Last Updated on November 9, 2019 by LawEuro
Communicated on 11 September 2018
FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 16349/17
Nelya Igorivna SHTEPA
against Ukraine
lodged on 17 February 2017
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Ms Nelya Igorivna Shtepa, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1962 and lives in Slovyansk. She is represented before the Court by Mr O.V. Tananakin, a lawyer practising in Kyiv.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant was the mayor of Slovyansk between November 2010 and April 2014.
On 12 July 2014 criminal proceedings under Article 110 § 3 of the Criminal Code (infringement of State sovereignty and inviolability) were instituted against the applicant.
On 13 July 2014 the Kharkiv Chervonozavodskyi District Court ordered the applicant’s detention within the framework of the above proceedings. The relevant decision stated that she was accused of a serious offence, and that she could otherwise escape and hinder the investigation or continue with her criminal activity. No further details of the above-mentioned reasons were provided by the court.
In the meantime, additional charges under Article 258 § 2 of the Criminal Code (terrorist act) were brought against the applicant.
In the course of the pre-trial investigation and of the trial the courts extended the applicant’s detention on remand on twenty occasions in total. When reasoning the applicant’s continued detention the courts referred to the same grounds mentioned in the court decision of 13 July 2014. In some decisions the courts, without providing further details, additionally noted that:
– the applicant had failed to present evidence confirming that the risks in favour of her detention that had been previously assessed by the courts, had no longer pertained;
– the applicant’s arguments in favour of her release did not outweigh the public interest in keeping her detained;
– Article 176 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure barred the use of any preventive measures other than pre-trial detention in her case.
On 20 September 2017 the trial court changed the preventive measure in respect of the applicant to house arrest, having released her from detention. The applicant did not provide the Court with a copy of this decision.
The criminal case against the applicant is currently being heard at the trial court.
According to the applicant, in the course of the trial nineteen judges who heard her case either recused themselves, were disqualified or dismissed, took sick or paternity leave under pressure from the prosecution, or quit their career entirely. As a result of that, the proceedings in the criminal case against her were recommenced four times.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. Code of Criminal Procedure 2012
Article 176. General provisions on preventive measures
“1. Preventive measures are:
(1) a personal undertaking;
(2) a personal guarantee;
(3) bail;
(4) house arrest; and
(5) pre-trial detention.
…
5. Preventive measures of a personal undertaking, a personal guarantee, house arrest and bail may not be imposed on people who are suspected of or charged with the offences under Articles … 110 … [or] 258 … of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.”
2. Criminal Code 2001
Article 110 § 3 of the Criminal Code provides that any actions aimed at alteration of the territory or State borders, as well as any public appeals or dissemination of materials with appeals in respect of the mentioned activity which have caused death or other grave consequences, are liable to imprisonment of between ten and fifteen years, or for life imprisonment for deliberate actions by a public official, or repeated actions, or those taken by a group of persons. The sentence can also be accompanied by confiscation of the convicted person’s personal property.
Article 258 § 2 of the Criminal Code provides for imprisonment for between seven and twelve years for a terrorist act committed as part of a conspiracy or for a terrorist act which has caused substantial pecuniary damage or other grave consequences. The sentence can also be accompanied by confiscation of the convicted person’s personal property.
COMPLAINTS
Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complains that:
(i) she was subjected to physical and psychological ill‑treatment in detention;
(ii) the material conditions of her detention were poor;
(iii) she was not given access to an adequate medical treatment while in detention.
Relying on Article 5 the Convention, the applicant complains that the domestic court’s decision of 14 July 2014 on her detention as well as the courts decisions extending her detention until 20 September 2017 were arbitrary and lacked reasoning.
The applicant further complains, under Article 5 of the Convention, that her pre-trial detention was unreasonably long.
Next, the applicant complains, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the criminal proceedings against her have been unreasonably long.
Lastly, relying on Articles 14 and 18 in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention, the applicant complains that she suffered discriminatory treatment aimed at her isolation from political activity while in detention.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Was the applicant’s detention between 13 July 2014 and 20 September 2017 free from arbitrariness and based on sufficient reasons for the purposes of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention? Was it compatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of the same provision (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 84 et seq., 5 July 2016)?
2. Has the length of the criminal proceedings in the present case been in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Merit v. Ukraine, no. 66561/01, §§ 72-76, 30 March 2004)?
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