Last Updated on November 2, 2019 by LawEuro
THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Applications nos. 16467/17 and 24115/17
Emidio AZZOPARDI against Malta
and Victor ATTARD and Others against Malta
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 12 March 2019 as a Chamber composed of:
Branko Lubarda, President,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Dmitry Dedov,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Alena Poláčková,
Jolien Schukking,
María Elósegui, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, DeputySection Registrar,
Having regard to the above applications lodged on 20 February 2017 and 16 March 2017 respectively,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. They were represented by Dr C. Galea, a lawyer practicing in Victoria,Gozo.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
1. Background to the case
3. In 1983 the applicants were joint owners of a tract of land (hereinafter “the property”) in Xagħra, Gozo.
4. In 1983 by two separate declarations of the President of Malta it was declared that the two pieces of land, constituting the property at issue in the present case, namely Land A measuring 942 square metres and Land B measuring 484 square metres, were to be acquired by virtue of the Land Acquisition (Public Purpose Ordinance) (hereinafter “the Ordinance”), Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta (see Relevant domestic law and practice below).
5. The authorities took possession of the land on 4 November 1983 but did not make an offer of compensation, by means of a notice to treat, as bound to do by law.
6. The law at the relevant time did not provide for any procedure allowing the applicants to initiate proceedings for compensation. The initiation of compensation proceedings was an action which could be undertaken only by the authorities, and to which no time‑limit applied.
7. While the law was silent on the matter, the practice at the time was that once the quantum of compensation was established, owners would be paid such quantum plus interest of 5% on the quantum established, or the quantum offered if it had been accepted, with effect from the date of the taking of the land up to the date of the publication of the deed. During the domestic proceedings (mentioned below) relevant witness testimony confirmed that this was the constant practice, reflecting the interest applied by banks at the time.
8. In 1997, after twelve years waiting for an offer, the applicants wrote to the Commissioner of Land (‘Commissioner’) asking him to undertake all the necessary action so that the procedure leading to the acquisition of the land and to the publication of the deed of transfer be initiated. No reply was received.
9. In 2002 by means of Act XI of 2002, the Ordinance was amended. In particular Sections 12 and 22 thereof were substituted and Subsidiary Legislation 88.02 introduced (see Relevant domestic law and practice below).
10. On 4 July 2003 another letter was sent to the Commissioner which was acknowledged in the same month, by the authority; however, again no action ensued.
2. Constitutional redress proceedings (No. 25/2004/1)
11. In 2004 in the absence of any action from the authorities who had been legally bound to undertake the relevant steps, the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining about a violation of their property rights in that they had not yet received any compensation and that they had had no access to a tribunal to force the authorities to award them compensation. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
12. Pending these proceedings the Commissioner made an offer for compensation (see below) and these proceedings were thus adjourned sine die.
3. Other relevant facts
13. Pending the above‑mentioned constitutional redress proceedings, pursuant to the 2002 amendments, on 21 December 2005, two fresh presidential declarations were issued in respect of the two pieces of land.
14. In 2006 further amendments were made to the law, in particular by means of Act I of 2006 and Act III of 2006 (see Relevant domestic law and practice below). According to these amendments the interest on the value of the transfer of property was to be calculated on the average between the amount initially offered by the Commissioner and that finally awarded, at the rate of 5% per annum. Furthermore, the amendments provided that, with effect from the date of the new presidential declaration, the interest payable was that earned on the bank deposit made by the Commissioner.
4. Compensation proceedings
15. On 12 April 2007 the Commissioner issued two notices to treat, offering 75,600 Maltese liras (MTL) (approximately 176,284 euros (EUR)) for Land A and MTL 38,800 (approximately EUR 90,566) for Land B. The applicants refused the offer and in 2007 the matter was brought before the Land Arbitration Board (“the LAB”) for it to establish fair compensation.
16. In the compensation proceedings before the LAB the applicants claimed compensation amounting to MTL 440,700 (approximately EUR 1,026,555) for Land A and MTL 226,400 (approximately EUR 527,370) for Land B.
17. By a decision of 4 June 2009 the LAB established fair compensation as being EUR 877,707.89 for Land A and EUR 450,996.68 for Land B.
18. The Commissioner appealed and by a judgment of 24 February 2012 the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the LAB for the Commissioner to be able to request explanations by the technical members of the LAB as to their calculations.
