Last Updated on December 3, 2020 by LawEuro
FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF MAMMADOV v. AZERBAIJAN
(Application no. 7308/12)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 December 2020
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Mammadov v. Azerbaijan,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Mārtiņš Mits, President,
Latif Hüseynov,
Mattias Guyomar, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application against the Republic of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Azerbaijani national, Mr Shukran Hamid oglu Mammadov (Şükran Həmid oğlu Məmmədov – “the applicant”), on 7 January 2012;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 9 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 5 November 2020,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Ujar. He was represented by Mr R. Mustafazade, a lawyer practising in Azerbaijan.
2. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Ç. Əsgərov.
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. On 14 July 2007 several pieces of religious literature from the Risale‑I Nur Collection were seized during a police raid on a religious meeting which was taking place in the applicant’s home in Ujar. Subsequently, on an unspecified date he was fined under Article 299.0.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”) for the administrative offence of holding an unauthorised religious meeting.
5. In response to a letter from the applicant addressed to the Ujar Police Office on 13 November 2007, on 30 November 2007 the applicant was informed that the books had been seized so that they could be submitted for an expert examination by the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations (Dini Qurumlarla İş Üzrə Dövlət Komitəsi – hereinafter “the Committee”).
6. On 19 March 2010 the applicant complained to various authorities that the religious books that had been seized from his home had not been returned to him.
7. On 8 April 2010 the applicant received a letter from the Committee stating that, given their subject matter, it had been found that distribution of the books was undesirable.
8. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a claim against the Committee with the Sabail District Court, asking the court to order the return of the unlawfully seized religious literature.
9. According to the transcript of the hearing, the applicant argued that the books seized at his premises were his property. He had bought the books in a bookshop in Baku and had used them for only his personal needs, and he had had no intention to distribute them. Moreover, on 3 August 2006 the Committee had conducted research into the Risale-I Nur Collection and had come to the conclusion that books from this collection did not have any negative impact on the existing state of affairs as regards religion, and could be freely distributed. Furthermore, back in 2007 he had been fined under Article 299.0.2 of the CAO for the administrative offence of holding an unauthorised religious meeting, but not for the illegal distribution of religious literature, therefore even those proceedings could not serve as a legal basis for seizing the books.
10. During the course of the proceedings the Committee’s representative submitted an expert opinion which concluded that distribution of the books in question had been found to be undesirable. The expert opinion further stated that the books contradicted the tradition of religious tolerance in the country, because they were written in such a way as to turn Said Nursi (a Turkish Muslim theologian) into a phenomenon, propagate ideas about his life and activities among the younger generation, and encourage sectarianism.
11. On 24 January 2011 the first-instance court rejected the claim. In finding no fault on the part of the Committee, the court relied on paragraph 9.2 of the Regulation on the State Committee for Work with Religious Communities (see paragraph 19 below) and referred to the commissioned expert opinion which stated that because the titles making up the Risale-I Nur Collection encouraged sectarianism and aimed to create religious groups, their distribution had been found to be undesirable.
When summarising the parties’ submissions, the conclusion of the expert opinion and the applicable legal provisions, the court held:
“… the defendant, being an authority in charge of the production, import and distribution of religious literature and other religious material, examined the content of the titles listed in the claim of Mammadov Shukran Hamid oglu [the applicant] and issued an expert opinion [in that regard] which found that their distribution was undesirable, as they purported to encourage sectarianism and the creation of religious groups. The claimant was informed accordingly by the letter dated 8 April 2010. Therefore, having considered that expert opinion, the court finds that the defendant correctly found that the distribution of the literature in question by the complainant was undesirable.”
12. It appears from the decision of the first-instance court that on 23 September 2003 and 27 September 2004 the Committee had authorised several private persons to import a number of titles from the Risale-I Nur Collection.
13. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. Relying on Article 9 of the Convention and Articles 29 and 48 of the Constitution, the applicant argued, inter alia, that the expert opinion which the first-instance court had relied upon heavily was too vague in its conclusion, in that it was not supported by any reference to particular parts of the books in question.
14. On 25 January 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal rejected the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first‑instance court in a summary fashion.
15. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against that decision, essentially reiterating the arguments which he had made before the Baku Court of Appeal.
16. On 24 August 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal, having found – with reference to Article 9 § 2 of the Convention and the Court’s case-law – that the authorities had acted in the interests of public safety and the protection of public order in preventing the applicant from distributing the seized books at unauthorised religious meetings.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan
17. At the material time, the relevant provisions of the Constitution provided as follows:
Article 29. Right of property
“I. Everyone has a right of property.
…
IV. No one shall be deprived of his or her property in the absence of a court decision …”
Article 47. Freedom of thought and speech
“I. Everyone enjoys freedom of thought and speech.
II. No one shall be forced to proclaim or repudiate his or her thoughts [or] beliefs.
III. Agitation and propaganda inciting racial, ethnic, religious [or] social discord and hostility are not allowed.”
Article 48. Freedom of conscience
“I. Everyone enjoys freedom of conscience.
II. Everyone has the right to freely determine his [or her] attitude towards religion, to profess, individually or together with others, any religion, or to profess no religion, [and] to express and disseminate his or her beliefs concerning his or her attitude to religion …”
B. Relevant domestic legislation concerning religious activities
18. Article 22 (Religious literature and items of a religious nature) of the Law on Freedom of Religious Belief of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as in force at the material time, provided that individuals and religious communities might obtain and use religious literature and other items and material of a religious nature in any language. With the consent of the relevant executive authority [the Committee] for religious affairs, religious communities might import and freely distribute literature, items of a religious nature and other material containing religious content.
19. Paragraph 9.2 of the Regulation on the State Committee for Work with Religious Communities (“the Regulation”), as in force at the material time, provided that in the fulfilment of its duties, the Committee should have the right to control and authorise the production, import and distribution of literature and items of a religious nature and material containing religious and non-religious content, at the request of religious communities or relevant public authorities.
C. The Code of Administrative Offences
20. At the material time, the relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences provided as follows:
Article 23. Types of administrative penalties
“23.1. The following types of administrative penalties may be imposed for administrative offences:
…
23.1.4. Seizure of the instrument or object of the administrative offence;
…”
Article 27. Seizure of a particular item used as an instrument or
object in an administrative offence
“27.1. The seizure of an item which constitutes the lawful property of a person who has committed an administrative offence, and which has been used as an instrument or object in the commission of an administrative offence under the circumstances defined in the Special Part of the present Code, shall be effected by the obligatory transfer of the item in question to the State, and the item shall not be returned.
27.2. The seizure of a particular item which has been used as an instrument or object in the commission of an administrative offence shall be [ordered] by a judge.
…”
Article 299. Violation of rules concerning the establishment and
activities of religious organisations
“299.0. A violation of the rules concerning the establishment and activities of religious organisations, namely:
…
299.0.2. a violation of the rules provided for by the legislation for the organisation and conduct of religious meetings, rallies and other religious ceremonies;
…
‑ shall be punishable by a fine in the amount of ten to fifteen conventional financial units for physical persons, and forty to seventy conventional financial units for officials.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
21. The applicant complained that the arbitrary seizure of the religious literature in question had amounted to a violation of his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention reads:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
22. The Government argued that at domestic level the applicant had raised his complaint about the seizure of the religious literature only under Article 9 of the Convention, without invoking Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Accordingly, he had not exhausted the remedies available under domestic law, therefore this part of the application had to be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
23. The applicant maintained his complaint.
24. The Court notes that the documents in the case file clearly indicate that the crux of the applicant’s claim before the domestic courts was the return of the unlawfully seized personal property (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). Moreover, the applicant expressly relied on Article 29 of the Constitution, complaining of a violation of his property rights in his appeal against the first-instance court’s judgment. In these circumstances, the Government’s objection must be dismissed.
25. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
26. The applicant submitted that in accordance with the domestic legislation in force at the material time, namely Articles 23 and 27 of the CAO, deprivation of property had been possible only if the property in question had been used for committing an administrative offence, and in any case this had to be ordered by a court. Moreover, seizure as a form of penalty could be imposed only if this had been provided for by the respective Article of the CAO under which an offender had been convicted. In his case, Article 299 of the CAO had not sanctioned seizure at the time when he had been fined for committing the administrative offence, nor had the seizure in question been effected following a relevant court order. It followed that his property had been confiscated unlawfully, because seizure had not been provided for by law and there had been no court decision in that regard.
