Last Updated on May 2, 2019 by LawEuro
FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 52351/14
Živko VASILEVSKI
against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 18 December 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Aleš Pejchal, President,
Tim Eicke,
Jovan Ilievski, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 17 July 2014,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Živko Vasilevski, is a Macedonian national who was born in 1958 and lives in Štip. He was represented before the Court by Mr M. Marolov, a lawyer practising in Štip.
2. The Macedonian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by their former Agent, Mr K. Bogdanov, and then by his successor in that office, Ms D. Djonova.
The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. The applicant sued his employer before the Skopje Court of First Instance (Основен Суд Скопје – “the first-instance court”) for payment of a travel allowance to and from his place of residence.
5. At a hearing held in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer, the employer referred to its earlier submissions lodged with the court that had included evidence that the applicant’s place of residence at the relevant time had been the same as his place of work (namely: the employer’s personnel files, which included submissions made by the applicant about his declared place of residence; a court judgment from another set of proceedings to which the applicant was a party; a minor offence complaint against the applicant; a police hearing record concerning the applicant and a request for the applicant’s transfer to a different organisational unit made by his supervising officer). The applicant’s lawyer unsuccessfully argued that the material had been submitted out of time and objected to its admission into evidence. The material in question was admitted into evidence and read out at the hearing.
6. In a judgment of 17 October 2013 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant’s claim as ill-founded. Relying on the evidence submitted by the employer, it established that the applicant’s declared place of residence had been the same as his place of work and that the employer had provided organised transport when the applicant had been assigned work further afield.
7. On 26 March 2014 the Skopje Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Скопје – “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed an appeal by the applicant in which he had complained about the admission into evidence of the material submitted by the employer, which had not been served on him. The court held that the material in question had been relevant to the facts of the case, which had been correctly established by the first-instance court.
COMPLAINT
8. The applicant alleged, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the civil proceedings had been unfair in that the evidence submitted by the employer had not been served on him.
THE LAW
9. The applicant complained that the judgment in the impugned civil proceedings had relied on documents submitted by his employer which had been admitted into evidence contrary to the procedural rules set out in domestic law and which had not been served on him. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …”
A. The parties’ arguments
10. The Government submitted that all the evidence, including the material into question, had been adduced at the court hearing in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer. The applicant could not have been unaware of its contents and his representative could have examined it at the hearing and given his comments. Furthermore, the applicant had commented on those materials in his appeal and his submissions had been duly examined by the Court of Appeal.
11. The applicant maintained that the impugned evidence had neither been served on him nor had he been given the opportunity to examine it and to provide his comments.
B. The Court’s assessment
12. The Court reiterates that the concept of a fair hearing also implies a right to adversarial proceedings. That right means that the parties to criminal or civil proceedings must, in principle, have knowledge of, and be able to comment on, all evidence adduced or observations filed, with a view to influencing the court’s decision (see Grozdanoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 21510/03, § 36, 31 May 2007; and Naumoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 25248/05, § 25, 27 November 2012).
13. In the present case, the Court notes that in the impugned civil proceedings the applicant’s employer submitted written material, a copy of which was not forwarded to the applicant. The first-instance court admitted that material into evidence. It rejected the applicant’s objection in this respect and read out the evidence in question. The courts dismissed the applicant’s claim, relying on that evidence, which they considered relevant in order to properly establish the facts (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above).
14. The Court further notes that the material in question was admitted into evidence at a hearing held in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer. The latter neither requested a copy of that evidence nor did he seek an adjournment of the hearing in order to examine it and prepare any comments. Furthermore, the Court attaches weight to the fact that the impugned evidence included information from the applicant’s personnel file with the employer and various other documents (see paragraph 5 above), which did not contain any new information of which the applicant would not have been aware. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the applicant was familiar with the impugned evidence and had an opportunity to comment on it, as he subsequently did in his appeal. In such circumstances, it cannot be considered that the applicant’s right to adversarial proceedings has been violated.
15. In so far as the applicant complained of the first-instance court’s decision to admit the impugned material into evidence, contrary to domestic procedural rules, the Court reiterates that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law and that as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them (see, for example, García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I; Perić v. Croatia, no. 34499/06, § 17, 27 March 2008; and Karajanov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 2229/15, § 50, 6 April 2017). The Court’s task is to ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the way in which evidence was permitted, were “fair” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1993, § 31, Series A no. 274). As there is no evidence to suggest that the proceedings were otherwise unfair, it follows that the application is inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 24 January 2019.
Renata Degener Aleš Pejchal
Deputy Registrar President
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