SECOND SECTION
\nCASE OF MOSCALCIUC v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
\n(Application no. 42921\/10)<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT
\nSTRASBOURG
\n1 October 2019<\/p>\n
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.<\/p>\n
In the case of Moscalciuc v. the Republic of Moldova,<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Having deliberated in private on 10 September 2019,<\/p>\n Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:<\/p>\n PROCEDURE<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0The case originated in an application (no. 42921\/10) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article\u00a034 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Moldovan national, Mr Vladimir Moscalciuc (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 15 July 2010.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by Mr M. Bab\u0103r\u0103 and Mr V. Nicula, lawyers practising in Chi\u015fin\u0103u. The Moldovan Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr L. Apostol.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged, in particular, that his detention on remand had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons, and that the conditions of his detention had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 and Article 3 of the Convention respectively.<\/p>\n 4.\u00a0\u00a0On 13\u00a0November 2012 notice of the complaints was given to the Government.<\/p>\n 5.\u00a0\u00a0On 19 March 2019 the Court declared the complaint under Article\u00a03 of the Convention inadmissible.<\/p>\n THE FACTS<\/strong><\/p>\n I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE<\/p>\n 6.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was born in 1967 and is detained in Chi\u015fin\u0103u.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0\u00a0In 2003 the applicant received a criminal sentence for theft and was imprisoned. On 10\u00a0February 2010 an application which he had made for an amnesty law to be applied was allowed, and he was released.<\/p>\n 8.\u00a0\u00a0Immediately after exiting the court room following his release, the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having created an organised criminal group consisting of detainees in various prisons of the Republic of Moldova for the purpose of obtaining money from other detainees and creating a power system parallel to the prison administration.<\/p>\n 9.\u00a0\u00a0On 12 February 2010 the R\u00ee\u0219caniDistrict Court ordered that the applicant be detained for thirty days pending trial, accepting the prosecutor\u2019s arguments that the applicant could abscond and attempt to influence witnesses and victims, and that there was a need to protect public order. That decision was confirmed by the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal on 18\u00a0February 2010.<\/p>\n 10.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s detention was extended by the R\u00ee\u0219cani District Court on 10 March, 9 April, 10 May, 10 June and 6 July 2010. Each time, his detention was extended by thirty days. Those decisions were confirmed by the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal on 30\u00a0March, 20 April, 21 May and 18 June 2010. On 6 August 2010 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by another ninety days. The same court ordered further ninety-day extensions on 1\u00a0November 2010, as well as on 3\u00a0February, 21 April, 6 July and 26\u00a0October 2011. The grounds for extending the applicant\u2019s detention were always the same as those set out in the initial decision of 12 February 2010. Each of those decisions was upheld by a higher court and the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention ended on 27\u00a0February 2012, when he was found guilty as charged and convicted.<\/p>\n II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW<\/p>\n 11.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant domestic law concerning detention on remand has been set out in the Court\u2019s judgment in Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC] (no. 23755\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 42-43, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).<\/p>\n 12.\u00a0\u00a0Article 25 of the Constitution, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c(4)\u00a0\u00a0Detention on remand takes place on the basis of a warrant issued by a judge for a maximum period of 30 days. The lawfulness of the detention warrant may be challenged, in accordance with the law, before a hierarchically superior court. The period of detention on remand may be extended only by a court, in accordance with the law, up to a maximum period of twelve months.\u201d<\/p>\n THE LAW<\/strong><\/p>\n I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 13.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention that the domestic courts had given insufficient reasons for their decisions to remand him in custody and extend his detention. Article\u00a05 \u00a7 3 of the Convention reads as follows:<\/p>\n \u201c3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201d<\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Admissibility<\/strong><\/p>\n 14.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Merits<\/strong><\/p>\n 15.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that his detention on remand had been excessively long and had not been based on relevant and sufficient grounds.<\/p>\n 16.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disagreed with the applicant and argued that his detention had been justified by the complexity of the criminal proceedings and the need to avoid his tampering with the investigation or absconding.<\/p>\n 17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities. The requirement for a judicial officer to give relevant and sufficient reasons for the detention \u2013 in addition to the persistence of reasonable suspicion \u2013 applies already at the time of the first decision ordering detention on remand, that is to say \u201cpromptly\u201d after the arrest (see Buzadji, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a087 and 102). Furthermore, when deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (see, for example, Idalov v.\u00a0Russia [GC], no.\u00a05826\/03, \u00a7 140, 22 May 2012).<\/p>\n 18.\u00a0\u00a0Justifications which have been deemed \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d reasons in the Court\u2019s case-law have included such grounds as the danger of absconding, the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of evidence being tampered with, the risk of collusion, the risk of reoffending, the risk of causing public disorder and the need to protect the detainee (see, for instance, St\u00f6gm\u00fcller v. Austria, 10 November 1969, \u00a7 15, Series A no.\u00a09; Wemhoff v. Germany, 27 June 1968, \u00a7 14, Series A no. 7; Tomasi v. France, 27\u00a0August 1992, \u00a7 95, Series A no. 241\u2011A; Toth v.\u00a0Austria, 12\u00a0December 1991, \u00a7 70, Series A no. 224; Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, \u00a7\u00a051, Series\u00a0A no. 207; and I.A. v. France, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 108, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VII).<\/p>\n 19.\u00a0\u00a0The presumption is always in favour of release. The national judicial authorities must, with respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts militating for or against the existence of the above-mentioned requirement of public interest or justifying a departure from the rule in Article 5, and must set them out in their decisions on applications for release. The Court is essentially called upon to decide whether, on the basis of the reasons given in those decisions and the well\u2011documented facts stated by the applicant in his appeals, there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Buzadji, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 89 and 91). Arguments for and against release must not be \u201cgeneral and abstract\u201d (see Smirnova v. Russia,nos.\u00a046133\/99 and 48183\/99, \u00a7\u00a063, ECHR 2003\u2011IX (extracts)).<\/p>\n 20.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was repeatedly detained \u2012 for the same reasons each time \u2012 for more than two years. The reasons given appear to have only paraphrased the reasons for detention provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, without explaining how they applied in the applicant\u2019s case. However, in the Court\u2019s view, what is most important is the fact that the applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention for more than two years was contrary to Article 25 \u00a74 of the Constitution, which limited the duration of pre-trial detention to twelve months (see Savca v. the Republic of Moldova, no.\u00a017963\/08, \u00a7 50, 15\u00a0March 2016). Since the applicant\u2019s detention had in any event become unlawful under domestic law as it had exceeded twelve months, no reasons for extending it could be considered relevant and sufficient. There has accordingly been a violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention.<\/p>\n II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION<\/p>\n 21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.<\/p>\n FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT<\/strong><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Declaresthe application admissible;<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n Done in English, and notified in writing on 1 October 2019, pursuant to Rule\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.<\/p>\n Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Egidijus K\u016bris
\nEgidijus K\u016bris, President,
\nValeriu Gri\u0163co,
\nDarian Pavli, judges,
\nand Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131, Deputy Section Registrar,<\/p>\n
\nDeputy Registrar\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 President<\/p>\n