 2007).<\/p>\n 93.\u00a0\u00a0Article 118b of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act no. 99\/1963) provides for the principle of concentration of proceedings. It sets out that parties to proceedings must disclose material facts and specify the evidence for them before the end of the pre-trial stage (if that procedure takes place), the end of the first trial hearing or by the end of any other time-limit set by the court for parties to complement the relevant facts, file submissions for evidence or comply with other procedural duties. A court can only have regard to any facts and evidence submitted after that time if thefacts or evidence are intended to challenge the credibility of evidence already adduced, if they arose after the pre-trial or first trial hearing,if they were not submitted in time through no fault of the party concerned, or if they were submitted at the court\u2019s request.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Case-law of the Constitutional Court<\/strong><\/p>\n 94.\u00a0\u00a0In judgment no. II. \u00daS 862\/10 of 19 May 2010,the Constitutional Court quashed a case and remitted it to the Prague Municipal Court. Itnoted, with reference to the Court\u2019s judgment in Apicella v. Italy([GC], no.\u00a064890\/01, 29 March 2006), that in its new examination of the case the Municipal Court \u201cshould also take into consideration the length of the proceedings in awarding just satisfaction for delays in the original proceedings since otherwise, according to the Court\u2019s case-law, the action (for compensation) could not be regarded as an effective remedy if the (compensation)proceedings lasted 2\/3 of the period of the delayed original proceedings\u201d.<\/p>\n 95.\u00a0\u00a0In several subsequent judgments the Constitutional Court further endorsed the requirement to take into account the length of compensation proceedings themselves when deciding on compensation for damage caused by delays in the original proceeding (under section 31a (3) of Act\u00a0no.\u00a082\/1998); in particular, in judgments nos. I. \u00daS 562\/11 of 21\u00a0June 2011, IV.\u00a01572\/11 of 6 March 2012, and I. \u00daS 1599\/13 of 7\u00a0April 2015.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Case-law of the Supreme Court<\/strong><\/p>\n 96.\u00a0\u00a0In opinion no. Cpjn 206\/2010 of 13 April 2010,the Supreme Court set out the fundamental rules for adjudicating on claims for compensation for excessive length of proceedings. It noted, inter alia, that any unreasonably long compensation proceedings could be taken into considerationwhen determining the base amount of compensation (per year of excessively long main proceedings) and that the base amount might be increased on those grounds if the claimant so requested.<\/p>\n 97.\u00a0\u00a0In judgment no. 30 Cdo 3340\/2011 of 14 November 2011, the Supreme Court added that the possibility to increase the amount of compensation on the grounds of unreasonably long compensation proceedings was not applicable to appeals or appeals on points of law given the limits for submitting new facts and modifying the initial action in proceedings at first instance, provided that the procedure under Article\u00a0118b \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been followed.<\/p>\n 98.\u00a0\u00a0In judgment no. 4539\/2011 of 30 January 2013, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that \u201cthe base amount for a relevant period canonly be increased where the compensation proceedings themselves are excessively long and the plaintiff requests an increase in compensation on those grounds pending the effects of concentration in the particular proceedings\u201d.<\/p>\n 99.\u00a0\u00a0The same view was taken in the Supreme Court\u2019s subsequent case\u2011law, particularly in decisions nos. 30 Cdo 4398\/2013 of 18 June 2014, 30\u00a0Cdo 1098\/2014 of 30 September 2014 and 30 Cdo 221\/2015 of 17\u00a0June 2015. Those decisionswere challenged before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed thecomplaints at issue (decisions nos.\u00a0II.\u00a0\u00daS\u00a03235\/14 of 13\u00a0January 2015, I. \u00daS 3902\/14 of 11 August 2015, and II. \u00daS 2711\/15 of 24 November 2015).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that given their common factual and legal background the applications should be joined in accordance with Rule\u00a042 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0THE SCOPE OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it necessary to clarify, at the outset, the scope of the case and its examination of the complaints.<\/p>\n 102.\u00a0\u00a0It observes that the applicant\u2019s seven applications have focused in particular on the issue of the length of proceedings, in respect of both the main and the compensation proceedings in question, as well as the more general issue of the ineffectiveness of the compensatory remedy under the State Liability Act.<\/p>\n 103.\u00a0\u00a0In their additional observations the Government submitted that the applicanthad explicitly narrowed the scope of his applications by stating that the issue of the effectiveness of the remedy under the State Liability Act was the sole subjectof his applications.<\/p>\n 104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that although the applicant in his observations indeed focused on the issue of the effectiveness of the remedy, he made it clear in the end that his applications covered both the main proceedings and the compensation proceedings and requested that the Court find violations of the Convention with respect to both.<\/p>\n 105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that the present applications concern particularly the issue of the length of the main and compensation proceedings.<\/p>\n 106.