FOURTH SECTION
\nCASE OF EDINA T\u00d3TH v. HUNGARY
\n(Application no. 51323\/14)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n30 January 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n30\/04\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Edina T\u00f3th v. Hungary,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Ganna Yudkivska, President, Egidijus K\u016bris, Having deliberated in private on 9 January 2018,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 51323\/14) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Hungarian national, Ms Edina T\u00f3th (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 10 July 2014.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr G. Magyar, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr Z. Tall\u00f3di, Agent, Ministry of Justice.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged, in particular, disruption of her family life as a result of the respondent State\u2019s failure to assist her in being reunited with her abducted minor son. She relied on Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 May 2016 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Csob\u00e1nka, Hungary.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0In 2000 the applicant and H.B., also a Hungarian citizen,married in the United States of America, where they had lived since 1996.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 February 2003 their son was born in the US and acquired dual citizenship.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0The couple, who were becoming gradually estranged, returned to Hungary in 2004.On 26\u00a0December 2004, after a quarrel, H.B. took their son and left for an unknown destination.Over the next two weeks,heinformed the applicant by telephone about the condition of their son on a few occasions. After January 2005the calls stopped.Since then, the applicant has had no contact with her son.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings for divorce<\/strong><\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0Subsequently, the applicant filed for divorce. Since the whereabouts of H.B. were unknown, he did not personally participate in the proceedings and his interests were represented by a guardian ad litem.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 November 2005, as an interim measureimmediately enforceable irrespective of any appeal, the Szentendre District Court placed the child with the applicant, pending the outcome of the divorce proceedings.The interim decision became final on 14 January 2006.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 28 February 2007the District Court pronounced the divorce of the applicant and H.B.As regards the child, the court noted that H.B.had taken himunlawfullyand had deprived the applicantof any possibility of seeing her son for over two years. The courtgranted the applicant sole custody of the child, terminated H.B.\u2019s parental rights and ordered him to pay child maintenance. The court did not grant H.B. any visiting rights. The judgment became final on 24 April 2007. It appears that this decision was served on the guardian ad litem but not on H.B.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s criminal complaint alleging\u201cunlawful change of a minor\u2019s residence\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0Meanwhile, on 29 November 2005 the applicant had lodged a criminal complaint with the Szentendre Police Department alleging child abduction.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 December 2005the authorities carried out an identity check onH.B. who declared his addressto be in Sopron, Hungary.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 February 2006 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint, again requesting the authorities to issue a warrant against H.B.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 March 2006 the police again carried out anidentity check on H.B. in Sopron. He declared the same address as on 7 December 2005.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 April 2006the applicant filed a complaint with the authorities pointing out that theyhad already had two opportunities to interrogate H.B. and obtaininformation regarding the whereabouts of the child, but theyhad failed to do so.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 18 May 2006the Szentendre Police Department issued awarrant against H.B.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 May 2006 the investigation was suspendedbecause\u2011according to the information the Szentendre Police Department had at that point\u2012H.B.\u2019s place of residence had become unknown and the proceedings could not be continued in absentia.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 May 2006 the applicant\u2019s complaint was dismissed (see paragraph 16 above).<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 May 2007 the Sopron Police Department carried out a third identitycheck on H.B. at the police station. He informed the authorities of an address, although an incomplete one, in London (United Kingdom) where the child wasallegedly living with his grandmother. After questioning,he was released.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0Since H.B.\u2019s address had become known, on 29 May 2007the Szentendre Police Department decided to continue the investigation. The following day, 30 May 2007, that is to say after the judgment on the parties\u2019 divorce had been delivered, the District Court was informed about the location of H.B.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 August 2007 the resumed investigation was terminated for lack of any offence. According to the reasoning underlying the decision, the crime of unlawful change of a minor\u2019s residence may be committed only with intent,whereas the investigation concluded that H.B. was not aware of the District Court\u2019s judgment obliging him to hand over the child to the applicant.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s criminal complaint of \u201cfailure to provide child maintenance\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 April 2008 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Sopron Police Department alleging H.B.\u2019s failure to provide child maintenance. On 16 June 2008the authorities terminated the investigation, stating that the offence of failure to provide child maintenance may be committed only with intent,whereas the investigation concluded that H.B. was not aware of the District Court\u2019s judgment containing the obligation to pay child maintenance.