CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY (European Court of Human Rights) 75805/16 and 426 others

The present applications mainly concern the arrest and pre-trial detention of the applicants – all of whom were sitting as judges or prosecutors at different types and/or levels of court at the material time – on suspicion of their membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terrorist Organisation / Parallel State Structure” (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması, hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”), in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016.


SECOND SECTION
CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Applications nos. 75805/16 and 426 others – see appended list)
JUDGMENT

Art 5 § 1 • Lawful detention • Pre-trial detention of judges suspected of membership of an illegal organisation following a coup attempt, on the basis of an unreasonable extension of the concept of in flagrante delicto

STRASBOURG
23 November 2021

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Turan and Others v. Turkey,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, President,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Egidijus Kūris,
Branko Lubarda,
Pauliine Koskelo,
Marko Bošnjak,
Saadet Yüksel, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications (nos. 75805/16 and 426 others– see appended list) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by 427 Turkish nationals (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table;

the decision to give notice to the Turkish Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 19 October 2021,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1. The present applications mainly concern the arrest and pre-trial detention of the applicants – all of whom were sitting as judges or prosecutors at different types and/or levels of court at the material time – on suspicion of their membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terrorist Organisation / Parallel State Structure” (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması, hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”), in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016.

THE FACTS

2. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. At the time of the events giving rise to the present applications, they were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court, or served as judges in lower courts (hereinafter referred to as “ordinary judges”) or as prosecutors.

3. Some of the applicants were represented by lawyers, whose names are listed in the appendix. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Hacı Ali Açıkgül, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Turkey.

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

I. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE

A. Attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and declaration of a state of emergency

5. During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council” attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically installed National Assembly, government and President of Turkey. Further information regarding the events of that night may be found in the case of Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, § 7, 3 March 2020).

6. The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the attempt on the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of FETÖ/PDY.

7. On 16 July 2016 the Bureau for Crimes against the Constitutional Order at the Ankara public prosecutor’s office initiated a criminal investigation ex proprio motu into, inter alios, the suspected members of FETÖ/PDY within the judiciary. According to the information provided by the Government, this investigation against judges and prosecutors, including members of high courts, was initiated in accordance with the provisions of the ordinary law, on the ground that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto falling with the jurisdiction of the assize courts.

8. In instructions issued to the Directorate General of Security on the same day, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor noted that the offence of attempting to overthrow the government and the constitutional order by force was still ongoing and that there was a risk that members of the FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation who were suspected of committing the offence in question might flee the country. He asked the Directorate General of Security to contact all the regional authorities with a view to taking into police custody all the judges and public prosecutors whose names were listed in the appendix to the instructions – including some of the applicants –, and to ensure that they were brought before a public prosecutor to be placed in pre-trial detention under Article 309 of the Criminal Code.

9. On 20 July 2016 the Government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers.

10. On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15 (for the contents of the notice, see Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, no. 12778/17, § 66, 16 April 2019, or Baş, cited above, § 109).

11. During the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers passed several legislative decrees under Article 121 of the Constitution (see Baş, cited above, § 52). One of them, Legislative Decree no. 667, published in the Official Gazette on 23 July 2016, provided in its Article 3 that the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu ‑“the HSYK”) was authorised to dismiss any judges or prosecutors who were considered to belong or to be affiliated or linked to terrorist organisations or organisations, structures or groups found by the National Security Council to have engaged in activities harmful to national security.

12. On 18 July 2018 the state of emergency was lifted.

B. Suspensions and dismissals

1. Suspensions of ordinary judges and prosecutors

13. On 16 July 2016 the 3rd Chamber of the HSYK noted that, in accordance with the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor, a criminal investigation had been initiated in respect of judges and prosecutors suspected of being members of FETÖ/PDY (see paragraph 7 above). It decided to submit a proposal to the chairman of the HSYK to approve the opening of an investigation, in accordance with section 82 of Law no. 2802 on judges and prosecutors (“Law no. 2802”) (see Baş, cited above, § 67, for the relevant section of Law no. 2802).

14. On the same day, the 2nd Chamber of the HSYK held an extraordinary meeting. It noted that the proposal by the 3rd Chamber for the opening of an investigation had been accepted by the chairman of the HSYK and that the presidency of the Inspection Board of the Ministry of Justice had appointed a chief inspector. On the basis of the report drawn up by the chief inspector, the 2nd Chamber of the HSYK suspended 2,735 judges and prosecutors – including some of the applicants – from their duties for a period of three months, pursuant to sections 77(1) and 81(1) of Law no. 2802, on the grounds that there was strong suspicion that they were members of the terrorist organisation that had instigated the attempted coup and that keeping them in their posts would hinder the progress of the investigation and undermine the authority and reputation of the judiciary. Its decision was based on information and documents in the investigation files that it had been sent prior to the coup attempt and on information obtained following research by the intelligence services. Further details regarding the HSYK’s decision may be found in the Baş case (ibid., §§ 17-20).

15. It appears from the information provided by the Government that by decisions taken on 19 and 22 July, 10 August and 13 October 2016, the HSYK decided to suspend more judges and prosecutors from their duties –including some of the applicants – on grounds similar to those in its earlier decision of 16 July 2016.

2. Suspensions of members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court

16. On 17 July 2016 the 1st Presidency Board of the Court of Cassation issued a decision (no. 244/a) revoking the existing authorities of the members of the Court of Cassation whose names had been indicated by the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, including some of the applicants. A similar decision (no. 2016/27) was taken by the Presidency Board of the Supreme Administrative Court on the same date in respect of its members concerned, including, once again, some of the applicants.

3. Dismissals

17. On 24 August 2016, applying Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 667 (noted in paragraph 11 above), the plenary HSYK dismissed 2,847 judges and prosecutors – including many of the applicants – considered to be members of or affiliated or linked to FETÖ/PDY (decision no. 2016/426). The HSYK found that the position of the judges and prosecutors concerned within structures that were incompatible with the principles of independence and impartiality and their activities within the organisation’s hierarchy, coupled with their underlying sense of allegiance, were likely to undermine the reputation and authority of the judiciary. It held that the fact that judges and prosecutors obeyed the instructions of a hierarchical structure outside the State apparatus presented a genuine obstacle to the right of citizens to a fair trial.

18. According to the information provided by the parties, a total of a further 1,393 judges and prosecutors were dismissed from the profession in the following months, including some of the applicants.

II. APPLICANTS’ ARREST AND PRE-TRIAL DETENTION

A. Decisions for the applicants’ arrest and pre-trial detention

19. Acting on the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office (see paragraph 8 above), regional and provincial prosecutors’ offices initiated criminal investigations in respect of individuals suspected of being involved in the coup attempt and/or alleged to have links to the FETÖ/PDY organisation, including the applicants.

20. Following their arrest and detention in police custody, the applicants were placed in pre-trial detention on various dates between 18 July 2016 and 19 October 2016, mainly on suspicion of membership of the FETÖ/PDY organisation, an offence punishable under Article 314 of the Criminal Code (see Baş, cited above, § 58). The pre-trial detention orders were issued by the magistrates’ courts located at the respective places of the applicants’ arrest.

21. When ordering the applicants’ pre-trial detention, the magistrates’ courts relied mainly on the fact that the applicants had been suspended from their duties as judges or prosecutors on the grounds of their membership of the organisation that had instigated the attempted coup and that the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office had requested the launching of a criminal investigation in their regard. The magistrates noted the existence of further incriminating evidence in respect of some of the applicants, such as witness statements or evidence suggesting their use of the ByLock messaging system. Regard being had to the state of the evidence, the nature of the alleged offence or offences – which were among the so-called ‘catalogue’ offences listed in Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) –, the potential sentences and the ongoing investigations into the coup attempt across the country, the magistrates’ courts held that pre-trial detention was a proportionate measure. In the majority of the decisions, it was noted specifically that the criminal investigation was governed by the ordinary rules, given that the offence of which the suspects were accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a ’continuing offence’ (temadi olan suç) and that there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto governed by the relevant provisions of domestic law (see Baş, cited above, § 67, as regards the relevant section 94 of Law no. 2802, and paragraphs 30 and 31 below as regards Laws nos. 2797 or 2575, respectively).

22. On different dates the magistrates’ courts dismissed the applicants’ objections against the initial orders for their detention, mainly on the same grounds as those indicated in the initial detention orders.

23. The applicants’ continued pre-trial detention was reviewed automatically pursuant to Article 108 of the CCP, which provides for a review every thirty days (see Baş, cited above, § 62). Their requests for release were examined at the same time as the automatic periodic review of their detention, as provided under Article 3, paragraph 1 (ç), of Legislative Decree no. 668 (ibid., § 81). The reviews, which were carried out on the basis of the case files, were not conducted on an individual basis but concerned a large group of suspects. Both the decisions to prolong the pre‑trial detention and the dismissals of the applicants’ objections to their detention essentially involved a repetition of the reasons put forth at the time of the initial pre-trial detention.

B. Decisions concerning the applicants’ continued pre-trial detention, and their indictment, trial and conviction

24. According to the information provided by the parties, on various dates the applicants were charged with membership of a terrorist organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code. During the subsequent trial stage, the first-instance courts, ruling either at the scheduled hearings or at periodic reviews carried out between the hearings, ordered the applicants’ continued detention and dismissed their requests for release on grounds similar to those noted above.

25. According to the latest information in the case file, the first-instance courts have concluded their examinations regarding all applicants, except for a few. Most of the applicants were convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation, and some sixteen applicants were acquitted. For the most part, the appeal proceedings are still pending before the regional courts of appeal or the Court of Cassation, as relevant, except in the case of a few applicants whose convictions or acquittals have become final.

C. Individual applications to the Constitutional Court

26. In the meantime, the applicants lodged one or more individual applications with the Constitutional Court in respect of, inter alia, the alleged violation of their right to liberty and security on various accounts, all of which were declared inadmissible.

27. Amongst the complaints lodged by the applicants was the one concerning their detention in alleged breach of the procedural safeguards afforded to judges and prosecutors in domestic law and the lack of jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts that had ordered their detention, which the Constitutional Court found to be inadmissible. It held essentially that in view of the nature of the alleged offence and the manner in which it had been committed, it had been appropriate to accept the jurisdiction of the magistrates who had ordered the applicants’ detention. In many of the decisions, it further stated expressly that there had been no error of assessment or any arbitrariness as regards the application of the provisions relating to discovery in flagrante delicto.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

I. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

28. The relevant domestic law and practice, including the pertinent case‑law of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, have for the most part been set out in the cases of Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (cited above, §§ 46-48, 50-55 and 59-64) and Baş v. Turkey (cited above, §§ 52‑67, 70, 81-90, 98-99, 101-103). Further elements of relevant domestic law and practice are summarised below.

A. Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (Law no. 5271)

29. The relevant parts of Article 141 § 1 of the CCP provide:

“Compensation for damage … may be claimed from the State by anyone …

(a) who has been arrested or taken into or kept in detention under conditions or in circumstances not complying with the law;

(d) who, even if he or she was detained lawfully during the investigation or trial, has not been brought before a judicial authority within a reasonable time and has not obtained a judgment on the merits within a reasonable time;

(e) who, after being arrested or detained in accordance with the law, was not subsequently committed for trial or was acquitted; …”

B. Court of Cassation Act (Law no. 2797)

30. The relevant provision of the Court of Cassation Act (Law no. 2797) provides:

Preliminary examination, investigation and prosecution of offences

Personal and duty-related offences

Section 46

“The opening of an investigation against the First President, the first deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Court of Cassation, as well as the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, in respect of offences related to their official duties or personal offences shall be subject to the decision of the First Presidency Board. However, in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, the preliminary and initial investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of ordinary law.”

C. Supreme Administrative Court Act (Law no. 2575)

31. The relevant parts of the Supreme Administrative Court Act (Law no. 2575) provide:

Investigation

Section 76

“1. The initial investigation in respect of offences committed by the President, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Supreme Administrative Court in connection with or in the course of their official duties shall be conducted by a committee composed of a chamber president and two members selected by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court.

…”

The procedure for the prosecution of personal offences

Section 82

“1. The proceedings regarding the personal offences committed by the President, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Supreme Administrative Court shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions concerning the personal offences committed by the President, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the members of the Court of Cassation.

…”

D. Case-law of the Court of Cassation

32. On 2 July 2019 the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation delivered a judgment (E. 2019/9.MD-312, K.2019/514) regarding a former member of the HSYK suspected of membership of FETÖ/PDY, where it addressed, inter alia, the question of the compatibility with domestic law of the conduct of the preliminary investigation in accordance with the rules of ordinary law. After summarising its case law relating to the elements of the offence of membership of an armed organisation, which it noted was a personal offence, and to the notion of “continuing offence” (see, in this regard, Baş, cited above, §§ 83-86 and 90), the Court of Cassation proceeded with the examination of the concept of “in flagrante delicto” and its application in the context of continuing offences. Referring to the prevalent view in Turkish legal doctrine, the Court of Cassation held that continuing offences could be committed in flagrante delicto, and that the situation of discovery in flagrante delicto would persist in respect of continuing offences as long as the offence continued to be committed. The Court of Cassation pronounced as follows:

“… As indicated as part of the general remarks regarding membership of an organisation, in order to establish the presence of membership, it is sufficient that the perpetrator continually submits (…) to the hierarchy of the organisation by his concrete actions … Accordingly, membership (…) does not need to be demonstrated by other acts … On the other hand, in the event that the competent authorities have obtained evidence that raises a suspicion that the perpetrator is a member of a criminal organisation, and that the continuity of the membership can be established on the basis of that evidence …, it is not contrary to the law to … accept that the perpetrator had been [caught] while committing the offence [in question], within the meaning of Article 2 (j), paragraph 1 of the CCP, and that, therefore, [he or she] may be subject to the terms of discovery in flagrante delicto. It is not necessary here that the perpetrator’s criminal act be observed by the general public; it is sufficient that the competent authorities know at the time of arrest that the acts demonstrating the continuity of the membership of the organisation persist and that the perpetrator had not left the organisation.”

33. The Court of Cassation held that contrary to the Court’s findings in the case of Alparslan Altan, its interpretation of the concept of “discovery in flagrante delicto” in the context of the arrest of judges and prosecutors for alleged membership of FETÖ/PDY was not based on an unreasonable and arbitrary judicial interpretation. Its approach, which had also found acceptance by the Constitutional Court, was rather grounded in doctrine, on the theory of organised crime and, above all, on domestic legal provisions that had been enacted by the legislature in a consistent and harmonious manner, which the Strasbourg Court had not taken into account.

34. Referring to Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, the Court of Cassation further stated that in view of their nature and gravity, the investigation of certain offences, including that of membership of an armed organisation, would be conducted directly by the public prosecutors in accordance with the terms of the ordinary law, even if the offence was committed during, or in connection with, the performance of an official duty. Accordingly, where such grave offences were concerned, the requirements of Article 161 § 8 of the CCP would prevail and the special investigatory procedures envisaged in certain laws – such as Law no. 2797 in respect of the members of the Court of Cassation –, would not be applicable, regardless of whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto or not. The Court of Cassation contended that in its Alparslan Altan judgment, the Court had failed to assess the issue of the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention from the standpoint of Article 161 § 8 of the CCP.

35. The Court of Cassation concluded, in the light of the foregoing, that the conduct of the investigation against the defendant under the terms of the ordinary law had been in accordance with the relevant legal framework, that it had not resulted from an extensive or arbitrary interpretation of the law, and that it had thus been compatible with the requirements of the “quality of law”.

E. Case-law of the Constitutional Court

1. Selim Öztürk decision (application no. 2017/4834, 8 May 2019)

36. In a decision delivered on 8 May 2019, the Constitutional Court examined a complaint relating to the alleged unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention on 21 July 2016 of Selim Öztürk, who served as an ordinary judge subject to Law no. 2802 at the material time. According to the excerpt provided in the Constitutional Court’s decision, Mr Öztürk’s pre-trial detention was ordered by the Ankara Magistrates’ Court on the basis of Articles 100 and 101 of the CCP, without any specific reference to section 94 of Law no. 2802 or to the existence of a situation of a discovery in flagrante delicto. When upholding the lawfulness of that detention order, the Constitutional Court nevertheless found that it was factually and legally tenable to hold that the judge in question had been caught in flagrante delicto, having regard to the Court of Cassation’s consistent case-law on the matter, according to which the existence of a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto was inferred at the moment of the arrest of judges and prosecutors suspected of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation –, and to the fact that he had been detained amid efforts to quell the coup attempt for membership of the organisation behind that attempt.

2. Yıldırım Turan decision (application no. 2017/10536, 4 June 2020)

37. On 4 June 2020 the Plenary of the Constitutional Court delivered a decision of inadmissibility in the case of Yıldırım Turan, which concerned the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge – subject to Law no. 2802 – in the aftermath of the coup attempt on suspicion of membership of FETÖ/PDY. Like the present applicants, the applicant in that case complained, inter alia, that his pre-trial detention had been ordered without respect for the special procedural guarantees granted to the members of the judiciary in his position under Law no. 2802.