\u00a0\u00a0It further notes that in complaining about the length of the compensation proceedings the applicant relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 read in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention. The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see, among other authorities, Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, \u00a7 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011I; and, in the context of length-of-proceedings cases,Beggs v. the United Kingdom, no. 25133\/06, \u00a7 205, 6\u00a0November 2012, or Chuykina v. Ukraine, no. 28924\/04, \u00a7 31, 13\u00a0January 2011) and, having regard to its previous case-law, (in particular, Hajrudinovi\u0107 v. Slovenia, no. 69319\/12, 21 May 2015, andGagliano Giorgi v. Italy, no. 23563\/07, ECHR 2012 (extracts)), finds it appropriate to examine this complaint under both Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article 13 separately. The Court will also consider the applicant\u2019s arguments challenging the effectiveness of the compensatory remedy under the State Liability Act under the latter Article.<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 107.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the length of both the main proceedings and the compensation proceedings in this case had violated the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement laid down in Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal…\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The main proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0Non-compliance with the six-month rule<\/p>\n 108.\u00a0\u00a0In observations sent to the Court on 19 April 2016, the applicant complained for the first time about the length of the main proceedings no.\u00a037 C 51\/2004 (see paragraph5 above), which preceded the compensation proceedings no. 17 C 204\/2007, andwhichconstitute the subjectmatter of his first application, no. 10092\/13.<\/p>\n 109.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the fact that the proceedings for compensation for alleged non-pecuniary damage from the excessive length of the main proceedings under no. 37 C 51\/2004 were concluded by the Constitutional Court\u2019sjudgment of 24 April 2014 (see paragraph11above), the complaint about the length of the main proceedings lodged on 19 April 2016 must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-compliance with the six-month rule.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0Lack of a significant disadvantage<\/p>\n 110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applications were inadmissible because the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention. They alleged that the main proceedings initiated by the applicant had in fact concerned petty disputes which had not been of great significance for him and that he, on the contrary, had aimed to prolong them.<\/p>\n 111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed.<\/p>\n 112.\u00a0\u00a0Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that: (…)<\/p>\n (b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.\u201d<\/p>\n 113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the main element of the criterion set by this provision is whether the applicant has suffered any significant disadvantage (see Adrian Mihai Ionescu v. Romania (dec.), no. 36659\/04, 1 June 2010; Korolev v. Russia (dec.), no. 25551\/05, ECHR 2010; andKudli\u010dka v.\u00a0the\u00a0Czech Republic (dec.), no. 21588\/12, 3 March 2015). Inspired by the general principle of de minimis non curat praetor, this admissibility criterion is based on the idea that a violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should attain a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by an international court. The assessment of this minimum level is, in the nature of things, relative, and depends on all the circumstances of the case. The severity of a violation should be assessed taking into account both the applicant\u2019s subjective perceptions and what is objectively at stake in a particular case (see Korolev, cited above).<\/p>\n 114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already applied this criterion in a number of cases concerning the length of proceedings. In such cases, the Court has emphasized that the pure financial loss or the amount of the initial claim involved cannot be taken as the sole indication of a \u201csignificant disadvantage\u201d but the applicant\u2019s subjective perceptions and what was objectively at stake for him ought to be assessed rather in a much more general way, by having regard to all particular circumstances of the given case (see Havelka v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 7332\/10, 20\u00a0September 2011, or Shefer v. Russia (dec.), no. 45175\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 21 and 23, 13 March 2012). In the context of the length-of-proceedings cases, the Court has further considered, that in ascertaining whether the violation of a right attains the minimum level of severity, the following factors, inter alia, should be taken into account: the nature of the right allegedly violated, the seriousness of the impact of the alleged violation on the exercise of a right and\/or the possible effects of the violation on the applicant\u2019s personal situation. In assessing these effects, the Court examines, in particular, what was at stake in the proceedings or their outcome (see Giusti v. Italy, no.\u00a013175\/03, \u00a7 34, 18 October 2011,and Gagliano Giorgi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a056).<\/p>\n 115.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that in most of the main sets of proceedings the issues at stake were objectively of little importance. In the main proceedings no. 18 C 84\/2006 (application no.\u00a020708\/13), the applicant claimed compensation for an alleged incorrect house search on the grounds that the order for the search had given a different house number than the applicant\u2019s. Moreover, the same complaint has already been examined by the Court, which found it manifestly ill\u2011founded on 5 October 2010 (see \u017dirovnick\u00fd v. the Czech Republic(dec.), no. 7022\/06). In the main proceedings no. 5 Ca 176\/2004 and 5 Ca 329\/2006 (application no. 61245\/13) the applicant sought the annulment of imprisonment and prison rules, while in the main proceedings nos.