Last Updated on November 5, 2019 by LawEuro
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF GORLOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 35425/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 December 2018
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Gorlova v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Alena Poláčková, President,
Dmitry Dedov,
Jolien Schukking, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 27 November 2018,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 35425/07) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by aRussian national, Ms Anna NikolayevnaGorlova (“the applicant”), on 12 July 2007.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.
3. On 9 March 2009 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Sochi.
A. Judgments in the applicant’s favour against various State authorities
5. The applicant obtained three judgments in her favour against various domestic authorities specified in the Appendix.
6. The judgments were either enforced with a delay or remained unenforced until the date of receipt of the parties’ latest submissions, as specified in the table below.
7. According to the Government, to enforce the judgment of 23 June 2005 the authorities held a public auction to determine a company to perform the renovation of the applicant’s flat in Yakutsk. On 3 October 2008 the applicant refused to let the employees of the winner private company in, and they were unable to start the renovation works in the flat. In November 2008 the bailiffs sent a notification to the applicant that the renovation works were scheduled for 19 November 2008, but the notification was never delivered to her, as in the meantime she had moved to a different town. In March 2009 the bailiffs and the local administration employees attempted to visit the flat in question and compiled an act on the applicant’s absence from the flat.
B. Proceedings of 2004 concerning the bailiffs’ inaction
8. On 11 November 2004 the Justice of the Peace of the 41stCourt Circuit of Yakutsk granted the applicant’s complaint about the bailiffs’ inaction in various rounds of the enforcement proceedings concerning other judgments in her favour and ordered the bailiffs’ service of Yakutsk to pay the applicant 200,000.15 Russian roubles (RUB) of compensation.
9. The applicant requested to amend the judgment, to replace the respondent authority by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. Referring to the applicant’s request, on 9 February 2005 the Justice of the Peace, of the 41stCourt Circuit of Yakutsk annulled the judgment of 11 November 2004 and ordered that the proceedings be reopened.
10. In May 2005 the case was forwarded for examination to the Yakutsk Town Court according to the jurisdiction rules, on the respondent’s request. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged the decision to transfer the case; the final decision was issued on 16 June 2005 by the Yakutsk Town Court. On 28 June 2005 the proceedings were suspended on the applicant’s request. Since that date the applicant had not lodged any further applications with domestic courts. On 20 December 2005 the Yakutsk Town Court left the applicant’s action against the bailiffs without examination, for the applicant’s lack of interest in maintaining the case. The applicant did not appeal against the decision.
C. Judgment against a municipal unitary enterprise
11. On 19 November 2004 the Yakutsk Town Court granted the applicant’s civil action against the municipal unitary enterprise “Payment Processing Centre” (МУП «ЕРКЦ») of Yakutsk. The court found that the respondent company, when calculating the communal charges,had failed to take account of the water provider’s failure to supply water to the applicant’s flat in summer, as well as of the applicant’s absence from home for a specific period of time. The court ordered the enterprise (1) to count RUB 25,500 already paid by the applicant towards her debt in respect of communal charges; to recalculate the charges on account of (2) the applicant’s long-term absence and (3) the lack of hot water supply; and (4) to provide information about communal services already paid by her.
12. On 22 December 2004 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. The court found, in particular, that the enterprise was a due respondent, as the Yakutsk administration had delegated to it the power to collect communal charges from the population.
13. The debtor company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise set up by a decision of the local administration. The company had “the right of economic control” (правохозяйственноговедения) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out its statutory activities. The parties did not provide information on its core activities. It appears that it was, inter alia, in charge of collection of communal charges from local population. It also provided programming, data processing and IT consultancy services.
14. According to the Government, on 14 December 2004 the company’s activity was discontinued as the company wasre-structured in the form of transformation (реорганизованавформепреобразования) and incorporated as open joint-stock company OAO “Payment Processing Centre” («ОАО ЕРКЦ», “the OAO”).On the same date a relevant record was made in the Register of Legal Entities. The parties did not provide information on the owners of the newly-created company’s shares, did not submit a copy of the transfer and acceptance act and did not provide any details on the legal succession issue.
15. On 21 January 2005 the writs of execution were issued in respect of the judgment of 19 November 2004, and on 1 February 2005 the enforcement proceedings were opened.
