SECOND SECTION
\nCASE OF PISIC\u0102 v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
\n(Application no. 23641\/17)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nArt 8 \u2022 Respect for family life \u2022 Failure to enforce final judgment awarding mother custody \u2022 Children\u2019s alienation from their mother \u2022 Failure to act with requisite diligence \u2022 Positive obligations
\nSTRASBOURG
\n29 October 2019<\/p>\n
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Pisic\u0103 v. the Republic of Moldova,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:<\/p>\n Robert Spano, President, Having deliberated in private on 8 October 2019,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 23641\/17) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article\u00a034 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Moldovan national, Ms NeleaPisic\u0103 (\u201cthe applicant\u201d, who subsequently changed her name to Mrs NeleaGamar\u0163), on 16 March 2017.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Ms D. Str\u0103isteanu, a lawyer practising in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. The Moldovan Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr O. Rotari.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged in particular that by failing to take effective measures so as to ensure her access to her children, the authorities had breached her right to protection of her family life.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 5\u00a0May 2017 notice of the application was given to the Government.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Ialoveni.<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n A. The applicant\u2019s divorce and custody of the children<\/strong><\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 September 2002 the applicant married P. While they were married they had a son, who was born on 14 July 2003.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 March 2006 the applicant obtained a divorce. She also obtained custody of her son.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant remained in the family house, and after a while she again started cohabiting with her former husband and subsequently gave birth to two more sons (twins) on 5 August 2007. P. acknowledged that he was the father of the two boys.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, in 2012 P. started being aggressive towards her. On 26 December 2012 she left the family home with her three children and claimed financial maintenance from P.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 July 2013 P. came to the house where the applicant lived and forcibly put the two younger children in his car, driving them to his house without the applicant\u2019s permission.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0Shortly thereafter the applicant lodged a court action, requesting custody of the two younger children. On 31 July 2013 she asked the Ialoveni District Court to examine the case urgently, stating that she was certain that P. was manipulating the children and using various means to turn them against her. She submitted that since their abduction she had not been able to speak to them, and asked the court to order P. not to keep the children away from her. On 31 July 2013 she also complained about the incident of 29 July 2013 to the local police, who allegedly failed to respond.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 August 2013 the applicant complained to the Ialoveni Department for Social Assistance and Family Protection (\u201cthe DSAFP\u201d). She mentioned that since the children had been taken away from her she had been able to talk to them only sporadically, always in P.\u2019s presence, and for short periods of time. During those meetings P. had been aggressive towards her, had in an authoritarian manner prohibited her from asking certain questions which he perceived as being detrimental to his position, and had prohibited the children from speaking about certain things. She was convinced that P. was manipulating the children and turning them against her.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 September 2013 P. returned the children to the applicant. On 4\u00a0September 2013, following requests by both parents, the DSAFP recommended a schedule, according to which all three children would stay with their father every second weekend and the rest of the time would stay with their mother.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, P. continued to follow and insult her, threatening her with violence. She asked for a protection order and on 10\u00a0September 2013 the Ialoveni District Court ordered him not to approach the applicant or the three children for three months. That order was not enforced, and the children remained at P.\u2019s house until an unknown date.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 December 2013 P. allegedly went to the applicant\u2019s house and forcibly took the two younger children to his own house without her permission. On an unknown date the children were returned to the applicant.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0On 20 December 2013 the applicant sought and obtained a three-month extension of the protection order of 10\u00a0September 2013.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 January 2014 the applicant made a complaint to the Ialoveni prosecutor\u2019s office, stating that on 26 December 2013 P. had gone to the kindergarten which the two younger children attended and had taken them, despite her protests, promising to bring them back on 1 January 2014. He had done this in spite of the protection order of 20 December 2013. She added that on 10 January 2014 P. had met the children in the street and tried to convince them to go with him, telling them nasty things about the applicant. She insisted that the protection order be enforced.