\u00a010\u00a0Ca\u00a010\/2005 and 10 Ca 400\/2006 (application no. 61482\/13) he mainly challenged a reprimand he had been given for taking his cell window out of its frame. In the main proceedings no. 10 C 49\/2008 (application no.\u00a022520\/14) he complained about the taking of DNA by a cheek swab, but not about storing his DNA profile. His claim was considered as being outside the statutory time-limit and, moreover, the applicant did not then pursue his appeal on points of law and constitutional complaint properly.<\/p>\n 116.\u00a0\u00a0In contrast, the Court notes that in the main proceedings no.\u00a034\u00a0C\u00a0126\/2004 (application no. 22455\/13) the applicant raised an objectively serious claim of violent conduct by police officers during the house search. However, the subsequent compensation proceedings led to financial redress for the length of the main proceedings (lasting seven years at three levels of jurisdiction) of approximately EUR 1,200 (see paragraph\u00a039), an amount which is close to the level of domestic compensation that could still be sufficient and appropriate for the Court.<\/p>\n 117.\u00a0\u00a0Considering,also, the applicant\u2019s subjective perception of the alleged damage suffered in these long main sets of proceedings, the Court cannot disregard the overall context of his extensive use of judicial proceedings. He has launched numerous parallel proceedings at the domestic level and made fifty-two applications to the Court, of which only one has resulted in a judgment so far (compare Havelka, cited above, and Dudek v.\u00a0Germany (dec.), no. 12977\/09 et al., 23 November 2010). In that respect, the Court shares the domestic courts\u2019view (see the quotation from the Supreme Court in paragraph 11) that the applicant\u2019s practice of having extensive recourse to judicial proceedings \u2013 although in no manner capable of justifying any limitation on his right of access to a court \u2013 necessarily affects his perception of the damage arising from the unreasonable length of a set of proceedings, compared with people for whom bringing a lawsuit and participating in judicial proceedings is not an ordinary part of their everyday life.<\/p>\n 118.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the Court is of the opinion that the applicant has not suffered a \u201csignificant disadvantage\u201d in respect of his right to proceedings within a reasonable time in the main proceedings mentioned above (applications nos. 20708\/13, 22455\/13, 61245\/13, 61482\/13 and 22520\/14).<\/p>\n 119.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court cannot reach the same conclusion concerning main proceedings no. 34 C 138\/2006 (application no. 13258\/15). Over and above the fact that those proceedings are still ongoing, or at least they were as of March 2016, the Court notes that these proceedings concern alleged defamation, and therefore the protection of the applicant\u2019spersonality rights and reputation. The defendant is also not a public authority, as in the rest of the main proceedings at issue, but a private legal entity. Under those circumstances, even the applicant\u2019s extensive involvement in judicial proceedings cannot lead to the conclusion that he has not suffered a significant disadvantage owing to the length of the defamation proceedings.<\/p>\n 120.\u00a0\u00a0Having found a lack of a significant disadvantage on the part of the applicant with respect to the main proceedings at issue in applications nos.\u00a020708\/13, 22455\/13, 61245\/13, 61482\/13 and 22520\/14, the Court must now examine the two \u201csafeguard clauses\u201d provided in Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(b): whether respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits, and whether the case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal.<\/p>\n 121.\u00a0\u00a0Under the first safeguard, the Court is required to continue examining an application if it raises questions of a general character affecting the observance of the Convention.<\/p>\n 122.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s complaints raise the question of the reasonable length of proceedings, which has been addressed by the Court on numerous occasions, including with respect to the Czech Republic (see, for example, Vokurka, cited above; Antoni v. the Czech Republic, no. 18010\/06, 25\u00a0November 2010; andGolha v. the Czech Republic, no. 7051\/06, 26\u00a0May 2011). In those circumstances, the Court considers that respect for human rights does not require the continued examination of these complaints (see also Gagliano Giorgi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 59-62).<\/p>\n 123.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, it must examine the second safeguard clause,which was designed to ensure that every case receives a judicial examination, whether at the national level or at the European level, in order to avoid a denial of justice (see Korolev, cited above; Kudli\u010dka, cited above; or Gagliano Giorgi, cited above, \u00a7 63).<\/p>\n 124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in all five cases the applicant\u2019s complaintsabout the length of the main proceedings were examined both by the Ministry of Justice and by the competent courts at two, three or four levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 125.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that the applicant\u2019s cases were duly considered by a domestic tribunal within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b).<\/p>\n 126.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaints about the length of the main proceedings at issue in applications nos. 20708\/13, 22455\/13, 61245\/13, 61482\/13 and 22520\/14 must be declared inadmissible, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention.<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0Other admissibility criteria<\/p>\n 127.