FIRST SECTION
\nDECISION<\/p>\n
Application no. 56553\/15
\nStanis\u0142aw Jan PIOTROWSKI
\nagainst Poland<\/p>\n
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 12\u00a0February 2019 as a Committee composed of:<\/p>\n
Ksenija Turkovi\u0107, President,<\/p>\n
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,<\/p>\n
Armen Harutyunyan, judges,<\/p>\n
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 November 2015,<\/p>\n
Having deliberated, decides as follows:<\/p>\n
THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, Mr Stanis\u0142aw Piotrowski, is a Polish national, who was born in 1941 and lives in Gda\u0144sk. He was represented before the Court by Ms\u00a0M.\u00a0Pecyna, a lawyer practising in Cracow.<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0The circumstances of the case<\/strong><\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.<\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0Background<\/em><\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 September 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego) issued a decree on agrarian reform (dekret o reformie rolnej). The decree provided that properties of an agricultural nature, owned or co-owned by natural or legal persons, with an area exceeding 100 hectares (ha) in total or 50 ha of agricultural land, would be allocated for agrarian reform (section 2(1)(e)). It further prescribed that such properties would be transferred to the State Treasury immediately and without any compensation.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 December 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation issued a decree on the nationalisation of certain forests (dekret o przej\u0119ciu niekt\u00f3rych las\u00f3w na w\u0142asno\u015b\u0107 Skarbu Pa\u0144stwa). The decree provided that forests and forest land, owned or co-owned by natural and legal persons, with an area exceeding 25 ha, would be transferred to the State Treasury.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0Events before 10 October 1994<\/em><\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s grandfather was the owner of the Mierzanowice estate and of forest land. These properties were taken over by the State Treasury pursuant to the above-mentioned decrees. The applicant is one of the legal successors of his grandfather.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0Events after 10 October 1994<\/em><\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 June 2010 the applicant brought a claim against the State Treasury in the Kielce Regional Court. He sought compensation for the nationalisation of the forest land which had been owned by his legal predecessor. He relied on section 7 of the Act of 6 July 2001 on the preservation of the national character of the country\u2019s strategic natural resources (ustawa o zachowaniu narodowego charakteru strategicznych zasob\u00f3w naturalnych kraju \u2013 \u201cthe 2001 Act\u201d).<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0Subsequently, the applicant amended his claim and also sought compensation for a legislative omission (zaniechanie legislacyjne). He argued that the State had failed to enact the supplemental provisions referred to in section 7 of the 2001 Act.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 October 2010 the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. With regard to the claim for an indemnity under section 7 of the 2001 Act, the court held that this provision could not be interpreted as a basis for a direct claim for an indemnity in respect of nationalised forests. The provision did not specify the amount of any indemnity that could be awarded or the applicable conditions.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the claim for compensation for a legislative omission, the court held that neither section 7 of the 2001 Act nor any other regulation created an obligation to legislate. Therefore, there was no basis for a\u00a0compensation claim in respect of a legislative omission.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed. On 4 February 2011 the Cracow Court of Appeal set aside the Regional Court\u2019s judgment. It confirmed that section\u00a07 of the 2001 Act did not constitute a sufficient basis for a claim for payment of an indemnity. However, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower court with regard to the claim in respect of legislative omission. It found that there was potential for the applicant to establish the State\u2019s liability for a\u00a0legislative omission under Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Constitution. The Court of Appeal noted that section\u00a07 of the 2001 Act created a right to an indemnity for nationalised property. However, this regulation was incomplete in the absence of separate provisions ensuring the realisation of the right. In consequence, the situation amounted to a legislative omission. The Court of Appeal instructed the lower court to examine the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of this ground.<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0On 29 August 2013 the Kielce Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. It held that despite Article 386 \u00a7 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) and the Court of Appeal\u2019s directives in its judgment of 4 February 2011, the court had to take into account a resolution of the Supreme Court of 20 December 2012 (no. III CZP 94\/12). In that resolution the Supreme Court had held that section 7 of the 2001 Act did not constitute the basis of a subjective right for the natural persons specified in that provision or of an obligation to enact separate provisions referred to in that provision.