Last Updated on June 15, 2021 by LawEuro
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF VLASOV v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 14390/11)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
15 June 2021
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Vlasov v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Georges Ravarani, President,
Anja Seibert-Fohr,
Andreas Zünd, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 14390/11) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Vladimir Sergeyevich Vlasov (“the applicant”), on 10 February 2011;
the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (“the Government”) of the complaint concerning his right to the presumption of innocence and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 15 June 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Nizhniy Tagil.
2. The Government were represented by Mr M. Galperin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. In October 2019, the applicant was accused of hooliganism, an offence under Article 20.1 § 1 of the Code of administrative offences, consisting of using rude language in a public place, swinging his arms and kicking against a wall of a shopping mall.
5. By a decision of 1 February 2010, the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil discontinued the administrative-offence proceedings due to the expiry of the prosecution period.
6. Meanwhile, in November 2009, the applicant had been charged with use of violence against a public official, an offence under Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code, consisting of hitting a police officer after being arrested for the above hooliganism and being taken to a police station.
7. On 23 June 2010, the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil found the applicant guilty of the offence under Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The court referred, among other evidence of the applicant’s guilt, to the administrative-offence proceedings for hooliganism that had been discontinued on 1 February 2010.
8. The applicant appealed against his conviction. He complained inter alia that the trial court should not have referred to the decision of 1 February 2010 in so far as, pursuant to Ruling no. 9-P of 16 June 2009, the Constitutional Court of Russia (see paragraph 11 below), he should have been presumed innocent as regards the charges against him in the administrative-offence proceedings.
9. On 18 August 2010, the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court upheld the judgement using the following passages:
“The guilt of the applicant was confirmed by the following: (…) information according to which Vlasov had committed an administrative offence but the proceedings were discontinued due to the expiry of the prosecution period.
(…)
The trial court in this criminal case established that the officers had acted lawfully when arresting the drunken defendant. He had committed the administrative offence. Officer Ch. had acted lawfully and within the scope of his official duties when arresting the defendant and taking him to the police station.”
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
10. Article 24.5 § 1 subparagraph 6 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) provides that ongoing administrative-offence proceedings are to be discontinued where the prosecution period has expired.
11. In Ruling no. 9-P of 16 June 2009, the Constitutional Court of Russia stated that, according to the principle of the presumption of innocence, the person for which administrative proceedings were discontinued on the basis of Article 24.5§ 1 subparagraph 6 of the CAO, has to be considered innocent of the relevant offence and that the State, when deciding not to prosecute such a person, no longer casts doubt on his status as an innocent person and, moreover, acknowledges that it has no basis for refuting his innocence.
12. In point 13.1 of Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 5 dated 24 March 2005 “On certain issues arising before the courts from application the Court of Administrative Offences”, the court indicated that in the event of the expiration of the prosecution period for an administrative offence, the ruling on termination of the proceedings should include all the relevant circumstances of the case, and not only those relating to the expiration period.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION
13. The applicant complained that the findings made by the appeal court in the criminal case violated the presumption of innocence as provided in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
A. Admissibility
14. The general principles concerning the applicability of Article 6 § 2 in proceedings that follow the conclusion of criminal proceedings are set out in the Court’s judgment Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC] (no. 25424/09, § 92-105, ECHR 2013).
15. The Court notes that the Government did not contest that the administrative proceedings under Article 20.1 § 1 of the CAO were “criminal” within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise (see Karelin v. Russia, no. 926/08, § 42, 20 September 2016).
16. The Court notes further that these proceeding were discontinued on 1 February 2010 due to the expiry of the prosecution period (see paragraph 5 above). The Court reiterates that following discontinuation of criminal proceedings, the presumption of innocence requires that the lack of a person’s criminal conviction be preserved in any other proceedings of whatever nature (Allen, cited above, § 102, with further references). Whenever the question of the applicability of Article 6 § 2 arises in the context of subsequent proceedings, the applicant must demonstrate the existence of a link between the concluded criminal proceedings and the subsequent proceedings. Such a link is likely to be present, for example, where the subsequent proceedings require examination of the outcome of the prior criminal proceedings (ibid., § 104). The Court has, therefore, to examine whether there was a link between the criminal proceedings which ended on 1 February 2010 and those which ended by the decision of 18 August 2010 of the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court.
17. In this regard, it observes that in its decision of 18 August 2010, the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court assessed the applicant’s participation in the events leading to the charge under Article 20.1 § 1 of the COA, for which examination was discontinued on 1 February 2010, by stating that the applicant “had committed the administrative offence” (see paragraph 9 above). For the Court, such a statement created a link between the concluded criminal proceedings and those which ended by the decision of 18 August 2010 of the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court.
18. For these reasons, Article 6 § 2 is applicable in the present case. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
19. Relying on Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 5 (see paragraph 12 above), the Government submitted that the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court in its decision of 18 August 2010 had not indicated that the applicant was guilty of an administrative offence but had merely acknowledged that the applicant’s actions contained constitutive elements of an administrative offence.
20. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 2 safeguards “the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”. Viewed as a procedural guarantee in the context of a criminal trial itself, the presumption of innocence imposes requirements in respect of, inter alia, the burden of proof, legal presumptions of fact and law, the privilege against self‑incrimination, pre‑trial publicity and premature expressions, by the trial court or by other public officials, of a defendant’s guilt (see Allen, cited above, § 93 and the case-law cited therein for examples of the above situations).
21. However, in keeping with the need to ensure that the right guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 is practical and effective, the presumption of innocence also has another aspect. Its general aim, in this second aspect, is to protect individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty of the offence charged (ibid., § 94). The language used by the decision-maker is of critical importance in assessing the compatibility of the decision and its reasoning with Article 6 § 2 (ibid., § 126).
22. In the instant case, the Court considers that, contrary to the Government’s argument, the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court’s statement that the applicant “had committed the administrative offence” amounted to a finding of guilt of the offence under Article 20.1 of the CAO (see, for a similar example, Nikolayev v. Russia [Committee], no. 61443/13, §§ 47‑48, 12 February 2019). Taking into account the context of the proceedings, the Court discerns nothing in the materials submitted that would justify the impugned choice of words made by the domestic courts.
23. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there was a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
24. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
25. The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
26. The Government submitted that Article 41 of the Convention should be applied in the present case in accordance with the Court’s established case-law.
27. The Court has no doubt that the applicant suffered distress and frustration on account of the violation of his rights set out in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
28. The applicant did not submit a claim for costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
C. Default interest
29. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 June 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Olga Chernishova Georges Ravarani
Deputy Registrar President
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