\u00a0\u00a0The Government alternatively argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention since he had received sufficient redress at the domestic level for the violation of his rights.<\/p>\n 128.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above findings concerning a lack of significant disadvantage on the part of the applicant owing to the length of the main proceedings in applications nos. 20708\/13, 22455\/13, 61245\/13, 61482\/13 and 22520\/14, this complaint can be considered only with respect to the main proceedings no. 34 C 138\/2006 (application no. 13258\/15). As of March 2016 those proceedings were still ongoing, having lasted nine years and four months by that time. In the related compensation proceedings the domestic courts only found a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights, but did not award him any financial compensation (see paragraph89 above). In those circumstances, taking into account the Court\u2019s settled case-law concerning the loss of victim status (see, among others, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 178-213, ECHR 2006\u2011V; Cocchiarella v.\u00a0Italy[GC], no.\u00a064886\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 69-98, ECHR 2006\u2011V; and D\u011bdi\u010d v.\u00a0the\u00a0Czech Republic (dec.), no. 31380\/08, 15 May 2011), the Court observes that although the domestic courts explicitly acknowledged an infringement of the Convention (a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to have his case heard withina reasonable time), they did not provide him with appropriate and sufficient redress. The applicant can therefore still claim to be a \u201cvictim\u201d of the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement in the instant case and the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The compensation proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n 129.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not make any comment on the admissibility of the complaints concerning the length of the compensation proceedings.<\/p>\n 130.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the Court cannot fail to notice that compensation proceedings no. 15 C 184\/2012 (application no. 13258\/15) lasted two years and ten months for the preliminary request and four levels of jurisdiction and that it took one year and eight months to reach a final decision at the court of appeal, excluding the proceedings on the appeal on points of law and the constitutional complaint. That cannot be considered as exceeding the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement of Article 6 \u00a7 1, even if the special nature of proceedings for compensation for damage resulting from another set of excessively long proceedings is taken into account (compare paragraphs\u00a0148\u2011150 below). This complaint must be therefore declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion as regards admissibility<\/em><\/p>\n 131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the length of main proceedings nos. 37 C 51\/2004, 18 C 84\/2006, 34\u00a0C\u00a0126\/2004, 5 Ca 176\/2004 and 5 Ca 329\/2006, 10 Ca 10\/2005 and\u00a010\u00a0Ca 400\/2006, 10 C 49\/2008 (at issue in applications nos. 10092\/13, 20708\/13, 22455\/13, 61245\/13, 61482\/13 and 22520\/14) and the complaint concerning the length of compensation proceedings no. 15 C 184\/2012 (at issue in application no. 13258\/15) are inadmissible pursuant to Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01, 3 and 4 of the Convention on the grounds of non-compliance with the six-month rule, lack of a significant disadvantage and manifest ill\u2011foundedness.<\/p>\n 132.\u00a0\u00a0The remaining complaints concerning the length of main proceedings no. 34 C 138\/2006 (application no. 13258\/15) and the length of compensation proceedings nos. 17 C 204\/2007, 30 C 178\/2009, 27\u00a0C\u00a0325\/2007, 26 C 58\/2008, 19 C 85\/2008 and 23 C 108\/2012 (applications nos. 10092\/13, 20708\/13, 22455\/13, 61245\/13, 61482\/13 and\u00a022520\/14) are neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds and, therefore, must be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant periods to be taken into account<\/em><\/p>\n 133.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the determination of the relevant periods to be taken into account with regard to the proceedings at issue, the Court finds that in the case of the compensation proceedings the relevant period begins with bringing a preliminary claim with the Ministry of Justice as that procedure is a prerequisite for bringing court proceedings for compensation (seeMocie v.\u00a0France,no. 46096\/99, \u00a7 21, 8 April 2003; X v. France, 31\u00a0March 1992, \u00a7\u00a031, Series A no. 234\u2011C; and, mutatis mutandis, Schmidtov\u00e1 v. the Czech Republic,no. 48568\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 54-55, 22 July 2003). The fact that the proceedings before the Ministry of Justice do not have the character of a \u201cdispute\u201d in classical terms does not alter that conclusion.<\/p>\n 134.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes further that the latest information on the state of individual sets of proceedings was provided by the parties in March 2016.<\/p>\n 135.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the compensation proceedings in application no.\u00a010092\/13, the period to be taken into consideration began on 12\u00a0June 2007 and ended on 24 April 2014. It thus lasted six years and ten months from the preliminary request (to the Ministry of Justice) and covered four levels of judicial jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 136.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of application no. 20708\/13, the period to be taken into consideration with regard to the compensation proceedings began on 8\u00a0June 2007 and had not yet ended by March 2016. By that month therefore the proceedings had already lasted eight years and nine months for the preliminary request and three levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 137.