THIRD SECTION
\nCASE OF KUZHELEV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
\n(Applications nos.\u00a064098\/09 and 6 others \u2013see appended list)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n15 October 2019<\/p>\n
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Kuzhelev and Others v. Russia,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Having deliberated in private on 24 September 2019,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The case originated in seven applications (nos.\u00a064098\/09, 64891\/09, 65418\/09, 66035\/09, 67406\/09, 67697\/09 and 1504\/10) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article\u00a034 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by seven Russian nationals.<\/p>\n 2. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M.\u00a0Galperin.<\/p>\n 3. On various dates the Government were given notice of the complaints concerning the non-enforcement of the judgments given against the federal unitary enterprise. In 2017 they were givenadditional notice of the part of four applicationsconcerning the non-enforcement of the judgments issued against the joint-stock company. The remainder of applications nos.\u00a064098\/09, 64891\/09, 66035\/09, 67406\/09, 67697\/09 and 1504\/10 was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule\u00a054\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 4. The applicants are seven Russian nationals living in St Petersburg. Their personal details are set out in Appendix\u00a0I.<\/p>\n A. Information on the applicants\u2019 former employer and creation of an open joint-stock company in 2007<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The employer unitary enterprise<\/em><\/p>\n 5. The applicants are former employees of the Kronstadt Marine Plant (Kronshtadtskiymorskoyzavod \u2013 \u201cthe Marine Plant\u201d), one of the oldest and largest shipyards in Russia, incorporated between 1997 and 2015 as a State unitary enterprise (\u201cthe FGUP\u201d or \u201cthe enterprise\u201d) of the Russian Ministry of Defence. It primarily provided various services to the Ministry, such as maintaining and repairing military ships and their weaponry, and shipbuilding for the Russian Navy. The FGUP\u2019s assets were federal property (Paragraph\u00a03.1 of the FGUP\u2019s rules).The FGUP had a \u201cright of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it in order to carry out its statutory activities (ibid.; for further details on the legal status of unitary enterprises in Russia, see, in so far as relevant, Liseytseva and Maslovv.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a039483\/05 and 40527\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a055-75, 9\u00a0October 2014).It was apparently the main employer in the town of Kronstadt.<\/p>\n 6. The enterprise was set up as a separate legal entity, a commercial organisation liable for its obligations with its entire assets (Paragraphs\u00a01.3, 1.5 and 1.6 of the rules). It was subordinate (\u0432\u0432\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0447\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438) to the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Its founders were the Ministry of Property Relations[1] and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (Paragraph\u00a01.4 of the rules).<\/p>\n 7. It was created with the aim of producing goods and providing services to meet the needs of the Ministry of Defence and other public needs (\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439) and for extracting profit (Paragraph\u00a02.1 of the rules). To achieve that aim, the enterprisecarried out, in particular, the following activities: repair and docking of military ships of the executive power of the Russian Federation; repair of their weaponry and production of component parts of military ships and military equipment; exportation of products, works and services for military purposes, other military assets for ships and onshore assets under contracts with the Ministry of Defence or legal entities specialising in those types of activities; repair of ships under the flag of the Russian Federation; recycling of military equipment systems; provision of industrial and non-industrial services to individuals and legal entities, including transportation and provision of services involving the use of docks, service roads, railway lines, and storage facilities on the FGUP\u2019s territory, as well as utility sales; engineering, technical reviews, exploitation and modernisation of property of the State technical authority (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0432\u0433\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0430\u0434\u0437\u043e\u0440\u0430) for common and military use; education services, transportation services, medical activities, rent of vacant areas and quays; maintenance and servicing of cars; production of consumer goods, as well as research, development and technological works (Paragraph\u00a02.2 of the rules).<\/p>\n 8. The enterprise could sell, rent and loan its real property, transfer it as a capital contribution to theauthorised capital of companies and partnerships, or otherwise dispose of such property, only withthe prior approval of the Ministry of Property Relations (its regional department) and the Ministry of Defence (Paragraph\u00a03.8 of the rules). The enterprise could pledge or rent the assets acquired as a result of its economic activity, or transfer such assets as a capital contribution to the authorised capital of companies and partnerships, in themanner and within the limits established by the rules and national law. The transfer of assets was by deed, in accordance with Paragraph\u00a03.8 of the rules (cited above) and the procedure defined by the Ministry of Defence (Paragraph\u00a05.1 of the rules). The Ministry of Defence determined the annual amount of benefits to be transferred by the enterprise to the federal budget (Paragraph\u00a03.10 of the rules), as well as the rules for the setting of draft wholesale prices for State Defence order production inco-ordination and agreement(\u0441\u043e\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435)with State clients.Contracts with ordering parties of the Ministry of Defence were performed as a matter of priority (Paragraph\u00a04.1 of the rules). The enterprise was obliged, in particular, to meet its financial performance targets and fulfilthe State Defence order, provide information to the State bodies in the cases and within the procedure determined by the Ministry of Defence, and comply with secrecy and access requirements in the manner defined by the Ministry of Defence (Paragraph\u00a04.7).<\/p>\n 9. Owing to the enterprise\u2019s difficult financial situation,from 2000onwards several attempts to set insolvency proceedings in motion took place. In early 2005 the company\u2019s committee of creditors lodged anapplication with a commercial court requesting to place the FGUP in \u201cexternal administration\u201d (\u0432\u043d\u0435\u0448\u043d\u0435\u0435\u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435), a measure aimed at restoring the company\u2019s solvency by applying special measures under an external administration plan.<\/p>\n 10. On14\u00a0March 2005 the Commercial Courtof St Petersburg and the Leningrad Region placed the FGUP inexternal administrationfor a period of eighteen months and approvedan external manager (\u0432\u043d\u0435\u0448\u043d\u0438\u0439\u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0439), who replaced the debtor\u2019s management.On 26\u00a0June 2006 the same court extended the administration for a further six months.<\/p>\n 2. Creation of a joint-stock company, transfer of assets and the applicants\u2019 employment<\/em><\/p>\n 11. The external manager prepared an external administration plan to restore the FGUP\u2019s solvency. The plan included, inter alia, a \u201csubstitution of assets\u201d (\u201c\u0437\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0432\u201d, see paragraph\u00a074 below), to be achieved by creating an open joint-stock company (\u201cthe OAO\u201d) and transferring the entirety of the FGUP\u2019s assets thereto as a capital contribution.<\/p>\n 12. On 16\u00a0May 2005 the plan was approved by the creditors\u2019committee.<\/p>\n 13. It appears from the relevant domestic court decision (see paragraph\u00a021 below) that by letter no.\u00a0CC-08\/14269 of 28\u00a0June 2005 the Federal State Assets Management Agency informed an unspecified recipient (apparently the OAO) of its decision to approve the major provisions of the external administration plan and, in particular, the substitution of assets involving a transfer of the debtor\u2019s assets to the newlycreated joint-stock companyas a capital contribution, as a measure to restore the debtor\u2019s solvency.The letter indicated that transactions with the newlycreated company\u2019s shares and immovable propertyeffected in accordance with the external administration plan required an expert examination by the Federal State Assets Management Agency.<\/p>\n 14. On 1\u00a0September 2006 an independent market valuation of the company\u2019s assets was conducted.<\/p>\n 15. By a decision of 25\u00a0December 2006 the external manager (acting on behalf of the FGUP) created the open joint-stock company Kronstadt Marine Plant Awarded the Order of Lenin(KronshtadtskiymorskoyordenaLeninazavod\u2013 \u201cthe OAO\u201d) and transferred the major assets allocated under the FGUP\u2019s economic control (a total of 184 items, including buildings and watercraft) to the OAO as a capital contribution, with effect from 1\u00a0March 2007.<\/p>\n 16. The FGUP was the company\u2019s only founder.<\/p>\n 17. The FGUP employees, including the applicants, were accordingly registered as working for the OAO from that later date.<\/p>\n 18. On 9\u00a0February 2007 the FGUP\u2019s assets were transferred to the OAO in accordance with a transfer deed signed on that date.<\/p>\n 3. Annulment of the creation of the OAO and transfer of assets<\/em><\/p>\n 19. By Decree no.\u00a0394 of 21\u00a0March 2007 the President of the Russian Federation ordered that the Kronstadt Marine Plant be included in the United Shipbuilding Corporation, which had beencreated to unite the major shipbuilding companies, ship repair yards and maintenance companies across Russia, to streamline and consolidate civilian shipbuilding using military facilities.<\/p>\n 20. The military prosecutor, acting in the interests of the Russian Federation, the Federal State Assets Management Agency and the Ministry of Defence, lodged a court action against the FGUP challenging the decisions to create the OAO and transfer the assets, claiming that they were unlawful and void ab initio.The prosecutor argued, in particular, that,contrary to the requirements of the Insolvency Act, the external manager had failed to obtain a mandatory expert examination of the market valuation report by the Federal State Assets Management Agency, and that the value contained in the report was too low.The OAO objected, referring, inter alia, to the owner\u2019s approval of the main provisions of the external administration plan, including the substitution of assets (see paragraph\u00a013 above).<\/p>\n 21. On 19\u00a0October 2007 the Commercial Court of St Petersburg and the Leningrad Region allowed the prosecutor\u2019s action. It held that asubstitution of assets was possible in respect of unitary enterprises. However, under sections\u00a094(2) and 115(2) of the Insolvency Act, this way of restoring a company\u2019s solvency could only be included in the external administration plan or submitted for the committee of creditors\u2019consideration if there was a decision by the managerial body of the debtor entitled to decide on the debtor\u2019s concluding such transactions by the company\u2019s constituent documents. The FGUP\u2019s assets were State property allocated to the FGUP\u2019s economic control. The enterprise could not enter into any transactionsleading to the encumbrance or alienation of immovable property without the owner\u2019s consent (Article\u00a0295\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Civil Code). The court established that the interests of theowner of the assets of the debtor unitary enterprise in the context of the insolvency proceedings were represented by the Federal State Assets Management Agency. The court rejected the OAO\u2019s reference to the Agency\u2019s letter of 28\u00a0June 2005,as it indicated that transactions involving immovable property and shares of the newlycreated joint-stock company were subject to a mandatory expert examination by the Federal State Assets Management Agency. However, according to the court, the market valuation report (see paragraph\u00a014 above) had not been subject to the mandatory expert examination bythatAgency. The court concluded that the decision of 25\u00a0December 2006 had been taken in violation of domestic law, and accordingly declared the creation of the OAO and transfer of assetsinvalid. It further ordered the assets to be returned to the FGUP, pursuant to Article\u00a0167\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Civil Code (see paragraph\u00a066 below).<\/p>\n 22. On 11\u00a0February 2008 the 13th Commercial Appeal Court quashed the judgment of 19\u00a0October 2007 on appeal.