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The complaint submitted by the applicant on 27 June 2008 was rejected by the Sopron Police Department on 16 July 2008.<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s criminal complaint of\u201cendangering of a minor\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 April 2008 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint with the Szentendre Police Department. The applicant and her father were interviewed in the course of the investigation. However, on 11\u00a0November 2009the investigation was terminatedfor lack of evidence.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0A complaint submitted by the applicant challenging this decision was dismissed on 17 December 2009.<\/p>\n E.\u00a0\u00a0The criminal complaint of the applicant\u2019s father, claiming \u201cunlawful change of a minor\u2019s residence\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0In June 2013 the applicant\u2019s parents received an official letter notifying them of the amount to be paid for the child\u2019s school books. As a consequence, they became aware that the child was registered as attending school in Sopron. On the basis of this information, on 28 June 2013the applicant\u2019s father lodged a criminal complaint with the Szentendre Police Department alleging unlawful change of a minor\u2019s residence.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On the same day the criminal complaint was transferred to the Sopron Police Department, within whose territorial competence it fell. However, on 22 October 2013the investigation was suspended because after the authorities had attempted to establish the whereabouts of the suspect, his address again became unknown. A warrant was issued against H.B.<\/p>\n F.\u00a0\u00a0Enforcement proceedings aimed at the restitution of the child<\/strong><\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0Previously, on 6 February 2006the applicant had requested the enforcement of the District Court\u2019s interim measure of 16\u00a0November 2005 that placed the child with the applicant (see paragraph 10 above).<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 March 2006 the bailiff requested that the Sopron Police Department issue a warrant against H.B. On 30 March 2006the bailiffvisited the registered address of H.B. and established that neither he nor the child lived there. He found out that H.B. and the child mightbe residingin the United States. Apparently, no further measures were taken in these proceedings.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0In reply to a related complaint, on 4 May 2012the applicant was informed that, in the view of the Hungarian Court Bailiffs Chamber, the officer concerned was not responsible for the shortcomingsof the enforcement proceedings since H.B. and the child were residentabroad, and diplomatic steps weretherefore required to enforce the court\u2019s order.<\/p>\n G.\u00a0\u00a0International proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0Meanwhile, on 13 April 2007 the applicant contacted the Ministry of Justice, submitting that her child might be in the US. She later informed the Ministry that H.B. had in the meantime brought him back to Hungary.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 June 2009, in criminal proceedings conducted for fraud and other offences, international and European warrants were issued against H.B. On 27 July 2009 the Ministry of Justice requested the Hungarian Centre for International Cooperation in Criminal Matters to issue a warrant against H.B.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 December 2009 the Centre forwarded to the Ministry of Justice the information received from its US and Canadian partner offices, according to which H.B.had been placed in immigration detention in Canada.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 December 2009 H.B. was expelled from Canada and was ordered to leave the country before 7 January 2010. However, he escaped from custody and the Canadian authorities notified theirHungarian counterparts thathehad booked a plane ticket to Vienna under a false name.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Hungarian authorities requested Austrian cooperation, but on 12\u00a0January 2010 they were notified that H.B.had not been on the flight indicated by the Canadian police.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 June 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother informed the Ministry of Justice that she thought the child had been taken to California.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The Ministry of Justice senta request to the US for facilitation of child contact under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. However, the measures taken by the US authorities in order to find the child were unsuccessful.On 22\u00a0October 2012 theyindicated that the child and H.B. were probably in Canada and transferred the request to the Canadian authorities. The proceedings of the latter were alsofruitless.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 April 2013 the applicant informed the Hungarian Ministry of Justice that the H.B. was on the list of wanted persons in Canada and that he had previously fled from custody. On the basisof this information, on 26\u00a0April 2013 the Ministry of Justice asked the Canadian authorities to establish the child\u2019s place of residence. However, they were unable to do so.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 May 2014 H.B. was apprehended in Budapest and the child could at last be located.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0Since the applicant was living abroad at that time, the child\u2019s place of residence was established temporarily with her father in Csob\u00e1nka, Hungary.