Last Updated on July 3, 2019 by LawEuro
THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 8630/11
Aleksey Valentinovich SUPRUNENKO
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 19 June 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Branko Lubarda, President,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Georgios A. Serghides, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 5 January 2011,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Aleksey Valentinovich Suprunenko, is a Russian national, who was born in 1957 and lives in St Petersburg.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr G. Matyushkin, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarized as follows.
4. In the summer of 2008 the applicant travelled from Saint Petersburg to Georgiyevsk for a holiday in a house belonging to his family. Georgiyevsk is a town of 70,000 located in Russia’s southern province of Stavropol in the North Caucasus. The house in Georgiyevsk had previously belonged to the applicant’s grandmother, whom he visited both as a child and as an adult.
1. Police detain applicant as suspicious photographer
(a) Applicant’s version of events
5. On the afternoon of 31 August 2008 the applicant went out for a walk for the purpose of taking photos. At about 6 p.m. as he was walking around a school, with his camera in his hand, a police patrol car pulled up. Two officers carrying rifles approached the applicant. They charged him with littering the ground with sunflower seed husks (a popular snack) and ordered him to accompany them to a police station. The applicant protested and was therefore forced into the patrol car.
6. At the station the officers asked why the applicant had been photographing the school. The applicant explained that he was interested in landscapes, architecture, and street scenes, not specifically the school, but that anyway the school was not a secret installation and might be photographed. He urged the officers to let him go unless they had some other reason for arresting him. The officers replied that photographing the school was reason enough. They searched the applicant’s pockets but showed no interest in the contents of his camera’s memory card. An hour later another officer accused the applicant of having escaped from prison and said that he would check if his name was on the fugitives’ database. The applicant denied that accusation.
7. After a while two officers drove the applicant to his house and one of them ordered the applicant to go inside to fetch his ID. He accompanied the applicant to the gate and trespassed on the front yard. The applicant returned with his ID, documents relating to the house, and the ticket for his journey from Saint Petersburg, with which he hoped to justify his presence in the town. Despite his protests, the officers drove him back to the police station.
8. They fingerprinted the applicant, took a “mugshot” photo, and logged his physical features on the police computer. The entry contained the applicant’s name, date and place of birth, ethnic origin, detention status, permanent and temporary addresses, physical data (height, frame, hair, face colour, eye colour, and tattoos on arms and chest), the custody log reference, the date of arrest, and his ID details. The applicant was told that this data would be held indefinitely. At 8.30 p.m. the police let the applicant go.
(b) Government’s version of events
9. According to the Government, when the officers approached the applicant in the street they asked him to identify himself and to explain why he was photographing near the school. The applicant’s answer that he was photographing flowers left the officers unsatisfied. As the applicant could not produce an ID on the spot, the officers took him to the police station.
10. Once there, the applicant asked one of the officers to follow him home so that he could fetch the ID document. The officer offered to give the applicant a lift in his private car and the applicant agreed.
11. When they arrived, the applicant knocked on the door and asked the woman who opened it to bring him his ID. The officer waited outside. The officer then inspected the ID and the applicant agreed to return to the police station for further proceedings.
12. Back at the station, the applicant was photographed and booked into the custody log and a database entitled “Legend”. He was not fingerprinted, subjected to forensic procedures, or charged with any administrative offence. At 6.20 p.m. the applicant was released.
(c) Policeman’s alleged visit to applicant’s home to check on his behaviour
13. The applicant alleged that one year after his detention, on 31 August 2009, a police officer visited the house in Georgiyevsk for a preventive conversation. The officer showed the applicant’s photo to his neighbours and asked them about his behaviour. The neighbours were alarmed and bewildered as to the purpose of that visit.
2. Judicial review of detention
14. After his return to Saint Petersburg, on 22 November 2008, the applicant sought judicial review of his arrest and the retention of his personal details. He asked the court to declare those actions unlawful and to order the deletion of the database record.
15. On 12 January 2010 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of Saint Petersburg found for the government, concluding that the officers had followed Order 382 of the Stavropol Regional Interior Department dated 18 August 2008. That order had instructed them to look out for photographers showing heightened interest in schools on the eve of 1 September, the start of the academic year. The court blamed the applicant for his failure to convincingly explain his photographic project to the officers and for failing to recognise that his conduct might unnerve the local inhabitants in a region that was wary of terror attacks. The court denied that the applicant had been fingerprinted and found the storage of his personal data lawful.