<\/p>\n 23. On 29\u00a0April 2008 the Commercial Court of the North-West Circuit quashed the appeal judgment of 11\u00a0February 2008 and upheld the judgment of 19\u00a0October 2007 at final instance. The court established that, in accordance with section\u00a094(1) of the Insolvency Act, as of the date of the institution of external administration, the powers of the managerial bodies of the debtor, as well as those of the owner of property of the debtor incorporated as a unitary enterprise, had to be terminated, and the powers of the head of the debtor and other managerial bodies of the debtorwere transferred to the administrator. However, that rule was subject to the exceptions set out in section 94(2) of the Insolvency Act (see paragraph\u00a071 below). In particular, within the limits of the competencesprovided for by federal law, the managerial bodies of the debtor were entitled to take decisionson substitution of the debtor\u2019s assets.Even though the rights of the owner of the assets of the unitary enterprise were not set out directly in the Insolvency Act, section\u00a094(2)thereof was to be applied by analogy. The court concluded that in the absence of anydecision by the owner of the FGUP\u2019s assets, a substitution of assetscould not be included inthe external administration plan. The court, however, found no evidence that such a decision had ever been taken by the owner of the assets. Accordingly, the external manager\u2019s decision to create the OAO was invalid, as it had been taken in violation of the Insolvency Act. The appellate court further confirmed that the first-instance court had correctly applied the consequences of the invalid transaction and had rightly ordered the OAO to return the assets to the FGUP.<\/p>\n 24. In May 2008 the OAO advised the applicants of their potential dismissal and on 21\u00a0August 2008 dismissed them from their jobs.<\/p>\n 25. According to the applicants, between August and November 2008 the FGUP refused to reinstate them in their jobs and allow them access to their workplace.<\/p>\n B. Proceedings against the OAO and its insolvency<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. The prosecutor\u2019s claims against the OAO on the applicants\u2019 behalf and subsequent proceedings<\/em><\/p>\n 26. Shortly after the annulment of the above-mentioned transaction, a local prosecutor brought proceedings against the OAO on behalf of the applicants.<\/p>\n (a) Case of Mr Smirnov<\/p>\n 27. In the case of Mr Smirnov, the prosecutor claimed unpaid salary for April 2008 and compensation for delayed payment of salary. He further amended the claim, dropping the part concerning unpaid wages. By a judgment of 23\u00a0September 2008 the justice of the peace of the 110th\u00a0Court Circuit of St Petersburg allowed the remaining claim in part and ordered the OAO to pay Mr Smirnov445 Russian roubles ((RUB) \u2013 approximately 11\u00a0euros (EUR)) in compensation for delayed payment of salary in early 2008 (see Appendix II). The judgment entered into force ten days later.A writ of execution was issued. On 16 March 2009 the applicant forwarded it to the OAO\u2019s insolvency manager. The judgment has not been enforced.<\/p>\n (b) Cases of the six other applicants<\/p>\n (i) Court orders in the applicants\u2019 favour against the OAO<\/p>\n 28. In the cases of the six other applicants, the prosecutor brought proceedings against the OAO on their behalf seeking unpaid wages for June to August 2008 and in some cases, severance pay. On the dates listed in Appendix\u00a0II the justice of the peace of the 110th\u00a0Court Circuit of St\u00a0Petersburg awarded the applicants the amounts claimed in separate court orders (\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u044b\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0437\u044b).<\/p>\n 29. They took effect immediately but have never been enforced.<\/p>\n (ii) Application for the FGUP to substitute the debtor<\/p>\n 30. In 2008 the applicants applied to have the debtor in the domestic proceedings (the OAO) substituted. They argued that, since the creation of the OAO had been declared invalid and all the assets were to be returned to the FGUP, the latter was liable to pay the judgment debts made against the OAO.<\/p>\n 31. On the dates specified in Appendix\u00a0I thejustice of the peace of the 110th Court Circuit of St Petersburg allowed the application at first instance. She held that as the transaction had been voided, no transfer of rights or obligations to the OAO had taken place, and therefore the transfer of the employer\u2019s rights and obligations to the OAO had also been unlawful. The justice of the peace further cited, without giving further details, Article\u00a044 of the Code of the Civil Procedure on legal succession (see paragraph\u00a067.\u00a0below) and ordered that the OAO, the debtor under the court orders, be replaced by the FGUP.<\/p>\n 32. On the various dates in 2009 listed in Appendix\u00a0I the Kronstadt District Court of St Petersburg quashed the above-mentioned decisions. Firstly, it found that the annulment of the unlawful decisions to create the OAO and transfer assets had not given rise to legal succession. The court considered that the transfer of assets from the OAO to the FGUP had not automatically resulted in the obligations being transferred. Indeed, the judgment of 19\u00a0October 2007had not contained an order to that effect (see paragraph\u00a021 above). Otherwise, there were no grounds for such a transfer, as a result of either the OAO\u2019s reorganisation, or a \u201csingular succession\u201d, as, for instance, in theevent of assignment or transfer of the debt. Secondly, the courtfound that the decision on legal succession had been issued in the absence of the respondent\u2019s representatives, in violation of its procedural rights.<\/p>\n (iii) Adjustment proceedings<\/p>\n 33. It is apparent from the parties\u2019 observations received in 2011 that on various dates in 2010 the same justice of the peace adjusted the compensation by applying the consumer price index. The amounts are specified in Column\u00a05 of Appendix\u00a0II. The relevant judgments have not been enforced.According to the Government,Mr Kuzhelev and Ms Pavlova have never requested the original orders from the judicial authority and they remain in their respective casefiles.<\/p>\n 2. Insolvency proceedings in respect of the open joint-stock company<\/em><\/p>\n 34. On 6\u00a0October 2008 the FGUP, as the onlyfounder of the OAO, decided to liquidate the company.<\/p>\n 35. On 13\u00a0February 2009 the St Petersburg Commercial Court observed that the OAO had been created by a decision of the FGUP. By a final judgment of 29\u00a0April 2008 that decision had been declared invalid, and the OAO had been ordered to return the assets to the FGUP. Onthe date of the insolvency petition the OAO had been transferring assets to the FGUP and had discontinued production activities. According to the liquidation committee, the OAO\u2019s debts not challenged by the company exceeded RUB\u00a0305 million, whilst the aggregate value of the company\u2019s assets was RUB\u00a025.2 million, including RUB\u00a053,564 in recoverable accounts receivable. The court declared the OAO insolvent, and the liquidation process began.<\/p>\n 36. On 13\u00a0October 2009 the bailiffs service discontinued the enforcement proceedings and forwarded the relevant writs to the insolvency manager.<\/p>\n 37. Some applicants\u2019 attempts to challenge the court orders against the OAO in their favour (see paragraph\u00a028 above) on account of newly discovered circumstances, namely the decision to discontinue the enforcement proceedings and the insolvency procedure opened in respect of the OAO, proved unsuccessful. In particular, such request lodged by Mr\u00a0Kuzhelev was rejected in the final instance by the St Petersburg City Court on 7\u00a0April 2010.<\/p>\n 38. According to the stock inventory by the liquidator, as of 1\u00a0June 2009 the company had fixed assets of RUB\u00a016,000, resources of RUB\u00a0369,000 and a total of accounts receivable of RUB\u00a0727,657,000. On an unspecified date the market value of the assets was assessed by an independent expert as follows: no fixed assets determined; resources of RUB\u00a0369,000; and accounts receivable of RUB\u00a010,600,000[2].<\/p>\n 39. According to the Government, at some point the OAO\u2019s assets were offered for sale at auctionbut were not sold, whereupon the relevant documents were compiled.<\/p>\n 40. On various dates between 9 and 15 December 2009 Mr Khuzhelev, Ms Kudryashova, Ms Petrova, Ms Pavlova, Ms Lebedeva and Mr Tomilinrequested the insolvency manager representing the OAO to inform them whether their claims were included in the second line of the creditors\u2019 claims. On 28\u00a0January 2010 a group of OAO creditors under the court orders, including the six applicants, complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office that the insolvency manager had failed to reply.<\/p>\n 41. On 25\u00a0February 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Kronstadt District of St Petersburg advised Ms Kudryashova that all employees who had lodged a request with the insolvency manager of the OAO were included in the second priority line to be repaid. The prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicants that the claims were to be satisfied in accordance with the Insolvency Act. As the insolvency proceedings were ongoing, the prosecutor\u2019s office did not see any reason to intervene.<\/p>\n 42. On 12\u00a0April 2010 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St\u00a0Petersburg rejected Mr Tomilin\u2019s challenge of the bailiffs\u2019 decision to discontinue the enforcement proceedings (see paragraph\u00a036 above). The court found that the bailiffs service had lawfully discontinued the proceedings and had forwarded the writs to the insolvency manager, as the debtor OAO was undergoing insolvency proceedings. The applicant\u2019s appeal was disallowed by the St Petersburg City Court on 18\u00a0August 2010 for non-compliance with the necessary formal requirements, namely failure to specify the claim and pay the court fee.<\/p>\n 43. At some point the claims of 648 second priority line creditors were included in the registry of the creditors\u2019 claims.<\/p>\n 44. On 29\u00a0March 2012 the St Petersburg Commercial Court discontinued the insolvency proceedings and ordered the OAO\u2019s liquidation. The claims which had not been satisfied during the liquidation process, including the applicants\u2019 claims, were considered settled.<\/p>\n 45. On 31\u00a0May 2012 the OAO\u2019s liquidation was recorded in the Register of Legal Entities, and it ceased to exist.<\/p>\n C. Judgments in the applicants\u2019 favour against the FGUP and their enforcement<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Proceedings concerning reinstatement and unpaid wages<\/em><\/p>\n 46. In 2008 the applicants brought proceedings against the FGUP challenging their dismissal, requesting to be allowed to work as of 21\u00a0August 2008, the date of their actual dismissal (see paragraph\u00a024 above). They also claimed unpaid wages and other work-related payments from 1\u00a0March 2007.<\/p>\n (a) Case of Mr Smirnov (application no.65418\/09)<\/p>\n 47. The applicant sued both the OAO and the FGUP for reinstatement in hisjob and unpaid wages as of 21\u00a0August 2008. He further supplemented his claims by challenging the orders of the external manager and the OAO director for his transfer from the FGUP to the OAO, requesting reinstatement in his job at the FGUP as of 21\u00a0August 2008 and asking for his employment record to be updated accordingly. He further dropped his claims against the OAO. The Kronstadt District Court decided that the claim for unpaid wages would be dealt with in a separate set of proceedings.<\/p>\n (i) Proceedings for reinstatement of employment<\/p>\n 48. On 20\u00a0November 2008 the Kronstadt District Courtallowed his claim in part. The court found that, in accordance with section\u00a0115(4) of the Insolvency Act and Article\u00a075 of the Labour Code (see paragraphs\u00a068 and 77 below), the transfer of an employer\u2019s rights and obligations to a newlycreated joint-stock company was conditioned only bya change in ownership of the company\u2019s assets, which meant, by operation of law, a transfer of title to the assets. As the transfer in the present case had been declared invalid and without legal effect, a change in ownership of the assets had not taken place. Accordingly, the court declared the transfer of the employer\u2019s rights and obligations to the OAO unlawful, and the respective orders of the external manager and OAO director invalid. The court concluded that the applicant\u2019s employment with the FGUP had not been terminated lawfullyand ordered his reinstatement as of 1\u00a0March 2007 and his employment record to be updated accordingly.<\/p>\n 49. On 24\u00a0December 2008 the St Petersburg Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s findings on appeal. It noted in addition, in reply to the FGUP\u2019s appeal, that the applicant\u2019s reinstatement to work for the OAO in March 2007 was not per sea ground to discontinue his employment relationship with the FGUP, as this was not one of the grounds for termination of a contract of employment set out in the Labour Code.<\/p>\n (ii) Proceedings for unpaid wages for August to November 2008<\/p>\n 50. On 28\u00a0November 2008 the Kronstadt District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claims for unpaid wages for July to November 2008. As in the earlier set of proceedings(see paragraph\u00a048 above), it found that, as the transfer of title to the FGUP\u2019s assets had not taken place as a result of the invalidity of thetransaction, the OAO had not acquired the employer\u2019s rights and obligationsunder the applicant\u2019s contract of employment. Accordingly, his employment with the FGUP had not been discontinued, and the FGUP was liable to pay him wages. The court further held as follows:<\/p>\n \u201cThe court further rejects the [respondent FGUP\u2019s] argument about the [OAO\u2019s] responsibility to pay [the applicant] wages and allowances, as, [given] the unlawfulness of the transfer of duties and obligations from the FGUP to the OAO, there are no grounds for the latter to calculate and pay the above amounts to [the applicant]\u201d.