19. The Commissioner filed questions to the technical members on 30 May 2012. The latter replied on 4 July 2012. The Commissioner filed his submissions on 6 September 2012 and on 28 November 2012 the applicants filed their replies.
20. By a decision of 5 June 2013 the LAB confirmed the valuations as set out in their decision of 4 June 2009.
21. The Commissioner again appealed and by two judgments of 28 March 2014 the Court of Appeal turned down the appeal and confirmed the quantum of compensation.
5. Further amendments
In the meantime in 2009 the Ordinance was again amended by means of Act XXI of 2009 (see Relevant domestic law and practice below).
6. The transfer of property
22. On 16 June 2014 the deed of transfer of ownership was published and the Government paid the applicants the value as established by the LAB (i.e. EUR 877,707.89 for Land A and EUR 450,996.68 for Land B) plus interest with effect from the date of taking of the land up to the date of the publication of the deed, in accordance with the Ordinance as it stood at that date, that is in 2014, applying the relevant amendments in particular Section 12(3) of the Ordinance. Thus, interest was paid on the average between the amount initially offered by the Commissioner and that finally awarded by the LAB, at the rate of 5% per annum (i.e. EUR 822,258.14 and 422,943.33 respectively for Land A and B), together with the interest earned on the bank deposit affected by the Commissioner in connection with the second declaration (i.e. EUR 31,386 and EUR 16,678 respectively for Land A and B). This reflected a total interest of EUR 853,644 on Land A and EUR 439,172 on Land B.
7. Constitutional redress proceedings (No. 25/2004/1) ‑ continuation
23. Following the deed of transfer, the applicants felt that their property rights had been breached as a result of the interest paid to them which was substantially lower than that which they would have received under the previous practice.
24. On 31 July 2014 the applicants requested the court to reappoint their case for hearing and the court upheld the request. They explained that their complaint no longer required the Commissioner to take the relevant steps to undertake the transfer the property but that their complaint was now related to the amount of interest paid. They considered that, as a result of the amendments, the applicants were denied interest in the amount of EUR 828,025. It followed that the Government had introduced legislative amendments shifting the situation in the Government’s favour, decades after the taking of the applicants’ property. Moreover, during such time the applicants had had no access to court to request compensation, and could thus do nothing against the inaction of the authorities.
25. By a judgment of 23 May 2016 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence rejected the applicants’ updated claims on the merits.
26. Having accepted to take cognisance of the case in the absence of any ordinary remedies the court considered that the taking had been lawful and pursued the public interest (road construction).
27. As to the proportionality of the measure, the court noted that the values awarded for the land had not been contested. What was being contested was the payment of interest. The applicants had been paid EUR 2,621,521.35 (value of land plus interest) and they were claiming a further EUR 789,076.52 which represented the difference between the interest paid to them and that which would have been paid to them in line with the practice applicable before the amendments. The court noted that the previous practice was calculated at 5% interest on the value established, which was based on the rates the banks applied to simple savings accounts at the time. However, in more recent years the banking reality had changed and ordinary savings accounts were receiving interest of between 0.3% and 0.18%. Moreover, it was relevant that the value of the land was based on its value in 2005 and not in 1983 when the land had been taken over by the authorities. Thus, the applicants had already benefitted from the increase in value of the property. It would have been otherwise had the valuation of the land been based on its value in 1983, in which case the rate of interest would have been of great importance. Given that the applicants were awarded the value of the land in 2005, and nevertheless were also awarded interest on that amount, dating back from 1983, the court considered that such interest which formed part of the compensation was also adequate. The court noted that it was nevertheless unacceptable that the applicants had had to wait thirty years to receive compensation for the taking of their property.
28. The applicants were ordered to pay one third of the costs of the proceedings.
29. On 13 June 2016 the applicants appealed, noting in particular that the court had not taken account of the fact that the amendment had had retroactive effect.
30. By a judgment of 25 November 2016 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal and confirmed the first‑instance judgment. In particular it noted that it was of great importance that the value of the land was based on a 2005 valuation, i.e. twenty‑two years after the taking, and thus the applicants had already benefitted from the increase in value of the property. It followed that a calculation of interest based on a mean between the two valuations was adequate in such circumstances. Furthermore, the new amendments had not changed the law. Indeed prior to the amendments, the payment of interest was based on a practice which reflected the rates established by banks, it followed that the amendments introduced a new rule solely to fill a lacuna which existed in the law. Indeed in that light the applicants had had no vested right. In conclusion, while the applicants had had to wait thirty years for their compensation, they had eventually obtained such compensation, which was, moreover, adequate. The costs of appeal proceedings were to be paid by the applicants.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. The Ordinance
31. Prior to the amendments introduced in 2002, the LandAcquisition (PublicPurposes) Ordinance, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta, which has now been repealed, provided that:
Section 12(1)
“…the competent authority shall give to the owner a notice … by means of a judicial act, stating the amount of compensation, as shown in a valuation to be attached to the notice to treat.”