<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0The Regional Court noted that the resolution bound only the Court of Appeal which had referred the legal question to the Supreme Court. However, the resolution also had to be taken into account in the applicant\u2019s case. The legal question concerned a case with similar factual circumstances and the claims in that case had been based on the same legal provisions as in the applicant\u2019s case. The court noted that consistency of case-law amounted to a guarantee of the constitutional principle that a citizen could trust in the State and its laws. In addition, this principle required that all courts had to ensure consistency of case-law.<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The Regional Court accepted the findings of the Supreme Court\u2019s resolution of 20 December 2012. It accordingly dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim on the basis that the State Treasury was not liable for the alleged legislative omission.<\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant appealed. He argued that the lower court had wrongly considered that there had been no legislative omission. The applicant also alleged that the lower court had failed to follow the directives of the Court of Appeal in breach of Article 386 \u00a7 6 of the CCP.<\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 April 2014 the Cracow Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. With regard to the alleged breach of Article 386 \u00a7 6 of the CCP, the Court of Appeal noted that such a ground of appeal could have been successful if it had, at the same time, been demonstrated that the existence of that shortcoming could have had a significant impact on the outcome of the case. It also noted that the appellate court\u2019s directives had been intended to guide the court of first instance, but they could not have imposed a given outcome in advance. For these reasons, the applicant\u2019s argument was dismissed.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to section 7 of the 2001 Act, the Court of Appeal held that this provision could not be interpreted as a basis for a direct claim for an indemnity. In so far as the claim for compensation in respect of a\u00a0legislative omission was concerned, the court found that section 7 of the 2001 Act did not contain an obligation to enact specific provisions concerning indemnities. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Supreme Court that section 7 of the 2001 Act was a declaratory provision. It referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court of 15 February 2013 (no. I CSK 345\/12). The Court of Appeal also noted that there existed established case\u2011law regarding the interpretation of section 7 and it found no reason to depart from that case-law.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He alleged a breach of procedural provisions in that, inter alia, the lower courts had failed to follow the directives given by the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 4\u00a0February 2011 as to the interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act. The applicant further alleged that there had been no consistent interpretation of section\u00a07 of the 2001 Act in the Supreme Court\u2019s case-law, referring to a\u00a0judgment of 29 June 2012 (case no. I CSK 547\/11). In that judgment the Supreme Court had recognised that there had been a legislative omission in a\u00a0similar case.<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0On 17 February 2015 the Supreme Court refused to entertain the cassation appeal. It found that the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a significant legal issue in the case. With regard to section 7 of the 2001 Act, the Supreme Court noted that this provision had been interpreted in a\u00a0consistent manner in numerous decisions (namely a resolution of 20\u00a0December 2012, case no. III CZP 94\/12; a judgment of 29 June 2012, case no. I CSK 547\/11; judgments of 6 September 2012, case no. I CSK 59\/12, case no. I CSK\u00a077\/12 and case no. I CSK 96\/12; and a judgment of 15\u00a0February 2013, case no. I CSK 345\/12). These decisions established that section 7 of the 2001 Act was a declaratory provision and did not constitute the basis of a subjective right; accordingly, it could not be relied on to establish a claim against the State Treasury for an indemnity in respect of loss of property of the type specified in section 1 of the 2001 Act or a claim for compensation due to the failure to enact a normative act mentioned in section 7 of the 2001 Act.<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The Supreme Court\u2019s decision was served on the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 8 May 2015.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Relevant domestic law and practice<\/strong><\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0A detailed description of the relevant domestic law and the Supreme Court\u2019s practice regarding the interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act can be found in the leading decision in Zamoyski-Brisson and Others v.\u00a0Poland ((dec.), no. 19875\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 24-52, 12 September 2017).<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0Article 386 \u00a7 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure stipulates that a legal assessment and directives as to the further course of the proceedings expressed in the reasons for a judgment of the appellate court bind both the\u00a0court to which the case was remitted and the appellate court in a\u00a0renewed examination of a case.