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of application no. 22455\/13, the period to be taken into consideration with regard to the compensation proceedings began on 6\u00a0June 2007 and had not yet ended by March 2016. By that month therefore the proceedings had lasted eight years and nine months for the preliminary request and three levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 138.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of application no. 61245\/13, the period to be taken into consideration with regard to the compensation proceedings began on 10\u00a0October 2007 and ended on 29\u00a0May 2013, thus lasting five years and eight months for the preliminary request and four levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 139.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of application no. 61482\/13, the period to be taken into consideration with regard to the compensation proceedings began on 30\u00a0October 2007 and had not yet finished by March 2016. By that month therefore the proceedings had already lasted eight years and five months for the preliminary request and three levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 140.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of application no. 22520\/14, the period to be taken into consideration with regard to the compensation proceedings began on 23\u00a0December 2011 and had not yet ended by March 2016. By that month therefore the proceedings had lasted four years and three months for the preliminary request and two levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 141.\u00a0\u00a0As to application no. 13258\/15, the period to be taken into consideration with regard to the main proceedings began on 7\u00a0November 2006 and had not yet ended by March 2016. By that month therefore they had already lasted nine years and four months at three levels of jurisdiction.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The main proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n 142.\u00a0\u00a0The Government admitted that some delays occurred in the main proceedings no. 34 C 138\/2006 (application no. 13258\/15) and that their overall length must be viewed as unreasonable. However, they saw no reason to award any compensation to the applicant.<\/p>\n 143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of a case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979\/96, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2000-VII, and Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal [GC], no. 35382\/97, \u00a7 19, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).<\/p>\n 144.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above, or Pieni\u0105\u017cek v. Poland, no. 62179\/00, 28\u00a0September 2004).<\/p>\n 145.\u00a0\u00a0Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court observes that there were periods of delay attributable to the domestic authorities in the proceedings and that the issues at stake for the applicant (his reputation) were rather important. In addition, the Government themselves made no argument that the case was particularly complex or that the applicant contributed significantly to prolonging the proceedings. Under those circumstances, and having regard to its relevant case-law, the Court considers that the length of the main proceedings in question was excessive and failed to meet the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement.<\/p>\n 146.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The compensation proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n 147.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, being aware of the Court\u2019s case-law on this issue, made no argument that the compensation proceedings at issue had met the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement. They left it to the Court\u2019s discretion to decide whether or not there had been a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to a trial within a reasonable time.<\/p>\n 148.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that according to its case-law it would not apply the criteria established for assessment of the reasonableness of the duration of the regular proceedings to determine the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings concerning claims for damage sustained due to the length of the regular proceedings. It further considers that the issue of the duration of proceedings should normally not be treated as particularly complex. Moreover, special diligence is required from the State when dealing with cases in which the parties seek redress for damages sustained due to unreasonable length of proceedings (see, for instance, Belperio and\u00a0Ciarmoli v. Italy, no. 7932\/04, \u00a7 42, 21 December 2010).<\/p>\n 149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that it previously held in respect of the remedies provided for excessive length of proceedings under the Italian \u201cPinto\u201d law that in principle proceedings should not take more than one year and six months at one level of jurisdiction and two years at two levels of jurisdiction, unless special circumstances justify a longer time for processing claims (see Gagliano Giorgi, cited above, \u00a7 72; CE.DI.SA Fortore S.N.C. Diagnostica Medica Chirurgica v. Italy, nos. 41107\/02 and 22405\/03, \u00a7 39, 27 September 2011; and Francesco Quattrone v. Italy, no.\u00a013431\/07, \u00a7 33, 26 November 2013).<\/p>\n 150.\u00a0\u00a0More recently, the Court considered as unreasonable a period of five years and ten months for adjudicating a claim for damages due to an excessive delay in previous proceedings (see Hajrudinovi\u0107, cited above).<\/p>\n 151.