FIRST SECTION
\nCASE OF ARZUMANYAN v. ARMENIA
\n(Application no. 25935\/08)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n11 January 2018<\/p>\n
FINAL
\n11\/04\/2018<\/p>\n
This judgment has become final under Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Arzumanyan v. Armenia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, President, Having deliberated in private on 5 December 2017,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 25935\/08) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by an Armenian national, Mr Aleksandr Arzumanyan (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 29 December 2007.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr V. Grigoryan, a lawyer practising in London. The Armenian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan,Representative of the Republic of Armenia to the European Court of Human Rights.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged, in particular, that the domestic courts had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for his detention.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 September 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Yerevan.He is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and at the material time he headed a political movement called \u201cCivil Disobedience\u201d.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 May 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article\u00a0190 \u00a7 3 (1) of the Criminal Code (money laundering) in respect of the applicant.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 May 2007 the applicant was arrested and on 10 May 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of two months, upon an application by the investigator, taking into account the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that the applicant, if remaining at large, could abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings. The applicant objected to that application, arguing that the investigator had failed to submit any well\u2011founded arguments in support of the allegation that he would abscond or obstruct justice, whereas he had no previous convictions, was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence and stable social life, and was a well-known public figure. The District Court\u2019s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal within fifteen days.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 May 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising similar arguments.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 May 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decidedto uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances of the case and the possible investigative measures to be carried out gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 July2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant\u2019s detention by two months, upon an applicationby the investigator, finding that the applicant, if remaining at large, could obstruct the investigation, abscond, exert unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and commit another offence. The District Court\u2019s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 July and 3 September 2007 the applicant lodgedan appeal, raising argumentssimilar to those previously raised.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 July 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances and complexity of the case; the investigative measures to be carried out and the applicant\u2019s behaviour, namely his refusal to give any testimony, which was a factor slowing down the investigation, gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and also abscond.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 31 August 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant\u2019s detention by two months, upon an application of the investigator, on the same grounds as before. The District Court\u2019s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raisingarguments similar to those previously raised<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 September 2007 the investigator decided to replace the applicant\u2019s detention with a written undertaking not to leave his residence and to release him in view of the fact that the investigative measures would take some time and it was no longer necessary to keep the applicant in detention.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 September 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to leave the applicant\u2019s appeal of 3 September 2007 unexamined in view of the fact that he had been released.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Constitution<\/strong><\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The Armenian Constitution was enacted in 1995. On 27 November 2005 the Constitution was amended with effect from 6 December 2005. In accordance with the new Article 92 of the Constitution, the Court of Cassation, as the highest judicial instance, was entrusted with a new role, namely to ensure the uniform application of the law.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0Article 22 of the Constitution provided at the material time that no one was obliged to testify against himself, his spouse or a close relative.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Code of Criminal Procedure (in force since 1999)<\/strong><\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0Article 137 \u00a7 5 provides that a court decision imposing detention as a preventive measure may be contested before a higher court.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0Article 287 provides that an appeal against a court decision whether or not to impose or extend detention may be lodged with the Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0Article 403 provided at the material time that an appeal on points of law might be lodged against finaljudgments and decisions ofthe first instance courts and the Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Decisions of the Council of Court Chairmen<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Decision no. 20 of 12 February 2000<\/em><\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0Paragraph 4 of the Decision stated that Article 137 \u00a7 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) prescribed that a court\u2019s decision to impose detention as a preventive measure might be contested before a higher court. However, the Code did not provide for a procedure for contesting the lawfulness and reasons of the Court of Appeal\u2019s decisions imposing and extending detention. Hence, in such cases the Court of Appeal\u2019sdecisions might be contested before the Court of Cassation.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Decision no. 83 of 8 December 2005<\/em><\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0The Decision stated that Paragraph 4 of Decision no. 20 of the Council of Court Chairmen of 12 February 2000 was repealed, taking into account that under Article 92 of the Constitution the Court of Cassation, as the highest general jurisdiction court, was called upon to ensure the uniform application of the law.