<\/p>\n 51. The court also noted that the justice of the peace of the 110th Court Circuit hadnot issued a court order in the applicant\u2019s favour against the FGUP[3]. The court ordered the FGUP to pay the applicant RUB\u00a082,583.45 in respect of salary for \u201cJuly and August 2008 and the period between 21\u00a0August and 28\u00a0November 2008\u201d and dismissed the remainder of his claims.<\/p>\n 52. On 21\u00a0January 2009 the St Petersburg Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal for the same reasons as in the first-instance judgment. The court stressed, in particular, that under Article\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01, 2 and 3 of the Labour Code,a change in ownership of assets was not grounds to discontinue anemployment relationship. Domestic law attached importance to an employer\u2019s link with an enterprise as an asset complex, irrespective of ownership. Therefore, in the absence of an employee\u2019s intention, a change in ownership of assets was not a reason to discontinuean employment relationship at the employer\u2019s initiative. The appellate court concluded that the transfer of assets from the FGUP to the OAO and, subsequently, back to the State enterprise, was not grounds for the applicant\u2019s dismissal within the meaning of the Labour Code.<\/p>\n (b) Cases of the six other applicants<\/p>\n (i) Proceedings for reinstatement of employment<\/p>\n 53. In November 2008, pursuant to the annulment of the decisions to create the OAO and transfer the FGUP\u2019s assets, the applicants obtained separate judgments reinstating them in their jobs with the FGUP from 21\u00a0August 2008, the date of their dismissal from the OAO.<\/p>\n (ii) Proceedings for unpaid wages for August to November 2008<\/p>\n 54. On the dates specified in Appendix\u00a0I the Kronstadt District Court examined the claims of the six applicants for unpaid wages and in separate judgments allowed them in part for the same reasons as in the case of Mr\u00a0Smirnov (see paragraph\u00a050 above). The court awarded them their unpaid wages from 21\u00a0August 2008 to the dates of the relevant judgments, and dismissed the remainder of the claims. In particular, it refused to order the FGUP to pay severance pay and unpaid wages for June to August 2008, as those claims had already been allowed by the justice of the peace of the 110th Court Circuit in the proceedings against the OAO (see paragraph\u00a028above). The judgments were subsequently upheld on appeal and entered into force on the dates specified in Appendix I.<\/p>\n (c) Index-linking proceedings in all cases<\/p>\n 55. On 7\u00a0April 2009 the Kronstadt District Courtfound that the FGUP had failed to comply with the judgment in favour of Mr Smirnov and awarded him a total of RUB\u00a08,056 (EUR\u00a0183). That amount represented the index-linking of the award, compensation for delayed payment of the amounts awarded by the court and compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage for the non-enforcement. On 13\u00a0May 2009 the St\u00a0Petersburg Regional Court upheld the decision.<\/p>\n 56. The Government submitted in their observations that at some point the unpaid wages had been index-linked and the applicants had received compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The parties did not submit any further details or documents in that regard.<\/p>\n 2. The applicants\u2019 dismissal in March 2009 and subsequent proceedings for damages<\/em><\/p>\n 57. In early March 2009 the applicants were dismissed from the FGUP. After three to four weeks they received severance pay and various other payments related to their previous employment. Six of the applicants brought separate sets of proceedings claiming unpaid wages, severance pay and index-linking on those amounts. On various dates their claims were allowed in so far as they concerned the delay in payment of their severance package. They were awarded default interest and compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage for that period, in the amounts specified in Appendix\u00a0I. The court dismissed the remainder of their claims.<\/p>\n 3. Enforcement of the above-mentioned judgments<\/em><\/p>\n 58. In December 2009 the FGUP started paying the amounts awarded in both sets of proceedings, in several instalments. By 24\u00a0November 2010 they were paid in full. On 30\u00a0November 2010 the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgments were discontinued because they had all been enforced.<\/p>\n 4. Index-linking of the awards against the FGUP<\/em><\/p>\n (a) Case of Mr Smirnov<\/p>\n 59. According to the applicant\u2019s observations, on 11\u00a0April 2011 the Kronstadt District Court ordered that the award in favour of Mr Smirnov for the period of non-enforcement be index-linked and obliged the FGUP to pay him RUB\u00a012,825 under that head. The decision became final ten days later.<\/p>\n 60. According to the Government\u2019s observations of 19\u00a0October 2011, the applicant received the writ of execution in respect of that judgment but did not submit it to the bailiffs.<\/p>\n 61. It is unclear whether the decision was enforced.<\/p>\n (b) Cases of Ms Kudryashova and Mr Tomilin<\/p>\n 62. The Government submitted copies of claims by Ms Kudryashova and Mr Tomilinfor the index-linking of the initial awards against the FGUP, which appear to have been lodged with the domestic court in January 2011 and late December 2010 respectively. The parties did not provide copies of the subsequent court decisions or information onenforcement of the relevant court awards, if any.<\/p>\n 5. Decision to discontinue insolvency proceedings in respect of the FGUP and subsequent developments<\/p>\n 63. By a letter of 16\u00a0July 2009 the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy advised the FGUP\u2019s employees\u2019 representatives that the Marine Plant was included in a list of organisations of strategic importance entitled to receive a subsidy from the federal budget between 2008 and 2010 in order to resolve the FGUP\u2019s financial difficulties. The Ministry of Defence was taking all possible measures to discontinue the insolvency proceedings in respect of the FGUP, including those aimed at payment of the enterprise\u2019s debts and restoringits solvability.<\/p>\n 64. In 2010 the insolvency proceedings in respect of the FGUP were discontinued owing to a settlement between the FGUP and its creditors. The owner of the debtor\u2019s assets approved of the settlement. On 25\u00a0February 2010 the Commercial Court of St Petersburg and the Leningrad Region approved the friendly settlement.<\/p>\n 65. It further appears that the Marine Plant was in operation until 2015, when it was restructured and transformed into a different legal entity (a newly created joint-stock company). On 20\u00a0April 2015 the restructuring of the company was recorded in the Register of Legal Entities, and the FGUP ceased to exist.<\/p>\n II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n A. Invalid transactions<\/strong><\/p>\n 66. Article\u00a0167 of the Civil Code (General Provisions on the Consequences of the Invalidity of a Transaction) provides as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c1. An invalid transaction shall not entail legal consequences, with the exception of those connected with its invalidity, and shall be invalid from the moment of its conclusion.<\/p>\n 2. If a transaction has been recognised as invalid, each of the parties shall be obliged to return to the other party all it has received as part of the transaction, and if return is impossible in kind (including where the transaction concerns the use of property, work performed or services rendered), its cost shall be reimbursed in money – unless other consequences of the invalidity of the transactions have been stipulated by law.<\/p>\n 3. If it follows from the content of the disputed transaction that it may only be terminated for the future, the court, while recognising the transaction as invalid, shall terminate its operation for the future.\u201d<\/p>\n B. Provisions on procedural succession applied by the domestic courts<\/strong><\/p>\n 67. Under Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the event of withdrawal (\u0432\u044b\u0431\u044b\u0442\u0438\u0435) of one of the parties in a disputed legal relationship or that established by a court (\u0432 \u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0440\u0435\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438) (in the event of death, restructuring of the legal entity, assignment of the debt, cession and in other cases of a change of the person in the obligations), the courtallows (\u0434\u043e\u043f\u0443\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0435\u0442) the replacement of this party by its legal successor. Procedural succession is possible at any stage of the civil proceedings. All actions taken before the legal successor\u2019s entry into the proceedings are obligatory for him to the extent they would have been obligatory for the person whom the legal successor has replaced (Article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02).<\/p>\n C. Relevant provisions of the Labour Code<\/strong><\/p>\n 68. Article\u00a075 of the Labour Code of the Russian Federation provides that a change in ownership of anorganisation may not serve as grounds to discontinue employment contracts with other employees of the organisation. If an employee refuses to continue to work because of a change in ownership of an organisation, the employment contract is discontinued in compliance with the Code. A change in jurisdiction (subordination) of an organisation or restructuring (merger, accession, division, separation or transformation) of an organisation isnot deemed grounds for rescission of the employment contracts concluded with the organisation\u2019s employees.<\/p>\n D. Relevant provisions of the Insolvency Act<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. External administration<\/em><\/p>\n 69. \u201cExternal administration\u201d is a procedure applied in a bankruptcy case to the debtor for the purpose of restoring its solvency (section\u00a02 of the Act). Section\u00a093 of the Insolvency Act provides that external administration is instituted by a commercial court on the basis of a decision of a creditors\u2019 meeting, except in the cases specified by the Act. It is put in place for a period not exceeding eighteen months. This period can be extended in the manner specified by the Act for up to a further six months, unless otherwise provided for by the Act. The external administration term can be reduced at the request of the creditors\u2019 meeting or the external manager. The decision to put the external administration procedure in place takes effect immediately. It may be appealed against.<\/p>\n 70. Section 94(1) of the Insolvency Act (\u201cConsequences of the Institution of External Administration\u201d) provides that once external administration is instituted:<\/p>\n – the powers of the head of the debtor are terminated, and the duty to manage the affairs of the debtor is vested in the external manager;<\/p>\n – the external manager is entitled to issue an order of dismissal of the head of the debtor or ask him or her to leave his or her office for another position in the manner and on the terms provided for by employment legislation;<\/p>\n – the powers of the managerial bodies of the debtor and owner of property of the debtor unitary enterprise are terminated, and the powers of the head of the debtor and other managerial bodies of the debtor are transferred to the external manager, except for the powers of the debtor\u2019s managerial bodies and owner of the property of the debtor unitary enterprise specified in section\u00a094(2). The managerial bodies of the debtor, interim receiver and administrative receiver must, within three days of the approval of the external manager, ensure that the debtor\u2019s accounting and other documentation, seals and rubber stamps, material and other valuables are transferred to the external manager;<\/p>\n – a moratorium on meeting creditors\u2019 claims relating to monetary obligations and mandatory payments may be imposed, except in the cases specified by the Act, and creditors\u2019 claims for monetary obligations and compulsory payments, except for the current payments that may be presented to the debtor only in the observance of the procedure for presenting claims to a debtor provided for by the Act.<\/p>\n 71. Section 94(2) of the Insolvency Act stipulates that the managerial bodies of the debtor, within the limits of the competencesprovided for by federal law, are entitled to make decisions:<\/p>\n – on designating the number and face value of shares;<\/p>\n – on increasing the joint-stock company\u2019s authorised capital by means of issuing additional ordinary shares;<\/p>\n – on addressing a petition to a creditors\u2019 meeting to include the possibility of an additional issue of shares in the external administration plan;<\/p>\n – onestablishing the procedure for conducting a general meeting of shareholders;<\/p>\n – on filing a petition for the sale of the debtor\u2019s enterprise;<\/p>\n – on replacing the debtor\u2019s assets;<\/p>\n – on electing a representative of the debtor\u2019s founders (stockholders);<\/p>\n – on concluding an agreement on the terms for the provision of funds for discharging the debtor\u2019s obligations between a third party or third parties and the managerial bodies of the debtor authorised by the constituentdocuments to adopt decisionson concluding large transactions.<\/p>\n 72. Section 94(3) of the Insolvency Act, introduced on 30\u00a0December 2008,deals specifically with the rights of the owner of the property of a debtor unitary enterprise. In particular, it stipulates that, within the limits of the competences provided for by federal law, the owner of the property of a debtor unitary enterprise is entitled to decideon replacing (substituting) the debtor\u2019s assets.