SECOND SECTION
\nCASE OF \u0130ZZET \u00c7EL\u0130K v. TURKEY
\n(Application no. 15185\/05)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n23 January 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n23\/04\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of \u0130zzet \u00c7elik v. Turkey,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Robert Spano, President, Having deliberated in private on 19 December 2017,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 15185\/05) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Turkish national, Mr \u0130zzet \u00c7elik (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 7 October 2003.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr M. Filorinal\u0131 and Ms\u00a0F.\u00a0K\u00f6stak, lawyers practising in Istanbul. The Turkish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 December 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 October 2016 the Vice-President of the Second Section invited the Government to submit further observations, if they so wished, following the judgment in Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos.\u00a050541\/08 and 3 others, ECHR 2016).<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in K\u0131r\u0131kkale.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 September 1998 the applicant was arrested by police officers and taken into custody on suspicion of being a member of an illegal organisation.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 September 1998 police officers at the Istanbul Security Headquarters took a statement from the applicant in the absence of a lawyer, as a result of the restriction stemming from Law no. 3842. He confessed that he was a member of the organisation in question and gave information about certain activities in which he had participated.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 October 1998 a statement was taken from the applicant by the Istanbul public prosecutor. He confirmed the statement he had made to the police.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On the same day, the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statement he had made to the public prosecutor, but withdrew the one he had made to the police. The applicant alleged that he had given the statements under duress. The investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 October 1998 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant under Article\u00a0125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with being involved in separatist activities against the Republic of Turkey. The criminal proceedings commenced before the Istanbul State Security Court, the bench of which included a military judge.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 October 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court held a preparatory hearing and decided that the first hearing would take place on 16\u00a0December 1998.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 December 1998 the other co-accused, namely G.T., Z.A. and D.P.N.J., gave evidence in person. They did not give any statement in relation to the applicant.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 March 1999 the trial court, noting the absence of the accused, decided to adjourn the hearing.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0At the hearing held on 2 June 1999, the applicant gave evidence in person and stated thathe had been forced to sign his previous statements.The applicant retracted those statements while maintaining that he had not been involved in any of the offences attributed to him. At the same hearing, the other co-accused, namely A.B. and B.G. also gave evidence in person. They did not make any statements in respect of the applicant.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0While the criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending, on 18\u00a0June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court was replaced by a civilian judge. Between 18 June 1999 and 2 September 2002, the trial court consisting of three civilian judges held fourteen hearings on the merits.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 4 August 1999, the State Security Court,composed of three civilian judges,heard evidence from A.S., \u015e.K., H.K., S.K., N.\u00c7., T.G., \u00d6.\u00d6. as witnesses, from M.N. as accused and from K.\u00d6. as a complainant.Two of them made incriminatory statements in relation to the applicant. When asked his comments concerning those statements,the applicant rejected them, maintaining that he had had no connection with the accusations.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 April 2001 the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits (esas hakk\u0131nda m\u00fctalaa) and requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. At the same hearing, the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested time to submit the applicant\u2019s defence submissions.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0 On 29 August 2001 the applicant\u2019s lawyer made his defence submissions in relation to the merits of the case.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 March 2002 the applicant\u2019s lawyer reiterated his previous defence submissions.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 June 2002 the applicant\u2019s lawyer, again reiterated his previous defence submissions. At the same hearing, the applicant stated that he had agreed to his lawyer\u2019s submissions.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 September 2002 the applicant and his lawyer presented their closing arguments. On the same day the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to thirty years\u2019 imprisonment, pursuant to Article\u00a0125 of the former Criminal Code. The first-instance court based its decision on several items of evidence, such as the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, documents relating to the organisation which had been found and seized in the course of police operations, and the statements of some co-defendants.