27. The Government submitted that the interference in question had been based on Article 23.1.4 of the CAO, which provided for sanctions for the distribution of unauthorised religious literature, and Article 22 of the Law on Freedom of Religious Belief and paragraph 9.2 of the Regulation, which gave the Committee the relevant power. These legislative norms had been accessible to the applicant and had been formulated with sufficient precision to enable him to foresee the consequences which a given action might entail. Moreover, the interference had pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of public order, as the religious literature distributed by the applicant had been banned by the Committee.
2. The Court’s assessment
28. The Court observes that in 2007 the police took several pieces of religious literature from the applicant’s home during a raid. Subsequently, he was also fined under Article 299.0.2 of the CAO for holding an unauthorised religious meeting. The parties did not submit a copy of the relevant court decision, but it was not disputed between them that at that time the seizure of the applicant’s property had not been ordered. Having made enquiries with several domestic authorities about what would happen as regards the seizure, in 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint against the Committee with the domestic courts, claiming the return of his possessions. Eventually, the complaint was rejected by courts at all levels. Relying on paragraph 9.2 of the Regulation and an expert opinion commissioned by the first-instance court, the courts found that the Committee had acted lawfully in refusing to return the applicant’s seized books in order to prevent their distribution.
29. The Court notes that the seizure of the applicant’s books and their retention by the authorities clearly constituted an interference with his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention. This interference amounted to a “deprivation of possessions” within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. To be compatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, such a measure must fulfil three conditions: it must be carried out “subject to the conditions provided for by law”, which excludes any arbitrary action on the part of the national authorities, it must be “in the public interest”, and it must strike a fair balance between the owner’s rights and the interests of the community (see, mutatis mutandis, Khalikova v. Azerbaijan, no. 42883/11, § 135, 22 October 2015).
30. As to the first condition, namely that any deprivation of possessions must be “subject to the conditions provided for by law” (see G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy [GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, § 292, 28 June 2018), the Court reiterates that, when speaking of “law”, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 alludes to the same concept that is to be found elsewhere in the Convention (see G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others, ibid, and Guţă Tudor Teodorescu v. Romania, no. 33751/05, § 42, 5 April 2016). This concept requires firstly that the impugned measures should have a basis in domestic law. It also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it be accessible to the persons concerned, precise, and foreseeable (see Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 109, ECHR 2000-I, and Batkivska Turbota Foundation v. Ukraine, no. 5876/15, § 56, 9 October 2018). Moreover, the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention. The issue of whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights only becomes relevant once it has been established that the interference in question satisfied the requirement of lawfulness and was not arbitrary (see Rafig Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 45875/06, § 119, 6 December 2011, and Fedulov v. Russia, no. 53068/08, § 75, 8 October 2019).
31. The Court notes that the applicant primarily complained that the seizure in question had been unlawful because although he had received an administrative fine for the offence of which he had been convicted, seizure had not been ordered, as the law itself had not provided for such a penalty for that offence at the material time. Moreover, the courts had not delivered any decision formally depriving him of his property, either before the seizure of the books from his residence or thereafter. Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether, in this specific case, such an interference was permitted and thus “lawful” under the Azerbaijani law in force at the material time.
32. The Court observes that Article 29 § IV of the Constitution, dealing with property rights, provided that deprivation of property could be ordered only by a court decision. Article 27.2 of the CAO further elaborated on this requirement by providing that only judges had the authority to order seizure in administrative proceedings (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above). The Court further observes that Article 22 of the Law on Freedom of Religious Belief and paragraph 9.2 of the Regulation gave the Committee the power to control and authorise the distribution of religious literature, but did not give it the authority to do the same in relation to the use of such literature by individuals (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above).