<\/p>\n 73. The external manager is approved by the commercial courtat the same time as the institution of external administration, except in the cases specified by the Act (section\u00a096(1)). Before the date of approval of an external manager the commercial court vests the duties and rights of an external manager stipulated by the Act in the person who executed the duties of the interim receiver, administrative receiver or winding-up receiver of the debtor, except for the drawing up of an external administration plan (section\u00a096(2)). The commercial court issues a ruling on the approval of the external manager. The ruling takes effect immediately and is amenable to appeal (section\u00a096(2) to (4)).<\/p>\n 2. Substitution (replacement) of the debtor\u2019s assets<\/em><\/p>\n 74. Section\u00a0115 of the Insolvency Act provides thatsubstitution of a debtor\u2019s assets (\u0437\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0432\u0434\u043e\u043b\u0436\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430) is effected by means of forming one public joint-stock company or several public joint-stock companies on the basis of the debtor\u2019s property. If one public joint-stock company is formed, its authorised capital must incorporate the property (including property rights) included in the enterprise and intended for the pursuit of entrepreneurial activity.<\/p>\n 75. Substitution of a debtor\u2019s assets by means of forming one public joint-stock company on the basis of the debtor\u2019s property may be included in the external administration plan based on a decision by the debtor\u2019s managerial body authorised by the constituent documents to adopt decisions on concludingthe relevant transactions of the debtor (section\u00a0115(2)).The ability to substitute a debtor\u2019s assets may be included in the external administration plan, on the condition that all creditors whose obligations are secured by a pledge\/mortgage of the debtor\u2019s property have voted in favour of the decision.<\/p>\n 76. When the debtor\u2019s assets are substituted, the debtor is the sole founder of the joint-stock company or several public joint-stock companies. The participation of other founders in the formation of a public joint-stock company or several public joint-stock companies is not permitted (section 115(3)(1)). The amount of authorised capital of the newly formed public joint-stock companies is determined by a decision of the meeting of creditors or creditors\u2019 committee and set at the amount defined in the report on the market value of the property contributed as payment for the authorised capital of the newly formedpublic joint-stock companies (section 115(3)(2)). Thevaluation of the property contributed as payment for the authorised capital of the newlyformed public joint-stock companies must be carried out in accordance with the procedure provided for bythe Act (ibid).<\/p>\n 77. In the event of substitution of a debtor\u2019s assets, all the employment contracts effective when the decision was made to substitute the debtor\u2019s assets remain in effect, with the employer\u2019s rights and duties being transferred to the newly formed public joint-stock company (companies) (section 115(4)).<\/p>\n 78. The document confirming the availability of a licence to carry out specific types of activities is subject to the issuing of a document confirming the fact that the newly formed public joint-stock company (companies) holds (hold) the relevant licence in accordance with the procedure provided for by federal law (ibid.)<\/p>\n 79. The shares of the public joint-stock company or public joint-stock companies formed on the basis of the debtor\u2019s property are included in the debtor\u2019s estate and may be sold at public auction (section 115(5)).The sale of shares of the public joint\u2011stock company or the public joint-stock companies formed on the basis of the debtor\u2019s property must ensure an accumulation of funds for restoration of the debtor\u2019s solvency (ibid.)<\/p>\n 80. By a Ruling of 15\u00a0December 2004 No.\u00a029 the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court of Russia clarified that, as the authorised capital of a company created by substitution of assets is paid with the debtor\u2019s property, the debtor is the only shareholder of that company when the latter is established (\u00a7\u00a044 of the Ruling).<\/p>\n E. Provisions on joint-stock companies referred to by the Government<\/strong><\/p>\n 81. In accordance with Article\u00a096\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Civil Code, as in force at the material time, and section\u00a02 of the Joint-Stock Companies Act (Law no.\u00a0208-FZ of 26\u00a0December 1995), as in force at the material time, a joint\u2011stock company is a commercial organisation whose authorised capital is divided into a definite number of shares of stock certifying the rights and obligations of the members (shareholders) vis-\u00e0-vis the company. Shareholders are not liable for the obligations of the company and bear the risk of losses associated with its activity only to the extent of the value of the shares owned by them.<\/p>\n 82. The authorised capital of a joint-stock company is comprised of the face value of the company\u2019s shares acquired by the shareholders. The company\u2019s authorised capital defines the minimum amount of the company\u2019s property guaranteeing the interests of its creditors (Article\u00a099 of the Civil Code).<\/p>\n 83. A company is liable to the extent of its assets. It is not liable for the obligations of its shareholders. If the insolvency (bankruptcy) of a company is caused by the actions (omissions) of its shareholders or other persons vested with the right to issue instructions binding upon the company or otherwise having the power to determine its actions, then such shareholders or other persons may, if the company lacks sufficient assets, be held vicariously liable for its obligations. The insolvency (or bankruptcy) of a company is considered to be caused by the actions (or failure to act) of its shareholders or other persons vested with the right to issue instructions binding upon the company or otherwise having the power to determine its actions, only where they have exercised such right and\/or power in the furtherance of the company\u2019s carrying out of its actions, knowing in advance that the consequences of carrying out those actions would be insolvency (bankruptcy) of the company (section\u00a03(1) to (3) of the Joint\u2011Stock Companies Act).<\/p>\n 84. The State is not liable for the debts of the company, and the company is not liable for the obligations of the State and its bodies (section\u00a03(4) of the Joint-Stock Companies Act).<\/p>\n 85. The founders of the company are citizens or and (or) legal entities which have taken the decision to found it. Public and local authorities cannot act as the founders of the company, unless otherwise provided for by federal law (section\u00a010(1) of the Joint-Stock Companies Act).<\/p>\n F. Legal status of unitary enterprises<\/strong><\/p>\n 86. The Civil Code of the Russian Federation defines State and municipal unitary enterprises as commercial organisations that do not exercise a right of ownership in respect of the property allocated to them by their owners. The property of the unitary enterprise is indivisible. Only State-run and municipal enterprises can be set up in the form of unitary enterprises (Article\u00a0113\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Civil Code). The State or municipal authority retains ownership of the property but the unitary enterprise may exercise the right of economic control (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) or operational management (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over it (Article\u00a0113\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Civil Code). The director of a unitary enterprise is appointed by, and reports to, the property owner (Article\u00a0113\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Civil Code, as in force at the material time).<\/p>\n 87. Other domestic provisions relevant to cases on the legal status of State and municipal unitary enterprises with the right of economic control are summarised in Liseytseva and Maslov(cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a054-127).<\/p>\n 88. Section\u00a02 of the Insolvency Act provides that a \u201crepresentative of the owner of the assets of a debtor unitary enterprise\u201d is a person empowered by the owner of the assets of the debtor unitary enterprise to represent its lawful interests when the procedures applied in a bankruptcy case are being implemented.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS<\/p>\n 89. The Court considers that, in accordance with Rule\u00a042\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Rules of Court, the applications should be joined, given their similar factual and legal background.<\/p>\n II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE\u00a01 OF PROTOCOL No.\u00a01 ON ACCOUNT OF NON\u2011ENFORCEMENT AGAINST THE UNITARY ENTERPRISE<\/p>\n 90. The applicants complained about the non-enforcement of the judgments against the FGUP. They referred to Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.1, which read as follows:<\/p>\n Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.<\/p>\n The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d<\/p>\n 91. The Government contested the complaint on the same grounds as those set out in Liseytseva and Maslov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0137-41). In particular, they submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to them, such as compensation for damage under Articles\u00a01069 and 1070 of the Civil Code, as well as non-pecuniary damage under Article\u00a0151 of the Civil Code. They argued that the debts of the State unitary enterprise \u2013 a separate legal entity under domestic law \u2013 could not be attributed to the State, for exactly the same reasons as those summarised in Liseytseva and Maslov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0136-42). The company had not performed any public functions. Its activities had been commercial, performed at the FGUP\u2019s own risk. The subsidiary liability of the State could not be engaged since the owner had not caused the company\u2019s insolvency. It had not given any binding instructions or otherwise defined the company\u2019s actions. The authorities had provided the requisite assistance to the applicants in their efforts to have the court orders enforced. Furthermore, the State had not been responsible for the FGUP\u2019s debts as since 2005 it had been placed in \u201cexternal administration\u201d; the owner\u2019s powers had accordingly terminated in accordance with the Insolvency Act as in force at the material time (see paragraphs\u00a070-71), and the owners\u2019 rights defined in Article\u00a0113\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01,2 and 4 of the Civil Code (see paragraph\u00a086 above) had been discontinued. They argued thatsince the external manager was not a \u201cpublic official\u201d, his actions could not be directly attributed to the State (see Katsyuk v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 58928\/00, \u00a7\u00a039, 5 April 2005). Furthermore, the awards in the applicants\u2019 favour against the FGUP had been fully recovered and the delay in enforcement of one year and ten monthshad been justified by the complexity of the insolvency procedure involving numerous creditors.Lastly, as regards Mr Tomilin and Ms\u00a0Kudryashova, they argued that the applicants\u2019 rights had been restored at the domestic level as the awards in the applicants\u2019 favour had been index\u2011linked and each applicant had received RUB\u00a01,000 (EUR\u00a022) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 92. The applicants maintained their claims. They argued that the Marine Plant had been a State enterprise of strategic importance, both in terms of the tasks it performed and employment in the town, and that the authorities had been heavily involved in its management at the time of the events, by way of, inter alia, the provision of subsidies.<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Compatibility rationepersonae \u2013 the State\u2019s responsibility for the FGUP\u2019s debts<\/em><\/p>\n 93. The debtor was incorporated as a State unitary enterprise under the domestic law in force at the material time. The Court has already dealt with the Government\u2019s argument concerning the company\u2019s legal status under domestic law in the above\u2011mentioned case of Liseytseva and Maslov. Having examined the Government\u2019s respective objection in detail, the Court held that the existing legal framework in Russia did not provide unitary enterprises with the degree of institutional and operational independence that would absolve the State from any responsibility under the Convention for any such companies\u2019debts (see Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0193-204). The Court held that, in order to decide on the operational and institutional independence of a given unitary enterprise having the right of economic control,it had to assess the nature of the enterprise\u2019s functions and the degree of the State authorities\u2019 actual involvement in the management of the enterprise\u2019s assets. In order to determine the issue of State responsibility for the debts of unitary enterprises, the Court must examine whether and how the extensive powers of control provided for by domestic law were actually exercised by the authorities in a given case (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 183\u201192 and 204-06).