Last Updated on September 2, 2020 by LawEuro
FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF BORZYKH AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE
(Applications nos. 5353/14 and 2 others)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25 June 2020
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Borzykh and Others v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, President,
Lado Chanturia,
Anja Seibert-Fohr, judges,
and Anne-Marie Dougin, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 5353/14, 54053/14 and 25353/16) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Ukrainian nationals, Mr Oleksiy Volodymyrovych Borzykh (“the first applicant”), Mr Andriy Vitaliyovych Pustyntsev (“the second applicant”) and Mr Ruslan Mykhaylovych Naumenko (“the third applicant”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table;
the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 3 and Article 5 §§ 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;
the decision to grant legal aid to the first applicant;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 2 June 2020;
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
The case concerns the allegedly inadequate conditions of the applicants’ detention in breach of Article 3 as well as the alleged lack of reasoning of the judicial decisions ordering their arrest and continued detention, the allegedly unreasonable duration of their detention on remand, the alleged absence of an effective procedure to challenge the lawfulness of their detention on remand, and the alleged absence of a right to compensation for alleged violations of their Article 5 rights.
THE FACTS
1. The applicants’ personal details appear in the appended table below.
2. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna, of the Ministry of Justice.
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
I. The applicants’ arrest and pre-trial detention
4. On various dates the applicants were arrested in the context of criminal investigations against them. Shortly afterwards the courts ordered their pre-trial detention. The relevant judicial decisions stated that the applicants were accused of serious crimes and might flee from and hinder the investigation or continue with their criminal activities if they were not placed in detention. The courts did not provide specific details explaining why these reasons remained valid.
5. Moreover, in application no. 25353/16 the court noted, without providing specific details, that the crime imputed to the applicant had been committed by members of a group, not all of whom had been identified.
6. In the course of the proceedings the courts extended the applicants’ detention a number of times, referring to the reasons set out in the initial decisions on the applicants’ detention. The courts furthermore noted that there were no reasons for releasing the applicants: no new circumstances had been identified that would warrant their release, and the circumstances that had led to the initial decision to place the applicants in detention pending trial had not changed.
7. On 17 September 2013 the trial court convicted the first applicant and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment.
8. On 8 November 2012 the trial court convicted the second applicant and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. On 17 September 2013 that sentence was quashed on appeal and the case was remitted for retrial. The Court of Appeal noted that there were no reasons for the second applicant to be released pending retrial. On 4 April 2014 the trial court again convicted the second applicant and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment.
9. On 15 September 2014 the trial court convicted the third applicant and sentenced him to ten years and six months’ imprisonment. On 9 May 2015 that sentence was quashed on appeal and the case was remitted for retrial. On 19 November 2015 in the course of retrial the court discontinued the third applicant’s detention, having released him from custody pending trial.
II. Conditions of the applicants’ detention
10. The applicants provided a description of the conditions of their detention in the pre-trial detention centres (“SIZO”; see paragraph 11 below), which may be summarised as follows. There was no running hot water, and the cold-water supply was intermittent. The cells were damp, mouldy, strong-smelling, inadequately heated and poorly ventilated with no fresh air; they were infested with insects, cockroaches and mice. The sanitary facilities were located in the living area, and were not fully partitioned. Nutrition and drinking water was poor, and the standards of hygiene were inadequate. The applicants were allowed to take a shower only once a week. The bedding was unsuitable. The cells lacked natural light, and artificial lighting was switched on day and night in the cells. There was no regular outdoor exercise.
11. In addition, the applicants submitted the following information:
1. the first applicant was held in the Kyiv SIZO from 15 September 2011 to 27 May 2014 in the following cells:
– no. 330: measuring approximately 14 sq. m and shared by six people;
– no. 167: measuring approximately 60 sq. m and shared by up to forty-eight people;
– no. 284: measuring approximately 15 sq. m and shared by eight people;
2. the second applicant was held in the Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk at the material time) SIZO from 6 September 2013 to 5 November 2014 in various cells (nos. 614, 621, 623, 625, 628, 629, 633, 634, 638 and 641), each measuring approximately 6.7 sq. m and shared by two people;
3. the third applicant was held in the Dnipro SIZO from 9 March 2013 to 19 November 2015 in various cells (nos. 1002, 1013, 1017 and 1035), each measuring about 15 sq. m and shared by six people.