38. The Constitutional Court stated at the outset that it had delivered many decisions where it had addressed this issue, both in respect of the members of the high courts (such as Alparslan Altan, no. 2016/15586, 11 January 2018, Salih Sönmez, no. 2016/25431, 28 November 2018, and Hannan Yılbaşı, no. 2016/37380, 17 July 2019, concerning members of the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, respectively) and ordinary judges (such as Adem Türkel, no. 2017/632, 23 January 2019). Relying on the relevant legal framework and the case-law of the Court of Cassation, it had found in all those decisions that the offence in question – that is, membership of an armed terrorist organisation – was a personal offence of a continuing nature. This effectively meant that the commission of the crime had been continuing at the time of arrest, and that, therefore, there had been a situation entailing discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts in all the cases concerned, which had rendered inapplicable the special procedural guarantees envisaged under different laws governing the members of the judiciary in question.

39. In two further judgments delivered on 31 October 2019 (namely, A.B., no. 2016/22702, and Mustafa Özterzi, no. 2016/14597, concerning a member of the Court of Cassation and an ordinary judge, respectively), it had consolidated this case-law and had underlined the fact that the assessment regarding the existence of a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto in the prevailing circumstances could not be deemed unfounded, given that the persons arrested were considered to have an organisational relation with FETÖ/PDY, which was behind the coup attempt, and that the arrests had taken place at a time when the efforts to avert that attempt were still ongoing and the threat against national security and public order persisted. The Constitutional Court therefore reiterated that in accepting the existence of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto with respect to the members of the judiciary arrested after the attempted coup, its main reference point had been the coup attempt itself.

40. The Constitutional Court then went on to review the judgment in the Baş case (cited above), where the Court had found a violation of Article 5 § 1 on the basis of its earlier conclusions in Alparslan Altan (cited above) regarding the extensive interpretation of the concept of in flagrante delicto by the domestic courts. According to the Constitutional Court, the Court’s findings in that case involved an assessment not of the application of the Convention, but of the interpretation of the relevant Turkish law. While it acknowledged the binding nature of the Court’s judgments, the Constitutional Court stressed that it was up to the Turkish public authorities, and ultimately to the domestic courts, to interpret the provisions of domestic law relating to the pre-trial detention of members of the judiciary. It held that although the Court was entitled to consider whether the interpretation given by Turkish courts to domestic law violated the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, it should not replace the domestic courts and interpret domestic law first-hand. It therefore deemed it useful to recapitulate the relevant domestic legal framework and practice governing the investigation and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary.

41. The Constitutional Court noted essentially that the existence of the element of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts constituted an exception to the procedural safeguards afforded to all judges and prosecutors, regardless of the level or type of court in which they served. However, unlike the legal framework governing the members of high courts and the elected judicial members of the HSYK, where the distinction between personal and duty-related offences was immaterial for the application of the relevant procedural safeguards, the “personal offences” committed by ordinary judges and prosecutors within the meaning of section 93 of Law no. 2802 would fall outside the protection afforded to them under the same law by reason of their profession. Measures taken in respect of such offences would therefore be subject to the rules of ordinary law, whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto or not.

42. Accordingly, when assessing the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge or prosecutor in the present context, it was of decisive importance to determine whether the offence attributed to him or her was a personal offence or an offence committed during or in connection with the performance of duties. Relying on a number of judgments delivered by the Court of Cassation in the aftermath of the attempted coup, as well as its own relevant case-law from the same period, it reiterated that the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation could not be committed by public officials as part of their duties and, for that reason, the initiation of a criminal investigation against Mr Yıldırım Turan, and his pre-trial detention, were not subject to authorisation by an administrative authority. There was, therefore, no legal obstacle to his arrest pursuant to the terms of the ordinary law.

43. That being so, the Constitutional Court emphasised that the question as to whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 had no bearing on the lawfulness of Mr Yıldırım Turan’s arrest, but was only relevant for the determination of the judicial authority with jurisdiction ratione loci to carry out the investigation and order the pre-trial detention. It accordingly dismissed Mr Yıldırım Turan’s allegation that his deprivation of liberty had lacked a legal basis.

II. INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL

44. The Government referred to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States, entitled “Judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities” and adopted on 17 November 2010. The relevant parts of the Recommendation have been noted in the case of Alparslan Altan (cited above, § 65).

45. They further brought to the Court’s attention Opinion no. 3 of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on the “Principles and Rules Governing Judges’ Professional Conduct, in Particular Ethics, Incompatible Behaviour and Impartiality”, dated 19 November 2002, which provided as follows in its relevant part:

“Article 75: As regards criminal liability, the CCJE considers that:

i) judges should be criminally liable in ordinary law for offences committed outside their judicial office;

…”

III. NOTICE OF DEROGATION BY TURKEY

46. On 21 July 2016 the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Council of Europe sent the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a notice of derogation (see, for the text of the notice of derogation, Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 66, or Baş, cited above, § 109).

47. The notice of derogation was withdrawn on 8 August 2018, following the end of the state of emergency.

THE LAW

I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

48. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment, pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

II. PRELIMINARY QUESTION CONCERNING THE DEROGATION BY TURKEY

49. The Government emphasised at the outset that all of the applicants’ complaints should be examined with due regard to the derogation of which the Secretary General of the Council of Europe had been notified on 21 July 2016 under Article 15 of the Convention. Article 15 provides:

“1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.

2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.

3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.”

50. The parties made submissions regarding the derogation under Article 15 of the Convention along the same lines as those noted in the cases of Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (cited above, §§ 68-70) and Baş v. Turkey (Baş v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 112-114).

51. The Court notes that in Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey (no. 13237/17, § 93, 20 March 2018) it held, in the light of the Constitutional Court’s findings on this point and all the other material in its possession, that the attempted military coup had disclosed the existence of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” within the meaning of the Convention. With regard to the scope ratione temporis and ratione materiae of the derogation by Turkey – a question which the Court could raise of its own motion – the Court observes that the applicants were detained a short time after the coup attempt, the event that prompted the declaration of the state of emergency. It considers that this is undoubtedly a contextual factor that should be fully taken into account in interpreting and applying Article 5 of the Convention in the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, § 103, ECHR 2014, and Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 75).

52. As to whether the measures taken in the present case were strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law, the Court considers it necessary to examine the applicants’ complaints on the merits (see Baş, cited above, § 116).

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION as regards the lawfulness of the applicants’ pre-trial detention

53. The applicants complained mainly that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in breach of the domestic law governing the arrest and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary, and disputed that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto for the purposes of section 94 of Law no. 2802 and section 46 of Law no. 2797. They further argued that the magistrates’ courts had lacked competence and territorial jurisdiction to decide on their detention.

54. The Court considers it appropriate to examine these complaints under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: …”

A. Admissibility

1. The parties’ submissions

55. The Government urged the Court to declare this complaint inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the applicants who had not made use of the relevant compensatory remedy under Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP, which provided for an award of compensation to anyone who had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty, as well as the applicants whose claims under that provision were still pending before the domestic courts. The Government further claimed that one of the applicants (application no. 55057/17) had been granted compensation pursuant to Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP following his acquittal and had therefore lost his victim status. In the Government’s view, any other applicants whose claims for compensation were pending before the competent courts could similarly obtain redress and lose their victim status, which the Court had to take into account in examining the admissibility of their complaints. The Government lastly asked the Court to declare the applications inadmissible for abuse of the right of application to the extent that the applicants had not informed the Court of the developments in their cases following the lodging of their applications.

56. The applicants contested the Government’s arguments.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies

57. Referring to the general principles developed in its case-law regarding the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, for instance, Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, §§ 115-116, ECHR 2015), the Court reiterates firstly that for a remedy in respect of the lawfulness of an ongoing deprivation of liberty to be effective, it must offer a prospect of release (see Mustafa Avcı v. Turkey, no. 39322/12, § 60, 23 May 2017). It notes in this respect that it has already found that the remedy provided for in Article 141 of the CCP is not capable of terminating the deprivation of liberty (see, for instance, Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 84). It therefore rejects the Government’s preliminary objection insofar as it concerns the applicants who are still deprived of their liberty for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

58. Secondly, with regard to the remaining applicants who are no longer in pre-trial detention, the Court recalls that where an applicant, who is no longer in detention, complains that he or she was detained in breach of domestic law, a compensation claim capable of leading to an acknowledgment of the alleged violation and an award of compensation is in principle an effective remedy which needs to be pursued if its effectiveness in practice has been convincingly established (see Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, § 208, 22 December 2020).

59. The Government do not dispute the fact that the applicants have challenged the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention before various domestic instances, including the Constitutional Court, and that on none of those occasions was the unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention acknowledged (see paragraph 27 above). Moreover, the examples of case‑law provided by the Government regarding the domestic courts’ interpretation of the concept of “in flagranto delicto” in the present context demonstrate unequivocally that the applicants’ detention in accordance with the ordinary law provisions, as opposed to the special procedure pertaining to the detention of judges and prosecutors envisaged under the applicable laws, was considered to be compatible with the relevant domestic law by the highest courts of the land (see the case-law cited in paragraphs 32-43 below).

60. The Court considers, in the light of the foregoing, that a compensation claim under Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP would have had no prospects of success in respect of the applicants’ complaint under Article 5 § 1 regarding the unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention. Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicants were not required to make use of that compensatory remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, for a similar finding, Baş, cited above, § 121, and Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, no. 23199/17, § 126, 10 November 2020). It therefore dismisses the Government’s objection in this regard.

(b) Victim status

61. As for the question whether the applicant in application no. 55057/17 may be considered to have lost his victim status on account of the compensation awarded to him under Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP, the Court refers to its consistent and well-established case-law to the effect that a favourable decision or measure is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive applicants of their status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010, and Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 85).

62. The Court notes in this connection that the award in question was made in view of the said applicant’s acquittal and involved no acknowledgment of unlawfulness of his pre-trial detention. The wording of Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP is indeed very clear that compensation under that provision is awarded to those who have been acquitted after being arrested or detained “in accordance with the law”. For this reason, and bearing also in mind the assessment made in paragraph 59 above regarding the domestic courts’ consistent approach to the issue of “lawfulness” in the present context, the award made to the applicant may not be considered as constituting an acknowledgement of the alleged breach of the right to liberty and removing his victim status. For that reason, the Court rejects the Government’s objection in this regard, both in relation to application no. 55057/17 and to any other applicants who may have in the meantime received compensation on the same ground.

(c) Abuse of the right of application

63. The Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, an application may be rejected for abuse if, among other reasons, it was knowingly based on untrue facts (see X and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 22457/16, § 145, 2 February 2021). Incomplete and therefore misleading information may also amount to abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation is given for the failure to disclose that information (see, for instance, Predescu v. Romania, no. 21447/03, § 25, 2 December 2008). The same applies where new, significant developments occur during the proceedings before the Court and where – despite being expressly required to do so by Rule 47 § 6 of the Rules of Court – the applicant fails to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts. However, even in such cases, the applicant’s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 97, ECHR 2012).

64. Having examined the case files and the parties’ submissions in the light of the foregoing principles, the Court does not find any indication to lead it to conclude that the applicants have withheld information in a deliberate attempt to mislead it, or have otherwise abused the right of petition in respect of their complaint in question. The Government’s objection in that connection should, therefore, be dismissed.

(d) Conclusion

65. The Court notes accordingly that the applicants’ complaint regarding the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicants

66. The applicants claimed that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in breach of the special rules of procedure prescribed in domestic law in relation to the arrest and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary.

67. The observations submitted by the applicants who were subject to Law no. 2802 at the time of their detention – that is, ordinary judges and public prosecutors – were largely along the same lines as those noted in the case of Baş (cited above, §§ 133-135).

68. As for the remaining applicants, who were members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court at the material time, they mainly noted that under the relevant provisions governing their respective status – namely section 46 of Law no. 2797 and section 76 of Law no. 2575 – the opening of a criminal investigation in their regard was in principle subject to a decision of their relevant Presidency Boards. They accepted that in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, the preliminary and initial investigations in their respect could be conducted under the rules of ordinary law, but contested the finding that their detention involved a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto. They therefore requested that the Court follow the approach it had taken in its judgment in Alparslan Altan (cited above). Some of the applicants stressed that while there was no doubt as to the “continuing” nature of the offence of membership of an armed organisation under Turkish law, the correlation made in the recent Court of Cassation judgments between such offences and the notion of “discovery in flagrante delicto” was quite far-fetched and even unlawful.

69. Some applicants further added that the offence of which they had been accused could only have been committed in connection with the performance of their official duties, given that the offence was said to relate to judicial actions that they had allegedly carried out under the instructions of the terrorist organisation in question.

(b) The Government

70. The Government largely repeated the observations that they had lodged in the cases of Alparslan Altan and Baş (both cited above, §§ 92-98 and §§ 136-141 respectively), as relevant, and argued that, contrary to the Court’s findings in those cases, the pre-trial detention of the applicants had been in compliance with the applicable domestic legislation.

71. The Government stated at the outset that investigations had been initiated and detention orders had been issued against the applicants pursuant to the general provisions of the CCP on the basis of the consideration that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto. The Government explained in particular that although Laws nos. 2797 and 2575 provided for a special procedure for conducting criminal proceedings against members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the assize courts’ jurisdiction, the investigations would be conducted in accordance with the rules of ordinary law and it would be possible to order preventive measures. Section 94 of Law no. 2802 pertaining to ordinary judges and prosecutors similarly provided for the application of the rules of ordinary law in the event of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the assize courts’ jurisdiction.

72. The Government noted that in the present cases, the investigation conducted against the applicants had concerned their suspected membership of an armed terrorist organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which fell within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. They further noted that, in view of the “continuing” nature of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the magistrates’ courts had found that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto at the time of the applicants’ arrest and had accordingly ordered their detention in accordance with the rules of ordinary law – i.e. Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP – as per the relevant provisions of Laws nos. 2797, 2575 and 2802. In the context of the individual applications brought before it, the Constitutional Court had moreover not accepted the applicants’ argument that the investigating authorities’ assessment – that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto in respect of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation imputed to them – had lacked a factual and legal basis and had thus been arbitrary. The Government therefore considered that the primary issue to be resolved before the Court was whether there was a situation of “in flagrante delicto” in respect of the offence imputed to the applicants.

73. Noting that it was incumbent on the domestic judicial authorities to interpret legal concepts provided in domestic law and to determine their scope, the Government claimed that the decisions of the magistrates’ courts at issue had been in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Cassation. They referred in this connection to the well-established practice of that court, according to which the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation was a “continuing offence” falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. They also referred to the conclusion reached by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation in a leading judgment of 10 October 2017 (E.2017/YYB-997, K.2017/404), where it was held that “there is a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto at the time of the arrest of judges suspected of the offence of membership of an armed organisation, and [consequently] the investigation must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of ordinary law” (see Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 63; for a similar finding, see also the judgment delivered by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation on 26 September 2017 (E. 2017/16-956, K. 2017/370), noted in Baş, cited above, § 88). The Government emphasised in this regard that the Court of Cassation’s jurisprudence on the matter was by no means a product of the post-15 July 2016 period, as that court had interpreted the concepts of “continuing offence” and “in flagrante delicto” in a similar manner in cases that concerned the offence of membership of terrorist organisations other than FETÖ/PDY and that predated the cases at issue. The application of those concepts in the present context had not, therefore, involved a new judicial interpretation that could be regarded as arbitrary.

74. The Government moreover stressed that in accepting the existence of “discovery in flagrante delicto” in respect of the members of the judiciary placed in detention subsequent to the coup attempt of 15 July, the Constitutional Court had taken the coup attempt itself as its main reference point, rather than the continuing nature of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, having regard to the fact that the judges concerned were arrested at a time when the efforts to avert the coup attempt were still ongoing.

75. Referring to the relevant international material (see paragraphs 44-45 above), the Government further noted that judges and prosecutors were criminally liable for offences committed outside their judicial office in the same way as any other citizen. They submitted in this connection that the offence of which the applicants had been accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a personal offence, and not one that could be regarded as an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties. They relied in support of this argument on a judgment delivered on 28 September 2010 by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation (E.2010/162‑K.210/179), where the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, of which the defendant had also been accused, had not been treated as an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties (see, for further information regarding that judgment, Baş, cited above, § 137).

76. The Government acknowledged that Laws nos. 2797 and 2575 pertaining to the members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, as well as Law no. 6216 governing the members of the Constitutional Court as outlined by the Court in Alparslan Altan (cited above, §§ 49 and 106-107), did not differentiate between offences committed in an official or personal capacity, and that the special procedures envisaged under the relevant laws would apply in both circumstances, unless there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto as indicated above. The situation was different, however, in respect of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to the provisions of Law no. 2802, which provided that personal offences governed by section 93 would be treated in accordance with the requirements of the ordinary law. Relying on the positions taken by the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in this regard (see, for instance, the references made in Baş, cited above, § 137, and Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 94, respectively, to the relevant courts’ case-law; see also the judgments noted in paragraphs 32-43 above), the Government therefore argued that even if the Court were to conclude that there had not been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto in respect of the ordinary judges and prosecutors in the present case, their detention would still be subject to the rules of ordinary law by reason of the “personal” nature of the offence imputed to them within the meaning of section 93 of Law no. 2802. The Government therefore argued that the Court’s reliance in Baş (cited above) on the conclusions that it had previously made in Alparslan Altan (cited above), in disregard of the clear distinction between the safeguards afforded to ordinary judges and prosecutors and the members of the Constitutional Court, had been erroneous.