33. The Court accepts that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited, as it is in the first place for the national authorities to interpret and apply that law (see Rafig Aliyev, cited above, § 125). However, the Court notes that in the instant case it cannot accept the reasons provided by the domestic courts as relevant and sufficient for the purpose of justifying the interference in question. It observes that the domestic courts refrained from addressing the applicant’s arguments that the seizure of his books in the first place had been effected contrary to the legislative requirements, namely in the absence of any court decision whatsoever; nor did they attempt to provide any interpretation of the legislation or rely on any existing or accessible jurisprudence that could be interpreted, in a precise and foreseeable manner, as being applicable to the deprivation of the applicant’s property. Instead, in their decisions, the courts confined themselves to examining the lawfulness of the Committee’s refusal to return the books in question to the applicant. In doing so, they reasoned their findings by reference to Article 9.2 of the Regulation and the need to prevent the applicant from distributing the seized books. However, both the domestic courts and the Government, in their submissions before the Court, failed to provide any explanation as to how Article 9.2 of the Regulation could be applied in respect of the applicant, who was a private individual whose responsibility for distributing religious literature had never been examined or established in any proceedings, judicial or otherwise.
34. Likewise, the Government, while arguing that the interference was lawful under Article 23.1.4 of the CAO, did not attempt to explain how that provision could be applied independently in respect of individuals, and without those persons being charged with the relevant administrative offence under the Special Part of the CAO, given that the text of that provision expressly provided for such a condition. Nor did the Government argue that this provision was applicable to such persons by virtue of an extensive interpretation of that text by higher courts, and they did not rely on any specific domestic jurisprudence complying with the requirements of accessibility and foreseeability in support of such an interpretation.
35. In such circumstances, the Court concludes that the interference with the applicant’s possessions could not be considered lawful within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to ascertain whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.
36. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION
37. The applicant complained in substance that the seizure of religious literature from his private premises had constituted an unlawful interference with his right to freedom of religion. Article 9 of the Convention reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Admissibility
38. Relying on Article 17 of the Convention, the Government, in a very succinct manner, contested the applicability of Article 9 of the Convention, arguing that the applicant’s real aim was to have the content of the seized books condoned – content which was clearly contrary to the values of the Convention concerning the protection of democracy, as the books were calling for the destruction of the State.
39. The applicant did not comment on this issue.
40. The Court notes that the relevant general principles concerning the applicability of Article 17 of the Convention were summarised in the cases of Paksas v. Lithuania ([GC], no. 34932/04, §§ 87-88, ECHR 2011 (extracts)), and Perinçek v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 27510/08, §§ 113-114, ECHR 2015 (extracts)).
41. In the present case, there is no indication that the applicant was pursuing any aim intended to destroy the rights enshrined in the Convention. Relying on the relevant national legislation, he complained at domestic level that the authorities’ actions had deprived him of the opportunity to peacefully enjoy his possessions, including his right to use the literature which had been seized to manifest his religion, and it does not appear from the case-file documents that the domestic courts ever examined the content of the books in question in relation to the assertion that they were calling for the destruction of the State (see paragraphs 10 to 16 above). Likewise, the applicant legitimately relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 9 of the Convention to challenge the decisions of the domestic courts, seeking to obtain a judgment from the Court whose execution at domestic level would have the likely effect of restoring his rights. In other words, he sought to regain the full enjoyment of rights which the Convention, in principle, secures to everyone, and of which he claimed to have been wrongly deprived by the domestic authorities, the Government’s allegation that the applicant’s real aim was to destroy the State being unsupported and immaterial in this context. Article 17 of the Convention cannot therefore apply (compare Paksas, cited above, § 89).
42. It follows that this part of the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established, and it must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
43. The applicant submitted that he could not have expected any negative outcome as a result of his possession of the books which he had obtained from a legitimate source. Moreover, the general public was unaware of any list of officially banned literature or literature whose circulation was considered to be inappropriate. Therefore, an individual’s potential responsibility as regards such literature was dependent on the Committee’s unfettered power. Nor was the existing legal framework foreseeable in its application, because the Committee’s policy in respect of the books in question had changed over time.
