Rabczewska v. Poland (European Court of Human Rights)

Last Updated on September 15, 2022 by LawEuro

Information Note on the Court’s case-law 266
September 2022

Rabczewska v. Poland – 8257/13

Judgment 15.9.2022 [Section I]

Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression

Lack of sufficient reasons for conviction and fine for offending religious feelings of others through publicly insulting the Bible: violation

Facts – The applicant is a popular pop singer. In an interview for a news website, subsequently reprinted in a tabloid, she made statements relating to the Bible and its authors. In particular, she stated that she was more convinced by scientific discoveries, and not by what she described as “the writings of someone wasted from drinking wine and smoking some weed”. Two individuals complained to a public prosecutor that the applicant’s statements had amounted to an offence under the Criminal Code (offending the religious feelings of other persons by publicly insulting an object of religious worship). The applicant was convicted and fined. She appealed unsuccessfully.

Law – Article 10:

The applicant’s criminal conviction had amounted to an interference with her right to freedom of expression, which had been prescribed by law and pursued the aim of protecting religious feelings, which corresponded to protecting the rights of others within the meaning of Article 10 § 2. The issue before the Court involved weighing up the conflicting interests, regard being had to the wide margin of appreciation left to the domestic authorities in the instant case.

With regard to the applicant’s statements, she had not argued that they had been part of a debate on a question of public interest, nor had she claimed to be an expert on the matter, a journalist or a historian. She had been answering a journalist’s question about her private life, addressing her audience in a language consistent with her style of communication, deliberately frivolous and colourful, with the intention of sparking interest.

The domestic courts had failed to assess properly – on the basis of a detailed analysis of the wording – whether the applicant’s statements had constituted factual statements or value judgments. They had failed to identify and carefully weigh the competing interests at stake. They had also not discussed the permissible limits of criticism of religious doctrines under the Convention versus their disparagement. In particular, the domestic courts had not assessed whether the applicant’s statements had been capable of arousing justified indignation or whether they had been of a nature to incite to hatred or otherwise disturb religious peace and tolerance in Poland.

It had not been argued before the domestic courts, or before the Court, that the applicant’s statements had amounted to hate speech and the domestic courts had not examined whether the actions in question could have led to any harmful consequences. It appeared that the relevant domestic legislative provision incriminated all behaviour likely to hurt religious feelings, with no additional criterion that it should threaten public order.

It had not been demonstrated that the interference in the instant case had been required, in accordance with the State’s positive obligations under Article 9, to ensure the peaceful coexistence of religious and non-religious groups and individuals under their jurisdiction by ensuring an atmosphere of mutual tolerance. Moreover, the Court considered that the expressions under examination had not amounted to an improper or abusive attack on an object of religious veneration, likely to incite religious intolerance or violating the spirit of tolerance, which was one of the bases of a democratic society.

Lastly, the applicant had been convicted in criminal proceedings originating from a bill of indictment lodged by a public prosecutor upon a complaint by two individuals. The criminal proceedings had thus been continued even after the applicant had reached a friendly settlement with one of the complainants. She had been sentenced to a fine equivalent to 1,160 euros, fifty times the minimum. It could not therefore be concluded that the sanction imposed on the applicant had been insignificant.

Accordingly, and despite the wide margin of appreciation, the domestic authorities had failed to put forward sufficient reasons capable of justifying the interference with the applicant’s freedom of speech.

Conclusion: violation (six votes to one).

Article 41: EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

(See also E.S. v. Austria, 38450/12, 25 October 2018, Legal Summary)

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