77. They further emphasised in this regard that the decisions taken by the HSYK on 16 July 2016 and afterwards on the suspension of these judges and prosecutors from office did not as such amount to an authorisation for the opening of a criminal investigation due to a duty-related offence; those decisions rather pertained to the disciplinary investigations initiated by the HSYK following the criminal investigation launched ex proprio motu by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office.

78. The Government lastly contended that consideration should also be given to Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, which provided that investigations into certain offences – including the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation imputed to the applicants – would be conducted directly by the public prosecutor pursuant to general provisions, even if the offence had been committed in connection with or in the course of official duties. In other words, Article 161 § 8 would bar the application of the special procedural safeguards afforded to judges and prosecutors under various laws.

2. The Court’s assessment

79. The Court refers at the outset to the relevant principles established in its case-law regarding the right to liberty and security under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see, for instance, Alparslan Altan, cited above, §§ 99-103, and Baş, cited above, § 143, and the cases cited therein).

80. It reiterates in particular that where the “lawfulness” of detention is at issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. This primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. The Court must further ascertain in this connection whether domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein, notably the principle of legal certainty (see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 72, 9 July 2009, with further references).

81. On this last point, the Court stresses that where deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see, for instance, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 92, 15 December 2016, and the cases cited therein).

82. The Court notes, moreover, that it has on many occasions emphasised the special role in society of the judiciary, which, as the guarantor of justice, a fundamental value in a State governed by the rule of law, must enjoy public confidence if it is to be successful in carrying out its duties (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 164, 23 June 2016, with further references). This consideration, set out in particular in cases concerning the right of judges to freedom of expression, is equally relevant in relation to the adoption of a measure affecting the right to liberty of a member of the judiciary. In particular, where domestic law has granted judicial protection to members of the judiciary in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions, it is essential that such arrangements should be properly complied with. Given the prominent place that the judiciary occupies among State organs in a democratic society and the growing importance attached to the separation of powers and to the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 196, 6 November 2018), the Court must be particularly attentive to the protection of members of the judiciary when reviewing the manner in which a detention order was implemented from the standpoint of the provisions of the Convention (see Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 102, and Baş, cited above, § 144).

83. Turning to the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court notes, and the parties do not dispute, that the applicants were all arrested and placed in pre-trial detention in accordance with the rules of the ordinary law, more specifically, on the basis of Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP. The parties diverge, however, on the question of whether the initial pre-trial detention of the applicants – as serving judges and prosecutors enjoying a special status at the time of the events – under the rules of the ordinary law may be said to have satisfied the “quality of the law” requirement. Having regard to the different legal regulations applicable to ordinary judges and prosecutors and members of high courts, respectively, the Court will address this question separately for each group.

(a) Ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802

84. The Court notes, as indicated above, that despite the special procedural safeguards flowing from their status as judges or prosecutors at the material time, the applicants were placed in pre-trial detention in accordance with the ordinary law, for they were deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, as per section 94 of Law no. 2802. The Court further notes that the application of the notion of “in flagrante delicto” in the specific context of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge subject to Law no. 2802 has already led to a finding of violation of Article 5 § 1 in Baş, where the Court found that that notion had been interpreted by the national courts in an extensive manner that was not in conformity with the requirements of the Convention (cited above, §§ 145-162). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, as well as the recent judgments of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court on this matter (see paragraphs 32-43 above), the Court sees no reason to depart from its findings in the Baş case (cited above, §§ 145-162).

85. The Court notes, as the Government have also pointed out, that in acknowledging the existence of “discovery in flagrante delicto” in the present circumstances, the Constitutional Court has adopted a slightly different approach from that followed by the Court of Cassation (see Baş, cited above, §§ 150-156 for a detailed examination of the Court of Cassation’s approach). More specifically, the Constitutional Court has taken the coup attempt as its main reference point, rather than relying solely on the continuing nature of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, in view of the factual context in which the relevant members of the judiciary had been arrested (see paragraph 39 above; see also the Government’s argument noted in paragraph 74 above). According to the Constitutional Court, the applicants, and all members of the judiciary caught in the aftermath of the coup attempt, could be considered to have been caught in flagrante delicto solely on the basis of their alleged organisational ties with the terrorist organisation behind that attempt. While the Court is aware of the unique circumstances that surrounded the applicants’ arrest, it considers that the Constitutional Court’s conjectural approach appears likewise to stretch the concept of “in flagrante delicto” beyond the conventional definition provided in Article 2 of the CCP (see Baş, cited above, §§ 59 and 152), noting in particular the absence of an affirmation on the part of the Constitutional Court or the Government that the applicants were arrested and placed in pre-trial detention while in the process of, or immediately after, committing an act linked directly to the coup attempt (see, for a similar finding, ibid., §§ 149 and 152).

86. The Court further notes the Government’s argument that the pre-trial detention of the relevant applicants under ordinary rules did not necessarily hinge on their discovery in flagrante delicto, but that it was also justified under section 93 of Law no. 2802, as the offence of which they had been accused was a personal offence governed by that section and not a duty‑related one. As indicated in the Baş case (ibid., § 158), it is not for the Court to determine into which category of offences the applicants’ alleged conduct falls. The Court will therefore limit its examination to assessing whether the relevant law was applied in the present circumstances in a manner that complied with the requirements of legal certainty (ibid., § 158).

87. The Court observes in this connection that in the detention orders issued regarding the applicants, no position was taken on the “personal” or “duty-related” nature of the offence at issue and that reference was made, if any, only to section 94 of the Law, which applies to both types of offences. For the reasons enunciated in the Baş case (ibid.), the Court considers that the presence of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto appears to have been decisive for depriving the applicants of the safeguards afforded under the relevant law. The Court further notes that even in those applications where the detention orders did not make an express reference to section 94, it is clear from the relevant case-law of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court that in the event of the arrest of a member of the judiciary for membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the conditions for “discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts” within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 would be considered to have materialised at the time of apprehension, in view of the continuing nature of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation attributed to them (see, for instance, the leading Court of Cassation judgments referred to in Baş, cited above, §§ 88 and 150, and in paragraph 73 above; see also the Constitutional Court judgment noted in paragraph 36 above, where the existence of a situation “in flagrante delicto” was endorsed by that court even in the absence of an express reference to section 94 or a recognition of such situation in the detention order). The Government have moreover acknowledged in their observations that the applicants’ pre-trial detention had been conducted in accordance with the general provisions of the CCP on account of their apprehension in flagrante delicto (see paragraphs 71-72 above).

88. The Court is, therefore, not convinced that the finding as regards the existence of a case of “in flagrante delicto” within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 may foreseeably have been considered as relevant only for determining the jurisdiction ratione loci of the court ordering the detention, without any bearing on the lawfulness of that detention (see Baş, cited above, § 158).

89. The Court also notes the argument made by the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 32-35 above), and repeated in the Government’s observations (see paragraph 78 above), that the special procedure set out in Law no. 2802 would in any event not apply in the applicants’ cases, since the investigation against them would be conducted directly by the public prosecutors by virtue of Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, regardless of whether the offence had been committed in a personal or official capacity or whether they had been caught in flagrante delicto. The Court considers in this regard that the interplay between the relevant provisions of Law no. 2802 and Article 161 § 8, and the effect of the latter on preventive measures that can be taken against members of the judiciary, remains unclear in the present context, noting in particular that Article 161 § 8 appears to relate solely to the designation of the authority responsible for conducting a criminal investigation. The Court further observes from the material before it that this argument advanced under Article 161 § 8 was not taken up by the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 37-43 above). In these circumstances, the Court may not take that provision into consideration for the purposes of determining the lawfulness of the applicants’ pre-trial detention under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

90. The Court reiterates, as also indicated by the Government in their observations, that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. It also reiterates, however, that it falls ultimately to the Court to determine whether the way in which that law is interpreted and applied produces consequences that are consistent with the principles of the Convention (see, for instance, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 250, 1 December 2020, and the cases cited therein). As the Government rightly pointed out, the judicial protection provided under Law no. 2802 does not mean impunity. That said, having regard to the importance of the judiciary in a democratic State governed by the rule of law, and to the fact that protection of this kind is granted to judges and prosecutors not for their own personal benefit but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions, the requirements of legal certainty become even more paramount where a member of the judiciary has been deprived of his or her liberty (see Baş, cited above, § 158).

91. Having regard to the foregoing, and to its considerations in the Baş case, the Court cannot conclude that the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were subject to Law no. 2802 took place in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, for the reasons set out above, the Court considers that the measure at issue cannot be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (ibid., §§ 159-162).

92. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were ordinary judges or prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 at the time of their detention.

(b) Members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court subject to Law no. 2797 and Law no. 2575

93. The Court notes that according to Article 46 of Law no. 2797 governing the members of the Court of Cassation, which is also applicable to members of the Supreme Administrative Court, the initiation of an investigation against these high court judges is subject to the decision of their relevant Presidency Boards, unless in the case of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, which triggers the application of the rules of the ordinary law (see paragraphs 30‑31 above).

94. The Court observes that the legal framework noted above is similar to that applicable to members of the Constitutional Court as laid out in the case of Alparslan Altan (cited above, § 49). It further observes that, just as in that case, the present applicants’ pre-trial detention was carried out in accordance with the terms of the ordinary law by reason of the judicial authorities’ finding that they had been caught in flagrante delicto.

95. The Court notes that the extensive application of the notion of “in flagrante delicto” resulted in the finding of violation of Article 5 § 1 in the aforementioned case of Alparslan Altan (ibid., §§ 104-115). Having regard to the information and documents before it, and to the argument in paragraphs 85 and 89-90 above, as relevant, the Court sees no reason to depart from its findings in Alparslan Altan (cited above). It finds accordingly that the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of their pre-trial detention were similarly not deprived of their liberty in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, as required under Article 5 § 1. The decision to place these applicants in pre-trial detention may not, moreover, be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (ibid., §§ 116-119).

96. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court subject to Law no. 2797 or Law no. 2575 at the time of their detention.

IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

97. Some of the applicants also complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in the absence of reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offence of which they had been accused, that the decisions for their detention had not been accompanied by relevant and sufficient reasons, and that the length of their pre-trial detention had been excessive. Some applicants further argued under Article 5 § 4 that the reviews conducted by the domestic courts into their detention had not complied with certain procedural safeguards, and/or under Article 5 § 5 that there had been no effective domestic remedies to allow them to obtain compensation for the alleged breaches of their rights under Article 5[1].

98. The Court has found above that the applicants’ detention was not prescribed by law, which runs counter to the fundamental principle of the rule of law and to the purpose of Article 5 to protect every individual from arbitrariness. Having regard to the significance and implications of this finding, which goes to the heart of the protection afforded under Article 5 and entails a violation of one of the core rights guaranteed by the Convention, and to the accumulation of thousands of similar applications on its docket concerning detentions in the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état in Turkey, which puts a considerable strain on its limited resources, the Court considers – as a matter of judicial policy – that it is justified in these compelling circumstances to dispense with the separate examination of the admissibility and merits of each remaining complaint raised by each individual applicant under Article 5. The Court also points out in this connection that an individualised examination of the remaining complaints brought by each applicant would significantly delay the processing of these cases, without a commensurate benefit to the applicants or contribution to the development of the case-law. It notes furthermore that it has already addressed the legal issues raised by these complaints for the most part (see, in particular, Selahattin Demirtaş (no 2), Alparslan Altan and Baş, all cited above; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, no. 72/17, 19 January 2021). It is precisely within this exceptional context that the Court, guided by the overriding interest to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention system, which is under threat by the constantly growing inflow of applications (see, mutatis mutandis, Burmych and Others v. Ukraine (striking out) [GC], nos. 46852/13 et al, §§ 111, 119 et seq., 157 and 210, 12 October 2017), decides not to examine the applicants’ remaining complaints under Article 5.

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

99. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

100. The applicants requested compensation in varying amounts in respect of non‑pecuniary damage for the alleged violation of their rights under Article 5. Most of the applicants also claimed pecuniary damage, corresponding mainly to their loss of earnings resulting from their dismissal, as well as the legal costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

101. The Government considered that the applicants’ claims were unsubstantiated and excessive.

A. Relevant general principles

102. The Court reiterates at the outset that Article 41 of the Convention empowers it to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (see Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, § 179, 17 May 2016).

103. The Court also reiterates, however, that it is not its role under Article 41 to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties (see Al Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, § 114, ECHR 2011). The Court is an international judicial authority contingent on the consent of the States signatory to the Convention, and its principal task is to secure respect for human rights, rather than compensate applicants’ losses minutely and exhaustively. Unlike in national jurisdictions, the emphasis of the Court’s activity is on passing public judgments that set human rights standards across Europe (see, mutatis mutandis, Goncharova and other “Privileged Pensioners” cases v. Russia, nos. 23113/08 and 68 others, § 22, 15 October 2009, and Nosov and Others v. Russia, nos. 9117/04 and 10441/04, § 68, 20 February 2014). Accordingly, the awarding of sums of money to applicants by way of just satisfaction is not one of the Court’s main duties but is incidental to its task under Article 19 of the Convention of ensuring the observance by States of their obligations under the Convention (see, for instance, Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no. 35589/08, § 64, 30 March 2017).

104. The Court further notes that it enjoys a certain discretion in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 41, as is borne out by the adjective “just” and the phrase “if necessary” (see, for instance, Arvanitaki‑Roboti and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 27278/03, § 32, 15 February 2008). The exercise of such discretion encompasses such decisions as to refuse monetary compensation or to reduce the amount that it awards (see Arvanitaki‑Roboti and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 27278/03, § 32, 15 February 2008). The Court’s guiding principle in this respect is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 224, ECHR 2009, and Al-Jedda, cited above, § 114).

B. Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present case

105. As regards the applicants’ request for pecuniary damage, which they claim to have sustained as a result of their loss of earnings following their dismissal, the Court observes that the present judgment concerns the applicants’ pre-trial detention and not their dismissal from the office of judge or prosecutor. Accordingly, it cannot discern a causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, and it therefore rejects any claims under that head (see, for a similar finding, Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 154, and Baş, cited above, § 289).

106. As for the remainder of the applicants’ claims for non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, the Court finds it appropriate to rule in equity and make a global and uniform assessment in that respect, having regard to the general principles noted above, as well as to the materials in its possession, its case-law, the repetitive nature of the legal issues examined in the present case and the number of similar applications pending before it. Accordingly, it considers it reasonable to award each of the applicants a lump sum of 5,000 euros (EUR), covering non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

107. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Decides, unanimously, to join the applications;

2. Declares, unanimously, the complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention concerning the lawfulness of the applicants’ initial pre-trial detention admissible;

3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the initial pre-trial detention of the applicants who were ordinary judges and prosecutors at the time of their detention;

4. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the initial pre-trial detention of the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of their detention;

5. Holds, by six votes to one, that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the applicants’ remaining complaints under Article 5 of the Convention;

6. Holds, unanimously,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on these amounts, which are to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

7. Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 November 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Hasan Bakırcı                              Jon Fridrik Kjølbro
Deputy Registrar                                President

___________

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:

(a) Concurring opinion of Judge Koskelo, joined by Judge Ranzoni;

(b) Partly concurring opinion of Judge Yüksel;

(c) Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Kūris.

J.F.K.
H.B.

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KOSKELO, JOINED BY JUDGE RANZONI

108. The present judgment is remarkable in an unusual and highly problematic sense. The Court concludes, in effect, that it is faced with a situation that renders it unable to fulfil its function, and this conclusion is reached, moreover, in the context of core aspects of core rights enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention. Having found a violation of Article 5 § 1 on the ground of the unlawfulness, in terms of domestic law, of the applicants’ initial pre-trial detention (points 3 and 4 of the operative provisions), the Court leaves the other complaints raised by the applicants under Article 5 unexamined (point 5).

109. I have voted in favour of this extraordinary outcome, reluctantly and with great misgivings. Why so?

110. It is well established that there are situations where complaints raised under different provisions of the Convention rely on a factual basis and on legal arguments which present similarities, to the extent that the Court may be justified in considering that, once a violation is found under one provision, it is not necessary to separately examine the issue from the standpoint of another provision also invoked by the applicant. The present joined cases, however, do not fall into that category of situations because, in this instance, the Court refrains from examining all other complaints raised under Article 5 apart from the issue of lawfulness. This exclusion covers, in particular, complaints pertaining to the requirement of reasonable suspicion, which under the Court’s well-established case-law is an essential and necessary condition for pre-trial detention to be in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, and thus at the very core of one of the core rights. The issues raised under those complaints and the complaints based on the lack of lawfulness are not “overlapping”. In fact they concern Convention safeguards which are distinct and fundamentally important.

111. Furthermore, based on the cases already examined by the Court, such as Alparslan Altan v. Turkey and Baş v. Turkey (both cited in the present judgment), as well as the related circumstances transpiring from them, it must be presumed that many of those other complaints might be well‑founded.