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court reiterates that even if proceedings for compensation for damage sustained due to the excessive length of previous proceedings themselves suffer from delays such that they do not meet the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement as applied with regardto this special kind of proceedings, the domestic authorities may still remedy the situation and prevent a finding of a breach of the Convention if they themselves acknowledge their delays and increase accordingly the amount of compensation awarded in order to make good the further delay (compare Cocchiarella, cited above, \u00a7 98).<\/p>\n 152.\u00a0\u00a0The Court sees no reason to depart from the case-law mentionedabove and its requirements as to the remedies provided by States for excessive length of proceedings.<\/p>\n 153.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the compensation proceedings at issue in application no. 10092\/13 lasted six years and ten months at five levels of jurisdiction (see paragraph135); the compensation proceedings in application no. 20708\/13 lasted eight years and nine months at four levels as of March 2016 and are possibly still ongoing (see paragraph136); the compensation proceedings in application no.\u00a022455\/13 lasted eight years and nine months at four levels up to March 2016 and are possibly still ongoing (see paragraph137); in application no.\u00a061245\/13 the compensation proceedings lasted five years and eight months at five levels (see paragraph138); the compensation proceedings in application no. 61482\/13 lasted eight years and five months at four levels as of March 2016 and are possibly still ongoing (see paragraph139); and the compensation proceedings in application no. 22520\/14 lasted four years and three months at three levels as of March 2016 and are also possibly still ongoing (see paragraph140).<\/p>\n 154.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing in mind the case-law mentioned above, none of those periods can be considered reasonable for proceedings concerning claims for damage sustained due to the length of other proceedings.<\/p>\n 155.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes further that the applicant also raised a complaint about the excessive length of most of the compensation proceedings, however, the domestic courts failed to grant it, except for the Municipal Court in proceedings no. 27 C 325\/2007 (application no. 22455\/13). In that case, the Municipal Court indeed intended to award the applicant increased compensation due to the length of the compensation proceedings (see paragraph39 above) butfailed in the end to do so, apparently because of a miscalculation. If the court had given redressasit had intended, it would have provided a remedy for the excessive length of those proceedings.<\/p>\n 156.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the domestic legal practice concerning consideration of the excessive length of compensation proceedings while adjudicating on damages in such proceedings (see paragraph94 and following), the Court welcomes the fact that Czech courts, under the domestic law (section 31a (3) of the State Liability Act), have already generally accepted the possibility of remedying excessively lengthy compensation proceedings by awarding increased compensation. At the same time, the Court cannot overlook the fact that the domestic courts have recentlysignificantly limited the application of that possibility in practice by only allowing for it if plaintiffs raise such a complaint early enough during the proceedings before the court of first instance (see paragraphs97-99). Having regard to the fact that undue delays in compensation proceedings may well occur only later during proceedings before courts of first instance, or even in the later stages of proceedings, the Court notes that the approach adopted in the most recent Czech cases thwarts the application of such a remedy in many cases.<\/p>\n 157.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises the need for special diligence when dealing with cases in which redress for damage sustained due to the unreasonable length of other proceedings is sought (see paragraph148 above). In such cases, speedy progress in the proceedings and a quick assessment of the claim is of the utmost importance. That is why, whenever any delays occur in such proceedings, the court determining the amount of compensation should,if the domestic law makes it possible, as Czech law does according to earlier case-law of the Czech superior courts (see paragraphs94-96), acknowledge its own delays and accordingly award a particularly high amount of compensation. That avoids prolonging the whole case unnecessarily and avoids the applicant having to claim compensation for the length of compensation proceedings in a chain manner, thus burdening the domestic judicial system even more (compare also the Municipal Court\u2019s intention in proceedings no. 27 C 325\/2007, at issue in application no.\u00a022455\/13, see paragraph39).<\/p>\n 158.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that there has also been a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 with respect to the compensation proceedings concerned.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 159.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained further that the remedy under the State Liability Act does not constitute an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [this] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d<\/p>\n 160.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard, the applicant complained about the length of compensation proceedings and further challenged alleged systemic deficiencies in the remedy under the State Liability Act. In particular, he challenged the applicability of the rules of civil procedure to those proceedings, the rules for the preliminary request to be filed with a responsible Ministry or other public authority, the possibility for the respondent State to defame plaintiffsinappropriately in the proceedings and non-compliance with the rule of a \u201cstrong but rebuttable presumption\u201d of non-pecuniary damage caused by excessively long proceedings. Consequently, the applicant requested that the Court initiate a pilot-judgment procedure under Rule 61of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n 161.