RELEVANT international material
12. In the Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 9 to 21 October 2013 (CPT/Inf (2014) 15), the CPT noted as follows (original emphasis; footnotes omitted):
“118. The CPT’s delegation paid follow-up visits to Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa and Simferopol SIZOs, where remand prisoners/inmates not yet serving their sentences represented about 90% or more of the whole prison population in these establishments. It should be noted from the outset that these establishments were operating below their official capacities at the time of the 2013 visit, although these capacities were still based on the national standard of 2.5 m² of living space per inmate:
● with an official capacity of 3,271 places, Kyiv SIZO was holding 2,618 prisoners (including 207 women and 80 juveniles). The opening of a new accommodation building for women in December 2011 helped to increase the capacity of the establishment (with 173 additional places);
● Dnipropetrovsk SIZO was accommodating 1,777 inmates (including 129 women and 24 juveniles) for an official capacity of 3,519 places; …
119. The CPT is pleased to note that in the establishments visited, all the inmates appeared to have been provided with their own beds in the cells seen by the delegation. Further, the standard advocated by the Committee of 4 m² of living space per inmate in multi-occupancy cells was observed in many cells of the establishments concerned. Both penitentiary staff and prisoners with whom the delegation spoke expressed their appreciation about the significant reduction of the prison population and the larger amount of living space in the cells in the context of the adoption and entry into force of the new CCP.
Nevertheless, … the CPT’s delegation observed localised overcrowding in all the establishments visited. Cell occupancy rates in many cells were not only far from meeting the CPT’s standard of at least 4 m² per prisoner, but were also in breach of Ukrainian standards, with as little as 1.5 m² of living space per prisoner in some multi-occupancy cells (e.g. 38 prisoners were being held in a cell of some 57 m², without counting the space taken up by the in-cell toilet, in Kyiv SIZO; four prisoners were being accommodated in a cell of some 7 m², not including the space taken up by the in-cell toilet, at Odessa).
…
The delegation noted that at Dnipropetrovsk SIZO, metal shutters attached to the cells’ windows in blocks Nos. 9 and 10 had been removed following the 2009 visit. Steps were also being taken to pursue gradual renovation works in the cells; most of the accommodation areas were indeed in a poor state of repair, badly ventilated and dirty. Further, in-cell toilets were only partially partitioned. …
c. outdoor exercise
122. In all the SIZOs visited, inmates had access to one hour of daily outdoor exercise (two hours for juveniles). Nevertheless, the yards seen by the CPT’s delegation were frequently too small for their intended occupancy and for real physical exertion (e.g. 9.5 m² for up to two inmates or 34 m² for up to 12 prisoners in Kyiv). …
d. activity programmes
…
124. In the course of the 2013 visit, the delegation found that there was virtually no change as regards the provision of out-of-cell activities for remand prisoners. Most remand prisoners were locked up in their cells for 23 hours per day, with little to occupy themselves (e.g. watching TV or reading books). …”
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
13. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
14. The applicants complained that the conditions of their detention in the periods of time indicated in paragraph 11 above had been poor. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
15. The Government submitted that the first applicant had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies, as he should have lodged his complaints about the conditions of detention with the prosecutor’s office.
16. The first applicant submitted that the remedy referred to by the Government had already been examined by the Court in other cases against Ukraine and had been found to be ineffective.
17. The Court notes that it has already examined and dismissed similar objections, finding the remedy referred to by the Government ineffective (see, for instance, Sokil v. Ukraine, no. 9414/13, § 38, 22 October 2015). With reference to the above-mentioned case-law and the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that the Government have not shown that the first applicant had in practice an opportunity to obtain an effective remedy for his complaint – that is, a remedy which could have prevented the violations from occurring or continuing, or which could have afforded him appropriate redress. The Court therefore considers that the first applicant’s complaint about the conditions of his detention cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, and, consequently, dismisses the Government’s objection in this regard.
18. The Court notes that the remaining complaints are neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
19. The applicants reiterated their complaints outlined in the application forms, in particular as regards cell overcrowding, the lack of water supply, the poor bedding, the limited opportunities to shower, the lack of access to natural light and ventilation, and the inability to take daily exercise.