112. Nor can it be said, under such circumstances, that the present situation would fall within the criterion used by the Court in certain cases where it may find it appropriate to limit its examination to the “main legal questions” raised by the complaints before it (see, for instance, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).

113. It is also quite clear that the present situation is not comparable with so-called pilot judgment proceedings, where the Court may strike out applications in the same series for the purpose of “returning” the issues to be addressed at the domestic level. In the present situation, it is already evident that the applicants’ recourse to domestic remedies failed and that no further domestic action can be expected to address the alleged violations of Article 5.

114. From a strictly legal point of view, there is hardly any plausible justification for leaving all the other complaints, including those relating to the core issue of reasonable suspicion, unexamined.

115. Moreover, the complaints arise from the detention of judges and prosecutors in very large numbers, which makes the situation even more serious. At the same time, it is precisely the volume of the problem which lies at the heart of the Court’s dilemma (see paragraph 98 of the judgment).

116. The decision not to examine the applicants’ other complaints raised under Article 5 of the Convention thus has a critically novel quality. I have nonetheless arrived at the conclusion that the time has come to acknowledge the reality as it presents itself: if alleged violations occur on a large scale and the rights concerned are no longer protected through domestic remedies, even the international supervision entrusted to the Court reaches its practical limits. The fact that core rights are at stake renders the state of affairs particularly sad and serious but cannot in itself change it. In circumstances where it has become clear that the complaints cannot, and therefore will not, be processed within a reasonable time-frame, or without paralysing the Court’s activity more generally, it is better to make this impasse transparent rather than maintain illusions about the situation. Any further conclusions remain for other bodies to consider.

117. For the reasons set out above (and in paragraph 98 of the judgment itself), the wording used in the operative provision (point 5 – “no need to examine”) is not, in my view, appropriate in the present context. Despite this, however, I voted in favour of this provision as I agree with its outcome.

118. As a final point, I affirm my agreement with the finding of a violation on the grounds that the applicants’ pre-trial detention was not lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, albeit with one additional remark. It concerns the Government’s argument that the lawfulness of the detention of those applicants who were ordinary judges or prosecutors did not, under the relevant domestic law, depend on the existence of discovery in flagrante delicto but on whether the offence in question was a “personal” offence or a “duty-related” one, i.e. an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties (see paragraphs 41 and 76 of the present judgment). The Government have submitted that under domestic law, the offence of membership in a terrorist organisation – of which the applicants were suspected – qualifies as a “personal offence”, rendering the specific procedural safeguards and rules governing ordinary judges and prosecutors inapplicable.

119. While acknowledging that it is primarily a prerogative of the domestic courts to interpret domestic law, the position relied on by the Government nonetheless raises a fundamental question in the present context. In their observations before the Court, the Government have consistently described the organisation in question (“FETÖ/PDY”) as one which had the aim of infiltrating various public institutions, including the judicial system, and of creating a “parallel State”, the latter expression being also used in the wording adopted by the Government to denote that organisation. More specifically, the Government have submitted that judges and prosecutors belonging to that organisation took instructions from its hierarchy when dealing with cases entrusted to them. It is difficult to understand how such submissions can be reconciled with the proposition that membership of this particular organisation nonetheless remains to be characterised as a “personal offence” which is not linked with the exercise of the suspects’ duties as judges or prosecutors. In the specific circumstances of these cases, such an interpretation of domestic law appears neither reasonable nor consistent with the Convention requirements of foreseeability and legal certainty.

PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE YÜKSEL

120. In the present case, I voted with the other members of the Chamber to find a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as regards ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802. Nevertheless, and with all due respect to my colleagues, I submit this concurring opinion to: (a) share the reasons for which I am unable to agree with the Chamber’s reasoning in reaching that conclusion; and (b) emphasise that the discord between the Court and the highest domestic courts on the question of the lawfulness of the detentions of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 remains unresolved.

121. The Chamber’s reasoning in the present case follows the findings of the majority in Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, 3 March 2020) in respect of the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge pursuant to Law no. 2802. In Baş the Court held by a majority that the Turkish national courts’ expansive interpretation of the scope of the concept of in flagrante delicto and their application of section 94 of Law no. 2802 was manifestly unreasonable and incompatible with Article 5 § 1. The Court held therefore that the applicant’s detention had been unlawful (see Baş, cited above, § 158).

122. In my partly dissenting opinion in Baş, I set out the reasons for my disagreement with the majority’s finding that the applicant’s detention was unlawful. The crux of my reasoning was that I did not share the majority’s view that the shortcomings in the applicant’s case amounted to such a “gross or obvious irregularity” (see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 84, 9 July 2009) as to render the detention unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. With the utmost respect to my colleagues, I maintain that my view as set out in my partly dissenting opinion in Baş is the legally correct interpretation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in the context of detentions pursuant to Law no. 2802.

123. In the present case, however, I made the decision to vote in favour of finding that the detention of the applicants subject to Law no. 2802 was unlawful and a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. While I maintain the validity of my view as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Baş, I cannot ignore the fact that the majority’s view in Baş is now final and is the settled law of the Court for the time being on the issues presented in the present application. As a judge of this Court who believes that applications before the Court should be dealt with in a manner that sustains judicial integrity and the coherence of its case-law, and without prejudice to my view as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Baş, I concur with the majority in the present case.

124. I would nevertheless like to stress that the divergence that has emerged between this Court and the highest courts of Turkey on the question whether the arrest and pre-trial detention of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 have been effected in accordance with a “procedure prescribed by law”, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, continues to persist (see, to this effect, the latest decision delivered by the Constitutional Court on 4 June 2020 in the case of Yıldırım Turan, referred to in paragraphs 37-43 of the present judgment). Bearing particularly in mind the high number of applications pending before the Court which raise the same legal issue, I consider that it falls to the Grand Chamber, as the highest judicial formation of the Court, to address this state of contradiction and to clarify and consolidate the Court’s position in this regard.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS

1. I voted against point 5 of the operative part of the judgment. At the same time, I agree with the outcome, because, hard as I try, I am unable to propose any pragmatic alternative to the majority’s audacious decision to terminate the examination of the numerous applicants’ complaints under Article 5 § 1 (c), 5 § 3, 5 § 4 and 5 § 5 of the Convention. My disagreement thus concerns not the very outcome but the wording of operative point 5: had it been worded without using the formula “no need to examine”, which it now contains, and had it thus corresponded to the reasoning intended to substantiate it (paragraph 98 of the judgment), I would have voted for it (and whatever misgivings, if any, I might have had, I would have expressed them in a much shorter concurring opinion). Regrettably, the formula “no need to examine” is certainly not adequate for the extraordinary situation in which the Court has found itself in the present case. That formula had to be avoided – and it could have been avoided at no cost. It is most unfortunate. It is faulty. It is misleading, because its employment in the operative part suggests that the respective complaints are not meritorious.

But they certainly are.

I

2. The Court does not owe any examination of the admissibility, let alone of the merits, in response to all the complaints that it receives. There is a vast array of legal grounds – and good reasons – for leaving certain complaints, even whole applications, unexamined.

3. To begin with, some non-examination is rather routine. Quite a lot of the complaints submitted to the Court do not meet the admissibility criteria defined in Article 35 and must be rejected on these formal grounds. Others are struck out of the Court’s list of cases, when the Court establishes that they meet the conditions set out in Article 37.

4. Apart from the above, in the Court’s practice there are also some not so routine, indeed quite exceptional, cases where the applications (or at least some complaints) are left unexamined.

5. A telling example would be the so-called pilot-judgment procedure. It is undertaken when the Court finds a systemic (or structural) problem raised by the applicant’s individual case and underlying the violation found in it. In view of the growing number of similar applications and of the potential finding of an analogous violation in the respective cases, the examination of those similar applications which have not yet been communicated to the respondent Government is adjourned until that State adopts the general measures aimed at resolving that systemic (structural) problem which gave rise to the violation found in the pilot judgment, and only those applications which have already been communicated continue to be examined under the normal procedure (see, for example, Broniowski v. Poland (merits), [GC], no. 31443/96, ECHR 2004-V; and, in the Turkish context, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012). After the successful implementation of the general measures required by the pilot judgment, the adjourned applications are struck out of the Court’s list of cases, and the pilot-judgment procedure is closed. This procedure is therefore designed to assist the member States in resolving, at national level, the systemic (structural) problems found by the Court, securing to all actual and potential victims of the respective deficiencies the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, offering to them more rapid redress and easing the burden on the Court, which would otherwise have to take to judgment large numbers of applications which are similar in substance, as a rule, at the expense of other meritorious cases. The pilot-judgment procedure was conceived as a response to the growth in the Court’s caseload, caused by a series of cases deriving from the same systemic (structural) dysfunction, and to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention machinery.

6. Alas, it does happen that the State fails to execute the pilot judgment. This may generate large numbers of follow-up applications which raise issues that are identical in substance to those raised in the case in which the pilot judgment was adopted. Perhaps the most well-known example of a pilot judgment which the respondent State failed to execute would be the one adopted in the case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine (no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009), which otherwise would have been an inconspicuous case. That failure led the Court to adopt what it called a “new approach” in dealing with the massive influx of as many as 12,143 Ivanov‑type follow-up applications, plus those of the five applicants specifically in the case of Burmych and Others v. Ukraine ((striking out) [GC], nos. 46852/13, 12 October 2017)). In Burmych and Others the Court proceeded in a thitherto unheard of and most extraordinary way. It concluded that the said Ivanov-type applications had to be dealt with in compliance with the respondent State’s obligation deriving from the pilot judgment adopted in Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov, struck them out of its list of cases, considering that the circumstances justified such a course, and transmitted them to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in order for them to be dealt with in the framework of the general measures of execution of the above-mentioned pilot judgment. At the same time the Court underlined that this strike-out decision was without prejudice to its power to restore to the list of its cases, pursuant to Article 37 § 2, the respective applications “or any other similar future applications, if the circumstances justify such a course”. The Court also envisaged that it might be appropriate to reassess the situation within two years from the delivery of the Burmych and Others judgment “with a view to considering whether in the meantime there have occurred circumstances such as to justify its exercising this power” (§ 223).

7. The Burmych and Others precedent was indeed instrumental for the purposes of substantially unclogging the Court’s docket. Whether it was in any way instrumental also to the applicants, who sought justice in Strasbourg, but were sent back to their domestic authorities against whose (in)action they had complained, and thus whether it fulfilled its purpose, is yet to be seen. It will have successfully served its purpose if those applicants, whose applications the Court resolved not to examine, have received any tangible satisfaction at the domestic level. It is reported that today, with four years having passed since the adoption of the judgment in Burmych and Others, there are more indications to the contrary. Be that as it may, the above-mentioned “reassessment of the situation” by the Court has not yet taken place.

But this is not my point here.

8. My point – pertinent to the present case – is that, as was rightly pointed out by the seven dissenters in Burmych and Others (Judges Yudkivska, Sajó, Bianku, Karakaş, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc), that judgment was one of judicial policy. The approach of the dissenters (which, in my reading, underlies their whole joint dissenting opinion) is that, as a matter of principle, judicial policy considerations cannot be a substitute for legal reasoning and, consequently, a judgment based on judicial policy considerations alone is per se incompatible with the “legal interpretation of human rights” (see paragraph 1 of their opinion).

Ideally, yes. In real life, it depends. In an ideal world, judgments indeed should be substantiated solely or at least primarily by legal argument. But the world is not a perfect place. When one proclaims the august, majestic maxim that fiat iustitia, pereat mundus, one should also ask oneself: what would iustitia be in a mundus which periit? What sense would iustitia make in such a mundus? Would it make any practical sense at all? And would it be at all possible?

In Burmych and Others the Court considered that it was left with no choice other than to depart from the ideal(istic) standards of application-processing and to disengage itself from thousands of potentially meritorious applications, the examination of which would have paralysed its activities, while still providing some (even if not, as it seems to have turned out, efficient) redress procedure to the applicants at the domestic level. The Court reasoned that any alternative would have been worse. If Burmych and Others was not legally justifiable, then it was at least explicable and therefore defensible from the standpoint of the pressing need to secure the broader mission of the Court. That course was taken grudgingly, nolens volens, the Court being cognisant of the possibility of fallouts of all sorts.

9. It must be noted that the Burmych and Others judgment, just like the pilot judgments, does not contain the “no need to examine” (or its twin sister “not necessary to examine”) formula. Nowhere in the whole text. The Court did not see the complaints which it resolved not to examine as undeserving, i.e. not requiring examination. Not at all. Rather, it considered that those complaints merited examination, but could not be effectively examined by the Court in those circumstances. It struck the unexamined applications out of its list of cases pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (c) and transmitted them to the Committee of Ministers “in order for them to be dealt with in the framework of the general measures of execution of the [relevant, unimplemented] pilot judgment” (point 4 of the operative part). Instead of using the formula “no need to examine”, the Court ratiocinated as to “whether it [was] justified to continue to examine [those] applications” (§ 175), i.e. employed the exact wording of Article 37 § 1 (c). But even the word “justified”, perhaps because it has a connotation of justice, the latter not being merely a formal legal term, does not appear in the operative part of the Burmych and Others judgment.

10. What makes the Burmych and Others precedent so pertinent to the present case is that in that judgment the Court legitimised judicial policy as the principal or, rather, the sole ground for one of its judgments. And it not only decided to refrain from examining the respective complaints, but also openly and transparently conceptualised that decision. Whoever reproaches the Court for that unclogging of its docket, at least cannot reproach it for being evasive as to the reasons underlying that decision. From then on, the Court’s resolve to leave certain complaints unexamined in principle can be substantiated – if not duly legally reasoned, then at least factually explained – by referring to judicial policy considerations pertaining to very exceptional circumstances occurring in the realm of real life, not in that of pure law. Such a course is, to put it mildly, not a neat one from the purely legal(istic) perspective. But now it is part of the Court’s case-law. Needless to say that the circumstances in which the Court’s recourse to this method is defensible must be exceptional, indeed extraordinary.

II

11. The pilot judgments and the Burmych and Others precedent concern non-examination of certain complaints (applications) in very exceptional situations. However, the Court routinely, having examined one or several complaints, resolves not to examine certain “other” complaints raised in the same application.

12. In particular situations the “no need to examine” approach is legally tenable and is legitimately professed by the Court. This is so when the “other” complaints, although formulated as separate, are interrelated, as they overlap with the complaint(s) already examined in that case. They overlap, because they either share the same factual background or invoke such provisions of the Convention which are interrelated. The overlapping of one or another kind allows or even requires the Court to treat such complaints as raising the same legal issue and not requiring their re‑examination from yet another angle, once that issue has already been examined from one angle, factual or legal.

13. A “factual overlap” of the complaints may prompt the Court to resolve that it would be pragmatic, and in that sense justified, not to examine anew what is essentially the same complaint, and that non‑examination would not be to the detriment of the applicant or of the development of Convention law.

The Court uses various techniques to establish, and various phraseologies to designate, this “factual overlap”. Those techniques and phraseologies are so diverse that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to arrange them in any typology. Here are a couple of very recent examples from their infinite variety. In Dareskizb Ltd. v. Armenia (no. 61737/08, § 93, 21 September 2021, not yet final), the Court decided that, having regard to its findings under Article 6 § 1 that the applicant company had been denied access to a court, it was “not necessary” to examine whether, in that case, there had been a violation of that Article also as regards the composition of that court. In C. v. Croatia (no. 80117/17, § 81, 8 October 2020), which concerned the right of a child to be heard in custody proceedings and the need to appoint a special guardian ad litem to protect the child’s interests, the Court held that the combination of flawed representation and the failure to duly present and hear the applicant’s views in the proceedings had irremediably undermined the decision-making process in the case and that obviated “the need … to examine whether the applicant’s best interests were properly assessed by adopting the decision to grant custody to his father without any preparation or adaptation period or whether the enforcement of that decision had been compatible with Article 8”.

14. A typical example of a “legal overlap” is the interrelatedness of ostensibly separate complaints, by which the Court is requested to assess the same factual situation under two different provisions of the Convention, one of which subsumes (or absorbs) the other at least in part, e.g. under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13, respectively as lex specialis and lex generalis; or Article 11, lex specialis, and Article 10, lex generalis. If a violation of the Convention based on its special provision is found, the re‑examination of the same matter under a general provision would normally be redundant.

15. In deciding whether to take that self-restricting course, the Court has a discretion that is not narrow. The case-law in which the second, third, etc., of the overlapping complaints are left unexamined is abundant.

In such cases the formula “no need to examine” (or “not necessary to examine”) means exactly what it says on the tin. It does not mislead or deceive, for it adequately represents the Court’s approach and reasons behind its resolve not to examine certain complaints.

16. In parallel, the formula “no need to examine” has been employed also in such instances where the examination of the applicants’ complaints clearly merited examination.

Roughly, all such cases in which the formula in question is employed fall into one of three categories.

17. The first category includes the politically sensitive cases, in which an applicant complains under Article 18. It happens that the Court, having found a violation of a Convention provision, nevertheless decides that it is “not necessary” to examine whether that violation resulted from a “hidden agenda”. If this question is answered in the affirmative (which is often too evident), this could trigger the formal finding of a violation of Article 18. This should be all the more so where the Court has found violations of not one but of several Convention provisions.

