Last Updated on October 3, 2020 by LawEuro
FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 15359/14
Károly BÍRÓ
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 26 March 2019 as a Committee composed of:
Georges Ravarani, President,
Marko Bošnjak,
Péter Paczolay, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 12 February 2014,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Károly Bíró, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1967 and lives in Kozármislény. He was represented before the Court by Mr A.K. Kádár and Mr B. Tóth T., lawyers practising in Budapest.
2. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, Ministry of Justice.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. In June 2000 the applicant was appointed as a notary of the Kozármislény Municipality, and from 2008 he worked as honorary chief notary.
5. On 17 January 2011 the Kozármislény Municipality dismissed the applicant from his position as notary without giving any reasons, and terminated his public service employment.
6. On 25 February 2011 the applicant filed a labour-law complaint against the Kozármislény Municipality, requesting that the court establish that the termination of his public service employment had been unlawful.
7. On 15 September 2011 the Pécs Labour Court upheld the applicant’s complaint in the most part. It held that the termination of the employment had been unlawful, and obliged the employer to pay the unpaid balance of the applicant’s salary plus a lump sum in damages and to reimburse the litigation costs that he had incurred. When determining the compensation element of the applicant’s claim, the court noted that he had since found alternative employment and had been employed since 13 September 2011.
8. On 12 January 2012, following appeals by both parties, the Pécs High Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment in the most part but increased the amount of damages awarded. Since the respondent, being a municipality, was statutorily exempted from court duties (illeték – specifically, court issue fees) (see paragraph 12 below), no such duties were collected from the Kozármislény Municipality, despite its having lost the case. However, it was obliged to pay 150,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) in respect of the legal costs incurred (perköltség) by the applicant during the second-instance proceedings.
9. The respondent municipality submitted a request for judicial review of the judgment.
10. On 5 June 2013 the Kúria quashed the second-instance decision and reversed the first-instance judgment, dismissing the applicant’s claim. As opposed to the first- and second-instance courts, the Kúria found that the dismissal had been lawful. In particular, it found that the applicant had received the Kozármislény Municipality’s decision in written form and that the mere fact that the decision had not contained information about the available remedies and the exact notice period did not make the termination unlawful. The applicant was ordered to pay the legal costs which the municipality had incurred in connection with the litigation. In addition, the applicant was ordered to pay court duties in the amount of HUF 445,000 for the first-instance proceedings, HUF 445,000 for the second-instance proceedings and HUF 741,600 for the judicial review proceedings; that is, court duties amounting to a total of HUF 1,631,600 (approximately EUR 5,200).
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
11. For the relevant domestic law, see Harrison McKee v. Hungary (no. 22840/07, § 12, 3 June 2014). In addition, the following provisions ofAct no. III of 1952 on the (old) Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “the Code of Civil Procedure”) are relevant:
Section 78
“(1) The costs of the successful party shall be covered by the unsuccessful party.
…”
Section 358/B
“If the [employee’s relevant income] originating in the employment relationship … does not exceed [a certain amount specified by law], the litigant employee … is entitled to an ‘employee’s exemption from court fees’ [including court duties] (munkavállalói költségkedvezmény)…”
12. Act no. XCIII of 1990 on Duties (hereinafter “the Duties Act”) provides at section 5(1) that, inter alia, the Hungarian State and local municipalities and associations shall be entitled to a full exemption from court duties.
13. Decree No. 6/1986. (VI. 26.) of the Minister of Justice regarding the application of fee exemptions in court procedures provided, at the material time and in so far as relevant, as follows:
Section 3
“Unless [the law provides for another ground for exemption from court fees], litigants are exempted from [advancing court fees, which include either court duties or other costs] on the basis of the subject matter of the dispute, irrespective of their means … (tárgyi költségfeljegyzési jog) in the following cases:
…
f) lawsuits related to employment, public service or civil servant agreements,
…”
Section 6
“…
(2) Exceptionally, an exemption from court fees may also be allowed if … by taking into account other circumstances of the given party, the court establishes that that party’s means of subsistence are at risk.”
14. Decree No. 73/2009. (XII. 22.) of the Minister of Justice and Public Administration sets out the income level below which the ‘employee’s exemption from court fees’ (see paragraph 11 above) is available.
15. In decision no. 3/1995. (II. 17.) AB (unrelated to the present case), the Constitutional Court held as follows:
“The Constitutional Court has established that section 5(1) of the Duties Act – in particular point (b) thereof which provides a full ‘personal’ exemption for municipalities – does not in itself constitute discrimination violating section 70/A of the Constitution with regard to a party not entitled to such exemption.