20. As regards the first applicant’s case, the Government submitted that they could not provide specific information about the size of the cells in the SIZO and the number of inmates held together with the first applicant because the relevant documents had been destroyed upon the expiry of the statutory retention period. As regards the third applicant’s case, the Government did not question the size of the cells indicated by the third applicant (see paragraph 11 above) but stressed that the cells mentioned had been designed to accommodate five people.
21. As regards the other aspects of the applicants’ detention, the Government submitted that those had been in compliance with domestic prison rules.
22. The applicable general principles in respect of conditions of detention have been summarised in Muršić v. Croatia ([GC] no. 7334/13, §§ 96‑141, 20 October 2016).
23. The Court notes that, in the present case, the applicants provided a detailed description of the conditions of their detention in the SIZO.
24. The Court furthermore notes that there is no significant discrepancy between both parties’ submissions as regards the size of the cells, the number of inmates and other aspects of the conditions of the applicants’ detention. It can therefore be concluded that the first applicant had at his disposal between 1.25 and 2.3 sq. m of personal space; the second, 3.35 sq. m of personal space; and the third, between 2.5 and 3 sq. m of personal space.
25. In cases where a prison cell measuring in the range of 3 to 4 sq. m of personal space per inmate is in issue, as in the second applicant’s case, space remains a weighty factor in the Court’s assessment of the adequacy of conditions of detention. In such instances, a violation of Article 3 will be found if the space factor is coupled with other aspects of inappropriate physical conditions of detention related to, in particular, access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of room temperature, the possibility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements (see Muršić, cited above, § 139).
26. In this connection, the Court observes the applicants’ allegations that there were problems with lighting, ventilation, heating, sanitation, nutrition and hygiene (see paragraph 10 above).
27. The Court also refers to the findings of the CPT, which visited the Kyiv and Dnipro SIZOs in October 2013, that is to say, before or at the time the applicants were held in those facilities (see paragraph 12 above).
28. Lastly, the Court notes that it has already found that the conditions of detention in the Kyiv SIZO did not meet the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention (see, for the most recent examples, Bilozor and Others v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 9207/09 and 5 others, 20 July 2017, and Starenkiy and Rudoy v. Ukraine [Committee], nos. 44807/10 and 15752/14, 11 January 2018). The Court also notes that in the recent case of Sukachov v. Ukraine (no. 14057/17, §§ 90‑100, 30 January 2020), it carefully examined the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the Dnipro SIZO from 2012 to 2017 and found them incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.
29. The combination of the above-mentioned factors is sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the conditions of the applicants’ detention in the Kyiv and Dnipro SIZOs in the periods of time indicated in paragraph 11 above amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of that provision.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
30. The applicants complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that their pre-trial detention had been unjustified and unreasonable.
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention reads as follows:
“ Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
31. The Government submitted that, in the case of the second applicant’s detention, only a specific period (namely from 17 September 2013 to 4 April 2014) should be taken into account in the Court’s analysis under Article 5 § 3. They further concluded that that period, which had lasted six months and eighteen days, could not be considered unreasonable in the light of the circumstances of the case and invited the Court to declare the second applicant’s complaint on that account manifestly ill-founded.
32. Although the second applicant did not object to the Government’s argument that only a specific period of the detention should be analysed, he nevertheless submitted that his detention during that period had been unjustified and therefore unreasonable.
33. The Court considers that the Government’s argument is closely linked to the substance of the second applicant’s complaint concerning the justification of his detention on remand. It must therefore be joined to the merits.
34. The Court further notes that the above complaints are neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
35. The applicants submitted that their pre-trial detention had not been based on sufficient grounds and had been unreasonable.
36. The Government contested the applicants’ arguments, stating that their detention had been justified and reasonable.
37. The applicable general principles are set out in Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova ([GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 84‑91 and 102, 5 July 2016). The Court in particular reiterates that the persistence of a reasonable suspicion is a condition sine qua non for the validity of continued detention, but, after a certain lapse of time, it no longer suffices: the Court must then establish (1) whether other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continue to justify the deprivation of liberty and (2), where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, whether the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings. The Court has also held that justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities. The issue of whether a period of detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto. It must be assessed according to the particular features of each case, the reasons given in the domestic decisions and the well-documented matters referred to by the applicant in his applications for release. Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 153, ECHR 2000‑IV; and Buzadji, cited above, §§ 87, 90).
38. Details of the periods and the duration of the applicants’ detention for the purposes of the Court’s examination under Article 5 § 3 are set out in the appended table.