One example (indeed one out of many) of such regrettable over‑reluctance to examine the applicants’ well-founded complaints under Article 18 would be Kasparov and Others v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 51988/07, 13 December 2016), where the Court found violations of Articles 5 § 1, 6 § 1 and 11, which, in the Court’s own words, “had the effect of preventing and discouraging [the applicants] and others from … actively engaging in opposition politics”. Then the Court pulled the brake. It concluded that “in view of this” it was “not necessary to examine whether … there has been a violation of Article 18” (§ 55).

Such evasive judgments have been adopted in some politically sensitive cases against Russia and Turkey. Regarding Turkey (which is the respondent State in the present case), one could mention, for example, Şahin Alpay v. Turkey (no. 16538/17, 20 March 2018), Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey (no. 13237/17, 20 March 2018), or Atilla Taş v. Turkey (no. 72/17, 19 January 2021). I have made clear my disagreement with that approach in my partly dissenting opinions in Sabuncu v. Turkey (no. 23199/17, 10 November 2020) and Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey (no. 13252/17, 13 April 2021).

Yet, here this matter is touched upon for the sake of comprehensiveness only. The applicants in the present case did not complain under Article 18. This category of “undeserving” complaints therefore can be put aside.

18. The second category of the Court’s indisposition to the examination of duly substantiated complaints includes the cases which are, so to say, more mundane – in that sense that they are not related to alleged ulterior political motives prohibited by Article 18. These are not instances where the non-examination of the complaints is justified owing to their “factual” or “legal overlapping”. They are left without examination solely because the Court has so decided, without providing (at least not explicitly) any reasons for such a course and often without such legitimate reasons being in place at all. The Court justifies this by the fact that it has already examined some of the applicant’s complaints (and, as a rule, has found violations of some Convention provisions), so, bluntly put, it should be enough.

In such cases, the (in)famous Câmpeanu formula is employed. I refer to the case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu ([GC], no. 47848/08, 17 July 2014). That judgment gave the name to the formula in question, for it was that judgment in which this approach was consolidated. The formula goes that the Court, having examined certain “main” legal questions raised by the applicants, leaves the “remaining” complaints unexamined. It is as if a dentist says to his patient: “I fixed the big holes, so please do not overburden me also with small holes, for you will survive somehow”. The examination of the “main” legal questions ostensibly justifies the non-examination of the others, even if they are not interrelated with those actually examined.

Like the Burmych and Others solution, the Câmpeanu formula stems from a certain pragmatism in such situations, where the Court has to economise its human, time and other resources, and the respective judicial policy considerations. Even so, Burmych and Others was adopted in a situation which hardly anyone would deny was a truly exceptional one. In that judgment, the Court’s stance is explained in great detail. One would find not the slightest trace of such open and detailed explanation either in Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu or in other judgments where the Câmpeanu formula is employed, in fact copy-pasted. That formula has become self-justifying. The seven dissenters in Burmych and Others criticised that judgment as being adopted for the sake of “momentary judicial convenience” (§ 39 of the joint dissenting opinion). Although there is a grain of truth – and not a tiny one at that – in such a characterisation, I would be quite reluctant to follow, at least to the end, that criticism regarding Burmych and Others itself, because, contrary to the assertions of those colleagues, that decision in fact did have something to do with “judicial economy, judicial efficiency, or the Brighton philosophy”. But I think that this characterisation would indeed be congenial if applied to the Câmpeanu-type (non-)findings. There is nothing behind the Câmpeanu formula, except mere “momentary judicial convenience”. Perhaps too momentary.

Luckily, the Câmpeanu formula is not accepted as a normal, justifiable judicial practice by all judges of the Court. On this I refer to Judge Pastor Vilanova’s partly dissenting opinion in Popov and Others v. Russia (no. 44560/11, 27 November 2018), Judge Bošnjak’s partly dissenting opinion in Petukhov v. Ukraine (no. 2) (no. 41216/13, 12 March 2019), and my own partly dissenting opinion in the latter case. There is therefore some hope, however slim, that one day the Câmpeanu formula may be abandoned. But that may be only my wishful thinking.

19. The third category of cases in which the Court decides not to examine certain admissible “other” complaints includes judgments where the Court’s resolve not to examine them, because there is “no need” to do so, is not accompanied by any explicit, even if succinct, reasoning, which would at least somehow explain its self-restraint to the readership. Not even is the “main legal question” argument provided, as in Câmpeanu-type cases. This does not mean, in and of itself, that the non-examination would not be possible to justify. The problem is that readers are left to find out for themselves whether the Court’s determination not to examine those complaints is justified owing to their overlapping with the complaints already examined or is a result of the Court’s fiat.

Sometimes it is one, sometimes the other.

III

20. When thoroughly compared with previous solutions, the present case does not fall into any of the above-provided types of termination of the examination of admissible complaints.

I begin by comparing the present case with the cases in which pilot judgments have been adopted or which, like the very exceptional case of Burmych and Others, are related to an earlier pilot judgment. Then I will turn to the comparison of the present case with those in which the examination of “other” complaints was terminated on the basis that, in the Court’s own words, it was “not necessary”. I leave aside Article 18 cases, because, as already mentioned, the applicants in the present case did not complain under that Article. However, two other categories, the second and the third, merit at least a sentence or two. After that I will look into whether the present case bears any resemblance with those in which the examination of “other” complaints was terminated owing to the overlapping of the “undeserving” complaints with those already examined.

21. Firstly, the present judgment is not a pilot judgment. It does not mention any systemic (structural) problem, identified by the Court, in respect of which the respondent State must adopt any general measures rectifying the situation at the domestic level, and the examination of the relevant complaints has not been adjourned until the adoption of such measures; the Court has merely refused to examine them.

In addition, the complaints left unexamined in the present case are not those not yet communicated to the respondent Government. They were all duly communicated; therefore, even if this judgment had been a pilot judgment, the Court should have continued to examine them under the normal procedure. For the adjournment in the pilot-judgment procedure applies to complaints raised by “similar” applications, not those which have been submitted in precisely that case.

22. Nor does the present judgment bear any relation to a previous pilot judgment. The substantiation of the Court’s resolve to leave hundreds of well-reasoned applications unexamined, as provided in paragraph 98 of the judgment, refers to Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) ([GC], no. 14305/17, 22 December 2020), Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (no. 12778/17, 16 April 2019) and Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, 3 March 2020) as the judgments in which legal issues raised by complaints left unexamined have been “addressed for the most part”. This is true. And yet, “for the most part” means “not all”. Moreover, “addressed” does not amount to the identification of a systemic (structural) problem. On top of that, those “legal issues” do not encompass the “factual issues” of the hundreds of applicants in the present case, which are at the root of their complaints. For those applicants did not apply to the Court for the reason that some “legal issues” could be “addressed” – they applied for the settlement of their “factual issues” with the domestic authorities.

23. Secondly, the present case is not a case of the Burmych and Others type. That case concerned a situation to which the Court’s approach was in many respects different from its approach to the situation examined – or, rather, not examined – in the present case. Burmych and Others clearly instructed the respondent State to implement the Court’s earlier pilot judgment, which the State had thus far failed to do. In the present case, there is nothing of that sort (and cannot be, because there is no related earlier pilot judgment). In Burmych and Others, the Court transmitted the non-examined applications – and thus the supervision over the State’s progress or lack thereof – to the Committee of Ministers. There is nothing of the kind in this case (and cannot be for the same reason). In Burmych and Others a possibility of reassessment of the situation is postulated. There is not a hint of anything like that in the present judgment.

Thus there is one essential difference between the present case and Burmych and Others. Burmych and Others may be figuratively compared to such necessary surgical amputation of a limb, where not only the person’s life is saved and, in addition, the hospital is sheltered from destruction, but also the ablated limb is replaced with a kind of prosthesis, however badly functioning, and the person is promised that one day the surgeon may revisit his condition. The present judgment rather looks like such an amputation where the loss of limb was not replaced by any surrogate, the surgeon sent the patient home for unattended treatment by someone who had allegedly inflicted the injuries on him, closed the hospital from within, and bade him farewell.

24. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Burmych and Others does not speak at all of complaints that do not require examination. The “no need to examine” formula is not used in that judgment – unlike in the present one.

25. Last but not least, in Burmych and Others the applications were struck out of the Court’s list of cases. In the present case they were not struck out – they were merely left unexamined. It is true that I do not find any realistic counter-arguments which would allow me to disagree with the majority that in the present case, like in Burmych and Others, there was a pressing need for the Court to depart from the ideal(istic) standards of application-processing so that the broader mission of the Court could be secured.

26. I therefore do not find the reference in paragraph 98 to Burmych and Others, very bare and thus unqualified as it is, to be particularly apt for the present situation. That judgment could certainly be referred to – but perhaps with more provisos, i.e. with considerations not only of the similarities between the situations (“constantly growing inflow of applications”), but of the difference in the Court’s approach to them. The reference as it stands now does not strengthen the reasoning – it weakens it. For none of the safeguards employed in that 2017 case have been imported into the present judgment. The “mutatis mutandis” caveat does not help. It only disguises the fact that the only resemblance of this judgment to Burmych and Others is that the Court has adopted it also under the duress of reality, in which it has been left with no other choice, if the long-term effectiveness of the Convention machinery is to be ensured.

27. On the other hand, when compared to Burmych and Others, the present judgment is more applicant-friendly in the sense that the applicants have won at least on one front: a violation of Article 5 § 1 has been found on account of the unlawfulness of their initial pre-trial detention. Not enough, but the five applicants in Burmych and Others did not receive even that.

28. I turn now to the cases in which the Court has substantiated the non-examination of “other” complaints by resorting to the formula “no need to examine” (or “not necessary to examine”).

29. Regarding the cases falling into the second above-mentioned category of employment of the formula “no need to examine”, the present case is fundamentally different, because the Câmpeanu formula is not used in this judgment. In fact, hardly anyone would say that in this judgment the “main” legal issues have been examined or that those not examined can be labelled as “secondary” in any sense.

30. As to the third above-mentioned category of cases, the difference between them and the present one is also essential, because in this judgment an explanation is provided as to why the “other” complaints are left unexamined. Whether or not that explanation will be accepted as satisfactory by the applicants and the broader readership is another matter.

31. It remains to be seen whether the unexamined complaints could be seen as overlapping with those actually examined.

But I am happy to be dispensed from the need to address this point, because this has been done by Judge Koskelo in her concurring opinion, joined by Judge Ranzoni. There it is convincingly shown that there is no overlapping of complaints. Indeed, the finding of a violation of Article 5 on account of a lack of basis in domestic law for the applicants’ detention does not, in and of itself, imply that there has also been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c), or that there has been no such violation.

In order to answer that question the applicants’ situation would have to be examined from the angle of Article 5 § 1 (c).

IV

32. To sum up, there clearly is a need to examine the complaints left without examination in the present case – even though in its operative part the Court has stated that there is no such need.

This is why I see point 5 of the operative part as misleading.

33. What is more, the said need is a pressing one, particularly in view of the fact that, as can be seen from the concurring opinion of my distinguished colleague, one could presume that more than just a few of the complaints submitted in the present case under Article 5 § 1 (c) might be very well founded, in the light of such cases as Alparslan Altan v. Turkey and Baş v. Turkey (both cited above) and the circumstances transpiring from them. I would only add that, on the balance of probabilities, the presumption that there was no sufficient factual basis for the detention of at least some of the applicants is not at all futile, especially given the fact that the applicants so massively detained without a requisite legal basis were judges and prosecutors.

34. The decision not to examine the lion’s share of the complaints is an acknowledgment of the limits to the Court’s capacity in the face of the massive influx of applications. The reference to “judicial policy” (paragraph 98) means that the non-examination of complaints is determined not by any tenets of any Articles of the Convention, but by such reality, against which usual legal institutional and procedural mechanisms are helpless, unless the Court allows itself the dubious luxury of extending the examination of these complaints for at least a decade (but more likely for even longer) or (another most unattractive alternative) to postpone the examination of other meritorious complaints, at least those against the same State.

In that context it should be mentioned that today there are thousands of cases pending against Turkey which concern detentions and criminal convictions handed down in the aftermath of the 2016 attempted coup d’état in that State. Every week their number increases by scores. The Court is in fact inundated with cases related to those events. In addition to that tsunami, there is a yet larger pool of pending unrelated cases against Turkey.

35. In such circumstances, the decision not to examine the complaints that consume the most time, effort and other resources is the only pragmatic way out. From the purely legal(istic) perspective, it is not a satisfactory one, and not easily defensible. But it can be explained by reference to reality. That decision is not a judicial fiat. That explanation is provided here in paragraph 98. It is fairly stated at the end of that paragraph that the Court “decides not to examine the applicants’ remaining complaints under Article 5” (emphasis added), and that that decision has been adopted within the “exceptional context” of the case. There is not the slightest hint about the “remaining” complaints not meriting examination (“no need to examine”) – only the grudging acknowledgment of the impracticality and inappropriateness of such examination in the face of the need to ensure the Court’s overall long-standing mission. This is an expediency justification – not a fully-fledged justification in the purely legal sense, perhaps not in the moral sense either, but still some justification of the untoward, intrusive choice, where all alternatives were worse. And, as has been shown, since Burmych and Others judicial policy considerations in principle may provide some substantiation, and in that sense some justification, for the Court’s decision to leave certain complaints unexamined in certain extraordinary circumstances. This judgment is the application of that methodological principle, inapplicable in normal circumstances, but already entrenched in the Court’s case-law.

36. Whatever the explanation in paragraph 98, the “no need to examine” formula employed in point 5 of the operative part virtually brings it to naught. The findings of the operative part should be read in conjunction with the reasoning leading to them. But this particular finding does not correspond, either in letter or in spirit, to the explanation provided in paragraph 98. This is why I did not vote for it, even though I agree with the outcome of the non-examination of the “remaining” complaints.

37. What happened is that the Chamber took the standard formula (as shown, already used too indiscriminately in a number of cases) and applied it in the most non-standard situation – one never encountered before.

For the situation faced by the Court in the present case is unprecedented. It therefore commands an unprecedented solution. Usual tools would not work. That has been explained in paragraph 98 – and abandoned in point 5 of the operative part. But when a judgment is adopted, it is not the paragraphs of the reasoning part that are voted on, but the points of the operative part.

I cannot cease to wonder why four years ago the Grand Chamber found an adequate way of referring to the exceptionality of the situation in the operative part of Burmych and Others, whilst the Chamber has not followed the Grand Chamber’s example when formulating point 5 of the operative part of the present judgment.

V

38. There is a risk that some may read this judgment, by which so many complaints of so many applicants have been denied examination, as a signal that a member State can escape responsibility for violating the Convention en masse, since the Court may be flooded with complaints against that State to such an extent that it becomes unable to cope with them and decides not to examine them.

To be frank: if a regime decides to go rogue, it should do it in a big way. And if responsibility can be escaped by “doing it big”, why not give it a try?

39. Recently the Court dealt with an attempt to drastically increase the number of applications to the Court, unambiguously aimed at causing it to become “congested, saturated and flooded” and at “paralysing its operations” (Zambrano v. France (dec.), no. 41994/21, § 36, 21 September 2021). In that case it was noted that the right of application was being abused by applicants pursuing a strategy of flooding the Court with a tsunami of applications and thus with the aim of paralysing it.

40. But what if a similar strategy is pursued not by a group of applicants, whatever their motives may be, but by the Government of a member State, seeking to escape responsibility for violations of the Convention?

The question remains, and even becomes more pertinent: can the course adopted in this case be adopted again in an increasing number of cases? How many times can this be before such situations are no longer regarded as “exceptional”?

41. To conclude, the situation encountered by the Court in the present case is indeed unprecedented and exceptional by all standards applicable hitherto, or at best – or, rather, worst – is comparable only to Burmych and Others. But a similar exceptionality in principle can be “repeated”. Thus, as in addition to this exceptional situation there may be others, a remedy or safeguard, or counterbalance must be found – and applied. Needless to say, that remedy or safeguard, or counterbalance, cannot and must not be judicial.

To that effect, I can but agree with Judge Koskelo that “[a]ny further conclusions remain for other bodies to consider”.

VI

42. I follow Judge Koskelo’s remarks as to the dubious categorisation, in Turkish law, of the offences allegedly committed by the applicants in the present case as “personal offences”. The contradiction between the judges and prosecutors allegedly receiving instructions from the supposedly illegal organisation’s hierarchy, on the one hand, and their alleged membership in that organisation being categorised as a “personal offence”, on the other, is striking. Indeed, “such an interpretation of domestic law appears neither reasonable nor consistent with the Convention requirements of foreseeability and legal certainty”.

43. In this context, I must admit that I should have been more critical in Baş (cited above), where the Chamber, of which I was part, stated that “it [was] not for the Court to determine into which category of offences the applicant’s alleged conduct [fell]” (§ 158).

Perhaps it was. Or at least that statement had to be accompanied by an appropriate proviso.

