45245\/15<\/a>). It emphasised that as a result of those changes, biometric data that was held unlawfully under the new legislation including that of the applicant, was destroyed or deleted. Accordingly, the declaration confirmed that:<\/p>\n\u201cAll of MrDjalo\u2019s biometric data held by the forensic service provider or on NDNAD or IDENT1 were destroyed or deleted … by 31 October 2013 at the latest.\u201d<\/p>\n
9.\u00a0\u00a0Underlining that the applicant was suspected but not convicted of a crime, the Government considered his situation was indistinguishable from that of the applicants in S.\u00a0and\u00a0Marper v.\u00a0the\u00a0United\u00a0Kingdom (cited above). It went on to say that:<\/p>\n
\u201cthe Government therefore acknowledge that the retention of MrDjalo\u2019s biometric data by the forensic service provider and on the NDNAD and IDENT1 was pursuant to the same blanket and indiscriminate powers considered by the Court in the S\u00a0and Marpercase, and therefore that retention must also have constituted a violation of Article\u00a08.\u201d<\/p>\n
10.\u00a0\u00a0In relation to the applicant\u2019s DNA Profile that was retained in test sets, the declaration underlines that these test sets were purely for research purposes and were not searchable by the police authorities. However, under the new law, an authorisation should have been in place from 31\u00a0October\u00a02013 to govern its retention. No such authorisation was in place. Therefore:<\/p>\n
\u201c…the Government accept that, from 31October2013 until 14\u00a0September\u00a02017, Mr\u00a0Djalo\u2019s DNA profile was held on the test sets in breach of domestic law. The Government therefore acknowledge that the retention of MrDjalo\u2019s DNA profile on the test sets was not in accordance with the law, and therefore that retention constituted a violation of Article\u00a08.\u201d<\/p>\n
11.\u00a0\u00a0As the Government could not be certain whether the applicant\u2019s anonymised fingerprints were also held on a test set, and in light of the fact that the test set in question was destroyed on 8September2017, no specific declaration was made in that respect.<\/p>\n
12.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the photograph, the Government referred to a ruling of the domestic courts in R(C)v. CommissionerofPolice of the Metropolis [2012]\u00a0EWHC\u00a01681\u00a0(Admin). In that case the High Court found that the policy governing retention of custody photographs for individuals suspected but not convicted of a crime was disproportionate. As a result, a new policy was brought into force on 28March2017. According to the declaration:<\/p>\n
\u201cPursuant to the new policy framework, the Greater Manchester Police reviewed the retention of MrDjalo\u2019s custody photograph on 14\u00a0July\u00a02017 having regard to the particular facts of MrDjalo\u2019s individual case. The Greater Manchester Police decided that the continued retention of MrDjalo\u2019s custody photograph is necessary for policing purposes and there is an exceptional reason for retaining it.<\/p>\n
…<\/p>\n
The Government therefore acknowledge that the retention of MrDjalo\u2019s photograph during the period 5February2007 to 27March2017 was pursuant to the same blanket and indiscriminate powers considered by the High Court in the C case and therefore that retention must also constitute a violation of Article\u00a08.\u201d<\/p>\n
The Declaration concludes:<\/p>\n
\u201c…the Government consider that the acknowledgement and declaration of the violation of Article\u00a08 in MrDjalo\u2019s case, coupled with the measures that the Government has taken to ensure that subsequent retention of biometric data and custody photographs is subject to schemes of retention which are compliant with Article\u00a08, constitutes just satisfaction for MrDjalo.\u201d<\/p>\n
13.\u00a0\u00a0By a letter of 29 November 2017, the applicant indicated that he was not satisfied with the terms of the unilateral declaration on the ground that his photograph continued to be retained.<\/p>\n
14.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article\u00a037 of the Convention provides that it may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to one of the conclusions specified, under (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph\u00a01 of that Article. Article\u00a037\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c) enables the Court in particular to strike a case out of its list if:<\/p>\n
\u201cfor any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.\u201d<\/p>\n
15.\u00a0\u00a0It also reiterates that in certain circumstances, it may strike out an application under Article\u00a037\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued.<\/p>\n
16.\u00a0\u00a0To this end, the Court has examined the declarationin the light of the principles emerging from its case-law, in particular the TahsinAcar judgment (Tahsin Acar v.Turkey (preliminary objections)\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a026307\/95, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a075-77, ECHR2003-VI; WAZA Sp. z o.o. v.Poland\u00a0(dec.), no.\u00a011602\/02, 26 June 2007; and Sulwi\u0144ska v.Poland(dec.), no.\u00a028953\/03, 18\u00a0September\u00a02007).<\/p>\n
The Court has established in a number of cases, including those brought against the United Kingdom, its practice concerning complaints about the violation of 8 concerning the retention of biometric data and photographs (see, for example, S. and Marper v.the United Kingdom, cited above,Goggins and Others v.the United Kingdom(striking out), nos.\u00a030089\/04 and 7others, 19July2011; andThomas v.the United Kingdom\u00a0(dec.) [Committee],no.\u00a024344\/08, 25April2017).<\/p>\n
It also recalls that the possibility of judicial review offers reasonable prospects of success for the applicant to complain about retention of his photograph under the new policy (see Goggins and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a055).<\/p>\n
Having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government\u2019s declaration, and given the clear and extensive case-law on the topic, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of the application (Article\u00a037\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0in fine).<\/p>\n
In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the case out of the list.<\/p>\n
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n
Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government\u2019s declaration under Article\u00a08 of the Convention and of the modalities for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;<\/p>\n
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases in accordance with Article\u00a037\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c) of the Convention.<\/p>\n
Done in English and notified in writing on 1\u00a0March\u00a02018.<\/p>\n
Renata Degener\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Kristina Pardalos
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n