39. The Court notes that the second applicant did not complain that his detention had been unreasonable for the purposes of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention as regards the period from 1 March 2012 (when he was arrested) to 8 November 2012 (when he was convicted by the trial court). The Court will therefore not analyse that period as such. Nevertheless, it may take note of it when examining the complaint under Article 5 § 3 as a whole (see paragraph 43 below).
40. The seriousness of the charges against the applicants and the risk of their absconding from or interfering with the respective investigations were mentioned in the initial orders for their arrest and pre-trial detention (see paragraph 4 above). Those reasons were, and remained, the main grounds for the applicants’ detention until their conviction or release. The decisions on the applicants’ detention were couched in general terms and contained repetitive phrases. They did not suggest that the courts had made an appropriate assessment of the facts relevant to the question of whether such a preventive measure was necessary in the circumstances at the respective stages of the proceedings.
41. Moreover, with the passage of time, the applicants’ continued detention required further justification, yet the courts did not provide any further reasoning. It appears that the domestic courts did not attempt to demonstrate the existence of concrete facts proving that the alleged risks outweighed the need to respect individual liberty. In fact, the burden of proof was wrongly shifted onto the applicants (compare Khayredinov v. Ukraine, no. 38717/04, §§ 40 and 41, 14 October 2010, and Makarenko v. Ukraine, no. 622/11, § 91, 30 January 2018).
42. The Court particularly notes that the domestic courts repeatedly justified the applicants’ further detention by referring to the absence of any reasons to release them (see paragraph 6 above), whereas Article 5 § 3 of the Convention implies the opposite approach and requires the national authorities to provide grounds for the person’s continuing detention (see Komarova v. Ukraine, no. 13371/06, § 79, 16 May 2013).
43. As regards the Government’s argument raised in relation to the second applicant’s complaint that the period of his pre-trial detention did not raise an issue under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the Court observes that indeed the period under consideration, which lasted six months and eighteen days (see paragraph 31 above), taken alone, does not appear to be unreasonable. The Court, however, does not lose sight of the fact that the second applicant has spent 8 months in 2012 in pre-trial detention within the same criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 39 above). During the above period of time his detention had been based on the judicial decisions containing similar reasoning which the Court has analysed in §§ 40-42 above.
44. Furthermore, as appears from the relevant decisions, the courts, when extending the second applicant’s detention during the period under consideration (namely from 17 September 2013 to 4 April 2014), did not advance any new reasons that would have justified the second applicant’s detention, and used merely abstract and stereotyped phrases. In this connection, the Court is of the opinion that the second applicant’s detention, which at that time had been extended a number of times, required the authorities to provide further specific arguments in favor of his detention. However, no such reasons were provided.
45. The Court has often found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in cases against Ukraine on the basis that even in respect of lengthy periods of detention, the domestic courts referred to the same set of grounds (if any at all) throughout the period of the applicant’s detention (see, for example, Kharchenko v. Ukraine, no. 40107/02, §§ 80‑81 and 99, 10 February 2011, and Ignatov v. Ukraine, no. 40583/15, §§ 41‑42, 15 December 2016).
46. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that by failing to address specific facts or to contemplate other measures as an alternative to pre-trial detention and by relying essentially and routinely on the seriousness of the charges and the risk of the applicants absconding from or interfering with the respective investigations, the authorities extended their detention pending trial on grounds that cannot be regarded as “sufficient” and “relevant” to justify its duration.
47. The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, and, consequently, dismisses the Government’s objection in so far as it concerns the second applicant’s complaint.
IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
48. The first applicant also complained under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that his right to a review of the lawfulness of his detention had been breached. The second applicant furthermore complained, under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention, that he had had no enforceable right to compensation for his lengthy detention.
49. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings under Article 3 and Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 29 and 47 above), the Court considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present applications, and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the other complaints mentioned in the preceding paragraph (see, for example, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
50. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
51. The first applicant claimed 676.59 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage (for the cost of food parcels allegedly sent to him while in detention).
52. The applicants also claimed the amounts indicated in the appended table in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
53. The Government considered those claims unsubstantiated and excessive.
54. The Court finds that the first applicant’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage is not substantiated and therefore rejects it. On the other hand, making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards the applicants the amounts indicated in the appended table, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
55. The applicants claimed the following amounts for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court:
– in application no. 5353/14: EUR 3,750;
– in application no. 54053/14: EUR 3,600; and
– in application no. 25353/16: EUR 3,600.