…
The economic and financial considerations behind the ‘personal’ exemption of municipalities from duties are that a municipality performs public tasks, and covers its expenses from its own revenues and from allowances granted from the central budget. If a municipality were to be forced to pay court duties, this would unjustifiably reduce the amount of funds available to cover the costs of implementation of public services, and in some cases the municipality would effectively be paying the court duty to the central budget using the allowances it had received from the central budget …”
16. Under section 24(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and sections 39‑42 of the Duties Act, the amount of court duties payable depends on the amount claimed in the lawsuit and is not related to the party’s financial situation.
COMPLAINTS
17. The applicant complained that the imposition of the court duties on him as a losing party – which in a reverse situation would not have been payable by the respondent municipality – had amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to discrimination in his enjoyment of the said right, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention.
THE LAW
A. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
18. The applicant complained that the imposition of the court duties had amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …”
1. The parties’ arguments
19. The Government argued that Hungarian law fully secured the right of access to court in cases such as the present one. In particular, it provided a means-based exemption from court fees and thereby secured the right of access to courts generally, on the basis of financial hardship (see section 6 of the Decree No. 6/1986. (VI. 26.) of the Minister of Justice, cited in paragraph 13 above). Furthermore, a special, means-based exemption from court fees was available for employees under section 358/B of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 11 above). In addition, in labour cases, litigants had a subject-matter-based right of exemption from having to advance the court fees (see paragraph 13 above).
20. Moreover, the status-based full exemption of local municipalities from court duties in civil and administrative proceedings was aimed at enhancing the implementation of public services and was meant to provide relief for bodies whose revenues derived from the central budget. In the Government’s view, the exemption did not hamper the right of access to court of other, non-municipal, parties.
21. The Government pointed out in that connection that discrimination could only exist with regard to persons in comparable situations. In the present case the differentiation that had been made by the legislator had not been related to the employer-employee relationship. The categories of beneficiaries of the exemption expressly included municipalities, independently of whether a municipality in any given process was acting as an employer or as a party to an entirely different legal relationship. Therefore the regulation did not discriminate but provided a benefit – on rational grounds – for pre-defined entities in a way that did not entail a restriction on the right of access to court for any other parties. In any event, the exemption from court duties did not absolve the municipalities from having to pay any remaining court fees or the costs incurred by the opposing party, if they lost the case.
22. The applicant argued that the ‘employee’s exemption from court fees’referred to by the Government had not been available in his particular circumstances, given that he had had to declare a high income level to form the basis of his claim – although he had already been dismissed from that employment. Paradoxically, as the claim had been based on that high income, this had caused a large amount of court duties to become payable because the duties had been calculated by reference to the declared income. In the applicant’s view, the possibility of being granted an exemption from advancing the court fees alone did not render the system compatible with Article 6.
23. Furthermore, the applicant explained that his complaint was not directed against local municipalities being exempted from court duties as such, but at the inequality created by the fact that employees were not fully exempted from such duties if they lost a claim brought in the context of a labour dispute. The municipality could thus make use of legal remedies without having to bear the risk of paying substantial court duties, while the applicant could not. In the instant case both the applicant and the municipality had been in a comparable situation since they had both been litigants in civil proceedings.
2. The Court’s assessment
24. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. The right of access, namely the right to institute proceedings before a court in civil matters, constitutes one aspect of this “right to court” (see Jureša v. Croatia, no. 24079/11, § 41, 22 May 2018). However, the right of access to the courts is not absolute but may be subject to limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, which regulation may vary in time and in place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals (see Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, § 78, 5 April 2018).
25. The Court further refers to the principles regarding court fees as set out in Harrison McKee v. Hungary (no. 22840/07, §§ 22, 25, 26 and 29, 3 June 2014). In particular, it notes that the requirement to pay fees to civil courts in connection with claims they are asked to determine cannot be regarded as a restriction on the right of access to a court that is incompatible per se with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, the amount of the fees assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of a given case is a material factor in determining whether or not a person enjoyed his right of access (see Stankov v. Bulgaria, no. 68490/01, § 52, 12 July 2007).