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 April 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. On 29\u00a0May 2003 that decision was deposited with the registry of the Istanbul State Security Court.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0A description of the relevant domestic law may be found in Salduz v.\u00a0Turkey ([GC] no. 36391\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 27-31, ECHR 2008), and Turgut and Others v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 4860\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 19\u201126 26 March 2013).<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE GOVERNMENT\u2019S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the application had been introduced outside the six-month time-limit. In this connection, they stated that although the decision of the Court of Cassation had been pronounced on 16 April 2003, the application had been sent to the Court on 7\u00a0December 2004, more than six months later.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with the Court\u2019s established practice at the material time, the date of introduction of an application was the date of the first letter indicating an intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the nature of the complaint. In the instant case the Court notes that, according to the correspondence in the file, the applicant purportedly sent his first letter on 7October 2003 by registered post and that the Court never received it. By a fax of 21 June 2004 the applicant requested information about his application. On 23 June 2004, the Court Registry informed him that his application had not been received and requested him to re-send his application form. By a letter dated 3 August 2004 the applicant sent the receipt of the registered letter (which indicates that he received the receipt on 10October 2003) for his missing application form. On 7\u00a0December 2004, he re-sent his full application form dated 7 October 2003. In light of the foregoing, the Court observes that the full application form was re\u2011submitted on 7 December 2004 with the receipt of the registered post which shows that the applicant\u2019s application form dated 7\u00a0October 2003 was missing even though it was sent by registered post. In the light of the registered post receipt submitted by the applicant, the Court considers the date of introduction of the application to be 7 October 2003 (see \u00d6zbent and Others v. Turkey, nos. 56395\/08 and 58241\/08, \u00a7 33, 9\u00a0June 2015).<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, concerning the calculation of the six-month period starting from the date of the final domestic decision, the Court notes that the judgment of the Court of Cassation was deposited with the registry of the first-instance court on 29\u00a0May 2003.The Court reiterates that where an applicant is not automatically entitled to be served with a written copy of the final domestic decision and if she or he was represented by a lawyer during the domestic proceedings, as in the present case, the date on which the final domestic decision was deposited with the registry of the first\u2011instance court should be taken as the starting-point under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention \u2013 that is to say the latest date by which the applicant or his or her representative would definitively be able to discover the content of the decision (see Ipek v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39706\/98, 7 November 2000, and Okul v. Turkey (dec.), no. 45358\/99, 4 September 2003). Accordingly, in the present case the applicant lodged his application with the Court on 7\u00a0October 2003 within the six\u2011month time-limit, as required by Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. In view of the above, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s preliminary objection.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6\u00a0OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair trial on account of his trial by the Istanbul Security Court whose composition included a military judge, the denial of access to a lawyer during the preliminary investigation, the use of statements taken under duress to convict him, the non-communication of the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court Cassation and the failure of the trial court to hear important witnesses. He further complained that the length of the criminal proceedings had been excessive. Article 6 of the Convention provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal…<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require<\/p>\n d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;<\/p>\n …\u201d<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those allegations.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Independence and impartiality of the Istanbul State Security Court<\/strong><\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained ofa violation of his right to a fair trial on account of the involvement of a military judge in part of his trial before the Istanbul State Security Court.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the military judge had only attended the first four hearings, during which the trial court had taken the statements of the applicant and the other co-accused. They further submitted that at the hearing held on 4 August 1999, the entirecase file was read out due to the change in the composition of the trial court, namely the removal of the military judge. It was from that moment on that the applicant could make his defence submissions before a court composed of civilian judges. In fact, he was able put forward his defence arguments at the hearings held on 29 August 2001 and 19 June 2002. In addition to that, witnesses whose testimonies were later relied on by the trial court to convict the applicant had also given evidence following the removal of the military judge. As a result, the Government contended that the limited presence of the military judge in the criminal proceedings had not constituted a reasonable ground for the applicant to have concerns about the fairness of the entirety of the proceedings.