Last Updated on May 11, 2020 by LawEuro
FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF KRUCHIÓ AND LEHÓCZKI v. HUNGARY
(Applications nos. 43444/15 and 53441/15)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14 January 2020
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kruchióand Lehóczkiv. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Branko Lubarda, President,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Péter Paczolay, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 December 2019,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in two applications (nos. 43444/15 and 53441/15) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Hungarian nationals, Mr T. Kruchió (“the first applicant”) and Mr L. Lehóczki (“the second applicant”), on 28 August 2015 and 21 October 2015 respectively.
2. The applicants were represented by Ms L. Lakatos, a lawyer practising in Miskolc, and Mr A. Kovács, a lawyer practising in Szeged. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Justice.
3. On 8 December 2017 and 13 March 2018 the Government were given notice of the applications.
4. The Government objected to the examination of the applications by a Committee. Having considered the Government’s objection, the Court rejects it.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. The first applicant (Mr Kruchió)
5. The first applicant was born in 1967 and is currently detained in Szeged.
6. On 26 September 2003 the Csongrád County Regional Court convicted the first applicant of premeditated murder, robbery and misuse of firearms. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of release on parole.
7. On 25 May 2004 the Szeged Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.
8. Following the Court’s judgment in the case of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 66069/09 and 2 others, ECHR 2013 (extracts)), the applicant lodged a request for review with the Kúria, arguing that his whole-life sentence constituted a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
9. On 26 March 2015 the Kúriadismissed the application on the grounds that the Court’s judgment did not concern a decision or proceedings against the applicant, and Hungary had not been a party to the proceedings before the Court. It also pointed out that the domestic legislation had changed with the introduction of the “mandatory pardon procedure” (kötelezőkegyelmieljárás) for convicts serving whole-life sentences.
B. The second applicant (Mr Lehóczki)
10. The second applicant was born in 1955 and is currently serving his prison sentence in Szeged.
11. On 9 December 2004 the Heves County Regional Court convicted the second applicant of aggravated murder. He was sentenced to whole-life imprisonment with no possibility of release on parole.
12. On 21 April 2006 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld this judgment.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE AND INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIAL
13. For the relevant domestic law and practice, as well as international and comparative material, see T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14, §§ 16-19, 4 October 2016).
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
14. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to order their joinder (Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court).
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
15. The applicants complained that despite the new pardon procedure in force as of 2015, their whole-life sentences had remained de facto irreducible, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
16. The Court notes that the applications are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
(a) The applicants
17. The applicants submitted that the mandatory pardon procedure did not offer them a realistic chance of being released.
18. Referring to the Court’s judgment in the case of László Magyar v. Hungary (no. 73593/10, 20 May 2014), the applicants pointed out that the Court had held that when creating a review mechanism, a State should ensure that the decision allowing or rejecting a pardon request contain the reasons behind it, and that a convicted person can reasonably foresee the conditions under which a pardon can be granted. However, the new procedure disregarded those requirements: it remained within the President’s discretion whether or not to grant a pardon and he was not bound by any criteria when taking such a decision.
19. The applicants also submitted that under the new procedure, they could apply for release only after forty years, a term which fell foul of European trends. In their view, the Hungarian State should guarantee the review of life sentences after no longer than twenty-five years.
(b) The Government
20. The Government contended that following the Court’s judgment in the case of László Magyar (cited above), new legislation had introduced a mandatory pardon procedure for convicts serving whole-life sentences.
21. Under the new legislation, in the course of the mandatory pardon procedure the authorities had to examine whether the imprisonment continued to be justified as soon as a convict had served forty years of his life sentence. In the Government’s understanding, when the Hungarian legislature had set the time-limit for the mandatory pardon procedure at forty years, it had relied on the Court’s admissibility decision in the case of Törköly v. Hungary ((dec.), no. 4413/06, 5 April 2011), concerning a similar complaint.
22. The Government pointed out that each convict was aware, from the outset of his sentence, of what he must do to be considered for release and under what conditions. The new legislation further provided that proper consideration had to be given to the changes and developments that had occurred in the convicted prisoner on his way to rehabilitation, and allowed for the eventual termination of his imprisonment.
23. The Government further argued that the forty‑year period corresponded primarily to the retribution phase of a whole-life sentence, and was proportionate to the circumstances of the offence.
24. Moreover, before the expiry of the forty-year time-period, the applicants could avail themselves of the general pardon procedure, which afforded them the possibility of release if extraordinary circumstances deserving special consideration existed.
25. As regards the procedural elements of the pardon procedure, the Government argued that the findings concerning lack of procedural safeguards in the T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary judgment (cited above, § 49) were premature, since no such proceedings had yet been conducted.
2. The Court’s assessment
26. The whole-life sentence and the mandatory pardon procedure after forty years of imprisonment was the primary subject of scrutiny in the T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary case. The Court held that the fact that the applicants could have their release considered, in the form of mandatory pardon proceedings, only after they had served forty years of their life sentence was sufficient to conclude that the new Hungarian legislation did not offer de facto reducibility of the applicants’ whole-life sentences. That factor, coupled with the lack of sufficient procedural safeguards in the second part of the procedure, as provided for by the new legislation, led the Court to find a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary, cited above, § 50).
27. The Court notes that the arguments raised by the Government are similar to those already examined and rejected in the case of T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary. The Government have not submitted any new circumstances which would lead the Court to depart from its previous findings that the applicants’ whole-life sentences cannot be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention.
28. There has accordingly been a violation of this provision.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
29. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
30. The first applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. The second applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
31. The Government found the claim excessive.
32. In the absence of a claim on his part, the Court is not called upon to make any award under the head of non-pecuniary damage as far as the first applicant is concerned. As regards the second applicant, the Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by him and accordingly equally makes no award under this head (see T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary, cited above, § 54).
B. Costs and expenses
33. The first applicant did not claim any sums for costs and expenses. The second applicant claimed EUR 1,500 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This corresponds to twelve hours of legal work carried out by his lawyer, plus costs.
34. The Government found the claim excessive.
35. In the absence of a claim on his part, the Court is not called upon to make any award under the head of costs and expenses as far as the first applicant is concerned. As regards the second applicant, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award him the sum of EUR 1,500 for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
36. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Decides to jointhe applications;
2. Declaresthe applications admissible;
3. Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the second applicant;
(b) that the respondent State is to pay the second applicant, within three months, EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the second applicant;
(c) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;
5. Dismissesthe remainder of the second applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 January 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Andrea Tamietti Branko Lubarda
Deputy Registrar President
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