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Decision no. 96 of 5 April 2006<\/em><\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The Decision set out the new text of Paragraph 4 of Decision no. 20 of the Council of Court Chairmen of 12 February 2000. It stated that, since under Article 92 of the Constitution the Court of Cassation was the highest judicial instance called upon to ensure the uniform application of the law, an appeal to that court against decisions taken in pre-trial proceedings, including any decision on detention, did not follow from its constitutional status. Such appeals were to be left unexamined. In exceptional cases they might be examined by the Court of Cassation, if they raised issues of importance for judicial practice.<\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0Decisions of the Court of Cassation<\/strong><\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 July and 30 August 2007 the Court of Cassation examined appeals on points of law in two detention cases (decisions nos. VB-115\/07 and VB-132\/07). Both appeals on points of law were lodged by the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office against decisions of the Criminal Court of Appeal releasing the relevant detainees on bail. The appeals on points of law were admitted for examination on the ground that a decision by the Court of Cassation in those cases might have a significant impact on the uniform application of the law. The Court of Cassation quashed the decisions of the Court of Appeal, finding, inter alia, that that court had no authority under the law to release a detainee on bail, if that issue had not been the subject of examination before the trial court.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the domestic courts had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for his detention as required by Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be … entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201d<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies. In particular, he had not lodged appeals on points of law with the Court of Cassation against the decisions of the Criminal Court of Appeal of 24 May and 24 July 2007. The Government argued that such a procedure was envisaged by the domestic law, namely Article 403 of the CCP. The Government contested the applicant\u2019s argument that the Court of Cassation was no longer an available remedy in detention cases after the introduction of the constitutional amendments of 2005 and argued that there was no law limiting the jurisdiction of the Court of Cassation to examine such cases. They also contested the applicant\u2019s reliance on the case of Grigoryan v. Armenia (no. 3627\/06, 10 July 2012) and pointed to the fact that the Court of Cassation had in fact examined two detention cases in 2007 and 68such cases in 2008. Therefore, the applicant\u2019s failure to lodge appeals on points of law had been based on mere doubts.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he had not lodged appeals on points of law against the decisions of the Criminal Court of Appeal because the Court of Cassation had stopped examining such appeals in detention cases following the entry into force of the 2005 constitutional amendments. He referred to the circumstances of the case of Grigoryan(cited above,\u00a7\u00a7\u00a025\u201127 and 110-115) in which the Court of Cassation had left an appeal on points of law against a detention decision unexamined with reference to the constitutional amendments and the decision of the Council of Court Chairmen of 8\u00a0December 2005,and argued that the Government\u2019s submissions were in contradiction with the official position of the Court of Cassation. As regards the two cases examined by the Court of Cassation in 2007, neither decision had even been published for the applicant to be aware of the fact that the Court of Cassation had abandoned its malpractice. Furthermore, the existence of a mere two decisions for the whole period between 2005 and August 2007 clearly demonstrated that that remedy had been unavailable in practice. Moreover, the decisions in question had been taken either during the running of the appeal time-limit in his detention case or after its expiry. He could therefore not predict such developments.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged (see Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113\/99 et al., ECHR\u00a02010). Under Article 35 of the Convention, the existence of remedies which are available and sufficient must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 34932\/04, \u00a7\u00a075, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). It is incumbent on the Government claiming non\u2011exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success (see Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, no. 26839\/05, \u00a7 109, 18 May 2010). Once this burden of proof has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case (see Betteridge v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a01497\/10, \u00a7 48, 29 January 2013).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in this connection that the CCP was enacted in 1999 and it contained no explicit provisionproviding for a procedure for contesting detention decisions before the Court of Cassation, as confirmed by the decision of 12 February 2000 of the Council of Court Chairmen, a body vested with the authority of providing advisory and non\u2011binding interpretation of domestic law (see paragraph 22 above).Thus, the Government\u2019s allegation that such a right was provided by Article 403 of the CCP appears to contradict the interpretation given to the relevant provisions of theCCP by the judicial authorities. The Court further notes that, following thedecision of 12\u00a0February 2000, the right to appeal to the Court of Cassation in detention cases was made available in practice if not in law, but \u2013 as the Government themselves had acknowledged in their observations in the case of Grigoryan (see Grigoryan, cited above, \u00a7 110) \u2013 that practice was abandoned following the introduction of the constitutional amendments of 6\u00a0December 2005: on 8 December 2005 the Council of Court Chairmen repealed its decision of 12 February 2000 and on 5 April 2006 it issued another decision stating that, due to its new constitutional status, the Court of Cassation was no longer to examineappeals against decisions taken in pre-trial proceedings, including any decision on detention (see paragraphs 17, 23 and 24 above). As it appears from the case of Grigoryan, the Court of Cassation applied that new approach in practice (as Grigoryan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 25-27and 113-115).