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently held that certain aspects of the status of military judges sitting as members of State Security Courts rendered their independence from the executive questionable (see Incal v. Turkey, 9\u00a0June 1998, \u00a7 68, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV, and \u00c7iraklar v.\u00a0Turkey, 28 October 1998, \u00a739, Reports 1998-VII). The Court also found in \u00d6calan (v.Turkey [GC], no.46221\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 114-15, ECHR 2005\u2011IV) that when a military judge participated in one or more interlocutory decisions that remained in effect during the criminal proceedings in question, the military judge\u2019s replacement by a civilian judge in the course of those proceedings, before the verdict was delivered, failed to dissipate the applicant\u2019s reasonably held concern about that trial court\u2019s independence and impartiality, unless it was established that the procedure subsequently followed in the State Security Court sufficiently allayed that concern. In this connection, it is necessary to examine the nature of the procedural acts carried out with the participation of the military judge and to verify whether the proceedings on the merits were properly renewed after the military judge had been replaced (see Ceylan v. Turkey (dec.), no.68953\/01, ECHR 2005\u2011X).<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that the military judge was only present at one preliminary hearing and three hearings on the merits.In those three hearings, six of the accused, including the applicant, gave evidence in person and some minor procedural actswere carried out. Moreover, none of the other five accused made any statements, be it incriminatory or not, in respect of the applicant. However, the fact remains that the applicant made his initial defence submissionsbefore a court whose bench included a military judge. The Court is aware that the hearing of an accused by a court is an important procedural step on the merits in a criminal case. Thus, it has to ascertain whether the State Security Court in its new composition properly renewed that procedural act. In this connection, the Court notes that after the removal of the military judge from its bench, the trial court held fourteen more hearings and the case was examined by three civilian judges. Moreover, both the applicant and his lawyer were able to put forward theirdetailed defence arguments, including the ones against the public prosecutor\u2019s opinion on the merits, during those hearings (by contrast Akg\u00fcl v. Turkey, no.65897\/01, \u00a724, 16 January 2007). Likewise, the witnesses who made incriminating statements in respect of the applicant were also heard by the trial court composed of three civilian judges who ultimately delivered the judgmentand the applicant was able to submit his views in respect of those witnesses before the same court (compare and contrast \u00c7amlar v.Turkey, no. 28226\/04, \u00a7 44, 10November 2015). The above considerations, taken cumulatively, are sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the procedure followed by the State Security Court in its new composition is sufficient to allay the applicant\u2019s reasonably held concerns about the trial court\u2019s independence and impartiality.Therefore, the Court finds that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the replacement of the military judge before the end of the proceedings disposed of the applicant\u2019s reasonably held concern about the trial court\u2019s independence and impartiality (seeKabasakal andAtar v.\u00a0Turkey, nos.\u00a070084\/01 and 70085\/01, \u00a734, 19 September 2006)<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention under this head.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Lack of legal assistance available to the applicant during the preliminary investigation<\/strong><\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that the restriction on his right to legal assistance during the preliminary investigation had breached his right to a fair trial.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Salduz v.\u00a0Turkey ([GC], no. 36391\/02, ECHR 2008), the Government submitted that they were aware of the Court\u2019s case-law under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) of the Convention.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s access to a lawyer was restricted by virtue of Law No.3842 and was as such a systemic restriction applicable at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest (Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 56). The Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether the systematic nature of the restriction on the applicant\u2019s right of access to a lawyer was, in itself, sufficient to find a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, as, in any event, the Government have not offered any compelling reasons for the restriction or demonstrated that the absence of legal assistance at the initial stage of the investigation did not irretrievably prejudice the applicant\u2019s defence rights (Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 58; and Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541\/08 and 3others, \u00a7274.) In that respect, the Court notes that in convicting him, the first-instance court relied on the applicant\u2019s statements to the police. Moreover, it did not examine the admissibility of evidence at the trial. Likewise, the Court of Cassation dealt with this issue in a formalistic manner and failed to remedy this shortcoming (see, Bayram Ko\u00e7 v. Turkey, no.38907\/09, 5\u00a0September 2017).<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Length of criminal proceedings against the applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement, laid down in Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that pursuant to Law no. 6384 a Compensation Commission has been established to deal with applications concerning the length of proceedings and the non-execution of judgments. They maintained that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies, as he had not made any application to that Compensation Commission: this ground had also been recognised by the Court in its decision in the case of Turgut and Others v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 4860\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 19-26, 26\u00a0March 2013).