16. Referring to a“notification” dated 19 April 2005 by the municipal unitary enterprise “Payment Processing Centre”[1], the Government submitted that on an unspecified date the judgment had been enforced in part, in so far as the obligations to count the amount toward the applicant’s debt and to recalculate the charges on account of the lack of hot water were concerned. They did not submit a copy of the notification.
17. It appears that on 6 September 2007 the writs were returned to the bailiffsby an unspecified person or authority without execution.
18. On 12 September 2007 the bailiffs’ service discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the remaining part of the judgment on account of the impossibility to enforce it and returned the writs of execution to the Yakutsk Town Court. The parties did not provide copies of the relevant documents.
19. According to the Government, on 23 August 2008 the OAO was liquidated.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Restructuring of a company in the form of transformation
20. Article 58 § 5 of the Civil Code, as in force at the material time, provided that in case of restructuring in the form of transformation, rights and obligations of the restructured legal entity are transferred to a newly‑created legal entity in accordance with the transfer and acceptance act (передаточныйакт).
21. The transfer and acceptance act must contain provisions on succession for all obligations of the restructured legal entity in relation to all its creditors and debtors, including obligations contested by the parties.The transfer and acceptance act is approved by the legal entity’s founders (partners) or the body which has made a decision to restructure legal entities and is submitted together with constituent documents for official registration of newly-created legal entities or in order to introduce changes in constituent documents of the existing legal entities. A failure to submit a transfer and acceptance act together with constituent documents, as well as the absence therein of provisions concerning the succession of the restructured legal entity’s obligations entails the denial of theofficial registration of the newly-created legal entity (Article 59 of the Civil Code).
22. The owner of the property allocated under the unitary enterprise’s economic control may decide to restructure the company (Article 295 of the Civil Code and section 29 of the Unitary Enterprises Act as in force at the material time). In particular, restructuring could takethe form of transformation into a different legal entity (sections 29-35 of the Unitary Enterprises Act).
23. Section 34 of the Unitary Enterprises Act as in force at the material time stipulated that restructuring of a unitary enterprise in the form of transformation was to be conducted in accordance with domestic privatisation laws, in this case the Privatisation of the State and Municipal Property Act No. 178-FZ of 21 December 2001 (the Privatisation Act). Privatisation of the State and municipal assets meant an alienation of the assets owned by the State or a municipality to a physical or legal person’s ownership, against remuneration (Section 1 of the Privatisation Act).
24. Pursuant to an owner’s decision, a unitary enterprise could be transformed, inter alia, into an open joint-stock company (Section 13 § 1 of the Privatisation Act).
25. Creditors were to be notified in writing of the decision to restructure, and the information on that decision was to be published in media sources (Section 29 § 8 of the Unitary Enterprises Act).
26. The State, the subjects of the Russian Federation and the municipalities are not liable for debts which have not been included in the transfer and acceptance act (Section 27 § 2 of the Privatisation Act).
27. A transfer and acceptance act, as well as a sale-purchase agreement constituted, among other documents, a ground for registration of the property rights’ transfer to the purchaser. Upon the transfer of the property rights to a purchaser, a unitary enterprise was discontinued. A relevant record was made in the Register of legal entities (Section 27 § 8 of the Privatisation Act).
B. Other relevant provisions
28. In the event of liquidation the legal person ceases to exist without succession (Article 61 of the Civil Code, referred to by the Government).
29. The domestic provisions on the legal status of State and municipal unitary enterprises with the right of economic control are summarised in Liseytseva and Maslovv. Russia, nos. 39483/05 and 40527/10, §§ 54-127, 9 October 2014.
30. Relevant provisions of the Compensation Act as in force before 1 January 2017 and applicable to cases of non-enforcement of the domestic judgment imposing monetary obligations on State authorities are summarised in Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev v. Russia (nos. 27451/09 and 60650/09, §§ 15-20, 23 September 2010).
31. Relevant provisions of the Federal Law No. 450-FZ amending the Compensation Act of 2010, in force as of 1 January 2017 and extending the scope of the Compensation Act to cases of excessive delays in the enforcement of court judgments ordering the domestic authorities to fulfil various obligations in kind are summarised in Shtolts and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 77056/14 and 2 others, §§ 31‑41, 30 January 2018.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST THE STATE AUTHORITES
32. The applicant complained about the authorities’ failure to enforce four judgments in her favour given against the State authorities and the lack of an effective remedy in respect of the non-enforcement complaint. She referred to Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1, which read as follows:
Article 6
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …”
Article 13
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
33. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies. In particular, she had not lodged a court action against the bailiffs, did not claim non-pecuniary damage in court proceedings and did not complain about the authorities’ inaction. They further noted that the judgment of 23 June 2005 remained unenforced due to the applicant’s own conduct as she refused to cooperate with the authorities and thus obstructed enforcement.