16. According to the applicant, the District Court overlooked his complaint about the policeman’s unannounced visit to the family residence in 2009.
17. On 6 July 2010 the Saint Petersburg City Court upheld the lower court’s judgment and clarified the motives for the arrest. In the court’s finding, Order 382 sought to avert a repeat of the Beslan hostage tragedy[1] by putting the town police on high alert from 30 August to 2 September 2008. The police had searched schools for explosives and were looking out for potential assailants and hostile surveillance. As the applicant had had no ID on him, the officers had been obliged to take him to the police station and search for his name in the databases of the Federal Security Service and the Interior Ministry. The arrest served the public interest, had been brief, and had done the applicant no harm. The applicant had been spared charges. The logging of the applicant’s photo and his personal data into the police computer respected his rights.
B. Relevant domestic law[2]
1. Rules governing the detention of suspects
18. TheCriminalCode 1996 (Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации, № 63-ФЗ от 13 июня 1996 г.):
Article 30. Preparations for a crime, and attempted crimes
“1. [A]ny … intentional creation of conditions to commit a crime shall be deemed to constitute preparations for a crime ….
2. Criminal liability shall ensue from preparations to commit ordinarily grave or especially grave crime….”
Article 205. Act of terrorism
“1. The carrying out of … actions intimidating the population, and creating the threat of loss of life, of the infliction of significant property damage, or the onset of other grave consequences, for the purpose of influencing the taking of a decision by authorities … shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of eight to twelve years….”
19. TheCodeofAdministrativeOffences 2001 (Кодекс Российской Федерации Об Административных Правонарушениях, № 195-ФЗ от 30 декабря 2001 г.):
Article 27.1. Measures of restraint in administrative proceedings
“1. In order to suppress an administrative offence, to identify the offender, to book the offence (if not possible on the spot), to ensure a rapid and proper trial … and subsequent enforcement …, the authorised official … may apply the following measures of restraint …:
(i) transfer [to a police station];
(ii) administrative detention ….”
20. The Police Act 1991 (ЗаконРФот 18 апреля 1991 г. № 1026-1 «Омилиции»):
Section 2. Mission of the police
“The police has for its mission … the prevention and suppression of crimes and administrative offences….”
Section 10. Duties of the police
“The police … shall
1. prevent and suppress crimes and administrative offences, establish the circumstances leading to their commission and, within the limits of its powers, take measures aimed at the elimination of those circumstances….”
Section 11. Rights of the police
“For the accomplishment of its mission, the police shall have the right to
…
2. verify citizens’ identity documents if there exist sufficient grounds to suspect the citizens of having committed a crime or of being wanted, or if there exists a reason to institute administrative proceedings against them;
…
5. [e]ffect administrative detention;
…
7. detain and retain in custody … persons suspected of having committed a crime …;
…
14. keep [and use] … registers of natural and legal persons, items, and facts; use information systems for documenting its activities ….”
21. Annex 1 to Order No. 382 of 18 August 2008 issued by the Main Department of the Interior Affairs for the Stavropol Region (Приложение № 1кПриказуГлавногоУправленияВнутреннихДелпоСтавропольскомуКраю № 382 от 18 августа 2008 г.):
To counter the terrorist threat … during the preparations for and the holding of “Knowledge Day” on 1 September 2008, the police force of the Stavropol Region must
…
15. Pay special attention to … persons showing heightened interest in educational establishments and adjacent areas and carrying out photo and video filming. Each incident must be immediately acted upon in accordance with the legislation in force….
2. Rules governing police databases
22. The Personal Data Act 2006 (Федеральныйзаконот 27 июля 2006 г. № 152-ФЗ «Оперсональныхданных»):
Section 7. Confidentiality of personal data
“[Processors] of personal data and third parties with access [to that data] shall respect the confidentiality of such data ….”
23. The automated database called “Legend” (автоматизированнаябазаданных «Легенда»)was set up by virtue of Order No. 721 (FOUO) of 11 September 2006 of the Ministry of the Interior Affairs of Russia “On the Experimental Deployment of an Integrated Data Bank of Town (District) Departments of the Interior Affairs in the Southern and North-Western Federal Districts” (ПриказМинистерстваВнутреннихДелРоссииот 11сентября 2006 г. №721дсп «Овводевопытнуюэксплуатациюинтегрированногобанкаданныхгородских (районных) органоввнутреннихделЮжногоиСеверо-Западногофедеральныхокругов). That Order was preceded by Order No. 91 (FOUO) of 30 April 2004 of the Main Department of the Interior Affairs for the Stavropol Region “On the creation, record-keeping, and use of the automated centralised operational‑reference, search and criminal registers of the Interior Affairs bodies of the Stavropol Region” (ПриказГлавногоУправленияМинистерстваВнутреннихДелРоссиипоСтавропольскомукраюот 30 апреля 2004 г. № 91дсп «Опорядкеформирования, веденияииспользованияавтоматизированныхцентрализованныхоперативно-справочных, розыскныхикриминалистическихучётоворгановвнутреннихделСтавропольскогокрая»).