44. Finally, I seize this opportunity to admit that today I would also differently assess some of the other complaints in Baş, namely those under Article 5 § 4, regarding the restriction of Mr Baş’s access to the investigation file and the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of the magistrates’ courts.

Of course, this confession is post factum, but still offers some relief.

____________

[1] For a full list of the complaints raised by the applicants, see the communication report of 17 May 2019 in the case of Altun v. Turkey (no. 60065/16) and 545 others.

___________

APPENDIX

No. Application no. Case name Lodged on Applicant
Year of Birth
Represented by Applicant’s status at the time of pre-trial detention

 

1. 75805/16 Turan v. Turkey 24/11/2016 Ersin TURAN
1983
Bilal Eren MASKAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
2. 75794/16 Demirtaş v. Turkey 30/11/2016 Hasan DEMİRTAŞ
1989
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
3. 6556/17 Kaşıkçı v. Turkey 20/01/2017 Muhammet Ali KAŞIKÇI
1979
Gülşen ZENGİN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
4. 11888/17 Küçük v. Turkey 06/01/2017 Bekir KÜÇÜK
1974
Sariye YEŞİL TOZKOPARAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
5. 12991/17 Erel v. Turkey 04/01/2017 Kemalettin EREL
1972
Karar Koray ATAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
6. 13875/17 Polater v. Turkey 09/01/2017 Yusuf Ziya POLATER
1983
İsmail GÜLER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
7. 14126/17 Çetin v. Turkey 06/01/2017 İlker ÇETİN
1970
Semih ERKEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
8. 15011/17 Ulupınar v. Turkey 02/02/2017 Aziz ULUPINAR
1982
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
9. 15048/17 Karademir v. Turkey 19/01/2017 Mehmet KARADEMİR
1971
Karar Koray ATAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
10. 15066/17 Kılınç v. Turkey 16/01/2017 Bahadır KILINÇ
1972
Hanife Ruveyda KILINÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
11. 15098/17 Altıntaş v. Turkey 02/02/2017 Yusuf ALTINTAŞ
1975
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
12. 15124/17 Ulupınar v. Turkey 19/01/2017 Atilla ULUPINAR
1968
Pınar BAŞBUĞA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
13. 15290/17 Dalkılıç v. Turkey 17/01/2017 Erdem DALKILIÇ
1978
Elvan BAĞ CANBAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
14. 15494/17 Hamurcu v. Turkey 16/01/2017 Bayram HAMURCU
1989
Zehra KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
15. 28551/17 Cihangiroğlu v. Turkey 29/03/2017 Bircan CİHANGİROĞLU
1973
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
16. 28570/17 Miralay v. Turkey 16/01/2017 Necati MİRALAY
1980
Metin GÜÇLÜ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
17. 29073/17 Mercan v. Turkey 05/06/2018 Halil MERCAN
1985
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
18. 31217/17 Efe v. Turkey 22/03/2017 Metin EFE
1976
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
19. 33987/17 Kayı v. Turkey 17/01/2017 Halil İbrahim KAYI
1974
Rıza ALBAY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
20. 34014/17 Kılıç v. Turkey 24/03/2017 Erdal KILIÇ
1974
Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
21. 34028/17 Yılmaz v. Turkey 23/03/2017 Serdar YILMAZ
1983
Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
22. 34357/17 Gündüz v. Turkey 18/04/2017 Kasım GÜNDÜZ
1990
Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
23. 36845/17 Ağrı v. Turkey 10/01/2017 Uğur AĞRI
1978
Yasemin BAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
24. 39593/17 Köksal v. Turkey 22/03/2017 Mustafa KÖKSAL
1978
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
25. 40053/17 Gölyeri v. Turkey 16/05/2017 Murat GÖLYERI
1980
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
26. 40097/17 Çokmutlu v. Turkey 05/05/2017 Metin ÇOKMUTLU
1983
Arife ASLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
27. 40277/17 Evren v. Turkey 28/03/2017 Enver EVREN
1977
Fatih DÖNMEZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
28. 40565/17 Özen v. Turkey 15/03/2017 Gökhan ÖZEN
1988
Mustafa TEMEL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
29. 40937/17 Kaya v. Turkey 27/02/2017 Ömer KAYA
1980
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
30. 41286/17 Aydoğmuş v. Turkey 31/03/2017 Tahir AYDOĞMUŞ
1981
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
31. 41525/17 Özkan v. Turkey 13/04/2017 Mustafa ÖZKAN
1983
Osman BAŞER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
32. 41770/17 Örer v. Turkey 07/04/2017 Vedat ÖRER
1973
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
33. 41772/17 Tosun v. Turkey 29/12/2016 Tahsin TOSUN
1980
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
34. 41886/17 Alkan v. Turkey 06/04/2017 Gökhan ALKAN
1989
Fatma Aybike ÇINARGİL ŞAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
35. 42314/17 Tosun v. Turkey 18/04/2017 Kenan TOSUN
1987
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
36. 43668/17 Teke v. Turkey 20/03/2017 Hasan Ali TEKE
1988
Sultan TEKE SOYDİNÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
37. 43681/17 Koçak v. Turkey 03/04/2017 ÇETİN KOÇAK
1980
Arzu BEYAZIT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
38. 43710/17 Deliveli v. Turkey 31/03/2017 Hasan DELİVELİ
1978
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
39. 43715/17 Aydın v. Turkey 04/04/2017 Zafer AYDIN
1980
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
40. 43733/17 Şam v. Turkey 09/05/2017 Abdullah ŞAM
1981
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
41. 43753/17 Eken v. Turkey 09/05/2017 İsmail EKEN
1976
Murat EKEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
42. 44833/17 Yalvaç v. Turkey 02/05/2017 İbrahim YALVAÇ
1988
Arife ASLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
43. 44867/17 Güvenç v. Turkey 24/05/2017 İsmail GÜVENÇ
1985
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
44. 44881/17 Kızıl v. Turkey 22/05/2017 Bahtiyar KIZIL
1986
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
45. 44907/17 Yalım v. Turkey 03/05/2017 Cemalettin YALIM
1971
Hasan Celil GÜNENÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
46. 45079/17 Danış v. Turkey 11/04/2017 Muhammed Arif DANIŞ
1986
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
47. 45080/17 Akgül v. Turkey 04/05/2017 Mustafa AKGÜL
1973
Kürşat Orhan ŞIMŞEK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
48. 45129/17 Bahadır v. Turkey 23/06/2017 Mehmet BAHADIR
1976
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
49. 46907/17 Kurşun v. Turkey 20/02/2017 Ömer Faruk KURŞUN
1977
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer) Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
50. 46938/17 Tufanoğlu v. Turkey 23/03/2017 İshak TUFANOĞLU
1987
Regaip DEMİR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
51. 47039/17 Acar v. Turkey 22/03/2017 Gürcan ACAR
1966
Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
52. 47043/17 Güven v. Turkey 24/03/2017 Saban GÜVEN
1975
Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
53. 47050/17 Toptaş v. Turkey 16/03/2017 Sungur Alp TOPTAŞ
1991
Sultan TEKE SOYDINÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
54. 48156/17 Demir v. Turkey 04/05/2017 Şenol DEMİR
1979
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
55. 48162/17 Özgeci v. Turkey 08/05/2017 Erhan ÖZGECİ
1981
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
56. 48592/17 Kaya v. Turkey 04/05/2017 Osman KAYA
1983
Özcan DUYGULU Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
57. 48704/17 Atça v. Turkey 29/03/2017 Zekeriya ATÇA
1980
Ahmet KARAHAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
58. 48724/17 Şenkal v. Turkey 28/03/2017 Yılmaz ŞENKAL
1969
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
59. 48755/17 Çetin v. Turkey 08/05/2017 Sadi ÇETİN
1984
Muhammed ÇETİN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
60. 48776/17 Genç v. Turkey 08/05/2017 Durmuş Ali GENÇ
1970
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
61. 48803/17 Türkmen v. Turkey 08/05/2017 Ali TÜRKMEN
1982
Nilgün ARI Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
62. 49227/17 Berber v. Turkey 16/06/2017 İdris BERBER
1977
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
63. 49233/17 Öğütalan v. Turkey 24/03/2017 Ersin ÖĞÜTALAN
1987
Sefanur BOZGÖZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
64. 49455/17 Uluca v. Turkey 28/03/2017 İhsan ULUCA
1966
Uğur ALTUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
65. 49468/17 Aydemir v. Turkey 04/05/2017 Şinasi Levent AYDEMİR
1981
Necati TORUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
66. 49509/17 Salman v. Turkey 09/05/2017 Oğuz SALMAN
1976
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
67. 49880/17 Atlı v. Turkey 31/03/2017 Ragıp ATLI
1974
Zülküf ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
68. 49902/17 Kurt v. Turkey 22/03/2017 Levent KURT
1969
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
69. 52776/17 Ölmez v. Turkey 14/03/2018 Hayati ÖLMEZ
1980
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
70. 54540/17 Beydili v. Turkey 14/07/2017 Hasan BEYDİLİ
1983
İmdat BERKSOY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
71. 54553/17 Aras v. Turkey 21/07/2017 Yunus ARAS
1988
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
72. 54899/17 Kökçam v. Turkey 20/02/2017 Mustafa KÖKÇAM
1961
Ahmet Faruk ACAR Member of Supreme Administrative Court
73. 55003/17 Çağlar v. Turkey 26/05/2017 Sait ÇAĞLAR
1970
Fatma Zarife TUNÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
74. 55057/17 Var v. Turkey 19/04/2017 Selim VAR
1976
Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
75. 58516/17 Giden v. Turkey 03/02/2017 Yıldıray GİDEN
1983
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
76. 59572/17 Özgelen v. Turkey 11/04/2017 Mustafa Safa ÖZGELEN
1964
Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
77. 60292/17 Doğan v. Turkey 03/02/2017 Mustafa DOĞAN
1980
Mehmet ÇAVDAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
78. 60302/17 Karslı v. Turkey 08/02/2017 Hacı Serhat KARSLI
1983
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
79. 60326/17 Altun v. Turkey 10/01/2017 Hakan ALTUN
1976
Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
80. 60387/17 Hotalak v. Turkey 24/06/2017 Yusuf HOTALAK
1985
Harun IŞIK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
81. 61123/17 Öztürk v. Turkey 14/08/2017 Burhanettin ÖZTÜRK
1975
Şeyma GÜNEŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
82. 61232/17 Gürkan v. Turkey 19/06/2017 Şeref GÜRKAN
1972
Önder ÖZDERYOL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
83. 61417/17 Topal v. Turkey 23/05/2017 Orhan Birkan TOPAL
1981
Esin TOPAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
84. 61467/17 Hazar v. Turkey 22/05/2017 Zafer HAZAR
1974
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
85. 61547/17 Günay v. Turkey 20/06/2017 Hüseyin GÜNAY
1972
Fatma HACIPAŞALIOĞLU Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
86. 62174/17 Coşgun v. Turkey 12/05/2017 Mehmet COŞGUN
1980
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
87. 62633/17 Kundakçı v. Turkey 30/06/2017 Mesut KUNDAKÇI
1969
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
88. 62638/17 Karanfil v. Turkey 30/06/2017 Vecdi KARANFİL
1969
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
89. 62656/17 Çengil v. Turkey 30/01/2017 Birol ÇENGİL
1966
Osman ÇENGİL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
90. 62721/17 Şahin v. Turkey 02/02/2017 Murat ŞAHİN
1988
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
91. 62723/17 Bozkurt v. Turkey 13/02/2017 Hüseyin BOZKURT
1977
Muhterem SAYAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
92. 62741/17 Canavcı v. Turkey 26/01/2017 Mehmet Ali CANAVCI
1978
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
93. 62761/17 Polat v. Turkey 19/05/2017 Engin POLAT
1987
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
94. 62891/17 Ekinci v. Turkey 09/06/2017 Hüseyin EKİNCİ
1969
Elkan ALBAYRAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
95. 62896/17 Ekinci v. Turkey 09/05/2017 Fatih EKİNCİ
1983
Beyza Esma TUNA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
96. 62906/17 Erol v. Turkey 10/05/2017 Muhammed Akif EROL
1970
Hasan Hüseyin EROL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
97. 63234/17 Uzunel v. Turkey 08/06/2017 Enes UZUNEL
1986
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
98. 63607/17 Günay v. Turkey 08/06/2017 Mehmet GÜNAY
1978
Meryem GÜNAY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
99. 63610/17 Söyler v. Turkey 29/05/2017 Serdar SÖYLER
1984
Hüseyin YILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
100. 63611/17 Can v. Turkey 27/05/2017 Fatih CAN
1977
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
101. 63621/17 Boztepe v. Turkey 25/05/2017 Ramazan BOZTEPE
1972
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
102. 63708/17 Yıldız v. Turkey 30/05/2017 Enes YILDIZ
1988
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
103. 63718/17 Genç v. Turkey 01/06/2017 Yunus GENÇ
1975
Beyza Esma TUNA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
104. 63827/17 Şimşek v. Turkey 02/06/2017 Kemal ŞİMŞEK
1980
Muzaffer Derya ÇALIŞKAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
105. 64036/17 Buyuran v. Turkey 04/07/2017 Hasan Gazi BUYURAN
1969
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
106. 64499/17 Yıldırım v. Turkey 13/07/2017 Resül YILDIRIM
1969
Enes Bahadır BAŞKÖY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
107. 64545/17 Akbaş v. Turkey 18/04/2017 Talat AKBAŞ
1970
Hamit AKBAŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
108. 66287/17 Erdurmaz v. Turkey 18/03/2017 Sertkan ERDURMAZ
1983
Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
109. 66475/17 Kaya v. Turkey 26/05/2017 Tayfun KAYA
1973
Mehmet KAYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
110. 66705/17 Reçber v. Turkey 24/05/2017 Suat REÇBER
1978
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
111. 66829/17 Ünal v. Turkey 07/08/2017 Ümit ÜNAL
1981
Recep BAKIRCI Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
112. 67664/17 Yönder v. Turkey 20/07/2017 Mehmet Murat YÖNDER
1969
Yücel ALKAN Member of Court of Cassation
113. 68209/17 Sel v. Turkey 17/01/2017 Mehmet SEL
1976
Önder ÖZDERYOL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
114. 69379/17 Türkmen v. Turkey 08/08/2017 Necati TÜRKMEN
1970
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
115. 69443/17 Şafak v. Turkey 25/08/2017 Ercan ŞAFAK
1968
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
116. 69587/17 Birsen v. Turkey 07/07/2017 İsmail BİRSEN
1984
İshak IŞIK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
117. 70484/17 Gelgör v. Turkey 10/08/2017 Burhan GELGÖR
1970
Ahmet ÇORUM Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
118. 71053/17 Yazgan v. Turkey 08/08/2017 Mehmet YAZGAN
1988
Özge ALTINTOP Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
119. 71056/17 Girdi v. Turkey 28/08/2017 Seyfettin GİRDİ
1988
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
120. 72345/17 Ekici v. Turkey 25/07/2017 Barbaros Hayrettin EKİCİ
1989
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
121. 74901/17 Çalmuk v. Turkey 06/10/2017 Hüsnü ÇALMUK
1966
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
122. 76253/17 Demirbaş v. Turkey 14/10/2017 Samed DEMİRBAŞ
1982
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
123. 79800/17 Üzgör v. Turkey 01/11/2017 İsmail ÜZGÖR
1982
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
124. 82532/17 Kılınç v. Turkey 20/11/2017 Fatih KILINÇ
1977
Cem Kaya KARATÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
125. 82536/17 Say v. Turkey 20/11/2017 Mehmet SAY
1974
Zeynep Sacide SERTER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
126. 83719/17 Kırıcı v. Turkey 27/10/2017 Muhittin KIRICI
1974
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
127. 83801/17 Uzun v. Turkey 20/11/2018 Fahri UZUN
1972
Mustafa TUNA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
128. 83969/17 Özçelik v. Turkey 20/11/2017 Mustafa ÖZÇELİK
1979
Gülçin MOLA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
129. 84000/17 Aydemir v. Turkey 16/10/2017 İsa AYDEMİR
1981
Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
130. 84242/17 Babayiğit v. Turkey 29/11/2017 Yusuf BABAYİĞİT
1976
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
131. 84617/17 Babacan v. Turkey 13/11/2017 Hüseyin Güngör BABACAN
1966
Sümeyra Betül BABACAN ALKAN Member of Court of Cassation
132. 84631/17 Atasoy v. Turkey 24/11/2017 Habib ATASOY
1969
Fatih DÖNMEZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
133. 537/18 Şener v. Turkey 24/11/2017 Halil ŞENER
1976
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
134. 1217/18 Asan v. Turkey 06/12/2017 İdris ASAN
1964
Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
135. 1226/18 Budak v. Turkey 06/12/2017 Mesut BUDAK
1969
Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
136. 1542/18 Akkol v. Turkey 05/12/2017 İsmail AKKOL
1965
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
137. 6110/18 Candan v. Turkey 26/01/2018 Hasan CANDAN
1985
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
138. 6413/18 Gürakar v. Turkey 10/01/2018 Muhammed Salih GÜRAKAR
1984
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
139. 6485/18 Akgedik v. Turkey 03/01/2018 Hasan AKGEDİK
1979
Burcu HAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
140. 6487/18 Önal v. Turkey 18/01/2018 Yunus ÖNAL
1975
Betül Büşra ÖNAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
141. 6538/18 Taşer v. Turkey 16/01/2018 Durmuş TAŞER
1970
Hanife Ruveyda KILINÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