<\/p>\n 94. The Court has noreason to doubt that the core activities of the enterprise \u2013 one of the leading shipyards in Russia which maintained and repaired military ships and their weaponry, as well as built ships for the Russian Navy (see, for a list of the FGUP\u2019s main tasks, paragraph\u00a07 above)\u2013constituted public duties, and that theFGUP had strategic importance for the Russian Navy (see, for instance, paragraph\u00a063 above). Itoperated in a heavily regulated area of State defenceand was clearly placed, by virtue of its functions and the aims and specific tasks it performed, under the strict control of the authorities, namely the Ministry of Defence(see Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above,\u00a7\u00a7\u00a0208-10, and Yershova v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a01387\/04, \u00a7\u00a058, 8\u00a0April 2010). The assets allocated to the enterprise accordingly enjoyed special treatment under domestic law, as evidenced, inter alia, by the FGUP\u2019s rules (see paragraph\u00a08 above, and compare Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above,\u00a7\u00a0209).<\/p>\n 95. As regards the actual control exercised by the authorities, the Court notes the Government\u2019s submissions concerning the scope of the owner\u2019s powers in the context of the external administration put in place between 2005 and February 2010 in respect of the FGUP. However, in the Court\u2019s view, it cannot be said that the State\u2019s involvement in the external administration procedure in this particular case \u201cresulted only from its role in establishing the legislative framework for [such] procedures\u201d and \u201cin overseeing observance of the rules\u201d (contrast Kotov v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a054522\/00, \u00a7\u00a0107, 3\u00a0April 2012). On the contrary, in the Court\u2019s view, the State, as the owner of its assets placed under the FGUP\u2019s economic control, took decisions of paramount importance for the future of the unitary enterprise, as follows.<\/p>\n 96. Firstly, the authorities decided onthe FGUP\u2019s inclusion into the United Shipbuilding Corporation (see paragraph\u00a019 above).<\/p>\n 97. Secondly, the authorities approved ofthe substitution of assets involving a transfer of the debtor\u2019s assets to the newly created joint\u2011stock companyas a capital contribution, as a part of the external administration plan(see, for the contents of the relevant letter, paragraph\u00a013 above). With respect to the external administration procedure, the Court cannot but agree with the Government that, in accordance with section\u00a094(1) of the Insolvency Act, as of the date of the institution of external administration, the powers of the managerial bodies of the debtor, as well as those of the owner of property of the debtor incorporated as a unitary enterprise, had to be terminated, and the powers of the head of the debtor and other managerial bodies of the debtor were transferred to the administrator (see paragraph\u00a070 above). However, as it follows from the relevant provisions of domestic law \u2013 and as specifically established by the domestic courts in the proceedings concerning the validity of the OAO\u2019s creation in the present case \u2013 that rule was subject to the exceptions set out in section 94(2) of the Insolvency Act \u2013 notably, in so far as the approval of the substitution of assets was concerned (see paragraph\u00a071for the relevant domestic law and paragraph\u00a023 above for the courts\u2019 reasoning). Furthermore, the newly created company\u2019s transactions remained subject to the authorities\u2019 mandatory approval (see paragraph\u00a023 above). Thislack of approval was precisely the crux of the court action which the prosecutor brought in the interests of the Ministry of Defence and the Federal State Assets Management Agency, claiming to declare the substitution of assets invalid (see paragraph\u00a020 above). Having applied section\u00a094(2) of the Insolvency Act by analogy, the courts confirmed that the debtor hadbeen entitled to decide on the substitution of the debtor\u2019s assets (ibid.) \u2013 a crucial element of the case at hand. The courts concluded that in the absence of a relevant decision by the owner of the FGUP\u2019s property, a substitution of assets could not have been included in the external administration plan (paragraph\u00a023 above). As a result, the creation of the OAO was declared invalid, and at the time of the judgments in the applicants\u2019 favour (late 2008 to early 2009, see Column\u00a03 of Appendix\u00a0I) the assets were being returned under the FGUP\u2019s economic control.<\/p>\n 98. Finally, in 2009 the FGUP was included in a list of organisations of strategic importance entitled to State subsidies in order to resolve its financial difficulties, and the authorities actively took measures to discontinue the insolvency proceedings in respect of it, including those aimed at payment of the enterprise\u2019s debts and restoringits solvability (see paragraph\u00a063 above). Therefore, the State can be assumed to have accepted a certain degree of responsibility for the debts of the FGUP (see, mutatis mutandis, Khachatryan v.\u00a0Armenia, no. 31761\/04, \u00a7\u00a053, 1\u00a0December 2009).<\/p>\n 99. In the Court\u2019s view, these factorsare sufficient for a finding that a strong degree of State control was actually exercised by the authorities over the debtor unitary enterprise at the time of the events, that is, during the non-enforcement period.<\/p>\n 100. The Court concludes that the FGUP did not enjoy sufficient institutional and operational independence from the Stateat the time of the events and rejects the Government\u2019s ratione personae objection. Accordingly, the State is to be held responsible under the Convention for the judgment debts in the applicants\u2019 favour (see Liseytseva and Maslov,cited above,\u00a7\u00a0214).<\/p>\n 2. Exhaustion<\/em><\/p>\n 101. The Court has already examined the exhaustion issue in detail in Liseytseva and Maslov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 156-82 and, in particular, \u00a7\u00a0165), and does not see a reason to depart from those conclusions in the present case. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s plea as to non\u2011exhaustion.<\/p>\n 3. Victim status of two applicants<\/em><\/p>\n 102. With respect to Mr Tomilin and Ms Kudryashova, the Government argued that the applicants\u2019 rights had been restored at the domestic level as the awards in their favour had been index-linked and each applicant had received RUB\u00a01,000 (EUR\u00a022) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. However,it is sufficient for the Court to note that no details about the final awards in the index-linking proceedings against the FGUP and their eventual enforcementwere provided by the parties (see paragraph\u00a062 above). In any event, the Court reiterates thatthis remedy alone would not provide sufficient redress as it can only compensate damage resulting from monetary depreciation (see, mutatis mutandis,Burdov v.\u00a0Russia (no.\u00a02), no.\u00a033509\/04, \u00a7\u00a0108, ECHR 2009). As regards the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and even assuming that the reference to the delayed payment of salary by the FGUP could be regarded as acknowledgment of a violation, the award of EUR\u00a022 was manifestly unreasonable in comparison with the awards made by the Court in similar cases (see, for example, Voronkov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 39678\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a068-69, 30\u00a0July 2015). Accordingly, the Court finds nothing in the case material to suggest that the authorities granted the applicants appropriate and sufficient redress (see Cocchiarella v.\u00a0Italy, no.\u00a064886\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a070-72, 10\u00a0November 2004 with further references), and rejects the respective objection.<\/p>\n 4. Existence of a significant disadvantage in the proceedings concerning compensation for delayed severance pay<\/em><\/p>\n 103. As regards the complaint about the delayed enforcement of the domestic awards given in the second set of court proceedings against the FGUP concerning damages for the delay in payment of severance packages in the case of fourof the applicants (see Column no.\u00a04 of Appendix\u00a0I)[4], the Court notes that the awards ranged from EUR 3 to EUR 29 and were enforced with a maximum delay of one year and four months. Considering the minor nature of the awards, the Court arrives at the conclusion that the applicants did not suffer a significant disadvantage as a result of the authorities\u2019 failure to enforce the awards in good time.The Court further observes that it has already dealt with the issue of the non-enforcement of judgments against unitary enterprises on several occasions (see Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, and numerous follow-ups) and concludes that respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, does not require examination of the present complaint on its merits. Lastly, it observes that the applicants\u2019 case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(b), as evidenced by the judgments referred to in the relevant part of Appendix\u00a0I (see Vasilchenko v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a034784\/02, \u00a7\u00a049, 23\u00a0September 2010).<\/p>\n 104. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applications in this part must be declared inadmissible under Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(b) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 5. Complaint concerning the award in favour of Mr Smirnov in the index-linking proceedings of 11\u00a0April 2011<\/em><\/p>\n 105. In his observations the applicant mentioned, for the first time, that the judgment of 11\u00a0April 2011awarding him the index-linking of the initial award against the FGUP remained unenforced.<\/p>\n 106. This complaint falls outside the scope of his initial complaint of which the Government were given notice. Even assuming that it may be understood as a development of the initial grievance, the Court notes from the Government\u2019s submissions that the applicant received the writ of enforcement in respect of the award from the court but did not forward it to the bailiffs service (see paragraph\u00a060 above). The Court has already found that if an applicant for any reason obtains the writ of enforcement from the trial court himself, it would appear logical to require that he submits it to the competent authority with a view to enforcement of the judgment (see, mutatis mutandis, Gadzhikhanov and Saukov v.\u00a0Russia, nos. 10511\/08 and 5866\/09, \u00a7\u00a026, 31\u00a0January 2012). In the absence of any explanation from the parties, the authorities cannot to be held responsible for the applicant\u2019s unexplained failure to follow the domestic enforcement procedure and, notably, for his deliberate refusal to provide the writ of enforcement (see, mutatis mutandis, Gadzhikhanov and Saukov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a027-31). Accordingly, the delay up to 19\u00a0October 2011, which in itself was not unreasonable, is not attributable to the authorities. The Court further notes that it is not in possession of any information as to either the enforcement status of that award or further developments, such as the applicant\u2019s having forwarded the writ to the competent authorities.<\/p>\n 107. It follows that this part of the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 3\u00a0(a) of the Convention.<\/p>\n 6. Conclusion regarding other judicial awards against the FGUP<\/em><\/p>\n 108. On the other hand, the Court notes that the applicants\u2019 complaint about the FGUP\u2019s failure to comply with the decisions given in the proceedings concerning unpaid wages (see Appendix\u00a0I) is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 109. The Court notes that the judgments given in the applicants\u2019 favour were enforced with a delay of one year and ten months.<\/p>\n 110. The Court reiterates that a delay of less than one year in payment of a monetary judicial award was in principle compatible with the Convention, while any longer delay is prima facie unreasonable (see, among many others, Gerasimov and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a029920\/05 and 10\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a0169, 1\u00a0July 2014).While the complex insolvency proceedings involving several creditors may objectively justify some limited delays in enforcement, the overall delay is, in the Court\u2019s view, incompatible with the Convention requirements, especially given the nature of the awards \u2013 salary arrears accrued as a result of the transfer of the company\u2019s assets to the OAO and back to the FGUP. By failing for a considerable period of time to take the necessary measures to comply with the final judgments in the instant case, the authorities deprived the provisions of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of useful effect and also prevented the applicants from receiving the money to which they were entitled in good time, whichamounted to a disproportionate interference with their peaceful enjoyment of possessions (see, among other authorities, Khachatryan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a069; Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0224, with references contained therein; and Vladimirova v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a021863\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a056-57, 10\u00a0April 2018).<\/p>\n 111. Therefore, there has been a violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 thereto on account of the non\u2011enforcement of the final and binding judgments against the FGUP in the applicants\u2019 favour in the present seven cases.<\/p>\n III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No.1 ON ACCOUNT OF NON\u2011ENFORCEMENT AGAINST THE OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY<\/p>\n 112. The applicants complained about the non-enforcement of the court orders against the OAO in respect of salaries from June to July 2008 (see paragraph\u00a028 and Appendix II), as subsequently index-linked (see paragraph\u00a033 above). They relied on Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.1 to the Convention, both cited above.