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0At the Ialoveni District Court\u2019s request, on 30 January 2014 the DSAFP issued a conclusion regarding who should have custody of the two younger children. The DSAPF noted that both parents were able and willing to bring up their children. The children loved both parents equally and wanted to be close to both of them.<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date in April 2014 P. took his older son to his house and refused to return him to the applicant. She complained to the police about that on 19 April 2014.<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 May 2014 the applicant complained to the police that P. had taken the older child to his house and had prevented her from having contact with him. She stated that subsequently the child had missed several days of school. She had been to see him on a day when he had had exams and had managed to talk to him for about twenty minutes. He had told her that his father took him out with him in his car all day long instead of taking him to school. She had also found out that P. was trying to turn her son against her.<\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0On an unspecified date in June 2014 P. took one of the younger children to his house and refused to return him to the applicant. In August\u00a02014 P. asked the applicant to allow the third son to spend the holidays with his brothers, promising that after that all three children would be returned to her house. However, after allowing this, the applicant was unable to see the children.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0On 13 July 2014 the applicant complained to the local police that her older son was being held by P. without her permission, despite her having custody of the child (see paragraph 8 above). She added that her son was being manipulated by P., and that P. was convincing him that she was a bad mother and that he did not want to live with her.<\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0On 14 July 2014 the applicant asked the Ialoveni District Court to issue a protection order in respect of her and the children. She stated, inter alia, that P. had acted aggressively towards her, threatening to take the children away, which he had ultimately done. She considered that P.\u2019s actions had negative consequences on the children\u2019s psychological well-being.<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 July 2014 the applicant asked the Ialoveni District Court to accelerate the examination of the case concerning custody of the two younger children, given that it concerned a sensitive issue and P. had caused several unnecessary delays. That request was rejected on 16 July 2014, the court finding that the delays were related to the fact that several judges had withdrawn from the case, and that there was no reason to find that the proceedings had been excessively long.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 July 2014 the applicant also complained to the DSAFP that she was unable to see her sons, and that when she called her older son he would talk to her in a way which suggested that there was someone next to him indicating how he should reply. She made a similar complaint to the Human Rights Centre on 16 July 2014, stating that in the previous four months she had lodged many complaints concerning P.\u2019s abusive actions and the breach of her parental rights with various authorities.<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 July 2014 the Ialoveni District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application for a protection order (see paragraph 24 above). It appears that in the course of 2014 all the judges of the Ialoveni District Court withdrew from the case because they had previously issued protection orders or been otherwise involved in the proceedings. On 26 August 2014 the case was thus transferred to the H\u00eence\u0219ti District Court.<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 November 2014 the DSAFP issued another conclusion, for theH\u00eence\u0219ti District Court, reiterating its previous findings, but adding that the children\u2019s psychological state was being seriously affected. Although they had had a positive attitude towards both parents earlier, they had radically changed their views after living with their father. The DSAFP recommended that a report concerning the children\u2019s psychological state be produced, and that they be separated from both parents for a period of one month and placed in a placement centre, in order to receive psychological assistance in the absence of influence by either parent.<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 December 2014 a psychological report concerning the children was produced. The relevant expert concluded: that the children were being involved in the conflict between the parents; that their initially positive attitude towards both parents had clearly become negative as regards the applicant, as a result of P.\u2019s influence; that depriving the children of contact with their mother was a form of emotional abuse; and that any meeting with their mother would constitute a traumatising event for the children while they continued to live with their father.<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 January 2015 the DSAFP issued another conclusion, largely reiterating its previous findings. On 6 February 2015 the H\u00e2nce\u0219ti District Court rejected as unfounded the request made by the DSAFP in its conclusion of 19\u00a0November 2014 for the children to be temporarily placed in a placement centre.