142. 6812/18 Varol v. Turkey 19/01/2018 Ahmet Selçuk VAROL
1973
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
143. 6948/18 Aslan v. Turkey 23/01/2018 Veysel ASLAN
1968
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
144. 8332/18 Erdagöz v. Turkey 02/02/2018 Özcan ERDAGÖZ
1981
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
145. 8416/18 Bozkuş v. Turkey 25/01/2018 Bilal BOZKUŞ
1989
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
146. 8540/18 Demir v. Turkey 16/06/2017 Ahmet DEMİR
1979
Utku Coşkuner SAKARYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
147. 8543/18 Gümüş v. Turkey 16/06/2017 Mustafa Evren GÜMÜŞ
1981
Utku Coşkuner SAKARYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
148. 8606/18 Turğut v. Turkey 27/04/2017 Muhammed Davut TURĞUT
1990
Xavier LABBEE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
149. 9818/18 Çolaker v. Turkey 26/01/2018 Mustafa ÇOLAKER
1974
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
150. 9824/18 Kahya v. Turkey 17/01/2018 Mustafa KAHYA
1972
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
151. 9880/18 H.K. v. Turkey 29/01/2018 H.K.
1972
Duygu BUDAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
152. 9892/18 Güven v. Turkey 30/01/2018 Aziz GÜVEN
1989
Nur Efşan DEMİREL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
153. 10030/18 Köseoğlu v. Turkey 24/01/2018 Bilal KÖSEOĞLU
1966
Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
154. 10290/18 Çetin v. Turkey 19/09/2017 Yunus ÇETİN
1966
Cengiz VAROL Member of Supreme Administrative Court
155. 10291/18 Karadağ v. Turkey 29/11/2017 Bilal KARADAĞ
1967
Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
156. 10471/18 Tunçer v. Turkey 01/02/2018 Ömer TUNÇER
1983
Osman Fatih AKGÜL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
157. 12041/18 Yula v. Turkey 28/02/2018 Ali YULA
1982
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
158. 12574/18 Akbal v. Turkey 22/02/2018 Mehmet AKBAL
1971
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
159. 12594/18 Akdoğan v. Turkey 09/02/2018 Mehmet Emin AKDOĞAN
1981
Arzu BEYAZIT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
160. 12629/18 Şimşek v. Turkey 05/03/2018 Adnan ŞİMŞEK
1984
Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
161. 12630/18 Dursun v. Turkey 05/03/2018 Hasan DURSUN
1981
Önder ÖZDERYOL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
162. 13823/18 Akan v. Turkey 16/03/2018 Selim AKAN
1988
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
163. 14627/18 Akkurt v. Turkey 09/03/2018 İbrahim AKKURT
1984
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
164. 14849/18 Boz v. Turkey 14/02/2018 Nazım BOZ
1985
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
165. 16029/18 Necipoğlu v. Turkey 28/03/2018 Nazmi NECİPOĞLU
1972
Levent ÇEŞME Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
166. 16296/18 Gülmez v. Turkey 23/03/2018 Hüseyin GÜLMEZ
1975
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
167. 16305/18 Aydın v. Turkey 22/03/2018 Muzaffer AYDIN
1971
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
168. 16324/18 Temel v. Turkey 20/03/2018 Muhammed Zeki TEMEL
1978
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
169. 16368/18 Gül v. Turkey 23/03/2018 Tevfik GÜL
1983
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
170. 16386/18 Polat v. Turkey 02/03/2018 Halil POLAT
1984
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
171. 17174/18 Elibol v. Turkey 15/03/2018 Mert ELİBOL
1980
Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
172. 17237/18 Mertoğlu v. Turkey 16/03/2018 Hakan MERTOĞLU
1990
Hamza BARUT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
173. 17315/18 Çetin v. Turkey 10/03/2018 Muharrem ÇETİN
1971
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
174. 17391/18 Kırım v. Turkey 13/03/2018 Kerim KIRIM
1971
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
175. 17544/18 Sönmez v. Turkey 04/04/2018 Sebati SÖNMEZ
1979
Havva ÖZEL KAPLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
176. 17561/18 Toprak v. Turkey 01/03/2018 Muhammet TOPRAK
1984
Duygu BUDAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
177. 17576/18 Gül v. Turkey 23/02/2018 Olcay GÜL
1977
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
178. 17637/18 İkiz v. Turkey 02/04/2018 Durmuş Ali İKİZ
1979
Enes Malik KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
179. 17754/18 Kulak v. Turkey 23/02/2018 Sercan Coşkun KULAK
1983
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
180. 17828/18 Açıkgöz v. Turkey 04/04/2018 Bilal AÇIKGÖZ
1988
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
181. 17837/18 Uluçay v. Turkey 10/03/2018 Ömer ULUÇAY
1987
Mücahit AYDIN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
182. 17940/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 05/01/2018 Yavuz YILMAZ
1971
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
183. 18063/18 Aker v. Turkey 06/04/2018 Ender Yakup AKER
1986
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
184. 18110/18 Gül v. Turkey 11/04/2018 Veysi GÜL
1985
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
185. 18112/18 Bozlak v. Turkey 05/04/2018 Rafetcan BOZLAK
1990
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
186. 18200/18 Sarıgüzel v. Turkey 10/04/2018 Hacı SARIGÜZEL
1982
Mehmet GÜL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
187. 18214/18 Ünal v. Turkey 20/02/2018 Sedat ÜNAL
1982
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
188. 18695/18 Berber v. Turkey 30/03/2018 Selim BERBER
1976
Ahmet Aykut YILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
189. 19228/18 Çeliktaş v. Turkey 05/03/2018 Şakir ÇELİKTAŞ
1986
Burcu HAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
190. 19230/18 Küçük v. Turkey 05/04/2018 Yalçın KÜÇÜK
1983
Mehtap SERT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
191. 19445/18 Özen v. Turkey 12/04/2018 Edib Hüsnü ÖZEN
1981
Mehmet MIRZA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
192. 20548/18 Güldallı v. Turkey 20/04/2018 Ömer GÜLDALLI
1985
Ahmet ÖZGÜL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
193. 21020/18 Metin v. Turkey 30/04/2018 Özgür METİN
1982
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
194. 21064/18 Zengin v. Turkey 20/04/2018 Nihan ZENGİN
1990
Adem KAPLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
195. 21890/18 Erdem v. Turkey 02/05/2018 Yılmaz ERDEM
1975
Fatma (YILMAZ) KOCAEL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
196. 22009/18 Ünlü v. Turkey 20/04/2018 Halil ÜNLÜ
1985
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
197. 22013/18 Çakırca v. Turkey 03/05/2018 Kenan ÇAKIRCA
1983
Meryem GÜNAY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
198. 22033/18 Yavuz v. Turkey 24/04/2018 Yener YAVUZ
1971
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
199. 22087/18 Özen v. Turkey 27/04/2018 Murat ÖZEN
1976
Hilal YILMAZ PUSAT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
200. 22088/18 Kaymaz v. Turkey 03/05/2018 Yusuf Samet KAYMAZ
1988
Mehmet Ertürk ERDEVİR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
201. 22200/18 Altun v. Turkey 07/05/2018 Osman ALTUN
1972
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
202. 22205/18 Güler v. Turkey 02/05/2018 Ercan GÜLER
1978
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
203. 22238/18 Budak v. Turkey 30/04/2018 Serhan BUDAK
1984
Burcu HAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
204. 23665/18 Akbaba v. Turkey 07/05/2018 Şerafettin AKBABA
1983
Atıl KARADUMAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
205. 23858/18 Keskin v. Turkey 10/05/2018 Özcan KESKİN
1974
Ersayın IŞIK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
206. 24205/18 Kantar v. Turkey 04/05/2018 İsmail KANTAR
1976
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
207. 24216/18 Erkaçal v. Turkey 30/04/2018 Taner ERKAÇAL
1978
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
208. 24222/18 Çakmakçı v. Turkey 02/05/2018 Murat Hikmet ÇAKMAKÇI
1970
Fatih DÖNMEZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
209. 24224/18 Altun v. Turkey 07/05/2018 Ali Rıza ALTUN
1978
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
210. 24227/18 Maraşlı v. Turkey 22/05/2018 Yusuf Cuma MARAŞLI
1980
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
211. 24446/18 R.H. v. Turkey 14/05/2018 R.H.
1983
Emine Feyza ASLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
212. 24636/18 Vural v. Turkey 17/05/2018 Muhammed Said VURAL
1991
Esad VURAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
213. 24702/18 Şahin v. Turkey 09/05/2018 Adnan ŞAHİN
1975
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
214. 24762/18 Demirtaş v. Turkey 17/05/2018 İbrahim DEMİRTAŞ
1969
Ali YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
215. 24876/18 Gökçek v. Turkey 16/02/2018 Erdoğan GÖKÇEK
1969
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
216. 25037/18 Karabacak v. Turkey 24/05/2018 Orhan KARABACAK
1978
İhsan Can AKMARUL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
217. 25186/18 Özgül v. Turkey 21/05/2018 Ünver ÖZGÜL
1972
Duygu SEZEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
218. 25195/18 Kiriş v. Turkey 14/02/2018 Ahmet KİRİŞ
1965
Şeyma GÜNEŞ Member of Court of Cassation
219. 25218/18 Kara v. Turkey 07/05/2018 Nazım KARA
1966
Ahmet KARA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
220. 25228/18 Benli v. Turkey 18/05/2018 Esat Faruk BENLİ
1970
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
221. 25336/18 Ayyayla v. Turkey 23/05/2018 Hüseyin AYYAYLA
1973
Can GÜZEL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
222. 25370/18 Durgun v. Turkey 25/05/2018 Metin DURGUN
1969
Ali DURGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
223. 25880/18 Dedetürk v. Turkey 30/05/2018 Serkan DEDETÜRK
1977
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
224. 26281/18 Aksoy v. Turkey 24/05/2018 İsmail AKSOY
1970
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
225. 26414/18 Elieyioğlu v. Turkey 30/05/2018 Aydın ELİEYİOĞLU
1980
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
226. 26419/18 Özata v. Turkey 30/05/2018 Bedri ÖZATA
1981
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
227. 26530/18 Kadıoğlu v. Turkey 24/05/2018 Yasin KADIOĞLU
1978
Hatice YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
228. 26814/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 22/05/2018 Sinan YILMAZ
1975
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
229. 27022/18 Çelik v. Turkey 28/05/2018 Sabır ÇELİK
1974
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
230. 27057/18 Cihangir v. Turkey 30/05/2018 Nurullah CİHANGİR
1973
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
231. 27073/18 Çimen v. Turkey 29/05/2018 Mustafa ÇİMEN
1981
Şeyma LİMON TALUY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
232. 27092/18 Nas Çelik v. Turkey 28/05/2018 Seval NAS ÇELIK
1979
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
233. 27542/18 Yönder v. Turkey 05/06/2018 Muhammed YÖNDER
1983
Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
234. 27574/18 Bilgen v. Turkey 01/06/2018 Rasim İsa BİLGEN
1968
Hakan ÖZER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
235. 27581/18 Aygör v. Turkey 03/05/2018 Dursun AYGÖR
1965
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
236. 27600/18 Yalçıntaş v. Turkey 11/04/2018 Habib Hüdai YALÇINTAŞ
1972
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
237. 27611/18 Saral v. Turkey 29/05/2018 Süleyman SARAL
1974
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
238. 27998/18 Güney v. Turkey 02/06/2018 Yusuf GÜNEY
1979
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
239. 28050/18 Karaçavuş v. Turkey 15/05/2018 Ümit KARAÇAVUŞ
1981
Aykut ÖZDEMIR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
240. 28150/18 Yalçın v. Turkey 08/06/2018 Onur YALÇIN
1988
Mehmet SÜRMEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
241. 28481/18 Gödel v. Turkey 07/06/2018 Orhan GÖDEL
1971
Haydar YALÇINOĞLU Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
242. 28530/18 İlgen v. Turkey 04/06/2018 Faik İLGEN
1986
Nesibe Merve ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
243. 28538/18 Çelik v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Ahmet ÇELİK
1990
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
244. 28558/18 Arslan v. Turkey 06/06/2018 Fatih ARSLAN
1984
Kadir ÜNAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
245. 28636/18 Köse v. Turkey 13/04/2018 Eşref KÖSE
1974
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
246. 28690/18 Uluçay v. Turkey 07/06/2018 Ali ULUÇAY
1979
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
247. 28739/18 Kırbaş v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Savaş KIRBAŞ
1969
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
248. 28746/18 Özcan v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Uğur ÖZCAN
1968
Ayşe Nur AYFER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
249. 29587/18 Okumuş v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Ali Mazhar OKUMUŞ
1976
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
250. 29762/18 Özdemir v. Turkey 12/06/2018 Kadir ÖZDEMİR
1974
Ahmet KARAHAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
251. 29931/18 Özbek v. Turkey 08/06/2018 Okan ÖZBEK
1989
Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
252. 30232/18 Kızıler v. Turkey 20/06/2018 Levent KIZILER
1986
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
253. 30234/18 Turgut v. Turkey 13/06/2018 Bayram TURGUT
1974
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
254. 30267/18 Basdaş v. Turkey 20/06/2018 Mustafa BASDAŞ
1973
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
255. 30287/18 Sonay v. Turkey 18/06/2018 Suat SONAY
1978
Fatma (YILMAZ) KOCAEL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
256. 30481/18 Alıcı v. Turkey 14/06/2018 Hasan ALICI
1976
Bünyamin TAPAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
257. 30497/18 Güngörmüş v. Turkey 13/06/2018 Hasan GÜNGÖRMÜŞ
1981
Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
258. 30502/18 Coşar v. Turkey 19/06/2018 Ümit COŞAR
1988
Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
259. 30517/18 Oktar v. Turkey 18/06/2018 Mehmet OKTAR
1985
Erdem OKTAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
260. 31880/18 Alper v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Cafer Tayyer ALPER Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
261. 31888/18 Eroğlu v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Hüseyin EROĞLU
1982
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
262. 31908/18 Gülver v. Turkey 19/06/2018 Hasan GÜLVER
1970
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
263. 32352/18 Özden v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Salih ÖZDEN
1973
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
264. 32376/18 Karacaoğlu v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Hasan KARACAOĞLU
1990
Abdil TAŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
265. 32412/18 Özdemir v. Turkey 27/06/2018 Mehmet Fatih ÖZDEMİR
1985
Mehmet Yasin BUHUR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
266. 32418/18 Temel v. Turkey 28/06/2018 Yusuf TEMEL
1990
Mustafa TEMEL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
267. 32431/18 Kahveci v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Yusuf KAHVECİ
1979
Köksal YAVUZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
268. 32449/18 Nedim v. Turkey 22/06/2018 Mercan NEDİM
1985
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
269. 32599/18 Karakaya v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Murat KARAKAYA
1984
Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
270. 32605/18 Arıkan v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Ahmet ARIKAN
1972
Berivan YAKIŞIR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
271. 32611/18 Kadıoğlu v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Ali KADIOĞLU
1983
Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
272. 32906/18 Güverçin v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Sezgin GÜVERÇİN
1980
Karar Koray ATAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
273. 32945/18 Kır v. Turkey 13/06/2018 Oğuzhan KIR
1974
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
274. 32948/18 Altın v. Turkey 22/06/2018 Erkan ALTIN
1980
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
275. 32972/18 Hançerkıran v. Turkey 05/07/2018 Said Serhan HANÇERKIRAN
1977
Mustafa ASLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
276. 32999/18 Keçeci v. Turkey 02/07/2018 Tuğrul KEÇECİ
1988
Mustafa ÖZBEK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
277. 33007/18 Eşim v. Turkey 27/06/2018 Recep EŞİM
1972
Hacer SEZER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
278. 33112/18 Saz v. Turkey 27/06/2018 Murat SAZ
1974
Ali DURGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
279. 33417/18 Gül v. Turkey 04/07/2018 Ayşe Neşe GÜL
1968
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
280. 33474/18 Doğan v. Turkey 02/07/2018 Cem DOĞAN
1980
Naim DOĞAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
281. 33501/18 Orhan v. Turkey 05/07/2018 Bilal ORHAN
1985
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
282. 33714/18 Dural v. Turkey 20/04/2018 Kasım DURAL
1981
Remziye ARSLAN KAYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
283. 33806/18 Söyler v. Turkey 26/04/2018 Abdülkerim Ziya SÖYLER
1979
Metin YÜCESAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
284. 33941/18 Kandil v. Turkey 21/03/2018 Hamit Ali KANDİL
1979
Adnan AYDIN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
285. 33967/18 Özdemir v. Turkey 21/06/2018 Dursun ÖZDEMİR