44. The applicant also argued that even assuming that the Committee had acted in accordance with the applicable law, the resulting consequences of the domestic authorities’ actions had not pursued a legitimate aim, as he had never been engaged in the distribution of religious literature, and had used the seized titles only for his own personal purposes. Moreover, at domestic level he had been fined for the administrative offence of holding an unauthorised meeting, but the courts had never examined any issue concerning the distribution of literature, and his responsibility for such an act had not been established by a court decision.
45. The Government admitted that the ban had constituted an “interference” with or “limitation” of the exercise of the rights protected by Article 9 of the Convention. However, in democratic societies, in which several religions coexisted within one and the same population, it was necessary to place restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs were respected. In this context, they referred to Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, § 106, ECHR 2005 XI). In the Government’s view, the relevant legislation referred to in their submissions regarding the complaint concerning Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention had been accessible and foreseeable for the applicant, and the interference had pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of public order, as the religious literature distributed by the applicant had contained calls for sectarianism and the creation of religious groups, which undermined the principles of the State.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Whether there was an interference
46. It is undisputed by the parties, and the Court agrees, that there was an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion on account of the seizure of his books by the domestic authorities. In order to determine whether that interference entailed a breach of the Convention, the Court must decide whether it satisfied the requirements of Article 9 § 2, that is whether it was “prescribed by law”, pursued a legitimate aim for the purposes of that provision and was “necessary in a democratic society”.
(b) Whether the interference was prescribed by law
47. The Court reiterates that religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual thought and conscience. This aspect of the right set out in the first paragraph of Article 9, to hold any religious belief and to change religion or belief, is absolute and unqualified. However, as further set out in Article 9 § 1, freedom of religion also encompasses the freedom to manifest one’s belief alone and in private, but also to practise in community with others and in public. The manifestation of religious belief may take the form of worship, teaching, practice and observance (see Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 31, Series A no. 260‑A, and Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, cited above, § 105). Since the manifestation by one person of his or her religious belief may have an impact on others, the drafters of the Convention qualified this aspect of freedom of religion in the manner set out in Article 9 § 2. This second paragraph provides that any limitation placed on a person’s freedom to manifest religion or belief must be prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of one or more of the legitimate aims set out therein (see Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 48420/10 and 3 others, § 80, ECHR 2013 (extracts)).
48. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the Government relied on Article 22 of the Law on Freedom of Religious Belief, paragraph 9.2 of the Regulation, and Article 23.1.4 of the CAO (see paragraphs 27 and 45 above) as a legal basis for the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion. However, while both Article 22 of the Law and paragraph 9.2 of the Regulation gave the Committee the rights to control various aspects concerning religious literature in respect of religious communities, Article 22 of the Law clearly provided for the rights of individuals to freely obtain and use religious literature. In this regard, the Court also refers to its findings in paragraph 33 above concerning the domestic courts’ failure to provide any legal assessment in respect of the applicability of Article 9.2 of the Regulation to the applicant’s case, as he was a private individual who had never been involved in the distribution of religious literature. As to the Government’s reliance on Article 23.1.4 of the CAO, the Court refers to its findings in paragraph 34 above and sees no reason to deviate from them.
49. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the impugned interference was not “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.
50. Having reached that conclusion, the Court does not need to satisfy itself that the other requirements of Article 9 § 2 (legitimate aim and necessity of the interference) have been complied with.
51. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
52. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
53. The applicant claimed 8,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
54. The Government contested the amount claimed as excessive, submitting that, in any event, a finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.
55. The Court considers that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation, and that compensation should thus be awarded. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant the sum of EUR 1,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.
B. Costs and expenses
56. The applicant also claimed EUR 1,200 for legal costs incurred in the proceedings before the Court. In support of his claim, he submitted a contract dated 16 January 2016 for legal services in the proceedings before the Court. The applicant also requested that any compensation awarded under that head be paid directly into his representative’s bank account.
57. The Government contested this claim.
58. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the amount of legal work necessary in the present case, the Court considers it reasonable to award the total sum of EUR 600 to cover costs under all heads, to be paid directly into the applicant’s representative’s bank account.
C. Default interest
59. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 600 (six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid directly into his representative’s bank account;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 December 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Martina Keller Mārtiņš Mits
Deputy Registrar President
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