26. Lastly, the Court has considered in Stankiewicz v. Poland (no. 46917/99, § 60, ECHR 2006‑VI) that there might be situations in which the issues linked to the determination of litigation costs could be of relevance for the assessment as to whether the proceedings in a civil case seen as a whole complied with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
27. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the central issue lies in the fact that the applicant, who unsuccessfully pursued a claim against his employer, the Kozármislény Municipality, was required to pay court duties (forming part of the overall court fees – see paragraph 10 above), whereas the municipality would not have been obliged to pay such duties had it lost the proceedings. In the applicant’s view, this created an inequality which could be resolved only if employees were to be fully exempted from paying court duties (see paragraph 23 above). The applicant did not, however, complain in his application before the Court about the other litigation costs that he had been required to pay (see paragraph 10 above) or about the subject matter and outcome of the proceedings, namely the finding that his dismissal from the position of notary had been lawful.
28. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the scope of the applicant’s complaint, the Court notes that it cannot be compared to those cases where court fees were charged in respect of well-founded actions against the State. In the present case the applicant’s action was dismissed in its entirety on the merits (see paragraph 10 above, and see also Harrison McKee, cited above, §§ 31 and 32, and the cases cited therein). Likewise, the facts of the present case do not bear relevant similarities to the case of Stankiewicz (cited above) where all the litigation costs had to be borne by the defendants, despite the fact that the courts had found against the public prosecutor who brought the case (see Stankiewicz, cited above, § 67). In examining whether the facts complained of in the present case could nevertheless indicate that the applicant’s “right of access to a court” was impaired, the Court also finds the following considerations particularly important.
29. In so far as the applicant complained about him being in an unequal position compared to the municipality (see paragraph 23 above), the Court notes that the municipality had indeed enjoyed a certain privilege in that it had not had to pay the court duties (see paragraph 12 above). However, having regard also to the reasons underpinning this privilege (see paragraphs 15 and 20 above), such an exemption could not be considered incompatible per se with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. What is important is whether the exemption was applied so as to put the applicant at an undue disadvantage vis-à-vis the municipality (see, mutatis mutandis, Stankiewicz, cited above, § 69).
30. In this connection the Court notes that its task in cases arising from individual applications is not to review domestic law in the abstract, but to examine the manner in which that law has been applied to applicants (see Harrison McKee, cited above, § 30). Having regard to the application of the impugned law providing for the municipality’s exemption in the present case, the applicant could not be considered to be in a different position from that in other labour disputes. In particular, the applicant was unsuccessful with his case and would have had to pay the court duties regardless of the identity of his opponent (see paragraph 11 above). Nor can it be said that the municipality enjoyed a significant advantage in using legal remedies because of the exemption in question (see the applicant’s arguments summarised in paragraph 23 above), particularly as it risked having to pay all the other costs of the proceedings in the event that it did not succeed with its case (see paragraph 21 in fine above).
31. Furthermore, in so far as the applicant seems to suggest that the only way to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings would have been to exempt all employees from paying court duties (see paragraph 22 above), the Court reiterates that, in order to determine whether or not a particular person has enjoyed the right of access to court, the amount of the fees imposed is to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of a given case (see the case-law quoted in paragraph 25 above). It notes that the applicant did not provide any information to show that his financial situation was such as to make it particularly difficult for him to pay the court duties (compare Kreuz v. Poland, no. 28249/95, §§ 62-63, ECHR 2001‑VI). In any event, various procedural solutions were available under Hungarian law to avoid placing an excessive burden on litigants (see Harrison McKee, cited above, § 34), including a specific exemption from court fees afforded to employees in labour disputes (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above). The applicant seems to have been exempted from having to advance the court fees (see paragraph 13 above) but does not appear to have applied for a further exemption from ultimately having to pay them. The Court notes in this connection that his submissions regarding his ineligibility for a full exemption despite him being unemployed (see paragraph 22 above) do not appear properly substantiated. Moreover, as indicated by the Pécs Labour Court, he had found an alternative employment and had beenemployed since 13 September 2011 (see paragraph 7 above).
32. In view of the above, the Court finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
33. Relying on Article 14 of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been discriminated against in the enjoyment of his rights under Article 6 § 1.
Article 14 reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
34. The Court notes that this complaint overlaps with the one dealt with under Article 6 § 1 alone. Having regard to the applicant’s arguments (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above) and the considerations set out above (see, in particular, paragraphs 29 to 31 above), the Court considers that the facts of the present case do not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. This complaint must therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 18 April 2019.
Andrea Tamietti Georges Ravarani
Deputy Registrar President
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