56. The applicant in application no. 54053/14 furthermore claimed EUR 122 for translation expenses.
57. The applicants asked that the respective awards be paid directly into their representatives’ bank accounts.
58. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.
59. Regard being had to the documents in its possession, the complexity of the cases, the fact that the first applicant’s representative intervened in the proceedings at the communication stage only and the legal aid granted to the first applicant in the amount of EUR 850, as well as to the fact that the second and third applicants were represented by the same lawyer, the Court awards EUR 150 to the first applicant. The award is to be paid into the bank account of Mr M. Tarakhkalo, as indicated by the first applicant. The Court furthermore awards EUR 1,000 to the second and third applicants jointly. The award is to be paid into the bank account of Mr O. Ignatov, as indicated by the second and third applicants (see, for example, Belousov v. Ukraine, no. 4494/07, §§ 116‑17, 7 November 2013, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 288, 15 December 2016).
C. Default interest
60. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Joins to the merits the Government’s objection concerning the inadmissibility of the second applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and dismisses this objection after an examination of the merits;
3. Declares admissible, under Article 3 and Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the complaints by the first applicant, Mr Oleksiy Volodymyrovych Borzykh, regarding the conditions of his detention in the Kyiv SIZO from 15 September 2011 to 27 May 2014 and the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for his pre-trial detention;
4. Declares admissible, under Article 3 and Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the complaints by the second applicant, Mr Andriy Vitaliyovych Pustyntsev, regarding the conditions of his detention in the Dnipro SIZO from 6 September 2013 to 5 November 2014 and the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for his pre-trial detention;
5. Declares admissible, under Article 3 and Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the complaints by the third applicant, Mr Ruslan Mykhaylovych Naumenko, regarding the conditions of his detention in the Dnipro SIZO from 9 March 2013 to 19 November 2015 and the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for his pre-trial detention;
6. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of all the applicants;
7. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in respect of all the applicants with regard to the periods indicated in the appended table;
8. Holds that it is not necessary to examine the admissibility and merits of the first applicant’s complaints under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention regarding the courts’ failure to carry out a proper examination of his applications for release, and the second applicant’s complaints under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention regarding the lack of an enforceable right to compensation for his arbitrary detention;
9. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) the amounts indicated in the appended table in respect of each of the applicants, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 150 (one hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid into the bank account of the first applicant’s representative, Mr M. Tarakhkalo;
(iii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid into the bank account of the second and third applicants’ representative, Mr O. Ignatov;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
10. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 June 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Anne-Marie Dougin Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer
Acting Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
| No. | Application no. Case name Lodged on |
Applicant Date of birth Place of residence Nationality Represented by |
Nature of charges against the applicant | Name of court ordering the applicant’s arrest, date | Period of pre-trial detention under consideration (Article 5 § 3), length | Amount claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage | Amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage |
| 1 | 5353/14
Borzykh v. Ukraine 18/12/2013 |
Oleksiy Volodymyrovych BORZYKH 18/05/1981 Bila Tserkva Ukrainian Represented by Mykhaylo Oleksandrovych TARAKHKALO |
Drug-related crime | Vasylkiv Court of Kyiv Region,
11/08/2011 |
08/08/2011-17/09/2013,
2 years and 1 month |
EUR 30,000 | EUR 7,900 |
| 2 | 54053/14
Pustyntsev v. Ukraine 28/08/2014 |
Andriy Vitaliyovych PUSTYNTSEV 24/03/1980 Pyatykhatky Ukrainian Represented by Oleksandr Anatoliyovych IGNATOV |
Drug-related crime | Zhovtnevyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk,
03/03/2012 |
17/09/2013-04/04/2014
6 months and 18 days |
EUR 15,000 | EUR 4,400 |
| 3 | 25353/16
Naumenko v. Ukraine 10/04/2016 |
Ruslan Mykhaylovych NAUMENKO 17/03/1978 Dnipropetrovsk Ukrainian Represented by Oleksandr Anatoliyovych IGNATOV |
Gang robbery | Zhovtnevyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk,
09/03/2013 |
07/03/2013-15/09/2014 09/04/2015-19/11/20151 year and 2 months |
EUR 10,000 | EUR 7,900 |
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