Section 13(1)
“The amount of compensation to be paid for any land required by a competent authority may be determined at any time by agreement between the competent authority and the owner (…).”
Section 22
“If the owner shall by a judicial act decline to accept the offer made by the competent authority, the matter shall be brought before the Board by an application to be made by the competent authority, and the Board shall give all necessary orders or directions in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance.”
32. In so far as relevant, Section 12(3) of the same Ordinance, as amended in 2006, concerning the interest applicable in cases of expropriation read:
“simple interest at the rate of five per centum per annum shall accrue on the value of the land in accordance with Schedule 2, and for the period indicated in such Schedule, in favour of any person having a right of compensation in respect of any land acquired by the absolute purchase thereof under this Ordinance:
Provided that where a notice to treat has been issued under this Ordinance, the interest shall accrue on the value determined in such notice, from the date of the taking of possession of the land by the competent authority up to the date of transfer by title of absolute purchase in favour of the Government of Malta:
Provided also that when a notice to treat has been issued and the person entitled to compensation elected not to accept the price offered therein, simple interest at the rate of five per centumper annum shall accrue on the value of the land in accordance with Schedule 3, and for the period indicated in that Schedule, in favour of any person having a right of compensation in respect of any land acquired by absolute purchase thereof under this Ordinance.”
33. Schedule 3 to the Ordinance provided that the rate of 5% per annum was to be calculated on the mean value between the value on the date of the taking (i.e. the offer made by the Commissioner) and the value on the date of the determination of the value by the LAB.
34. In so far as relevant, Section 22 of the same Ordinance, subsequent to the 2009 amendments, read as follows:
Article 22
“(1) If the competent authority and the owner agree as to the amount of compensation for any land, the Board, on the application of any one of the parties, shall make an order carrying the agreement into effect:
Provided that the amount of acquisition rent or recognition in rent, as the case may be, shall be determined in terms of the relevant provisions of article 27.
(2) Where the land is to be acquired by the absolute purchase thereof (including the acquisition by conversion from possession and use or public tenure into absolute ownership), the President’s Declaration issued for the purposes of article 3, shall state the amount of compensation which the competent authority is willing to pay for the land to which the declaration refers. The Declaration shall have attached with it a valuation drawn up by an architect and where available a site plan of the land described in the Declaration.
(3) Within fifteen working days from the publication of the President’s Declaration as is referred to in subarticle (2) in the Gazette the Government shall deposit in an interest bearing bank account (which will guarantee a minimum of interest per annum as the Minister responsible for lands may by regulation under this subarticle prescribe) a sum equal to the amount of compensation offered in the President’s Declaration. Such sum shall be freely withdrawn together with any interests accrued thereon by the person or persons entitled to such compensation upon evidence to the entitlement thereto, in a manner satisfactory to the competent authority:
…
(5) The amount deposited as provided in subarticle (3) together with any interests accruing thereon may be withdrawn as provided in the said subarticle whether or not the sum deposited as compensation has been accepted as the amount of compensation due, and the withdrawal of such deposit interests shall not prejudice the right competent to any person to take action according to this Ordinance for the purpose of determining any further compensation that may be payable to him in accordance with this Ordinance.
(6) Where the person entitled to compensation does not accept that the amount deposited is adequate, such person may apply to the Board for the determination of the compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance. Such application shall, on pain of nullity, state the compensation that in the opinion of the applicant is due.
(7) Such application shall be filed in the Registry of the Board within twenty one days from the notification of the judicial act by the competent authority accepting proof of evidence in accordance with subarticle (4). The Board shall determine such compensation and shall give all necessary orders and directives in accordance with this Ordinance…”
2. The Civil Code
35. Article 1078 (b) of the Maltese Civil Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Where the time for the performance of the obligation has been left to the will of the debtor, or where it has been agreed that the debtor shall discharge the obligation when it will be possible for him to do so, or when he will have the means for so doing, the following rules shall be observed:
…
(b) if the subject-matter of the obligation is other than the payment of a sum of money, the time within which the obligation is to be performed shall be fixed by the court according to the circumstances.”