1979
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
286. 34161/18 İlhan v. Turkey 11/05/2018 Mehmet İLHAN
1981
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
287. 34165/18 Yalçınkaya v. Turkey 03/05/2018 Ömer YALÇINKAYA
1977
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
288. 34198/18 Kelam v. Turkey 27/06/2018 Ali Arslan KELAM
1977
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
289. 34207/18 Albayrak v. Turkey 06/07/2018 Bülent ALBAYRAK
1970
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
290. 34466/18 Yıldırım v. Turkey 29/06/2018 Bülent YILDIRIM
1978
Murat YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
291. 34538/18 Gençoğlu v. Turkey 04/07/2018 Hacer GENÇOĞLU
1990
Sultan TEKE SOYDİNÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
292. 34683/18 Öztürkeri v. Turkey 10/07/2018 Bekir ÖZTÜRKERİ
1989
Murat YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
293. 35036/18 Usta v. Turkey 13/07/2018 Onur USTA
1989
Hanifi BAYRI Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
294. 35163/18 Ak v. Turkey 14/07/2018 Hasan AK
1980
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
295. 35179/18 Sil v. Turkey 10/05/2018 Ahmet SİL
1985
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer) Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
296. 35181/18 Karanfil v. Turkey 31/05/2018 Kemal KARANFİL
1972
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
297. 35328/18 Çağlayan v. Turkey 18/04/2018 Serkan ÇAĞLAYAN
1973
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
298. 35435/18 Yıldız v. Turkey 05/07/2018 Utku YILDIZ
1990
Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
299. 35487/18 Ayko v. Turkey 10/07/2018 Mehmet AYKO
1990
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
300. 35910/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 10/07/2018 Abdurrahman YILMAZ
1968
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
301. 36216/18 Alaybay v. Turkey 20/07/2018 Hüseyin ALAYBAY
1973
Özhan KURT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
302. 36388/18 Kurt v. Turkey 11/07/2018 Saltuk Buğra KURT
1979
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
303. 36471/18 Akçalı v. Turkey 26/07/2018 Tamer AKÇALI
1972
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer) Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
304. 36545/18 Arslan v. Turkey 27/07/2018 Önder ARSLAN
1983
Yener ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
305. 36591/18 Çam v. Turkey 17/07/2018 Ali Rıza ÇAM
1971
Levent KAHYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
306. 36656/18 Şişman v. Turkey 12/07/2018 Sefa ŞİŞMAN
1978
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
307. 36666/18 Baytekin v. Turkey 03/04/2018 İbrahim BAYTEKİN
1973
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
308. 36930/18 Kaya v. Turkey 03/07/2018 Mine KAYA
1969
Grégory THUAN DIT DIEUDONNÉ Member of Court of Cassation
309. 37070/18 Maden v. Turkey 27/07/2018 Ahmet MADEN
1969
Fatma HACIPAŞALIOĞLU Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
310. 37257/18 Dertli v. Turkey 16/07/2018 Abdullah DERTLİ
1984
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
311. 37346/18 Bulut v. Turkey 20/07/2018 Hikmet BULUT
1979
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
312. 38144/18 Yırtıcı v. Turkey 31/07/2018 Asabil YIRTICI
1981
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
313. 38851/18 Mangal v. Turkey 07/08/2018 Serkan MANGAL
1981
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
314. 39058/18 Cil v. Turkey 10/08/2018 Kamil CİL
1977
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
315. 39092/18 Arslan v. Turkey 04/07/2018 Fatih ARSLAN
1980
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
316. 39476/18 Altın v. Turkey 06/08/2018 Ömer Faruk ALTIN
1986
Hanifi BAYRI Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
317. 39755/18 Çetinkaya v. Turkey 17/08/2018 Mehmet ÇETİNKAYA
1989
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
318. 40120/18 Göçen v. Turkey 10/08/2018 Bilal GÖÇEN
1984
Zeynep Sacide SERTER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
319. 40643/18 Babaoğlu v. Turkey 02/08/2018 Hüseyin BABAOĞLU
1981
Rabia Betül KAHRAMAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
320. 41131/18 Dedebali v. Turkey 13/08/2018 Rıza DEDEBALI
1984
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
321. 41242/18 Özer v. Turkey 13/08/2018 Eyüp ÖZER
1982
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
322. 41432/18 Hamurcu v. Turkey 10/08/2018 Betül HAMURCU
1989
Zehra KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
323. 42179/18 Solak v. Turkey 16/08/2018 Selami SOLAK
1982
Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
324. 42378/18 Karamete v. Turkey 29/08/2018 Abdullah KARAMETE
1982
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
325. 42727/18 Hatal v. Turkey 19/07/2018 İbrahim HATAL
1970
İsmet ÇELİK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
326. 43052/18 Gökoğlu v. Turkey 06/08/2018 Şükrü GÖKOĞLU
1971
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
327. 44227/18 Özyılmaz v. Turkey 28/08/2018 Muhteşem ÖZYILMAZ
1989
Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not lawyer) Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
328. 44388/18 Sabay v. Turkey 13/09/2018 Dursun SABAY
1977
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
329. 45116/18 İpteş v. Turkey 17/08/2018 Gültekin İPTEŞ
1967
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
330. 45362/18 Çalıkan v. Turkey 25/09/2018 Abdullah Seçil ÇALIKAN
1985
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
331. 45455/18 Eğerci v. Turkey 07/09/2018 Ahmet EĞERCİ
1969
Adem KAPLAN Member of Supreme Administrative Court
332. 45460/18 Kul v. Turkey 07/09/2018 Süleyman KUL
1966
Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not lawyer) Member of Court of Cassation
333. 45467/18 Uslu v. Turkey 07/09/2018 Mehmet USLU
1959
Adem KAPLAN Member of Court of Cassation
334. 45480/18 Taşdan v. Turkey 07/09/2018 Mehmet Nafi TAŞDAN
1984
Hatice YILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
335. 46203/18 Baba v. Turkey 25/09/2018 Ali Rıza BABA
1975
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
336. 46229/18 Buğuçam v. Turkey 21/09/2018 Ziya Bekir BUĞUÇAM
1980
Utku Coşkuner SAKARYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
337. 46260/18 Yalçın v. Turkey 21/09/2018 Zeki YALÇIN
1974
Canan DANIŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
338. 46264/18 Gençoğlu v. Turkey 26/09/2018 Mehmet GENÇOĞLU
1989
Sultan TEKE SOYDİNÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
339. 46414/18 Demirezici v. Turkey 26/09/2018 Mehmet Ali DEMİREZİCİ
1966
Süeda Esma ŞEN KARA Member of Court of Cassation
340. 47130/18 Korkmaz v. Turkey 20/09/2018 Mahmut KORKMAZ
1980
İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
341. 47418/18 Sırlı v. Turkey 28/08/2018 Mustafa SIRLI
1973
Süleyman SARIBAŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
342. 47439/18 Çelik v. Turkey 25/09/2018 Metin ÇELİK
1983
Ramazan ZEREY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
343. 47657/18 Musa v. Turkey 25/09/2018 Alperen MUSA
1983
Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
344. 48133/18 Yıldırım v. Turkey 03/10/2018 Bünyamin YILDIRIM
1988
Metin SÖNMEZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
345. 48158/18 Simavlı v. Turkey 27/09/2018 Mustafa SİMAVLI
1965
Süleyman Serdar BALKANLI Member of Court of Cassation
346. 48210/18 Ak v. Turkey 04/10/2018 Mustafa AK
1977
Burcu KÜTAHYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
347. 48547/18 Kocabeyoğlu v. Turkey 08/10/2018 Hasan Nafi KOCABEYOĞLU
1975
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer) Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
348. 49022/18 Alçık v. Turkey 05/10/2018 Ali ALÇIK
1964
Adem KAPLAN Member of Court of Cassation
349. 49092/18 Tutar v. Turkey 28/09/2018 Galip Tuncay TUTAR
1964
Adem KAPLAN Member of Supreme Administrative Court
350. 49260/18 Adalı v. Turkey 02/10/2018 Ercan ADALI
1973
Mehmet ÇAVDAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
351. 49461/18 Kaleli v. Turkey 10/10/2018 Temel KALELİ
1983
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
352. 49832/18 Ince v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Hüseyin İNCE
1972
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
353. 49843/18 Yardımcı v. Turkey 11/10/2018 Mehmet Murat YARDIMCI
1971
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer) Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
354. 49846/18 Aksoy v. Turkey 11/10/2018 Muharrem AKSOY
1976
Cabir Hulusi GÜLDEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
355. 50052/18 Koçtekin v. Turkey 15/10/2018 Okan KOÇTEKİN
1968
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
356. 50079/18 Aydın v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Turan AYDIN
1972
Zehra KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
357. 50343/18 Dönmez v. Turkey 10/10/2018 Bekir DÖNMEZ
1977
Deniz UYSAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
358. 51094/18 Alim v. Turkey 25/10/2018 Ümit ALIM
1979
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
359. 51105/18 Kaya v. Turkey 25/10/2018 Levent KAYA
1980
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
360. 51377/18 Başlar v. Turkey 27/10/2018 Yusuf BAŞLAR
1981
Zehra KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
361. 51430/18 Evğün v. Turkey 22/10/2018 Mustafa EVĞÜN
1979
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
362. 51548/18 Fırat v. Turkey 18/10/2018 Bircan FIRAT
1974
Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
363. 51920/18 İren v. Turkey 26/10/2018 Muzaffer İREN
1974
Hüseyin UÇAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
364. 52171/18 Yiğit v. Turkey 16/10/2018 Nazım YİĞİT
1972
Ali DURGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
365. 52298/18 Karakuş v. Turkey 09/10/2018 Nuri KARAKUŞ
1978
Zeynep ŞEN KARAKUŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
366. 52471/18 Cambolat v. Turkey 29/10/2018 Ahmet CAMBOLAT
1979
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
367. 52535/18 Ermiş v. Turkey 24/10/2018 Ercan ERMİŞ
1986
Duygu BUDAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
368. 52615/18 Vatan v. Turkey 26/10/2018 Zeki VATAN
1974
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
369. 52817/18 Yıldız v. Turkey 22/10/2018 Halil İbrahim YILDIZ
1985
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
370. 53077/18 Alada v. Turkey 05/11/2018 Zakir ALADA
1985
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
371. 53381/18 Uğurlu v. Turkey 01/11/2018 İbrahim UĞURLU
1982
Burcu HAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
372. 53564/18 Erdemir v. Turkey 23/10/2018 Ahmet ERDEMİR
1982
Sefanur BOZGÖZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
373. 53586/18 İnceoğlu v. Turkey 01/11/2018 İsmail İNCEOĞLU
1965
Ayşe Büşra İNCEOĞLU Member of Court of Cassation
374. 53610/18 Çelik v. Turkey 08/11/2018 Abdullah ÇELİK
1981
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
375. 53682/18 Çeliktaş v. Turkey 12/11/2018 Sedat ÇELİKTAŞ
1977
Ahmet ŞAHİN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
376. 53840/18 Özcan v. Turkey 06/11/2018 Lutfullah Sami ÖZCAN
1974
Menekşe Merve TEKTEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
377. 54260/18 Şen v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Şuayip ŞEN
1966
Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not lawyer) Member of Court of Cassation
378. 54263/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Zekeriya YILMAZ
1965
Adem KAPLAN Member of Court of Cassation
379. 54318/18 Cengiz v. Turkey 25/10/2018 Abdi CENGİZ
1965
Zehra KILIÇ Member of Court of Cassation
380. 54584/18 Taşdelen v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Reşat TAŞDELEN
1963
Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not lawyer) Member of Court of Cassation
381. 54844/18 Gürbüz v. Turkey 13/11/2018 Yasin GÜRBÜZ
1981
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
382. 54910/18 Sayıldı v. Turkey 16/11/2018 Yeşim SAYILDI
1972
Ahmet Serdar GÜNEŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
383. 54942/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 31/10/2018 Erkan YILMAZ
1986
Sultan TEKE SOYDİNÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
384. 55500/18 Sayıldı v. Turkey 16/11/2018 Selçuk SAYILDI
1969
Ahmet Serdar GÜNEŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
385. 55596/18 Ş.D. v. Turkey 20/11/2018 Ş.D.
1977
İbrahim KOCAOĞUL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
386. 57177/18 Aydın v. Turkey 24/11/2018 İlkay AYDIN
1982
İsmail GÜLER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
387. 57198/18 Mutlu v. Turkey 10/11/2018 Levent MUTLU
1977
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
388. 57202/18 Palancı v. Turkey 13/11/2018 Erhan PALANCI
1987
Esat Selim ESEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
389. 57504/18 Sarı v. Turkey 26/11/2018 Bozan SARI
1984
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
390. 57591/18 Özdemir v. Turkey 26/11/2018 Muzaffer ÖZDEMİR
1968
Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
391. 57936/18 Çolaklar v. Turkey 07/12/2018 İlyas ÇOLAKLAR
1985
Murat GÜNDEM Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
392. 58507/18 Özese v. Turkey 26/11/2018 Hasan Hüseyin ÖZESE
1960
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
393. 58514/18 Tapar v. Turkey 26/11/2018 Hacı Yusuf TAPAR
1989
Bünyamin TAPAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
394. 58522/18 Arabacı v. Turkey 17/11/2018 Kerem ARABACI
1972
İsmet ÇELİK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
395. 58651/18 Demir v. Turkey 15/11/2018 Murat DEMİR
1968
Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
396. 58875/18 Gül v. Turkey 28/11/2018 Hasan Basri GÜL
1979
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
397. 58925/18 Bahadır v. Turkey 28/11/2018 Oktay BAHADIR
1982
Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
398. 59274/18 T.Ç. v. Turkey 03/12/2018 T.Ç.
1977
Abdullah BIRDIR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
399. 59555/18 Yıldız v. Turkey 07/12/2018 Hasan YILDIZ
1981
Şerafettin AKTAŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
400. 59840/18 Sakman v. Turkey 04/12/2018 Ahmet SAKMAN
1981
Serdar ÇELEBİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
401. 59990/18 Kaya v. Turkey 30/11/2018 Mehmet KAYA
1972
Fatih ŞAHİNLER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
402. 233/19 Vural v. Turkey 11/12/2018 Hamdi VURAL
1978
Murat YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
403. 752/19 Sarıkaya v. Turkey 29/12/2018 Cebrail SARIKAYA
1976
Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
404. 1641/19 Göktopal v. Turkey 14/12/2018 Bülent GÖKTOPAL
1979
Muhammet ATALAY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
405. 1668/19 Kırmaz v. Turkey 05/12/2018 Fikret KIRMAZ
1980
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
406. 1779/19 Yumma v. Turkey 02/01/2019 Süleyman YUMMA
1970
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
407. 1843/19 Altınışık v. Turkey 01/12/2018 Kadir ALTINIŞIK
1968
Handan CAN Member of Court of Cassation
408. 1844/19 Aydın v. Turkey 14/11/2018 Mahmut AYDIN
1967
Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
409. 2111/19 Erdoğan v. Turkey 06/12/2018 Zekeriya ERDOĞAN
1966
Handan CAN Member of Court of Cassation
410. 2413/19 Demir v. Turkey 27/11/2018 Gökhan DEMİR
1986
İmdat BERKSOY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
411. 3078/19 Demiryürek v. Turkey 17/12/2018 Ahmet DEMİRYÜREK
1970
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
412. 3114/19 Yılmaz v. Turkey 05/12/2018 Mustafa YILMAZ
1967
Hilal YILMAZ PUSAT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
413. 3660/19 Cenik v. Turkey 21/12/2018 Fatih CENİK
1979
Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
414. 4149/19 Tekelioğlu v. Turkey 15/01/2019 Murat TEKELİOĞLU
1983
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
415. 4575/19 Cuvoğlu v. Turkey 04/01/2019 Mahmut CUVOĞLU
1985
Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
416. 4995/19 Ertaşkın v. Turkey 10/01/2019 Sedat ERTAŞKIN
1976
Zülküf ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
417. 5153/19 Bilici v. Turkey 11/01/2019 Hasan BİLİCİ
1986
Regaip DEMİR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
418. 5313/19 Memiş v. Turkey 08/01/2019 Yahya MEMİŞ
1965
Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
419. 5316/19 Aydın v. Turkey 21/01/2019 Mustafa AYDIN
1968
Mehmet ARI (not lawyer) Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
420. 5331/19 Şen v. Turkey 12/01/2019 ÇETİN ŞEN
1965
Süeda Esma ŞEN KARA Member of Court of Cassation
421. 6114/19 Şen v. Turkey 10/01/2019 Mümin ŞEN
1977
Zeynep ŞEN KARAKUŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
422. 7306/19 Alıcı v. Turkey 24/01/2019 Burhan ALICI
1971
İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
423. 7432/19 Üzüm v. Turkey 16/01/2019 Şahin ÜZÜM
1977
Ömer Faruk ERGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
424. 9927/19 Yıldırım v. Turkey 06/02/2019 Mecit YILDIRIM
1984
Hilal MET DUMAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
425. 10967/19 Doğan v. Turkey 15/02/2019 Osman İlter DOĞAN
1971
Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
426. 11047/19 Pınar v. Turkey 06/02/2019 Atilla PINAR
1973
Zülküf ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
427. 13015/19 Toklu v. Turkey 25/02/2019 Aykut TOKLU
1979
Merve Elif GÜRACAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor

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