THIRD SECTION
\nDECISION
\nApplication no. 36040\/04
\nMarina Mikhaylovna KOZYREVA
\nagainst Russia<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 23\u00a0January 2018 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra, President,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nJolien Schukking, judges,
\nand Fato\u015fArac\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 27 August 2004,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Ms Marina MikhaylovnaKozyreva, was a Russian national who was born in 1977 and lived in Velikiye Luki, Pskov Region. She was represented before the Court by Mr D.Y. Kozyrev, a lawyer practising in Velikiye Luki. By a letter dated 20 December 2004, the applicant\u2019s representative informed the Court that the applicant had died on 21 October 2016 and that her husband, Mr Andrey Yevgenyevich Kozyrev, wished to pursue the application.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were initially represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The circumstances of the case<\/strong><\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 December 2003 the applicant lodged a claim against the Social Welfare Authority of Velikiye Luki Town Council (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe defendant\u201d) seeking an increase in the amount of child allowance granted to her. In her claim she stated that the amount of the child allowance should be calculated on the basis of the consumer price index. She referred to a Constitutional Court ruling concerning allowances granted to those who had been involved in the cleaning-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The defendant submitted that the applicant had erroneously interpreted the law on social allowances, that she was entitled to a fixed child allowance under the law (as in force at the material time), and that the above-mentioned Constitutional Court ruling was inapplicable to her case.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 February 2004 the Velikiye Luki Town Court of the Pskov Region dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. On the same day she lodged an appeal against the judgment.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 February 2004 the Pskov Regional Court received the defendant\u2019s objections to the applicant\u2019s appeal wherein the defendant simply reiterated its submissions before the first-instance court. The applicant alleged that she had learned about the defendant\u2019s submissions when talking on the phone with a staff member of the Velikiye Luki Town Council on an unspecified date, after the case had been transferred to the Pskov Regional Court.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 March 2004 the applicant was informed that the appeal hearing would be held on 23 March 2004.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 March 2004 the applicant lodged a request with the President of the Pskov Regional Court asking for the submissions provided by the defendant to be sent to her.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 March 2004 the Pskov Regional Court received her request but did not respond to it.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 23 March 2004 the Pskov Regional Court upheld the decision of 2\u00a0February 2004. The court analysed the applicant\u2019s arguments and stated that the first-instance court had correctly applied the law on social allowances and that the applicant was entitled to a fixed child allowance. It did not refer to the defendant\u2019s submissions.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant domestic law<\/strong><\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cCCP\u201d), as worded at the material time, the parties to proceedings could study the case file, appeals and objections to appeals at the court registry.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0Article 344 of CCP provides that parties to proceedings may submit written objections to appeals, together with supporting documents (and copies thereof corresponding to the number of parties to the proceedings).<\/p>\n COMPLAINTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention of the violation of the equality of arms principle in her case in that the court had failed to send her the defendant\u2019s objections.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0She also complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the court decisions had not contained adequate reasoning.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Standing of the applicant\u2019s husband to pursue the application<\/strong><\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant died on 21 October 2016. In a letter of 10 June 2017 Mr\u00a0Kozyrev, the applicant\u2019s husband and heir, expressed his intention to pursue the application.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s husband has a legitimate interest in taking the applicant\u2019s place (see Dalban v. Romania [GC], no.\u00a028114\/95, \u00a7 39, ECHR 1999\u2011VI, and Ernestina Zullo v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a064897\/01, \u00a7 37, 29\u00a0March 2006).<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court holds that Mr Kozyrev has standing to continue the present proceedings.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint about the violation of the equality of arms principle<\/strong><\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained about the domestic court\u2019s failure to send her the defendant\u2019s objections to her appeal and give her an opportunity to reply to those objections. She relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing…\u201d<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there had been no breach of the applicant\u2019s rights under the Convention. They stated that the national law did not oblige the courts to send (to the appellant) objections to an appeal within a particular time-limit; they added that the applicant and her representative could have studied the case file, which contained the objections, at any time before 23\u00a0March 2004 but they had failed to do so. Furthermore, the defendant\u2019s objections to the appeal had included the same submissions as those in the objections to the applicant\u2019s claim; no new arguments or evidence had been added. The applicant had been informed in a timely fashion of the appeal hearing but had not attended it and had not asked for the hearing to be postponed in order that she might study the objections. Lastly, the appeal court had not based its decision on the defendant\u2019s objections and had not even referred to them in its judgment.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained her complaint.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the principle of equality of arms is part of the wider concept of a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, GorraizLizarraga and Others v. Spain, no. 62543\/00, \u00a7 56, ECHR 2004-III). That principle implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case under conditions that do not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage vis-\u00e0-vis his or her opponent (see DomboBeheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1993, \u00a7 33, Series A no. 274). For its part, the right to an adversarial trial, which is also part of the wider concept of a fair hearing, means the opportunity for parties to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party (see Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, 23 June 1993, \u00a7 63, Series A no. 262, and Olga Nazarenko v. Russia, no. 3189\/07, \u00a7 38, 31 May 2016).<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that on 26 February 2004 the defendant submitted its objections to the applicant\u2019s appeal and that those objections reiterated basically the same arguments as those contained in its objections to the applicant\u2019s claim lodged with the first-instance court. The Pskov Regional Court did not base its decision on any new factual or legal submissions (see Holub v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 24880\/05, 14\u00a0December 2010, and, by contrast, C.M. v. Switzerland, no. 7318\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a022-23, 17 January 2017).<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the applicant\u2019s case was subjected to a full and adversarial examination before the first-instance court, where she had an opportunity to comment on the defendant\u2019s position (see Valchev and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 47450\/11 and 2 others, \u00a7 78, 21 January 2014).<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore reiterates that Article 6 cannot be construed as conferring on litigants an automatic right to obtain a specific form of service of court documents (see Bogonos v. Russia (dec.), no. 68798\/01, 5\u00a0February 2004). It is incumbent on the interested party to display appropriate diligence in the defence of his or her interests (see Teuschler v.\u00a0Germany (dec.), no. 47636\/99, 4 October 2001).<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that under Russian law, parties may access their respective case files and examine the documents contained therein. Hence, the applicant could have studied the defendant\u2019s objections at the court registry; there is no evidence that her access to the case file was restricted. Moreover, she did not ask for the appeal hearing to be postponed and did not attend it, even though she received a summons in a timely fashion. Thus, the applicant failed to act with due diligence.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the non-communication of the defendant\u2019s objections did not place the applicant at a substantial disadvantage vis\u2011\u00e0\u2011vis her opponent or impermissibly impinge on the adversarial nature of the proceedings. Her complaint about the failure to give her an opportunity to study the opposite party\u2019s objections is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Other alleged violations of the Convention<\/strong><\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained about the courts\u2019 failure to provide adequate reasoning in their judgments.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,<\/p>\n Declares the application inadmissible.<\/p>\n Done in English and notified in writing on 15 February 2018.<\/p>\n Fato\u015f Arac\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n