<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0Nothing suggests thatthere had been any decisive shift on that matter in law or in practiceby the time the courts examined the applicant\u2019s detention case. The decisions of the Council of Court Chairmen of 8\u00a0December 2005 and 5\u00a0April 2006 had not been repealed or modified and there had not been any pertinent amendments to the CCP. It is notable also that none of the decisions taken by the Court of Appeal in the applicant\u2019s case stated that they could be contested before the Court of Cassation, which was the normal practice (see paragraphs 9 and 12 above and compare with paragraphs 7, 10 and 13 above). As regards the two decisions of the Court of Cassation indicated by the Government (see paragraph 25 above), it is not clear on what grounds appeals on points of law were lodged in those two cases by the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office and, moreover, admitted for examination by the Court of Cassation.It is noteworthy that the Court of Cassation did not provide any explanation or reasoning for its decisions to admit those appeals or any interpretation of the relevant domestic provisions regarding the right to appeal in detention cases that would signal a shift in its approach. Thus, the situation at hand must be distinguished from cases in which a new remedy is created as a result of interpretation of the domestic law by the courts, in which cases it normally takes six months for such a development of the case law to acquire a sufficient degree of certainty before the public may be considered to be effectively aware of the domestic decision which had established the remedy and the persons concerned be enabled and obliged to use it (see, among other authorities, Majski v.\u00a0Croatia, no. 33593\/03, \u00a7 70, 1 June 2006; Depauw v. Belgium (dec.), no.\u00a02115\/04, 15 May 2007; and Provide S.r.l. v. Italy, no. 62155\/00, \u00a7 18, 5\u00a0July 2007). Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that those two cases simply fell into the category of \u201cexceptional cases\u201d mentioned in the decision of the Council of Court Chairmen of 5\u00a0April 2006 (see paragraph\u00a024 above). However, no explanation has been provided by the Government \u2013 or the Court of Cassation itself \u2013 as to whether that was indeed the case and, if so, what criteria were applied in such \u201cexceptional cases\u201d. In such circumstances, the Court cannot but endorse its earlier findings and conclude that the right to appeal to the Court of Cassation in detention cases was not available at the material time (see Grigoryan, cited above, \u00a7 113), since it has not been demonstrated that such a right was sufficiently certain either in law or in practice and in fact all the circumstances point to the contrary. The Court would nevertheless lastly add that, even assuming that there was a clearly defined shift in the Court of Cassation\u2019s approach and the principles and time limits enshrined in the above-mentioned case law were applicable in the present case, the first appeal in question was examined by the Court of Cassation on 13 July 2007, that is roughly around the same period when the applicant\u2019s detention case was pending before the lower courts. In such circumstances, the applicant could not reasonably be expected to have predicted such a development or be blamed for not being aware of it. Nor would the existence of only two decisions suggest that there was an established practice at the material time. In view of the foregoing, the Court decides to dismiss the Government\u2019s non\u2011exhaustion objection.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that the courts had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for his detention.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the courts had provided relevant and sufficient reasons when imposing and extending the applicant\u2019s detention, such as the risk of absconding and obstructing the investigation.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its general principles under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention relating to the right to be released pending trial (seeBuzadji v.\u00a0the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 92-102, ECHR 2016 (extracts), and Ara Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 629\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 48-53, 20\u00a0October 2016) and notes that it has already found the use of stereotyped formulae when imposing and extending detention to be a recurring problem in Armenia (see Piruzyan v. Armenia, no. 33376\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 97\u2011100, 26 June 2012; Malkhasyan v. Armenia, no. 6729\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 74-77, 26 June 2012; Sefilyan v. Armenia, no. 22491\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 88-93, 2 October 2012; and, most recently,Ara Harutyunyan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a754-59). The present case does not appear to be different: the domestic courts similarly justified the applicant\u2019s continued detention with a mere citation of the relevant domestic legal principles and a reference to the gravity of the offence without addressing the specific facts of his case or providing any details as to why the risks of absconding, obstructing justice or reoffending were justified (see paragraphs\u00a07, 9, 10, 12 and 13 above). The Court therefore concludes that the domestic courts failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions imposing and extending the applicant\u2019s detention.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 81,250 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that there was no causal link between the violation alleged and the non-pecuniary damage claimed, which was also exaggerated and not supported by any evidence.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant undoubtedly suffered non\u2011pecuniary damage as a result of the violation found. It therefore awards the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed 850,000 Armenian drams (approximately EUR 1,630 at the material time) for the legal costs incurred before the Court. He submitted a copy of the contract concluded with his lawyer and of the relevant invoice.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the amount claimed was unreasonable and not well-documented and, in any event, had to be reduced since a part of the applicant\u2019s initial complaints had been declared inadmissible.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.Furthermore, legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no.\u00a033202\/96, \u00a7 27, 28 May 2002). In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 500 for the proceedings before the Court.<\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Declares the complaint concerning the alleged lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for the applicant\u2019s detention admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Holds<\/p>\n (a)\u00a0\u00a0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, the following amounts,to be converted into the currency of the respondent Stateat the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b)\u00a0\u00a0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant\u2019s claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 January 2018, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Abel Campos\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos
\nKristina Pardalos,
\nKrzysztof Wojtyczek,
\nKsenija Turkovi\u0107,
\nArmen Harutyunyan,
\nPauliine Koskelo,
\nJovan Ilievski, judges,
\nand Abel Campos, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n