COMPLAINTS
36. The applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that they had been denied interest as was to be calculated at the time of the taking of their property as a result of legislative intervention by the State which shifted the balance in the Government’s favour.
THE LAW
A. Joinder of the applications
37. In accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their similar factual and legal background.
B. Article 6 of the Convention
38. The applicants claimed that they had been subjected to legislative interventions by the State which shifted the balance in the Government’s favour. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …everyone is entitled to a fair …hearing …by [a] …tribunal …”
39. The Court reiterates that for Article 6 § 1 to be applicable under its “civil” limb, there must be a “dispute” regarding a “right” which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether it is protected under the Convention. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play (see Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, § 99, 19 September 2017).
40. Everyone has the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way, Article 6 § 1 embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is, the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, is one particular aspect (see Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], no. 51357/07, § 113, 15 March 2018, and Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 36, Series A no. 18).
41. Further, the Court has repeatedly ruled that although the legislature is not prevented from regulating, through new retrospective provisions, rights derived from the laws in force, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 preclude, except for compelling public interest reasons, interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute (see, among many other authorities, Stran Greek Refineries and StratisAndreadis v. Greece, 9 December 1994, § 49, Series A no. 301‑B; National &ProvincialBuildingSociety, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Societyv. the United Kingdom, 23 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VII and Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], nos. 24846/94 and 34165/96 to 34173/96, § 57, ECHR 1999‑VII).
42. Respect for the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial require that any reasons adduced to justify such measures be treated with the greatestpossibledegree of circumspection (see Stran Greek Refineries, cited above, § 49, and Maggio and Others v. Italy, nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and 56001/08, § 45, 31 May 2011). Financial considerations cannot by themselves warrant the legislature substituting itself for the courts in order to settle disputes (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 132, ECHR 2006‑V and Azienda Agricola SilverfunghiS.a.s.and Others v. Italy, nos. 48357/07 and 3 others, § 76, 24 June 2014). However, laws may be enacted before the start of proceedings (see Organisationnationale des syndicatsd’infirmierslibéraux (ONSIL) v. France (dec.), no. 39971/98, ECHR 2000‑IX) and it is possible for general legislation which may prove unfavourable to litigants to be enacted if it did not actually target pending judicial proceedings and was not aimed at circumventing the principle of the rule of law (see GorraizLizarraga and Others v. Spain, no. 62543/00, § 72, ECHR 2004‑III).
43. The Court notes that the authorities took possession of the applicants’ land on 4 November 1983, but it was only in 2007 that the applicants were offered compensation and that, upon their refusal of such offer, proceedings ensued before the LAB. However, the legislative action complained of took place in 2006. The Court further notes that, although the applicants in the present case do not complain so before this Court, it has previously been found that the impossibility of applicants to institute proceedings in such circumstances amounted to a breach of access to court (see, for example, Curmi v. Malta, no. 2243/10, § 57, 22 November 2011), often followed by a finding of a violation in respect of the length of proceedings before the LAB (see, for example, Frendo Randon and Others v. Malta, no. 2226/10, § 73, 22 November 2011 and Azzopardi v. Malta, no. 28177/12, § 57, 6 November 2014). Similar reflections were made in passing by the Constitutional Court in the present case (see paragraph 30 in fine).
44. The Court considers that against that specific background it could be possible to argue that a legislative intervention contrary to the Convention may occur even before judicial proceedings have started (see, a contrario, Organisationnationale des syndicatsd’infirmierslibéraux (ONSIL), cited above). In this connection the Court reiterates that when determining the period to be taken into account for the purposes of the length of proceedings, in the civil sphere, while the “reasonable time” usually begins at the moment the action was instituted before the tribunal (see, for example, Erkner and Hofauer v. Austria, 23 April 1987, § 64, Series A no. 117), it is also conceivable that in certain circumstances the period might begin earlier (see Golder, cited above, § 32). This is exceptional and has been accepted where, for example, certain preliminary steps were a necessary prerequisite to the proceedings (see, for example, K. v. Italy, no. 38805/97, § 35, ECHR 2004‑VIII). Thus, in cases in which an administrative authority’s decision is a necessary preliminary for bringing the case before a tribunal, the relevant period does not start running when the request is lodged but only as soon as a “dispute” arises (see Morscher v. Austria, no. 54039/00, § 38, 5 February 2004; and by implication, Blake v. the United Kingdom, no. 68890/01, § 40, 26 September 2006).