<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 February 2015 the H\u00e2nce\u0219ti District Court awarded P. custody of the two younger children.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0On 24 June 2015 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal reversed that judgment, awarding the applicant custody of the two younger children.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 August 2015 the applicant complained to the police that P. was continuing to refuse to allow her to have contact with her sons, despite the court judgment of 24 June 2015. She mentioned that P. had insulted her and had told her that while the children were with him they would not be willing to see her. She asked the police to take urgent measures to remove the children from P.\u2019s family and allow specialists in psychology to do their work in assisting the children. She reiterated her complaint to the police on 18 September 2015, also requesting that the children be placed in a placement centre as a matter of urgency, and that P. have no access to them while they were receiving psychological assistance.<\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0On 10 November 2015 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, stating that P. had managed to influence their children to the extent that they hated her. They suffered from parental alienation syndrome and the authorities had failed to prevent that, despite her many complaints concerning P.\u2019s actions. She asked for the children to be removed from P.\u2019s family as a matter of urgency and placed in a placement centre in order to receive psychological assistance. She also asked for criminal proceedings to be initiated against P. The parties did not inform the Court of any reaction to this complaint.<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0On 11 November 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected an appeal by P. That judgment was final.<\/p>\n B. Enforcement proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 January 2016 the applicant submitted a writ of enforcement in respect of the judgment of 24 June 2015 to a bailiff. On the same day the bailiff invited P. to comply with the final judgment by handing over the children. P. did not comply.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 February 2016, after the expiry of the time-limit for voluntarily complying with the final judgment, the bailiff went to P.\u2019s house, accompanied by the local social welfare office, a psychologist and the applicant. P. allowed them in, but the children refused to leave, stating that they wanted to stay with their father.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant continued to complain to various authorities regarding the failure to reunite her with her children, P.\u2019s influence on them, and how he had turned them against her. She also asked for the children to be temporarily removed from P.\u2019s family and placed in a placement centre, where they would be protected from the influence of both parents.<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 February 2016 the prosecutor\u2019s office initiated a criminal investigation against P. after the applicant complained of domestic violence in the form of his emotional abuse of the children. At the same time, the prosecutor annulled nine previous decisions refusing to initiate criminal proceedings against P., as well as a decision rejecting a complaint by the applicant\u2019s lawyer. The case was subsequently sent to court on 17\u00a0January 2017, and was ongoing when the latest observations by the parties were received in 2018.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 March 2016 the bailiff asked the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal to give an explanation for the judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour. On 11 May 2016 the court rejected that request, since the judgment was clear. In the meantime, on 30 March 2016 the bailiff had asked for a court order allowing forced entry into P.\u2019s house. The court rejected that request on 18\u00a0January 2017, finding that the bailiff had unrestricted access to P.\u2019s house.<\/p>\n 41.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 December 2016 the Ialoveni prosecutor\u2019s office obtained a new court protection order in favour of the applicant, obliging P. to stay away from her and the three children for three months. The court largely relied on the findings in the report of 3 December 2014 (see paragraph 29 above), and found that the children were being subjected to emotional abuse which could lead to the development of parental alienation syndrome.<\/p>\n 42.\u00a0\u00a0On 16\u00a0December 2016 the applicant and her brother went to the school which all three children attended, accompanied by two police officers. Since the decision of 15\u00a0December 2016 prohibited P. from approaching the children, the applicant hoped to be able to take them home. However, according to her account of the events, the school administration and the local authorities took measures to prevent this action, notably by calling P.\u2019s relatives and allowing them to enter the room where the children were and influence them, while they also insulted the applicant. Subsequently, the deputy mayor of the village where the children lived (who was acting as a guardian local authority) ordered that the three children be placed with their grandparents (P.\u2019s parents) on an emergency basis for a period of seventy-two hours. He subsequently extended the order for the children\u2019s placement with their grandparents for a period of up to forty-five days.<\/p>\n 43.