<\/p>\n COMPLAINTS<\/strong><\/p>\n 22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the dismissal of his claim for an indemnity. He also contested the courts\u2019 inconsistent interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act and the dismissal of his claim in respect of a legislative omission.<\/p>\n 23.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention of a\u00a0breach of his right to a fair trial. He alleged that the inconsistent interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act had led to the dismissal of his claims. In his view, the Supreme Court had failed to ensure a consistent interpretation of this provision.<\/p>\n The applicant further complained of a breach of Article 386 \u00a7 6 the CCP. He referred to the fact that the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal had disregarded the directives of the Court of Appeal given in its first judgment of 4 February 2011 in respect of the interpretation of his claim for compensation for a legislative omission.<\/p>\n The applicant also complained of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision refusing to entertain his cassation appeal which had deprived him of the opportunity to have the case examined on its merits by the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1<\/strong><\/p>\n 24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the courts\u2019 dismissal of his claims for an indemnity for the nationalised forest or, in the alternative, for compensation in respect of a legislative omission. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention reads, in so far as relevant:<\/p>\n \u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law…\u201d<\/p>\n 25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the principles established under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 with regard to restitution cases (see Kopeck\u00fd v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912\/98, \u00a7 35, ECHR 2004\u2011IX). It observes that the applicant\u2019s complaint did not concern the nationalisation of his legal predecessor\u2019s property effected on the basis of the 1944 decrees, and thus before the entry into force of Protocol No. 1 with regard to Poland on 10 October 1994. The Court\u2019s competence to deal with this application is therefore not ruled out ratione temporis (see, for example, Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII). The principal question is that of the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, namely whether there was a\u00a0sufficient basis in domestic law, as interpreted by the domestic courts, for the applicant\u2019s claim to qualify as an \u201casset\u201d for the purposes of this provision.<\/p>\n 26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the present case raises similar issues to those already examined and declared incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention (see Zamoyski-Brisson and Others v.\u00a0Poland (dec.), no. 19875\/13, 12 September 2017).<\/p>\n 27.\u00a0\u00a0In Zamoyski-Brisson and Others the Court firstly analysed the applicants\u2019 assertion that section 7 of the 2001 Act constituted the basis of their claim for an indemnity in respect of the nationalised forest. It noted that the domestic courts had dismissed that contention, having found that section 7 of the 2001 Act did not confer a claim for an indemnity on former owners or their legal successors. It further held that section 7 of the 2001 Act lacked a number of essential elements allowing such a claim to be formulated, including conditions to be fulfilled by persons eligible to be indemnified or the manner of determining the amount of such an indemnity (ibid., \u00a7 72).<\/p>\n 28.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic courts have consistently interpreted section 7 of the 2001 Act as excluding the possibility of it constituting an independent legal basis for a claim for an indemnity. That approach was set out in the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment of 29 June 2012 and in its three judgments of 6\u00a0September 2012. It was subsequently confirmed in the Supreme Court\u2019s resolution of 20 December 2012 and another judgment of that court of 26\u00a0June 2015 (ibid., \u00a7 74).<\/p>\n 29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also examined the applicant\u2019s submissions regarding his claim for compensation in respect of a legislative omission consisting of a failure to enact the supplemental provisions referred to in section 7 of the 2001 Act. It notes that the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment of 29 June 2012 (case no.\u00a0I CSK 547\/11) acknowledged that there had been a legislative omission in a case similar to the applicant\u2019s case. Nonetheless, in Zamoyski-Brisson and Others the Court held that the Supreme Court\u2019s position in the above\u2011mentioned judgment appeared to have been an isolated example and had not been followed in its subsequent case-law (cited above, \u00a7 79). The Supreme Court subsequently confirmed that section 7 of the 2001 Act simply contained a declaration of the legislature\u2019s intention as to the manner of satisfying future claims asserted by former owners of forests (see the Supreme Court\u2019s resolution of 20 December 2012 and its judgment of 26\u00a0June 2015, and Zamoyski-Brisson and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 48-52).<\/p>\n 30.