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has held on many occasions, Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief. The scope of the Contracting Parties\u2019 obligations under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; however, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law (see, e.g., Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 157, ECHR 2000\u2011XI). The \u201ceffectiveness\u201d means that the remedy must be adequate and accessible; while it does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant (see Peter v. Germany, no.\u00a068919\/10, \u00a7\u00a055, 4 September 2014, and Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 157).<\/p>\n 162.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not prescribe an exact form of a remedy under Article 13 to the Contracting Parties; moreover the requirements of Article\u00a013 may be satisfied not by a single remedy but by an aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law (see, e.g., Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0157). The Contracting Parties are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their Convention obligations under this provision (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 154; or Lukenda v. Slovenia, no.\u00a023032\/02, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2005\u2011X).<\/p>\n 163.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing those principles in mind, as well as its previous case-law concerning the effectiveness of the remedy provided for by the State Liability Act (in particular the Vokurka decision, cited above), the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaints regarding the procedural aspects of that domestic remedy do not show that it is incompatible with the requirements of Article 13. Nor does the Court find any substantiation for the applicant\u2019s complaints of a failure to comply with the rule of a strong but rebuttable presumption of non-pecuniary damage arising from excessive length of proceedings in compensation proceedings (compare, for example, the decision of the Supreme Court within the proceedings at issue in application no. 10092\/13, quoted in paragraph11 above). Lastly, the applicant\u2019s complaint about being denigrated by the respondent State is neither substantiated nor relevant with respect to Article 13.<\/p>\n 164.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Court turns to the length of the compensation proceedings complained about by the applicant. It reiterates that while it cannot be ruled out that excessive delays in an action for compensation will render the remedy inadequate (seeBelinger v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 42320\/98, 2 October 2011, and Cocchiarella, cited above, \u00a7 86), it finds in the present case that the duration of the proceedings, even though amounting to a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, was not of such significance as to call into question the effectiveness of the remedy as such (see Golha, cited above, \u00a7 73; Belperio and Ciarmoli v. Italy, cited above, \u00a7 53; Hajrudinovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 58; and Gagliano Giorgi, cited above, \u00a7 80).<\/p>\n 165.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the Court reiterates that it has already expressed concerns about the risks of the lengthening of compensatory proceedings in the Czech Republic, which can be assessed at several levels of jurisdiction (see Vokurka, cited above). In that regard, the Court emphasises that regardless of the conclusion it has reached as to the alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention in the present case, should the length of compensatory proceedings under the State Liability Actprove to be a common deficiency and should litigants lack easy access to higher levels of compensation on such grounds, irrespective of the stage of the proceedings where the delays occur, the conclusion of the Court regarding the compatibility of this remedy with Article 13 could be different (see DOMIRA, SPOL. S R.O. and Meluz\u00ednov\u00e1 v. the Czech Republic(dec.), nos.\u00a060702\/11 and 59633\/12, \u00a7 66, 7 March 2017).<\/p>\n 166.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For the same reasons, the Court finds no grounds to initiatea pilot-judgment procedure under Rule 61.<\/p>\n V.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 167.\u00a0\u00a0In applications nos. 61245\/13, 61482\/13, 22520\/14 and 13258\/15 the applicant also invoked Articles 1, 17 and 18 of the Convention, complaining about alleged defamation and personal assaults by the respondent State against him in the domestic proceedings. The Court finds no evidence whatsoever in the case file to substantiate those complaints or which might disclose an appearance of a breach of the provisions invoked. It follows that those complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 168.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, in application no. 22520\/14 the applicant also complained about the cheek swab he had been given (see paragraph66above) andabout the taking and storing of his DNA information as such, relying on Articles\u00a03, 8 and Article 14 taken in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8.<\/p>\n 169.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention it can only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. Complaints intended to be made before the Court should thus have first been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a066, Reports 1996\u2011IV; Cardot v. France, 19 March 1991, \u00a7 34, Series A no.\u00a0200; or similarly Lesko v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 49941\/06, 17\u00a0November 2009). Consequently, domestic remedies have not been exhausted when an appeal is not accepted for examination because of a procedural mistake by the applicant (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany[GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7 143, ECHR\u00a02010).