34. The applicant maintained her claim.
A. Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
1. Admissibilty
35. As regards the complaint about the non-enforcement of the judgment of 11 November 2004, the Court notes that the judgment was set aside on the applicant’s own request in February 2005. However, she only complained about the non-enforcement on 12 July 2007. The Court notes in addition that all subsequent proceedings concerning the matter were discontinued as early as in December 2005. Accordingly, her complaint in respect of the judicial award of 11 November 2004 was lodged out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
36. As regards other judgments issued against the State authorities dated28 November 2002, 28 August 2006 and 23 June 2005, the Court notes the Government’s argument that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies in respect of this complaint. The Court reiterates that at the time when the applicant brought her complaint about the length of proceedings to the Court, that is in July 2007, there was no effective remedy under Russian law capable of affording redress for the non-enforcement of domestic judgments imposing either monetary obligations or obligations in kind on the domestic authorities (see Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), no. 33509/04, §§ 101-17, ECHR 2009, and Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, nos. 29920/05 and 10 others, §§ 157-66, 1 July 2014). As regards the domestic remedies introduced by the Compensation Act in 2010 and 2017, the Court reiterates its settled approach that in any event it would be unfair to request the applicants whose cases have already been pending for many years in the domestic system and who have come to seek relief at the Court to bring again their claims before domestic tribunals (see Burdov (no. 2), cited above, § 144, and Gerasimov and Others, cited above, § 230). In line with this principle, the Court decides to proceed with the examination of the present case anddismisses the Government’s objection as regards the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant.
37. The Court further notes that the non-enforcement complaint concerning the judgments of 28 November 2002, 28 August 2006 and 23 June 2005 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
38. The Court notes that the judgment of 28 August 2006 was enforced with a delay of one year and slightly more than three months, and the judicial awards of 28 November 2002 and 23 June 2005 had remained unenforced until at least July 2009, that is for six years and seven months and four years and one month after their entry into force, respectively. The Court notes the Government’s objection concerning the applicant’s uncooperative behaviour in so far as the enforcement of the judgment of 23 June 2005 was concerned. It notes, however, that the Government had not produced any documents in support of their submissions. In any event, it is not contested by the Government that the first attempts to enforce the judgment were made in October 2008, that is more than three years since the judgment’s entry into force.
39. According to the Court’s case‑law, such delays are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the Convention (see, among others, Kozodoyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 2701/04 and 4 others, § 11, 15 January 2009).
40. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in cases raising issues similar to the ones in the present case (see, among many others, Burdov (no. 2), cited above, §§ 62 et seq.; Koshelevaand Others v. Russia, no. 9046/07, § 19, 17 January 2012; and Gerasimov and Others, cited above, §§ 169-71).
41. Having examined the material submitted to it, the Court notes that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. It finds that by failing, for a significant period of time, to comply with the enforceable judgments in the applicant’s favour the domestic authorities impaired the essence of her right to a court, and that such failure constituted an unjustified interference with the applicants’ right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.
42. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the present case on account of the non-enforcement of the domestic judgments of 28 November 2002, 23 June 2005 and 28 August 2006 in the applicant’s favour.
B. Article 13 of the Convention
43. The Court has already noted the existence of a domestic remedy against the non-enforcement of domestic judgments imposing monetary obligations, as well as the obligations of a pecuniary and non-pecuniary nature on the Russian authorities, introduced by the 2010 Compensation Act, subsequently amended in 2016. The Court has found that the Compensation Act in principle meets the criteria set out in Burdov (no. 2) and Gerasimov and Others pilot judgment and provides the applicants with a potentially effective remedy in respect of their non-enforcement complaints (see Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev, cited above, §§ 34-40,in so far as the compensation for non-enforcement of the monetary awards is concerned; and Shtolts and Others, cited above, §§ 87-116 and § 123, in so far as the compensation for delayed enforcement of judgments imposing obligations in kind is concerned). Even though the remedy was – and still is – available to the applicant, the Court reiterates its findings in paragraph 36 above that it would be unfair to request herto bring her claimsagain before domestic tribunals.