<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, as pointed out by the Government, a new domestic remedy has been established in Turkey following the application of the pilot-judgment procedure in the case of \u00dcmm\u00fchan Kaplan v.\u00a0Turkey (no.\u00a024240\/07, 20 March 2012). Subsequently, in its decision in the case of Turgut and Others, cited above, the Court declared a new application inadmissible on the ground that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, that is to say the new remedy. In so doing, the Court considered in particular that this new remedy was a priori accessible and capable of offering a reasonable prospect of redress for complaints concerning the length of proceedings.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in its decision in the case of \u00dcmm\u00fchan Kaplan it stressed that it could nevertheless pursue the examination of such complaints under the normal procedure in cases which had already been communicated to the Government prior to the entry into force of the new remedy.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0However, taking account of the Government\u2019s preliminary objection with regard to the applicants\u2019 failure to make use of the new domestic remedy established by Law no. 6384, the Court reiterates its conclusion in the case of Turgut and Others. It therefore concludes that the complaint of the excessive length of the criminal proceedings must be rejected under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Rifat Demir v. Turkey, no.24267\/07, \u00a7 35, 4 June 2013, and Yi\u011fitdo\u011fan v. Turkey (no.2), no.72174\/10, \u00a7 59, 3 June 2014).<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0Other alleged violations of Article 6 of the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the domestic courts had failed to hear witnesses who were purportedly on his side and that at the appeal stage he had not received the written opinions of the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of its findings under Article\u00a06 \u00a71 in conjunction with Article\u00a06 \u00a73 (c) of the Convention, the Court considers that no separate examination of the remaining complaints under Article 6 is necessary (see Tezcan Uzunhasano\u011flu v. Turkey, no. 35070\/97, \u00a7 23, 20 April 2004, and Ge\u00e7gel and \u00c7elik v.Turkey, nos.8747\/02 and 34509\/03, \u00a716, 13\u00a0October 2009).<\/p>\n III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 5 of the Convention of the excessive length of his pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the application was introduced outside the six-month time-limit because the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention ended on 2 September 2002 with the judgment of the Istanbul State Security Court whereas the application was lodged with the Court on 7\u00a0October 2003. It follows that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5 must be declared inadmissible for being introduced outsidethe six-month time\u2011limit, according to Article35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He further claimed EUR 4,100 for legal fees and EUR\u00a0300 for costs and expenses.<\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claims.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the most appropriate form of redress would be the retrial of the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Article\u00a06 of the Convention, should he so request (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a072). It further considers that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction (see Dvorski v.Croatia [GC], no.\u00a025703\/11, \u00a7\u00a0117, ECHR 2015) for non-pecuniary damage. It therefore rejects the applicant\u2019s claim.<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0As regards costs and expenses, the Court reiterates that an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of these only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Taking into account the awards made in comparable cases (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 79; G\u00fcrova v. Turkey, no. 22088\/03, \u00a7 21, 6\u00a0October 2009; Boluko\u00e7 and Others v. Turkey, no. 35392\/04, \u00a7 47, 10\u00a0November 2009; and \u015eaman v. Turkey, no. 35292\/05, \u00a7 45, 5 April 2011), the Court finds it reasonable to award EUR 1,000 under this head.<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaints concerning the lack of independence and impartiality of the trial court on account of the presence of a military judge and the right to have access to a lawyerunder Article 6\u00a73(c) in conjunction with Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaints concerning the excessive length of the pre-trial detention under Article 5 \u00a7 3 and the length of the criminal proceedings under Article 6 \u00a7 1 and inadmissible;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Istanbul State Security Court;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) in conjunction with Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of legal assistance available to the applicant during the preliminary investigation;<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0Holds thatthere is no need to examine separately either the admissibility or the merits of the applicant\u2019s other complaints under Article 6 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0Hold<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Dismisses the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 January 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Robert Spano
\nJulia Laffranque,
\nLedi Bianku,
\nI\u015f\u0131l Karaka\u015f,
\nPaul Lemmens,
\nValeriu Gri\u0163co,
\nJon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro, judges,
\nand HasanBak\u0131rc\u0131, DeputySection Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n