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant international law<\/strong><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of the Hague Convention of 25\u00a0October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abductionwhich entered into force on 1 July 1986 with regard to Hungary state as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe States signatory to the present Convention,<\/p>\n Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody,<\/p>\n Desiring to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access,<\/p>\n Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have agreed upon the following provisions \u2013<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Article 1<\/p>\n The objects of the present Convention are \u2013<\/p>\n a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and<\/p>\n b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Article 3<\/p>\n The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where \u2013<\/p>\n a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and<\/p>\n b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.<\/p>\n The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.<\/p>\n Article 4<\/p>\n The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.<\/p>\n Article 5<\/p>\n For the purposes of this Convention \u2013<\/p>\n a) \u2018rights of custody\u2019 shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child\u2019s place of residence;<\/p>\n b) \u2018rights of access\u2019 shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child\u2019s habitual residence.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Article 11<\/p>\n The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.<\/p>\n If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. …<\/p>\n Article 12<\/p>\n Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.<\/p>\n The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.<\/p>\n Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child.<\/p>\n Article 13<\/p>\n Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that \u2013<\/p>\n a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or<\/p>\n b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.<\/p>\n The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.<\/p>\n In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child\u2019s habitual residence.<\/p>\n Article 14<\/p>\n In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognised or not in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Article 16<\/p>\n After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of the notice.<\/p>\n Article 17<\/p>\n The sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been given in or is entitled to recognition in the requested State shall not be a ground for refusing to return a child under this Convention, but the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take account of the reasons for that decision in applying this Convention.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Article 19<\/p>\n A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.<\/p>\n Article 20<\/p>\n The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms….\u201d<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant domestic law<\/strong><\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of Act no. LIII of 1994 on Judicial Enforcement read as follows:<\/p>\n Common rules<\/p>\n Section 172<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0If enforcement is for the performance of a specific act or a specific conduct, forbearance or discontinuance (hereinafter referred to as “specific act”), the court shall issue an enforcement order to order the judgment debtor or the obligor (for the purposes of this Chapter hereinafter referred to as “obligor”) to voluntarily comply within the deadline specified…<\/p>\n Section 173<\/p>\n (1)\u00a0\u00a0If the notification of the judgment creditor reveals that the obligor has failed to voluntarily perform the specific act, it shall be inspected on-site by the bailiff if necessary.<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0In the event of failure of performance the bailiff shall submit the notification of the judgment creditor along with his inspection report without delay to the court of origin for authorising enforcement.<\/p>\n Section 174<\/p>\n The court shall determine by way of a ruling the manner of enforcement, such as<\/p>\n a)\u00a0\u00a0ordering the obligor to pay the cash equivalent of the specific act;<\/p>\n b)\u00a0\u00a0granting authorization to the judgment creditor to perform or to cause to be performed the specific act at the cost and risk of the obligor, and at the same time ordering the obligor to advance the estimated costs of such;<\/p>\n c)\u00a0\u00a0imposing a fine upon the obligor up to 500,000 forints;<\/p>\n d)\u00a0\u00a0enforcing the specific act with police assistance.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Section 176<\/p>\n In the event of the obligor\u2019s failure to perform the obligation within the deadline prescribed in the order for the imposition of the fine, such fine may be imposed once again.<\/p>\n Section 177<\/p>\n (1)\u00a0\u00a0The court shall stipulate the method of enforcement from those described under Section 174, which shall promote the performance of the obligation in the most efficient way in light of all applicable circumstances.<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0The court shall determine the method of enforcement in consideration of the judgment creditor\u2019s request, and after hearing the parties, if necessary.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n Surrender of a child<\/p>\n Section 180<\/p>\n (1)\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the enforcement of a court decision (court-approved settlement) on the surrender and custody of a child, the provisions of Sections 172-177 shall be applied subject to the exceptions set out in this Section.<\/p>\n (2)\u00a0\u00a0In the enforcement order the court shall request that the respondent comply voluntarily within the prescribed time limit, and shall order surrender of custody of the child to be obtained with police assistance in the event of non-compliance. The court shall send to the bailiff a copy of the court decision serving as grounds for enforcement, together with the enforcement order.<\/p>\n (3)\u00a0\u00a0The bailiff shall make the enforcement order and the copy of the court decision serving as grounds for enforcement available to the guardian authority as well, including therewith a notification for such authority to conduct on-site proceedings, to inform the respondent as to the consequences of failure to comply voluntarily, stressing the importance of protecting the child from having to go through said police action regarding custody, and to advise the bailiff on the ensuing results within fifteen days of receipt of the enforcement order.