44. However, in the light of the adoption of the domestic remedy, the Court, as in its previous decisions, considers that it is not necessary to examine separately the admissibility and merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 in the present case (see, see, for the Court’s reasoning in many similar cases concerning both monetary awards and obligations in kind, Korotyayeva and Others, nos. 13122/11 and 2 others, § 40, 18 July 2017, and Tkhyegepso and Others v. Russia, nos. 44387/04 and 11 others, §§ 21-24, 25 October 2011).
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
A. Non-enforcement of a judgment against the municipal unitary enterprise and the alleged lack of an effective remedy
45. The applicant complained of the non-enforcement of the judgment of 19 November 2004 given in her favour against the municipal unitary enterprise and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law. She relied on Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, all cited in paragraph 32 above.
46. The Government argued that the unitary enterprise in question was a commercial organisation independent from the authorities and that the debts of the enterprise were not attributable to the State for the same reasons as in Liseytseva and Maslov (cited above, §§ 137-41). The judgment could not have been enforced in full due to the lack of funds and the company’s subsequent liquidation.Referring to Article 61 of the Civil Code, they submitted that the creditors’ claims which had not been satisfied during the liquidation procedure due to the debtor’s shortage of funds, including the applicant’s claims, were considered as settled. In their further observations they submitted that the debtor company had been liquidated in 2004, as a result of restructuring into an open joint-stock company. Finally, they submitted that the State obligations were limited to providing the necessary assistance to the creditor in the enforcement of the court award and argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies as she had not lodged a court action against the bailiffs.
47. The applicant maintained her claim.
48. The Court reiterates that, in order to decide on the operational and institutional independence of a given municipal unitary enterprise with the right of economic control, the Court has to assess the nature of the enterprise’s functions and the degree of actual State or municipal authorities’ involvement in the management of the enterprise’s assets (see Liseytseva and Maslov, cited above, §§ 204-06).The Court notes that the parties in the present case did not provide detailed information on the exact scope and nature of the debtor unitary enterprise’s activity. It appears that the administration delegated its function to collect the communal charges to the enterprise and further decided to restructure it. However, in the Court’s view, it is not necessary to determine the issue of the State’s responsibility, as this part of the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reason.
49. In the present case, the Court notes that, at the time when the application was lodged with the Court, the debtor unitary enterprise in question no longer existed for about three years, as on 14 December 2004 it had been restructured in the form of transformation.
50. The Court is not convinced by the Government’s reference to Article 61 of the Civil Code, as the unitary enterprise in the present case was discontinued as a result of its restructuring in the form of transformation. Accordingly, it appears that the rights and obligations of the restructured legal entity were to be transferred to a newly-created legal entity in accordance with the transfer and acceptance act (see paragraph 20 above) a document which would, in the normal course of events, define the scope of the newly-created company’s obligationsfor the debts of the restructured enterprise (see paragraph 21 above).
51. In any event, the Court observes that the judgment against the unitary enterprise in the present case became final on 22 December 2004, and the writs of execution against the debtor unitary enterprise were issued in January 2005, when the debtor had no longer existed (see paragraph 14 above). It is therefore unclear whether the debt towards the applicant had been included either in the transfer and acceptance act (not submitted by the parties) or any other relevant document determining the scope of the OAO’s legal succession. Further, the initial judgment has never been amended or modified to change the debtor. Otherwise, no court decision, or any other document or information concerning the legal succession in respect of the judgment debt has been submitted to the Court.
52. Similarly, the parties did not provide any information to allow the conclusion that the debts of the OAO were attributable to the State.
53. In the absence of any additional information on the matter, the Court concludes that the complaint about the non-enforcement of the judgment against the unitary enterprise was lodged more than six months after it had been discontinued due to restructuring (see, mutatis mutandis, Bichenok v. Russia (dec.), no. 13731/08, 31 March 2015) and is, in any event, manifestly ill-founded in so far as the issue of the transfer of the judgment debt to the OAO is concerned.
54. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1, 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
55. It remains to be ascertained that the State authorities provided due assistance to the applicant in execution of the judgment.
56. It transpires from the Government’s submissions that the writs of execution, issued on 1 February 2005, were only returned to the bailiffs’ officein September 2007. By that time, the debtor specified in the writs – the municipal unitary enterprise – had no lodger existed for more than two years. The parties did not refer to any action taken by the bailiffs’ service during that period to assist the applicant in enforcement of the judicial award in her favour.