<\/p>\n 113. The Government argued that the proceedings against the open joint\u2011stock company, which had resulted in various sums being awarded to the applicants, were irrelevant for the present case as they had not concerned the State unitary enterprise. In their initial observations in 2011 they submitted that the insolvency proceedings in relation to the open joint\u2011stock company were ongoing and that the debts could still be recovered. They further argued that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies, namely, court action under Article\u00a01070 of the Civil Code, complaint against the bailiffs or the liquidator and a claim for index\u2011linking. In their additional observations after the recommunication of the case they argued (with reference to the provisions of domestic law cited in paragraphs\u00a081to 85 above)that the State was not liable for the debts of the OAO. Lastly, they submitted that the applicants had failed to request that their claims be included in the register of the creditors\u2019 claims and given second priority.<\/p>\n 114. The applicants maintained their claims. They stressed that the OAO had been declared non-existent de jure in terms of domestic law. While the State had taken effective measures to return the assets to the FGUP, the debt in respect of the salaries had remained in the \u201cempty\u201d OAO, without any prospect of recovery prior to its formal liquidation.<\/p>\n A. Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Complaints by six of the applicants<\/em><\/p>\n (a) Compatibility ratione personae- the State\u2019s responsibility for the OAO\u2019s debts<\/p>\n 115. The Court notes at the outset that the insolvency proceedings in respect of the OAOwere terminated on 29\u00a0March 2012 and that the claims which were not satisfied during the liquidation process were considered settled (see paragraph\u00a044 above). Accordingly, it appears that, contrary to the Government\u2019s initial submissions, the debts could no longer be recovered from the OAO.<\/p>\n 116. The Court further notes the Government\u2019s argument that the applicants failed to request to include their claims in the list of the creditors\u2019 claims. However, it transpires from both the applicants\u2019inquiry lodged with the prosecutor\u2019s office and the prosecutor\u2019s respective reply that their claims were included in the second priority line to be repaid (see paragraphs\u00a040 and 41 above). Accordingly, this argument is to be rejected.<\/p>\n 117. The Court further reiterates that a State may be responsible for debts of a State-owned company, even if the company is a separate legal entity, provided that it does not enjoy sufficient institutional and operational independence from the State to absolve the latter from its responsibility under the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Mykhaylenky and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 35091\/02 and 9\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a043-46, ECHR 2004\u2011XII; Cooperativa Agricola Slobozia\u2011Hanesei v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a039745\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a017\u201119, 3 April 2007; Yershova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a054-63; and Kotov[GC], cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092\u2011107). The key criteria used in the above-mentioned cases to determine whether the State was indeed responsible for such debts were as follows: the company\u2019s legal status (under public or private law); the nature of its activity (a public function or an ordinary commercial business); the context of its operation (such as a monopoly or heavily regulated business); its institutional independence (the extent of State ownership); and its operational independence (the extent of State supervision and control) (see Ali\u0161i\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.\u00a060642\/08, \u00a7\u00a0114, ECHR 2014). Additional factors to be taken into consideration are whether the State was directly responsible for the company\u2019s financial difficulties, siphoned the corporate funds to the detriment of the company and its stakeholders, failed to keep an arm\u2019s-length relationship with the company or otherwise acted in abuse of the corporate form (see Ali\u0161i\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115, and the references toAnokhin v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no.\u00a025867\/02, 31\u00a0May 2007, and Khachatryan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a051-55, contained therein).<\/p>\n 118. It is true that the debtor OAO was incorporated under domestic law as a joint-stock entity with separate legal personality, which had the ability to own assets distinct from the property of its shareholders and had delegated management. While such legal entities enjoyed under domestic law a certain degree of legal and economic independence from the State, the Court considers that the OAO\u2019s assets in the present case were to a decisive extent controlled and managed by the State at the material time (see Khachatryan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a051).<\/p>\n 119. The Court notes at the outset that the OAO was formed in a specific procedure of replacing (substitution of) the debtor\u2019s assets on the basis of the debtor\u2019s property. Even though the decision to replace the assets was taken within the external administration procedure, it is crucial that the State, as the owner of the property of the debtor unitary enterprise, was entitled to decide on replacing (substituting) the debtor\u2019s assets (see paragraphs\u00a013 and71, as well as the Court\u2019s analysis in paragraph\u00a097 above).<\/p>\n 120. In accordance with domestic law, the debtor FGUP was the sole founder of the joint-stock company and the entirety of the OAO\u2019s shares were to be initially transferred to the FGUP (see paragraph80above). Nothing in the parties\u2019 submissions indicates that the shares were subsequently sold on the open market or otherwise prior to the decision to annul the OAO\u2019s creation, and it appears accordingly that the substitution of assets procedure has not been completed.Furthermore, no information on the OAO\u2019s pursuit of independent entrepreneurial activity at the material time was submitted by the parties. Indeed, as early as in April 2008, that is, several months before the court orders in the applicants\u2019favour, the domestic court in the final instance had declared invalid the decision to create the OAO pursuant to the State authorities\u2019 court action. The Court can only discern from the documents submitted by the parties that the OAO was required to return all assets to the FGUP and was proceeding with the transfer at the material time, having\u201cdiscontinued production activities\u201d (see paragraph\u00a035above).<\/p>\n 121. However, while the assets were returned under the FGUP\u2019s economic control \u2013 and, accordingly, State ownership \u2013 without delay, the debt accumulated in respect of the unpaid salaries remained in the OAO created as a result of an invalid transaction, stripped of all property as a result of the order for the return of the assets and awaiting inevitable liquidation at the material time (see, mutatis mutandis, Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0211 and 217).<\/p>\n 122. Furthermore, the FGUP, as the OAO\u2019s only founder \u2013 and, consequently, the State (see the findings in paragraph\u00a0100above) \u2013 took the decision to liquidate the OAO (see paragraph\u00a034 above), which no longer had any assets but continued to accumulate debts towards its creditors, including the six applicants (see, mutatis mutandis, Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0211).The OAO proved unable to satisfy the applicants\u2019 claims in the insolvency proceedings, for lack of assets.<\/p>\n 123. Despite the above, the FGUPhad never accepted responsibility for the OAO\u2019s debts towards its ex-employees. The domestic courts rejected the applicants\u2019 request for the FGUP to substitute the debtor, finding that the transfer of assets had not automatically resulted in the obligations being transferred and had not given rise to a singular succession(see paragraph\u00a032 above). At the same time, the Court cannot but note that the argument about the lack of any link between the FGUP and the seven applicants during their \u201cemployment\u201d with the OAO was considered and rejected by the domestic courts in a parallel set of proceedings against the FGUP concerning reinstatement of their employment and unpaid wages (see paragraphs\u00a048, 49, 50, 52 and 54above).The Court finds it significant that in each set of those proceedings, the courts had no reason to doubt that, as the transfer of title to the FGUP\u2019s assets had taken place as a result of the invalid transaction, the OAO had not acquired the rights and obligations under the applicants\u2019 contracts of employment during the impugned period (ibid.). Accordingly, in the courts\u2019 view, all applicants\u2019 employment with the FGUP had not been discontinued for the period of their formal registration as working for the OAO in terms of the domestic labour law (ibid.).<\/p>\n 124. In view of the above factors taken cumulatively, the Court considers that at least by the dates of the court orders in the applicants\u2019 favour and during the ensuing period until the company\u2019s liquidation the OAO\u2019s assets and activities were, as a matter of fact, controlled and managed by the State to a decisive extent (see, mutatis mutandis, Khachatryan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a051, and contrast Anokhin, cited above). Therefore, the OAO did not enjoy sufficient institutional and operational independence from the State to absolve the latter from its responsibility under the Convention for the OAO\u2019s debts in respect of the salary arrears in the applicants\u2019 favour (see Khachatryan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a054, with further references). Consequently, in the specific circumstances of this case, the State is to be held responsible for the OAO\u2019s debts in respect of the salary arrears as established by the court orders and decisions set out in Appendix\u00a0II.<\/p>\n 125. The Court therefore concludes that the applicants\u2019 complaints are compatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and dismisses the Government\u2019s objection in this regard.<\/p>\n (b) Non-exhaustion<\/p>\n 126. As regards the Government\u2019s reference to Article\u00a01070 of the Civil Code, the objection is clearly inapplicable, since that provision deals specifically with damage caused by unlawful conviction, prosecution, detention or prohibition on leaving a place of residence, and the case files do not contain any evidence of any such action having been taken in the present two cases. As regards the remaining provisions of Chapter\u00a059, the Court has already found on several occasions \u2013 albeit in the context of judgments given against the State authorities \u2013 that, while the possibility of such compensation was not totally excluded, this remedy did not offer reasonable prospects of success, notably because it requires the establishment of fault on the part of the authorities. It was not contested by the Government that at no point had the fault of the authorities been established in the cases at hand. In sum, it has not been demonstrated that such action would have had any prospects of success in the present cases(see Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0165).<\/p>\n 127. As regards a complaint to the bailiffs service and a court action concerning the bailiffs\u2019 inaction, the Court notes that the judicial awards in the applicants\u2019 favour were made when liquidation in respect of the debtor enterprise was underway. In that situation, the bailiffs\u2019 duty was confined to forwarding the writs of enforcement to the liquidator in due time (see, mutatis mutandis, Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0161). That was precisely the conclusion of the first-instance court in the case of Mr\u00a0Tomilin (see paragraph\u00a042 above). Otherwise, at no point did the applicants allege in their complaints to the Court that the bailiffs had unduly delayed the transfer of the writs or otherwise failed to carry out their duties properly. The crux of the applicants\u2019 grievance is rather the debtor\u2019s inability to satisfy their respective claims. The Court concludes that, in these circumstances, a complaint to the bailiffs service or a civil action against the bailiffs would not have brought the applicants closer to their goal, that is, payment of the judgment debt (ibid.).<\/p>\n 128. Similarly, in so far as a complaint against the liquidator is concerned, at no point did the applicants refer to specific actions or omissions on the part of the liquidator which could have delayed or prevented enforcement. Furthermore, the Government have not provided any information on the due procedure and, indeed, its availability to the applicants (see, mutatis mutandis, Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0163). Norhave they demonstrated that its eventual use would have brought the applicants closer to their goal, that is, recovery of the debts established by the courts from the OAO, where the debtor clearly lacked assets.