<\/p>\n (4)\u00a0\u00a0In the event of non-compliance the bailiff shall schedule the on-site procedure and shall notify the party requesting the enforcement, the representative referred to in Subsection (1) of Section 180\/A, the guardian authority and the police. If the proceedings fail, the bailiff shall directly notify the aforementioned parties concerning the date set for the new proceedings.<\/p>\n (5)\u00a0\u00a0The bailiff shall carry out the procedure for having the child surrendered at the obligor\u2019sresidence – or if the child is not there, at the child\u2019sresidence – with assistance from the police and the custody office. For the purposes of Sections 180 and 180\/A \u2018domicile or habitual residence\u2019 shall mean the place of domicile and habitual residence notified and registered in the records of personal data and addresses of citizens, as well as any other unregistered place of abode that is used as a residence for any duration.<\/p>\n Section 180\/A<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (6)\u00a0\u00a0If the obligor or the child to be returned cannot be found at their registered domicile or residence, or at any other address known to the authorities, the bailiff shall issue a warrant to locate them, or an international warrant where it is deemed necessary.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the Hungarian authorities had failed to execute the judicial decision establishing the residence of her child with her and thus also failed to ensure the swift return of her child after his father had taken him without her consent. In so doing, the authorities had failed to secure her parental rights with respect to her son. She relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his … family life…<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted, in particular, that the Hungarian authorities had failed to make sufficient efforts to secure the return of her child, with a view to reasserting the exercise of her parental rights, following his abduction. She had had no contact with her child between 26\u00a0December\u00a02004 and 8 May 2014. Even though by the interim measure of 16 November 2005 the child had been placed in her custody and she had requested enforcement on 6 February 2006, the authorities had not located the child.As a result, the decision of 16 November 2005 has not been enforced until 8\u00a0May 2014, over eight years later. She had not seen her child between the ages of two and eleven.<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government were of the opinion that the authorities had taken all the necessary measures that could reasonably be expected to ensure the child\u2019s return. It had been due to external circumstancesbeyond their control\u2012namely the fact that the whereabouts of the father and the child were unknown\u2012 that the authorities had been not in a position to enforce the District Court\u2019s decision for a long time.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The mere fact that the various proceedings had not produced the expected outcome did not mean that the domestic or international undertakings had not been complied with. Specific actions had been taken by the authorities in the form of enforcement proceedings, the issuance of warrants and several sets of criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a parent and child\u2019s mutual enjoyment of each other\u2019s company constitutes a fundamental element of \u201cfamily life\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention (see Zdravkovi\u0107 v.\u00a0Serbia, no. 28181\/11, \u00a7 60, 20 September 2016, and McIlwrath v.\u00a0Russia, no. 60393\/13, \u00a7 121, 18 July 2017). It is therefore common ground that the relationship between the applicant and her child falls within the sphere of family life under Article 8 of the Convention. That being so, the Court must determine whether there has been a failure to respect the applicant\u2019s family life. \u201cRespect\u201d for family life implies an obligation for a State to act in a manner calculated to allow these ties to develop normally (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos.\u00a039221\/98 and 41963\/98, \u00a7\u00a0221, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011VIII).<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, even though the primary object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by public authorities, there are, in addition, positive obligations inherent in an effective \u201crespect\u201d for family life. In both contexts, regard must be had to the fair balance to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (see Zdravkovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 61).<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0As to the State\u2019s obligation to take positive measures, the Court has repeatedly held that Article 8 includes a right for parents to measures that will enable them to be reunited with their children and an obligation on the national authorities to take such measures (see, among other authorities, Iglesias Gil and A.U.I. v. Spain,no. 56673\/00, \u00a7 49, ECHR 2003\u2011V).<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0However, the national authorities\u2019 obligation to take measures to facilitate reunion is not absolute. The nature and extent of such measures will depend on the circumstances of each case, but the understanding and cooperation of all concerned are always an important ingredient. Whilst national authorities must do their utmost to facilitate such cooperation, any obligation to apply coercion in this area must be limited, since the interests as well as the rights and freedoms of all concerned must be taken into account, and more particularly the best interests of the child and his or her rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Where contacts with the parent might appear to threaten those interests or interfere with those rights, it is for the national authorities to strike a fair balance between them (see Iglesias Gil and A.U.I., cited above, \u00a7 50).Thus, the reunion of a parent with a child who has lived for some time with the other parent may not be able to take place immediately and may require preparatory measures to be taken (see Sylvester v. Austria,nos. 36812\/97 and 40104\/98, \u00a7\u00a058, 24\u00a0April 2003).