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 December 2016 another attempt to enforce the judgment failed, owing to the children being opposed to living with their mother.<\/p>\n 44.\u00a0\u00a0On 27 January and 3 February 2017 the local police and the mayor\u2019s office asked the applicant to show more interest in the children\u2019s psychological state. In particular, while acknowledging that she was unable to establish contact with them, the applicant was blamed for refusing any form of cooperation, which prevented the mayor\u2019s office from adopting any relevant decision. At the same time, P. was not allowed to approach the children and she was the only legal guardian. She was urged to \u201cassume her share of the responsibility\u201d, as the only person able to offer the children protection at that time.<\/p>\n 45.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 February 2017 a psychologist issued a conclusion concerning the state of mind of the children, who were at that time with P.\u2019s parents owing to a protection order preventing him from contacting his children. She found that all three children had been seriously affected by the separation from their father as a result of the protection order, and that any action aimed at rebuilding their relationship with their mother would be premature, as the children were displaying clear signs of resistance against their mother, who was associated with the \u201closs\u201d of their father.<\/p>\n 46.\u00a0\u00a0In the weeks that followed, the reconciliation procedure between the applicant and P. continued, with the involvement of a number of officials. Three meetings between various authorities took place on 7, 14 and 17\u00a0February 2017, aimed at identifying solutions for enforcing the judgment of 24 June 2015.<\/p>\n 47.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 and 13 June 2017 P. complained to the DSAFP that the applicant was not interested in rebuilding her relationship with the children, stating that she had only come to their school once every two months, for thirty minutes each time.<\/p>\n 48.\u00a0\u00a0On 7 June 2017 there was a new attempt to enforce the final court judgment. P. prepared the children\u2019s belongings and the applicant was ready to take them to her house. Together with a number of officials, the applicant was able to enter P.\u2019s home and talk with the children. However, they refused to come with her, despite being encouraged by P. to do so.<\/p>\n 49.\u00a0\u00a0On 9 and 23 June, as well as on 18 and 28 September 2017 the local welfare authorities met in a working group in order to identify ways of restoring the relationship between the applicant and her children.<\/p>\n C. New proceedings concerning custody of the children<\/strong><\/p>\n 50.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 March 2018 P. lodged a court action, asking for custody of the children. On 5 July 2018 the Ialoveni District Court allowed that application in part, transferring custody of the two younger children to P., but rejecting the application in respect of the older child.<\/p>\n 51.\u00a0\u00a0On 5 December 2018 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It found, inter alia, that both younger children, who were eleven by that time, had clearly expressed their wish to live with their father and not their mother. Moreover, the local welfare authority had concluded that the change of custody would be in the best interests of the children, who had strong ties to their father and would suffer from a change in their place of residence.<\/p>\n II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 52.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure read as follows:<\/p>\n Article 394.\u00a0\u00a0The legal force of a decision by an appellate court<\/p>\n \u201cThe decision of an appellate court shall be final (definitiv\u0103) from the moment it is adopted, and shall be enforced in accordance with the present Code and other laws.\u201d<\/p>\n Article 435.\u00a0\u00a0The suspensive effect of an appeal on points of law (recurs)<\/p>\n \u201c(1)\u00a0\u00a0An appeal on points of law shall suspend the enforcement of a judgment in a case concerning moving boundaries, the destruction of plants and seeds, the demolition of buildings or any other immovable items, and in other cases provided for by law.<\/p>\n …<\/p>\n (8)\u00a0\u00a0In non-pecuniary cases, the enforcement of a judgment may be suspended following the reasoned request of an appellant.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had not fulfilled their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d<\/p>\n 54.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The parties\u2019 submissions<\/em><\/p>\n (a) The applicant<\/p>\n 56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that since her first complaints in July 2013 the authorities had been well aware of the increasingly serious situation in which she and her children found themselves. In particular, it had been clear that P. had emotionally abused the children and turned them against her, yet no action had been taken against him.<\/p>\n 57.\u00a0\u00a0She had never given up trying to get her children back, but all her attempts to do so had been met by P.\u2019s hostility and the authorities\u2019 indifference. On the one occasion on 16 December 2017 when she had come close to convincing her children to come home with her, the local authorities and the school administration, in cooperation with P.\u2019s relatives, had done everything they could to prevent her being reunited with the children. The applicant\u2019s requests for the children to receive psychological assistance away from the influence of both parents had been rejected as inappropriate. Instead, she had been blamed for not being sufficiently interested in rebuilding her relationship with her children, which was not true.