<\/p>\n 129. Lastly, as regards the index-linking, five of six of the applicants made use of this opportunity and obtained domestic decisions ordering that the awardsbe increased (see Column\u00a05 of Appendix II). While the Government submitted that two of the applicants, Mr Kuzhelev and Ms\u00a0Pavlova, had failed to collect the original orders from the court (see paragraph\u00a033 above), no such argument was advanced in respect of the three remaining applicants. However, the decisions in the adjustment proceedings in favour of those three remaining applicants have, in turn, remained unenforced. Accordingly, the proceedings for index-linking were not an effective remedy in the circumstances of the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, Burdov (no. 2),cited above, \u00a7\u00a0108), as they were clearly unable to provide the applicants with adequate and sufficient redress in respect of the alleged violations.<\/p>\n 130. The Government\u2019s non-exhaustion argument should therefore be rejected.<\/p>\n (c) Complaints by Mr Kuzhelev and Ms Pavlova<\/p>\n 131. The Court further notes from the Government\u2019s submissions not disputed by the applicants that Mr Kuzhelev and Ms Pavlova failed to collect the original orders in respect of the awards made in the index-linking proceedings from the domestic court (see paragraph\u00a033 above and Column\u00a05 of Appendix II). Having regard to its case-law concerning the minimum requirement of creditors\u2019 cooperation (see, mutatis mutandis, Gadzhikhanov and Saukov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a026-31) the Court considers that the authorities cannot be held responsible for the applicants\u2019 unexplained refusal to collect the writs of enforcement. It follows that this part of the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 3\u00a0(a) of the Convention.<\/p>\n (d) Conclusion<\/p>\n 132. The Court further notes that the complaints (a) by Mr Kuzhelev, Ms\u00a0Pavlova, Ms\u00a0Lebedeva, Ms Petrova, Ms Kudryashova and Mr Tomilin about the non-enforcement of the court orders and decisions in respect of salaries for June to July 2008 against the OAO; and (b) by Ms Petrova, Ms\u00a0Lebedeva and Mr\u00a0Tomilin about the index-linking of those awards (all listed in the relevant column of Appendix II) are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n 2. Complaint by Mr Smirnov<\/em><\/p>\n 133. The Court notes that Mr Smirnov complained about the non\u2011enforcement of the judicial decision of 23\u00a0September 2008 ordering the OAO to pay him EUR 11 (see Column no.\u00a06 of Appendix II). Considering the minor nature of the award, the Court arrives at the conclusion that the applicant did not suffer a significant disadvantage as a result of the failure to enforce the award in good time. The Court has already dealt with an issue similar to that at stake in the present case on several occasions (see Anokhin and Khachatryan, both cited above)and concludes that respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, does not require examination of the present complaint on its merits. Lastly, it observes that the applicant\u2019s case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(b).<\/p>\n 134. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the application in this part must be declared inadmissible under Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(b) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n B. Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 135. The awards made by the justice of the peace in the applicants\u2019 favour have not been enforced to date. Given the finding of State liability for the OAO\u2019s debts owed to the applicants in the present case, the period of non-enforcement should include the period of debt recovery in the course of the liquidation proceedings (see Mykhaylenky and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a053). It is sufficient for the Court to note that in the instant cases the judgmentsissued in late 2008 in favour of six of the applicants had remained unenforced for more than three years by the date of the debtor company\u2019s liquidation in 2012.<\/p>\n 136. Such delays are prima facie incompatible with the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Kosheleva and Others v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a09046\/07, \u00a7\u00a019, 17\u00a0January 2012). While liquidation proceedings may objectively justify some limited delays in enforcement, the continuing non\u2011execution of the judgments in the applicants\u2019 favour for several years could hardly be justified in any circumstances. The facts of the present cases would rather suggest that the authorities did not consider themselves bound by the obligation to honour the judgment debts towards the employees related to their salaries after the FGUP had decided to liquidate the debtor company (see, mutatis mutandis, Yershova, cited above, \u00a7 72).<\/p>\n 137. By failing for years to take the necessary measures to comply with the final judgment given in favour of the applicants, the authorities impaired the essence of their \u201cright to a court\u201d and for a considerable period prevented the applicants from receiving the money which they were entitled to in full, which amounted to a disproportionate interference with the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions (see Khachatryan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a069).<\/p>\n 138. Accordingly, the Court finds, in respect of MrKuzhelev, Ms\u00a0Pavlova, Ms Kudryashova, Ms Petrova, Ms\u00a0Lebedeva and Mr\u00a0Tomilin, that there has been a violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 on account of the non-enforcement of the court orders and decisions in the applicant\u2019s favour in respect of salaries for June to July 2008 against the OAO, as listed in Column\u00a03 of Appendix II. It further finds, in respect of Ms\u00a0Petrova, Ms\u00a0Lebedeva and Mr Tomilin, that there has been a violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 on account of the non-enforcement of the awards in the index-linking proceedings against the OAO, listed in Column\u00a05 of Appendix\u00a0II.<\/p>\n IV. ALLEGEDVIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a013 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 139. The applicants further complained under Article\u00a013 of the Convention that they had no effective remedies at their disposal in respect of the non-enforcement complaints against both the FGUP and the OAO.<\/p>\n 140. Having regard to the findingsin paragraphs\u00a0101 and 126\u2012130 above, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine separately the admissibility and merits of this complaint.<\/p>\n V. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 141. Lastly, Mr Smirnov raised other complaints under Articles\u00a06 and 14 of the Convention.<\/p>\n 142. The Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matter complained of is within its competence, the complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.<\/p>\n 143. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.<\/p>\n VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 144. Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:<\/p>\n \u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d<\/p>\n A. Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Pecuniary damage<\/em><\/p>\n 145. The applicants claimed the amounts indicated in the relevant column of Appendix\u00a0III in respect of pecuniary damage. Those amounts represented the unpaid judgment debts, compensation for inflationary losses arising from delays in payment of the judicial awards, compensation for forced absence (unemployment) between 21\u00a0August 2008 and various dates in late 2008, and other payments allegedly due to them for different periods in 2009, as specified in Appendix\u00a0III.<\/p>\n 146. The Government considered the claims unreasonable and unsubstantiated, as the State was not responsible for the debts of either the FGUP or the OAO.<\/p>\n (a) Mr Smirnov\u2019s claim for unpaid salary for July and August 2008<\/p>\n 147. As regards Mr Smirnov\u2019s claim in respect of 15,129.12 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 45,955.48 for unpaid salary for July and August 2008, the Court notes from the documents submitted that those arrears were already included in the judgment of 28\u00a0November 2008 delivered by the Kronstadt District Court and subsequently paid in full by the FGUP. The Court accordingly rejects Mr Smirnov\u2019s claim under this head.<\/p>\n (b) The six other applicants\u2019 claims for unpaid judgment debts and index\u2011linking<\/p>\n 148. As regards the other applicants, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants the amounts of the unpaid judicial awards against the OAO in respect of salaries from June to July 2008 against the OAO (see Column 3 of Appendix II), as converted into euros at the rate applicable on the date of the respective court orders in respect of which a violation of the Convention has been found (see paragraphs\u00a0135-138 above and Appendix\u00a0II).<\/p>\n 149. The Court further points out its consistent approach that the adequacy of compensation would be diminished if it were to be paid without reference to various circumstances liable to reduce its value (see, mutatis mutandis, Gizzatova v. Russia, no.\u00a05124\/03, \u00a7\u00a028, 13\u00a0January 2005). The Court accordingly accepts the applicants\u2019 claims relating to the loss of value of the domestic awards since the delivery of the judgments in their favour and finds it appropriate to award additional sums in this respect, where they were requested.The Court further notes that the Government did not challenge the method of calculation of the inflationary losses chosen by the applicants. However, the Court notes that the applicants\u2019respective calculations of the inflationary losses \u201cup to 31\u00a0July 2017\u201d (the date of submission of their claims for just satisfaction) lack detail and are not substantiated with documents. It accordingly accepts the claim in so far as it was confirmed by the calculation of the domestic courts in the respective proceedings (see Column\u00a05 of Appendix\u00a0II, \u201cClaim to have the initial award index\u2011linked\u201d), and rejects it in the remaining part.<\/p>\n 150. The Court accordingly awards the six applicants the amounts specified in the relevant column of Appendix III, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n (c) Remainder of the claims by all applicants<\/p>\n 151. As regards the remainder of the claims, the Courtagrees with the Government that there is no causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claims under this head.<\/p>\n 2. Non-pecuniary damage<\/em><\/p>\n 152. Mr Smirnov claimed RUB\u00a0287,688 (approximately 7,276 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The other applicants submitted in their initial claims for just satisfaction that they had suffered non\u2011pecuniary damage and maintained their claims in the amounts indicated in their initial application forms, that is,EUR\u00a050,000 to each applicant.After the Government were given further notice of their complaint concerning the non-enforcement by the OAO, Mr Kuzhelev, Ms Pavlova, Ms Petrova and Ms Lebedeva maintained in their additional claims for just satisfaction that they had suffered non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n 153. The Government contested the claims as unfounded and noted, in respect of all applicants except Mr Smirnov, that the applicants had failed to specify the amounts under that head in their claims for just satisfaction. As regards the amounts indicated by the applicants in the initial application forms, the Government considered them ill-founded, as the applicants\u2019 Convention rights had not been violated, and, in any event, excessive.<\/p>\n 154. The Court notes that the applicants clearly maintain the claims in the amounts indicated in the observations and application forms. The Court awards each applicant EUR\u00a02,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, and rejects the remainder of their claims under this head.<\/p>\n B. Costs and expenses<\/strong><\/p>\n 155. Mr Kuzhelev claimed RUB\u00a0812.35 for postal and other expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings. Mr Smirnov claimed RUB 10,000 for postal and travel expenses. The Government did not dispute that amount. He did not submit any documents confirming his expenses in support of his claims. The other applicants did not claim for costs and expenses.<\/p>\n 156. The Government accepted that the postal expenses in the amount of RUB\u00a0368 could be reimbursed to Mr Kuzhelevand disputed the remainder of the amount claimed as unsubstantiated. They did not comment on Mr\u00a0Smirnov\u2019s claims.<\/p>\n 157. According to the Court\u2019 s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.<\/p>\n 158. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court awards Mr Kuzhelev EUR\u00a021, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. The Court rejects the remainder of his claims under this head.<\/p>\n 159. The Court further rejects Mr Smirnov\u2019s claims under this head, as it was not demonstrated that they had been actually and necessarily incurred.<\/p>\n 160. As regards the other applicants, the Court considers that, in the absence of a relevant claim, there is no call to make an award in respect of costs and expenses to the five other applicants.<\/p>\n C. Default interest<\/strong><\/p>\n 161. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Decides to join the applications;<\/p>\n 2. Declares admissible, in respect of all applicants, a complaint under Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 about the delayed enforcement of the judgments listed in Column\u00a03 of Appendix\u00a0I (\u201cProceedings concerning unpaid wages in 2008\u201d) against the FGUP;<\/p>\n 3. Declaresadmissible,in respect of Mr Kuzhelev, Ms Pavlova, Ms\u00a0Kudryashova,Ms Petrova, Ms\u00a0Lebedevaand Mr Tomilin, the complaints under Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 on account of the non-enforcement of the court orders and decisions in the applicant\u2019s favour in respect of salaries for June to July 2008 against the OAO and, in respect of Ms Petrova, Ms Lebedeva and Mr\u00a0Tomilin,the index-linking of those awards listed in the relevant column of Appendix II;<\/p>\n 4. Holds, in respect of all applications, that there has been a violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 to the Convention on account of the delayed enforcement of the judgments listed in Appendix\u00a0I (\u201cProceedings concerning unpaid wages in 2008\u201d) against the FGUP;<\/p>\n 5. Holds, in respect of Mr Kuzhelev, Ms Lebedeva, Ms Petrova, Ms\u00a0Pavlova, Ms Kudryashova and Mr Tomilin, that there has been a violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 to the Convention on account of the non-enforcement of the court orders in the applicant\u2019s favour in respect of salaries for June to July 2008 against the OAO listed in Column\u00a03 of Appendix II;<\/p>\n 6. Holds, in respect of Ms Petrova, Ms Lebedeva and Mr\u00a0Tomilin, that there has been a violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a01 to the Convention on account of the non-enforcement of the awards against the OAO in the index\u2011linking proceedings listed in Column\u00a05 of Appendix\u00a0II;<\/p>\n 7. Holds, in respect of all applications,that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article\u00a013 of the Convention;<\/p>\n 8. Declaresthe remainder of the applications inadmissible;<\/p>\n 9. Holds<\/p>\n (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months,the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent Stateat the rate applicable at the date of settlement:<\/p>\n (i) the amounts in euros specified in Appendix III, plus any tax that may be chargeable,in respect of pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (ii) EUR\u00a02,000 (two thousand euros) to each applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;<\/p>\n (iii) EUR\u00a021 (twenty-one euros) to Mr Kuzhelev, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;<\/p>\n (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;<\/p>\n 10. Dismissesthe remainder of the applicants\u2019 claim for just satisfaction.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 October 2019, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Stephen Phillips \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Paul Lemmens _______________<\/p>\n [1]. Between March 2004 and May 2008, \u201cthe Federal State Assets Management Agency\u201d. <\/p>\n Appendix\u00a0I<\/strong><\/p>\n Proceedings against the FGUP<\/strong><\/p>\n Application No.<\/strong><\/p>\n Lodged on<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant<\/strong><\/p>\n Date of birth<\/strong><\/p>\n Place of residence<\/strong><\/td>\n Proceedings concerning the unpaid wages in 2008<\/strong><\/td>\n Proceedings for damages for delay in payment of severance package<\/strong><\/td>\n Nature of the award<\/p>\n Date of judgment, Date of judgment, 16\/11\/2009<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 01\/09\/1946<\/p>\n StPetersburg<\/td>\n Unpaid wages between 21 August 2008 and the date of the domestic decision<\/p>\n 28\/11\/2008<\/p>\n 21\/01\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a0864)<\/td>\n as amended on appeal by the St\u00a0Petersburg City Court<\/p>\n 22\/06\/2009<\/p>\n 22\/07\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a027)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 27\/11\/2009<\/td>\n 29\/03\/1953<\/p>\n StPetersburg<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n Unpaid wages since August 2008<\/p>\n 01\/12\/2008<\/p>\n 21\/01\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a0720)<\/td>\n as amended on appeal by the St\u00a0Petersburg City Court<\/p>\n 19\/06\/2009<\/p>\n 22\/07\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a029)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 23\/11\/2009<\/td>\n 20\/03\/1940<\/p>\n StPetersburg<\/td>\n Unpaid wages for July and August 2008 and the period between 21 August 2008 and the date of the domestic decision<\/p>\n 28\/11\/2008<\/p>\n 21\/01\/2009<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court<\/p>\n Index-linking of the award of28\/11\/2008, compensation for delayed payment, non-pecuniary damage<\/p>\n 07\/04\/2009<\/p>\n 13\/05\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a01,181)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n RUB\u00a08,056<\/p>\n (EUR\u00a0183)<\/td>\n 30\/11\/2009<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 17\/09\/1954<\/p>\n St Petersburg<\/td>\n Kronstadt District Court of St Petersburg<\/p>\n 05\/12\/2008<\/p>\n 21\/01\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a0634)<\/td>\n 04\/08\/2009<\/p>\n 02\/09\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a022)<\/p>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 18\/11\/2009<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/td>\n 20\/01\/1947<\/p>\n St Petersburg<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n Unpaid wages since August 2008<\/p>\n 28\/11\/2008<\/p>\n 21\/01\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a0712)<\/td>\n 23\/06\/2009<\/p>\n 22\/07\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a03)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 25\/11\/2009<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 24\/10\/1957<\/p>\n St Petersburg<\/td>\n Unpaid wages since August 2008<\/p>\n 02\/12\/2008<\/p>\n 21\/01\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a0873)<\/td>\n 03\/08\/2009<\/p>\n 02\/09\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a022)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 08\/12\/2009<\/td>\n 08\/01\/1946<\/p>\n St Petersburg<\/td>\n 05\/12\/2008<\/p>\n 21\/01\/2009<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a0971)<\/td>\n 03\/08\/2009<\/p>\n 02\/09\/2009<\/p>\n <\/td>\n (EUR\u00a022)<\/p>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n APPENDIX\u00a0II<\/strong><\/p>\n Proceedings against the OAO<\/strong><\/p>\n Application<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant<\/strong><\/td>\n Court orders in the applicants\u2019 favour against the OAO in respect of salaries for June to July 2008<\/strong><\/td>\n Application for the FGUP to substitute the debtor (the OAO)<\/strong><\/td>\n Claim to have the initial award index-linked: Compensation for delayed payment of salary in February\u2011April 2008<\/strong><\/td>\n Equivalentin EUR<\/strong><\/td>\n (EUR\u00a0981)<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 29\/05\/09 quashed on appeal, request disallowed<\/td>\n RUB\u00a06,213(EUR\u00a0162)<\/td>\n <\/td>\n (EUR\u00a0892)<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 29\/05\/09 quashed on appeal, request disallowed<\/td>\n RUB\u00a05,981(EUR\u00a0156)<\/td>\n 03\/10\/2008<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a011)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n <\/td>\n (EUR\u00a0634)<\/td>\n 11\/06\/2009 quashed on appeal, request disallowed<\/td>\n <\/td>\n (EUR\u00a01,020)<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 18\/05\/09 quashed on appeal, request disallowed<\/td>\n RUB\u00a06,932 (EUR\u00a0181)<\/td>\n <\/td>\n (EUR\u00a01,028)<\/p>\n <\/td>\n 26\/05\/09 quashed on appeal, request disallowed<\/td>\n RUB\u00a07,045 (EUR\u00a0179)<\/td>\n (EUR\u00a01,124)<\/td>\n 09\/06\/2009 quashed on appeal, request disallowed<\/td>\n RUB\u00a06,947 (EUR\u00a0182)<\/td>\n <\/p>\n Appendix\u00a0III<\/strong><\/p>\n The applicants\u2019 claims in respect of pecuniary damage and the Court\u2019s award under this head<\/strong><\/p>\n Application<\/strong><\/td>\n Applicant<\/strong><\/td>\n The applicant\u2019s claims in respect of pecuniary damage (RUB)\/(EUR)<\/strong><\/td>\n The Court\u2019s award in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable<\/strong><\/p>\n (EUR)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n <\/td>\n \u00b7 RUB\u00a06,213 (EUR\u00a0162[2]<\/a>) index-linking of the above debt as ordered by the court; \u201cindex-linking up to 31\/07\/2017\u201d;<\/p>\n
\nPaul Lemmens, President,
\nPaulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
\nHelen Keller,
\nDmitry Dedov,
\nAlena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1,
\nGilberto Felici,
\nErik Wennerstr\u00f6m, judges,
\nand Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nRegistrar \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 President<\/p>\n
\n[2]. As summarised in the judgment of 29 March 2012 (see paragraph\u00a044).
\n[3]. As in the text of the judgment. In fact, in the six other applicants\u2019 cases, the orders were issued against the OAO, see paragraph\u00a028 above.
\n[4]. Similar complaints by Ms Kudryashova and Mr Tomilin were declared inadmissible at the communication stage.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n No.<\/strong><\/td>\n Column no.\u00a01<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Column no.\u00a02<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Column no.\u00a03<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n Column no.\u00a04<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n \n <\/td>\n <\/td>\n <\/td>\n Domestic court<\/p>\n
\nDate of the judgment\u2019s entry into force<\/td>\nDomestic award<\/td>\n Domestic court<\/p>\n
\nDate of the judgment\u2019s entry into force<\/td>\nDomestic award<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 1.<\/td>\n 64098\/09<\/p>\n Viktor Ivanovich KUZHELEV<\/strong><\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court of St\u00a0Petersburg<\/p>\n RUB\u00a030,582<\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court,<\/p>\n RUB\u00a01,194<\/p>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n 64891\/09<\/p>\n Yelena Feodosyevna PAVLOVA<\/strong><\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court<\/p>\n RUB\u00a025,504<\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court,<\/p>\n RUB\u00a01,280<\/p>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n 65418\/09<\/p>\n ValeriyMikhaylovich SMIRNOV<\/strong><\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court<\/p>\n RUB\u00a082,583<\/p>\n n\/a<\/td>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n 66035\/09<\/p>\n Galina Yevgenyevna KUDRYASHOVA<\/strong><\/p>\n Unpaid salary between 21\/08\/ 2008 and 05\/12\/2008<\/p>\n RUB\u00a026,912<\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court<\/p>\n RUB\u00a01,000<\/p>\n \n 5.<\/td>\n 67406\/09<\/p>\n Vera Alekseyevna PETROVA<\/strong><\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court<\/p>\n RUB\u00a025,196<\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court<\/p>\n RUB\u00a0122<\/p>\n \n 6.<\/td>\n 67697\/09<\/p>\n NatalyaLeonidovna LEBEDEVA<\/strong><\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court<\/p>\n RUB\u00a030.924<\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court<\/p>\n RUB\u00a01,000<\/p>\n \n 7.<\/td>\n 1504\/10<\/p>\n ValeriyMikhaylovich TOMILIN<\/strong><\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court of St Petersburg<\/p>\n RUB\u00a041,981<\/p>\n Kronstadt District Court<\/p>\n RUB\u00a01,000<\/p>\n \n\n
\n No.<\/strong><\/td>\n Column\u00a0no.1<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Column\u00a0no.2<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Column\u00a0no.3<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n Column\u00a0no.4<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Column no.\u00a05<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n
\nDate
\nInitial award increased by<\/strong><\/td>\nColumn\u00a0no.6<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n\n \n <\/td>\n <\/td>\n <\/td>\n Date of the court order<\/strong><\/td>\n Domestic award (RUB)<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/td>\n <\/td>\n Date<\/strong><\/td>\n Domestic award (RUB, EUR)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 1.<\/td>\n 64098\/09<\/td>\n Viktor Ivanovich KUZHELEV<\/strong><\/td>\n 09\/10\/2008<\/td>\n RUB\u00a034,916<\/p>\n 25\/12\/08 granted (first instance)<\/p>\n 17\/06\/2010<\/p>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2.<\/td>\n 64891\/09<\/td>\n Yelena Feodosyevna PAVLOVA<\/strong><\/td>\n 24\/10\/2008<\/p>\n RUB\u00a030,856<\/p>\n 11\/01\/09 granted (first instance)<\/p>\n 22\/06\/2010<\/p>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 3.<\/td>\n 65418\/09<\/td>\n ValeriyMikhaylovich SMIRNOV<\/strong><\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n 23\/09\/2008<\/p>\n RUB\u00a0445<\/p>\n \n 4.<\/td>\n 66035\/09<\/td>\n Galina Yevgenyevna KUDRYASHOVA<\/strong><\/td>\n 23\/10\/2008<\/p>\n RUB\u00a021,784<\/p>\n 25\/12\/2008 granted (first instance)<\/p>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 5.<\/td>\n 67406\/09<\/td>\n Vera Alekseyevna PETROVA<\/strong><\/td>\n 30\/10\/2008<\/p>\n RUB\u00a035,197<\/p>\n 29\/12\/08 granted (first instance)<\/p>\n 18\/06\/2010<\/p>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 6.<\/td>\n 67697\/09<\/td>\n Natalya Leonidovna LEBEDEVA<\/strong><\/td>\n 25\/11\/2008<\/p>\n RUB\u00a035,874<\/p>\n 11\/01\/09 granted (first instance)<\/p>\n 06\/08\/2010<\/p>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 7.<\/td>\n 1504\/10<\/td>\n ValeriyMikhaylovich TOMILIN<\/strong><\/td>\n 09\/10\/2008<\/td>\n RUB\u00a040.026<\/p>\n 25\/12\/2008 granted (first instance)<\/p>\n 17\/06\/2010<\/p>\n n\/a<\/td>\n n\/a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n \n\n
\n No.<\/strong><\/td>\n Column\u00a0no.1<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Column\u00a0no.2<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Column\u00a0no.3<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Column\u00a0no.4<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n \n 1.<\/td>\n 64098\/09<\/p>\n Viktor Ivanovich KUZHELEV<\/strong><\/td>\n \u00b7 RUB\u00a034,916(EUR\u00a0981[1]<\/a>) unpaid debt under the court order of 09\/10\/2008;<\/p>\n