45. However, the Court does not find it necessary to decide on this matter for the purposes of the present case, since even assuming that the State action in the instant case could be considered as a legislative intervention pending proceedings, it was nevertheless Convention compliant for the following reasons.
46. Primarily the Court notes that the legislative action complained of did not change the existent legal framework relating to compulsory purchase or compensation, but only a general practice on the calculation of interest on compensation which had not been regulated by law beforehand. Secondly, the legislative action complained of did not determine the substance of the dispute ‑ indeed the applicants were successful in obtaining compensation ‑ but only affected the calculation of interest, which is usually calculated on final payment by the State and not necessarily determined judicially. It therefore cannot be said that the legislative action was “designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute”, and still less was it designed to affect the substantive outcome.
47. More importantly, the Court shares the reasoning of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 30 above). It further considers that in such a situation the State was only trying to regulate a lacuna in the law which ‑ as a result of domestic practice ‑ could have led to applicants taking advantage of interest rates which did not reflect the realities of the market and in turn allowed them to make windfall profits (compare, National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society, cited above, § 112). Such a situation had had an impact on the public coffer and did not target specific proceedings. In view of the effects of the lacuna in the law, the situation deserved to be attended to by the legislature and therefore could not be considered as unforeseeable (compare EEG-SlachthuisVerbistIzegemv. Belgium(dec.), no. 60599/00, 10 November 2005). Thus, set against the specific above‑mentioned background, the Court can accept that the State had compelling public interest motives in taking such a legislative action (compare, OGIS‑InstitutStanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, nos. 42219/98 and 54563/00, § 72, 27 May 2004) and the introduction of the provisions on calculating interest did not adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings.
48. Accordingly, the applicants’ complaint under Article 6 is inadmissible as manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
C. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
49. The applicants claimed that they had been deprived of their possessions in so far as they had obtained a lesser sum in interest than that which they would have been awarded according to the practice prior to the legislative amendments. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
50. The Court reiterates that the concept of “possessions” referred to in the first part of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to the ownership of physical goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as “property rights”, and thus as “possessions” for the purposes of this provision. In each case the issue that needs to be examined is whether the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 1999-II, and Brosset-Triboulet and Others v. France [GC], no. 34078/02, § 65, 29 March 2010). “Possessions” can be existing possessions or assets, including, in certain well‑defined situations, claims. For a claim to be capable of being considered an “asset” falling within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the claimant must establish that it has a sufficient basis in national law, for example where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming it. Where that is the case, the concept of “legitimate expectation” can come into play (see Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, § 63, ECHR 2005‑IX, andKopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, §§ 35 and 48‑52, ECHR 2004‑IX).
51. In the present case the applicants base their complaint on the premise that according to the practice prior to the legislative intervention they would have been paid interest of a certain amount. However, the Court notes that the applicants do not have a domestic judgment in their favour, nor have they in any way substantiated a legitimate expectation to be paid interest at the rate demanded by them in the situation which applied to their case i.e. where, pursuant to the 2002 amendments, the value of their land was taken to be that at the time of the fresh declaration, namely in 2005 (see paragraph 13 above) and not that on the day of the taking in 1983. In consequence it cannot be said that they had a possession for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Lay Lay Company Limitedv. Malta, no. 30633/11, § 79, 23 July 2013).
52. Thus, this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3, and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Decides to join the applications;
Declares the applications inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 4 April 2019.
Fatoş Aracı BrankoLubarda
DeputyRegistrar President
_________________
Appendix
Application no.16467/17
1. Emidio AZZOPARDI is a Maltese national who was born in 1950, and lives in Rabat, Għawdex.
Application no.24115/17
1. Victor ATTARD is a Maltese national who was born in 1949, and lives in Xagħra, Għawdex.
2. Felicia ATTARD is a Maltese national who was born in 1955, and lives in Xagħra, Għawdex.
3. Francis ATTARD is a Maltese national who was born in 1954, and lives in Xagħra, Għawdex.
4. Martin ATTARD is a Maltese national who was born in 1951, and lives in Xagħra, Għawdex.
5. Catherine AZZOPARDI is a Maltese national who was born in 1952, and lives in Rabat, Għawdex.
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