<\/p>\n 58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also argued that the failure to enforce the final judgment giving her custody of the children had been in breach of Article 8.<\/p>\n (b) The Government<\/p>\n 59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to submit to the bailiff the writ of enforcement in respect of the judgment of 6 March 2006 within the three-year limitation period established by law. She had not asked the court to extend the period of enforcement. Accordingly, her complaint that there had been a failure to enforce that judgment (which had awarded her custody of her older son, see paragraph 8 above) was manifestly ill-founded.<\/p>\n 60.\u00a0\u00a0As for the judgment of 24 June 2015, the authorities had taken all reasonable action to ensure its enforcement. The Government argued that the period of delay between 24 June 2015 and 19 January 2016, when the writ of enforcement had been submitted to the bailiff, was not attributable to the authorities, since the judgment of 24 June 2015 had not yet become final. They relied on the Court\u2019s case-law to emphasise that the authorities\u2019 obligation to facilitate a parent\u2019s reunion with his or her children was not absolute. When a child had been living separately from a parent for some time, reunification could require preparatory measures, which could include only limited recourse to coercion, and should always be guided by the child\u2019s best interests. The failure to enforce the judgment of 24 June 2015 had mostly been due to the children\u2019s refusal to live with the applicant, as was clear from various psychological reports, but had also been due to the applicant\u2019s own conduct \u2013 her not being sufficiently actively involved in the process of rebuilding her relationship with the children.<\/p>\n 61.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the applicant\u2019s access to her children had not been obstructed by P., who had actually encouraged the children to go with her. The authorities had undertaken all reasonable efforts to enforce the judgment on 9\u00a0February and 19December 2016 and 7 June 2017, and to reconcile P. and the applicant on 10, 17 and 22 February 2017. A number of specialised authorities had been involved in 2017, such as the DSAFP, the Psychoeducational Assistance Service of the Ialoveni General Department of Education, the administration of the children\u2019s school, teachers, and a psychologist. In addition to the above-mentioned authorities, working groups involving the Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family, the Ministry of Justice, the Ombudsman and the National Union of Bailiffs had also been involved. However, the children\u2019s strong opposition to living with their mother and the serious animosity between the former spouses had interrupted the process.<\/p>\n 62.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government argued that the authorities had not condoned P.\u2019s alleged emotional abuse of the children, since on 29 February 2016 the prosecutor\u2019s office had started a criminal investigation into that allegation. Moreover, at the prosecutor\u2019s request, a protection order had been issued on 15\u00a0December 2016 and the applicant had not objected to any of those actions. Accordingly, the Government considered that they had taken all reasonable measures aimed at reuniting the applicant with her children. An absolute obligation to restore effective ties between the applicant and her children could not be imposed on them.<\/p>\n 2. The Court\u2019s assessment<\/em><\/p>\n (a) General principles<\/p>\n 63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u00a0 reiterates that although the primary object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by public authorities, there are, in addition, positive obligations inherent in effective \u201crespect\u201d for family life (see, amongst other authorities,Glaser v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a032346\/96, \u00a7 63). The Court has repeatedly held that in cases concerning parental contact rights, the State has in principle an obligation to take measures with a view to reuniting parents with their children, and an obligation to facilitate such reunions, in so far as the interests\u00a0of the child dictate that everything must be done to preserve personal relations (see, among other authorities, Hokkanen v. Finland, no. 19823\/92, \u00a7 55, 23\u00a0September 1994, Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000\u2011I, and A.V. v. Slovenia, no. 878\/13, \u00a7 73, 9 April 2019).<\/p>\n 64.\u00a0\u00a0However, the national authorities\u2019 obligation to take measures to facilitate a reunion is not absolute, since a reunion between a parent and a child who has lived with other persons for some time may not be able to take place immediately, and may require preparatory measures (ibid., \u00a7\u00a058; see also Ribi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 27148\/12, \u00a7 94, 2 April 2015, and A.V. v.\u00a0Slovenia, citedabove, \u00a7 74). What is therefore decisive is whether the domestic authorities have taken all necessary steps to facilitate\u00a0contact\u00a0that can reasonably be demanded in the special circumstances of each case (see,\u00a0mutatis mutandis,\u00a0Kuppinger v. Germany, no.\u00a062198\/11, \u00a7\u00a0101, 15\u00a0January 2015, and\u00a0A.V. v. Slovenia, citedabove, \u00a7\u00a074).<\/p>\n
\nMarko Bo\u0161njak,
\nJulia Laffranque,
\nValeriu Gri\u0163co,
\nIvana Jeli\u0107,
\nArnfinnB\u00e5rdsen,
\nSaadetY\u00fcksel, judges,
\nand Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n