\u00a0\u00a0In Zamoyski-Brisson and Others, the Court found that the domestic courts\u2019 decisions had revealed a consistent thread that claims for an indemnity in respect of the nationalised forests under section 7 of the 2001 Act, or for compensation for a legislative omission under Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 77 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution were to be considered unfounded in terms of domestic law (ibid., \u00a7 83).<\/p>\n 31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined the applicant\u2019s submissions regarding Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 1 in the present case. However, it does not discern any grounds on which it could reach a different conclusion as to the lack of basis for the applicants\u2019 claims in domestic law.<\/p>\n 32.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its findings in Zamoyski-Brisson and Others, the Court therefore concludes that the applicant has not shown that he had claims that were sufficiently established as to be enforceable, and he therefore cannot argue that he had a \u201cpossession\u201d within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.<\/p>\n 33.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No.\u00a01 is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 4.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Article 6 \u00a7 1<\/strong><\/p>\n 34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant made a number of complaints under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention alleging a breach of his right to a fair trial. This provision reads, in so far as relevant:<\/p>\n \u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …\u201d<\/p>\n 35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of the inconsistent interpretation of section\u00a07 of the 2001 Act which had led to the dismissal of his claims. In particular, referring to the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment of 29\u00a0June 2012 (case no.\u00a0I CSK 547\/11), he contested the final decision in his case that section\u00a07 of the 2001 Act did not contain an obligation to enact specific provisions concerning indemnities. In his view, the Supreme Court had failed to ensure a\u00a0consistent interpretation of this provision.<\/p>\n 36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the criteria which guide it in its assessment of the circumstances in which conflicting decisions by different domestic courts ruling at final instance entail a violation of the right to a fair hearing, enshrined in Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, consist in establishing, firstly, whether \u201cprofound and long-standing differences\u201d exist in the case-law of the domestic courts (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no. 76943\/11, \u00a7 116, 29 November 2016). The Court has already found that the domestic courts have consistently interpreted section\u00a07 of the 2001 Act with regard to both heads of the applicant\u2019s claim (see paragraphs 27-30 above). The applicant relied on one judgment of the Supreme Court in support of his interpretation in a claim for compensation for a legislative omission. However, this situation cannot be considered to amount to \u201cprofound and long-standing differences\u201d in the case-law of the Supreme Court. In addition, in the applicant\u2019s case the Supreme Court noted that section 7 of the 2001 Act had been interpreted in a consistent manner in numerous decisions (see paragraph 18 above). This finding renders the applicant\u2019s assertion that the Supreme Court had failed to ensure the consistent interpretation of the provision in question unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n 37.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the applicant alleged that the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal had disregarded the directives of the Court of Appeal given in its first judgment of 4 February 2011 with regard to the interpretation of his claim for compensation for a legislative omission. This, in his view, had amounted to a breach of Article 386 \u00a7 6 of the CCP.<\/p>\n 38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see Garc\u00eda Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544\/96, \u00a7 28, ECHR 1999\u2011I). It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Court\u2019s role is to verify whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention. That being so, save in the event of evident arbitrariness, it is not the Court\u2019s role to question the interpretation of the domestic law by the national courts (see, for example, Nejdet \u015eahin and Perihan \u015eahin v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 13279\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 49-50, 20 October 2011).<\/p>\n 39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s arguments about the alleged failure to follow the directives in question were considered and dismissed by the Court of Appeal in its second judgment of 16 April 2014. The Court of Appeal provided adequate reasons for its decision. In addition, the Supreme Court discerned no significant legal issue in the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal. The Court finds that the applicant had the benefit of adversarial proceedings, in which he was able to adduce evidence, and that his arguments were properly examined by the courts. At the same time, the courts\u2019 conclusions and their interpretation of the relevant law cannot be regarded as manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.<\/p>\n 40.\u00a0\u00a0Thirdly, the applicant complained about the Supreme Court\u2019s decision refusing to entertain his cassation appeal.<\/p>\n