<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0In cases of this kind the adequacy of a measure is to be judged by the swiftness of its implementationas the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between the child and the parent who does not live with him or her. The Court notes that Article 11 of the Hague Convention requires the judicial or administrative authorities concerned to act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children and any inaction lasting more than six weeks may give rise to a request for a statement of reasons for the delay (see Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no.\u00a031679\/96, \u00a7\u00a0102, ECHR 2000\u2011I).<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must therefore determine whether the national authorities took the appropriate steps in a speedy manner to facilitate the execution of the District Court\u2019s order of 16 November 2005 (which became final and immediately enforceable on 14 January 2006)as well as that of the same court\u2019s judgment of 28\u00a0February 2007.<\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant requested the enforcement of the court order on 6 February 2006. Meanwhile on 7 December 2005 and then againon 20 March 2006 the authorities had established H.B.\u2019s residenceas being in Sopron but, apart from a single attempt by the bailiff to meet him at the relevant address on 30\u00a0March 2006, no further steps were taken in the enforcement proceedings.<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, a warrant had been issued against H.B. on 18\u00a0May 2006 by the Szentendre Police Department (see paragraph 17 above). Indeed, he was located and admitted to the Sopron Police Department on 23\u00a0May 2007 (see paragraph20 above). Although he told the police that the child was living with his grandmother in London, this prompted no identifiable further action on the authorities\u2019 side and H.B. was released.<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court observes that on 24 April 2007 the District Court\u2019s judgment of 28 February 2007, whichhad granted the applicant sole custody of the child and terminated H.B.\u2019s parental rights, became final. It can therefore be concluded that as of this point in time at the latest, the Hungarian authorities had a formal obligation to retrieve the child. Nevertheless, although on 30 May 2007 \u2212that is to say after the divorce had been delivered \u2212 the District Court was notified about H.B.\u2019s location (see paragraph 21above), it does not appear that this piece of information was ever forwarded to the bailiff so as to enable the latter proceed with the enforcement.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant and her father had made several requests in order to prevent the damage to family life that may result merely from the lapse of time (see paragraphs9, 12, 14, 23, 25, 27 and29 above). However, in spite of all the effortsundertaken by them, it was not until 8 May 2014 that the child\u2019s location became known (see paragraph 40above).<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the authorities had specific knowledge concerning the whereabouts of H.B. on different occasions,and several warrants were issued against him, but he was never formally interrogated about the location of the child. The authorities acknowledged his statements alleging that the child did not reside with him,but did not attempt to gather further information in this regard \u2013 although the allegations proved to be untrue asduring this period the child was living in Hungary and later attended school there (see paragraph 27 above). The authorities failed to request information from schools on the possible enrolment of the child.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court observes that the fact that H.B. was not personally served with the District Court\u2019s judgment (see paragraph 11above) resulted in the paradoxical situation that no criminal proceedings for either the offence of unlawful change of a minor\u2019s residence or that of failure to pay child maintenance were conducted against him (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above).<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Hungarian authorities failed to make adequate and effective efforts to assist the applicant in her attempt to have her child returned to her with a view to exercising her parental rights.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained under Article 6 that the proceedings had been too lengthy and, under Article 13, that she had no effective remedy in respect of the shortcomings of the proceedings aimed at the retrieval of her son.<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the violation which it has found in respect of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that it has already examined the principal legal question arising in the present case (see paragraph 62above).<\/p>\n 65.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the facts of the case and the parties\u2019 arguments, the Court considers that aseparate examination of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6 and 13 of the Convention is not warranted (see Kamil Uzun v. Turkey, no. 37410\/97, \u00a7 64, 10 May 2007).<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 66.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.<\/p>\n 69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered considerable distress on account of the violation found and awards her, on the basis of equity, EUR 12,500 under this head.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 3,800plus VAT for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. That sum corresponds to 19 hours of legal work billable by her lawyer at an hourly rate of EUR 200 plus VAT.<\/p>\n 71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.<\/p>\n 72.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the full sum claimed.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declaresthe complaint under Article\u00a08 admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat it is not necessary to examine separately the remainder of the complaints;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 12,500 (twelve thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0 EUR 3,800 (three thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 January 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Marialena Tsirli\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ganna Yudkivska
\nVincent A. De Gaetano,
\nPaulo Pinto de Albuquerque,<\/p>\n
\nIulia Motoc,
\nGeorges Ravarani,
\nP\u00e9ter Paczolay, judges,
\nand Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n