<\/p>\n 170.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant\u2019s last appeal on points of law was not examined on the merits by the Supreme Court because of a failure by the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, to submit a proper appeal (see paragraph72). Furthermore, the applicant did not subsequently lodge a proper constitutional complaint and did not pursue the proceedings before the Constitutional Court (see paragraph73). It must therefore be concluded that he did not make proper use of the available and effective domestic remedies.It follows that this complaint must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 171.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 172.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed the following amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage: 10,000 euros (EUR) for the violation of Article 13 of the Convention and EUR 10,000 for the violation of Article 17. In addition, he requested compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the violations under each of his applications, without any further specification.<\/p>\n 173.\u00a0\u00a0The Government suggested that the finding of a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights would constitute sufficient redress, but alternatively noted that any sum awarded to the applicant in respect of any damage should not exceed EUR 10,000.<\/p>\n 174.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 5,000 under that head.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 175.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 172 in respect of postal expenses, EUR 298 for translation expenses and EUR 4,723 for legal costs incurred before the Court. Unlike the first two amounts, which were supported by evidence, the applicant only explained how the last amount was calculated (on the basis of the number of hours spent by the applicant\u2019s representative on studying the case file and documents, consultations with the applicant and the preparation of observations). The applicant noted that he had no financial resources and that his legal representative had been assigned to him free of charge by a court and the Czech Bar Association with respect to another case; that is why the applicant did not present any invoice or similar document proving the amount of legal costs.<\/p>\n 176.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not contest the claim for postal and translation expenses. They submitted that the claim for legal costs should not be granted as it had not been supported by proper evidence and, moreover, was exaggerated.<\/p>\n 177.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 470 covering the postage and translation expanses. As it has not been provided with any documents to justify the amount claimed by the applicant for legal costs or to elucidate the scope and nature of the applicant\u2019s agreement with his legal representative concerning the proceedings before the Court (see Loboda v. Ukraine, no. 8865\/06, \u00a7 62, 17\u00a0November 2016), the Court is unable to establish an amount for those costs and expenses. The claim for legal expenses shouldtherefore be rejected.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 178.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaint concerning the length of the main proceedingsin application no. 13258\/15 and the complaints concerning the length of the compensation proceedings in applications nos. 10092\/13, 20708\/13, 22455\/13, 61245\/13, 61482\/13 and 22520\/14 under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of those applications inadmissible;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds that there has been a violation of Article\u00a06 \u00a71 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds,<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months,the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 470 (four hundred and seventy euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Dismisses the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 February 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Renata Degener\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Armen Harutyunyan ____________<\/p>\n ANNEX<\/p>\n FIRST SECTION CASE OF \u017dIROVNICK\u00dd v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC (Application no. 10092\/13 and six other applications \u2013 see list appended) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 8 February 2018 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case…<\/p>\n
\nAle\u0161 Pejchal,
\nJovan Ilievski, judges,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n\n\n
\n \nNo.<\/td>\n Application no.<\/td>\n Lodged on<\/td>\n Domestic proceedings \u2013 no.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n \n <\/td>\n <\/td>\n <\/td>\n Main proceedings<\/td>\n Compensation proceedings<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n <\/td>\n 10092\/13<\/td>\n 05\/02\/2013<\/td>\n 37 C 51\/2004<\/td>\n 17 C 204\/2007<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n <\/td>\n 20708\/13<\/td>\n 13\/03\/2013<\/td>\n 18 C 84\/2006<\/td>\n 30 C 178\/2009<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n <\/td>\n 22455\/13<\/td>\n 26\/03\/2013<\/td>\n 34 C 126\/2004<\/td>\n 27 C 325\/2007<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n <\/td>\n 61245\/13<\/td>\n 11\/09\/2013<\/td>\n 5 Ca 176\/2004, 5 Ca 329\/2006<\/td>\n 26 C 58\/2008<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n <\/td>\n 61482\/13<\/td>\n 24\/09\/2013<\/td>\n 10 Ca 10\/2005, 10 Ca 400\/2006<\/td>\n 19 C 85\/2008<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n <\/td>\n 22520\/14<\/td>\n 09\/04\/2014<\/td>\n 10 C 49\/2008<\/td>\n 23 C 108\/2012<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n <\/td>\n 13258\/15<\/td>\n 11\/03\/2015<\/td>\n 34 C 138\/2006<\/td>\n 15 C 184\/2012<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"