57. However, the Court further notes the Government’s objection concerning the applicant’s failure to bring any proceedings against the bailiffs. The Court reiterates its findings to the effect that a civil action for damages under Article 1069 of the Civil Code constituted and effective domestic remedy in respect of an alleged failure of the national authorities to assist the applicant in enforcing a judgment against a private party (see Smagilov v. Russia (dec.), no. 24324/05, §§ 43-48, 13 November 2014). The Court notes that the applicant – who had been previously actively involved in several proceedings against the bailiffs concerning their other alleged omissions, and who had sent various complaints to authorities in respect of the present count of non-enforcement – did not bring either tort proceedings in respect of the bailiffs’alleged inaction in 2005-2007 or a court complaint concerning the bailiffs’alleged failure to act in good time to enforce the judicial award of 19 November 2004 (see Moskaleva and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 2664/04 and 6 others, 17 April 2018, operative part and lines 2‑4 and 8 of the Appendix).In any event, in the absence of either any domestic court’s decision on the matter, or more details from the parties, or even copies of the relevant basic documents such as a decision to discontinue the enforcement proceedings, the Court does not have sufficient information in its possession to decide on the scope of the legal assistance provided to the applicant, or the effect of any authorities’ actions or inaction on the progress of the enforcement, or the prospects of enforcement of the judgment after the debtor had ceased to exist in 2004.
58. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1, 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
59. The Court has found above that the non-enforcement complaint did not give rise to an arguable claim of a breach of a Convention right. Accordingly, Article 13 of the Convention does not apply.
60. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded incompatible rationemateriae and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § § 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Annulment of the judgment of 11 November 2004
61. The applicant may be further understood to complain in broad terms about the annulment of the judgment of 11 November 2004 in her favour.
62. The Court reiterates that the quashing of a final and binding judgment is an instantaneous act (see, among many other authorities, Sardin v. Russia (dec.), no. 69582/01, 12 February 2004). The judgment in issue clearly ceased to be binding and enforceable on 9 February 2005 (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant has not argued that she was unaware of those proceedings and their result. However, she only lodged her complaint on 12 July 2007, that is, outside the six-month time-limit.
63. It follows that this part of the application should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
64. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
65. The applicant claimed 8,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 7,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
66. The Government disputed the claims as excessive and unfounded and stated that the applicant had failed to submit any calculations, details or evidence in support of her claims in respect of pecuniary damage.
67. The Court notes at the outset that the respondent State has an outstanding obligation to ensure, by appropriate means, the enforcement of the judgments referred to in the Appendix which remain enforced.
68. The Court accepts the Government’s argument to the effect that the applicant had failed to submit itemized claims or evidence in respect of pecuniary damage and rejects her claims under this head. On the other hand, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 7,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
69. The applicant did not make a claim in respect of costs and expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to make an award under this head.
C. Default interest
70. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaints concerning the non-enforcement of the judgments of 11 and 19 November 2004 and the quashing of the judgment of 19 November 2004, as well as the complaint about the lack of an effective remedy against the non-enforcement of the judgment of 19 November 2004 inadmissible;
2. Declares admissible the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 concerning the non-enforcement of the judgments in the applicant’s favour specified in the Appendix;
3. Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 on account of the non-enforcement of the domestic judicial awards against the State authorities specified in the Appendix;
4. Decidesthat there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 13 concerning the lack of an effective remedy for the non-enforcement of the domestic awards against the State authorities specified in the Appendix;
5. Holds that the respondent State shall ensure, by appropriate means, within three months, the enforcement of the pending domestic judgments specified in the Appendix which remain unenforced;
6. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros) plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage,to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amountat a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
7. Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 December 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Alena Poláčková
Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
| Domestic court | Date of the judgment | Award
|
Respondent authority | Enforcement status |
| Yakutsk Town Court
|
28/11/2002
05/12/2002
|
RUB 500 | Federal Postal Service of the Krasnodar Region | Not paid until at least July 2009 (date of the Government’s observations) |
| 28/08/2006
10 days later
|
RUB 465,000 | Yakutsk Town Administration | Enforced in full 22/01/2008 | |
| Justice of the Peace, 41st Court Circuit of Yakutsk | 23/06/2005
10 days later |
Obligation to repair the applicant’s flat
|
Yakutsk Town Administration | Not enforced until at least July 2009 |
[1]. As in the Government’s observations
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