COMPLAINTS
24. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that the police had abused their powers by detaining him on the flimsy and untenable suspicion of his conducting surveillance on behalf of terrorists when he was in fact a law-abiding amateur photographer.
25. The applicant complained under Article 8 that, although he had committed no crime, the police retained his personal details indefinitely in a classified database not accessible to the public.
THE LAW
A. Complaint under Article 5 of the Convention
26. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention about his detention. As far as relevant, that Article reads:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
…
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so ….
1. The Government
27. The Government asked the Court to reject this complaint as inadmissible for the following reasons.
28. The applicant’s account of the facts was only partly correct.
29. His first transfer to the police station had been compliant with domestic law. Under sections 2 and 11 of the Police Act the police were authorised to ask the applicant to justify his presence and activity at the location in question and to identify himself. Moreover, Order 382 specifically urged police patrols to look out for photographers near schools.
30. The suspicion regarding the applicant had been reasonable. The inhabitants of Georgiyevsk had every reason to be on their guard because their region had been ravaged by terror attacks. In the period 1994–2008 insurgents had struck the North Caucasus eighteen times: they had hijacked a bus, raided cities, engaged in firefights with special forces, and had bombed cars, buses, trains, stations, markets, and apartment blocks. Amidst the fatalities and destruction wreaked by those attacks, the most atrocious had been the hostage siege in Beslan on the first day of school in 2004, which had cost the lives of 147 adults and 186 children.
31. Against this backdrop of events, the applicant’s picture-taking was bound to have alarmed the police. His physical appearance, clothes, and accent made him look out of place in the small town, where everyone knew everyone else. Unlike the locals – who were accustomed to identity checks − he had been carrying no ID, which was in itself suspicious. After Beslan, his explanation that he was photographing flowers appeared to be a mockery in the eyes of officers wearied by round-the-clock patrolling.
32. The applicant should have realised that his hobby might prompt the police to stop him. Had he been carrying an ID, he might have been spared the visit to the police station.
33. The applicant’s second transfer to the police station had also been lawful. It relied on section 11 § 14 of the Police Act and was needed to log his arrest on the police computer.
34. In general, when dealing with terrorism, the police are allowed extra powers of detention. The detention of a terror suspect, even if it lasts many hours, may be compliant with Article 5 § 1 (c) (see Murray v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1994, §§ 47, 51, 67, Series A no. 300‑A, and Sher and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 5201/11, § 149, ECHR 2015 (extracts)). The applicant was detained for a little over 20 minutes and thus did not suffer any significant disadvantage.
2. The applicant
35. The applicant insisted that his complaint was admissible for the following reasons.
36. The detention had violated domestic law. The Administrative Code allowed a person to be conveyed to a police station and to have his details recorded only if he was suspected of a specific offence. This rule was restrictive in nature, and Order 382 had not expanded the police’s powers. The police had not received any intelligence regarding the applicant’s allegedly illicit activities. Order 382 was a broadly-drawn instrument meant to stimulate the fight against crime. Compared with the Administrative Code, the Police Act gave the officers no extra powers. If the police had genuinely suspected the applicant, they could have kept him under surveillance under the Operational-Search Activities Act without detaining him.
37. The suspicion had been unreasonable. The Government exaggerated the level of the terrorist threat in Georgiyevsk. The attacks that they listed had happened across a vast territory over a period of a decade. The town was not in an emergency zone. If the officers had inspected the contents of his camera on the spot, they would have seen harmless images of a cat, flowers, and trees. They also could have made inquiries about the applicant with his neighbours.
38. The officers had had no reason to take him back to the police station after the visit to his home because by then they knew who he was. They did this purely to justify the initial detention.
39. In violation of Article 5 § 1 (c), the police had had no intention of bringing him before a competent legal authority. As the detention did not follow the rules of either administrative or criminal procedure, the applicant had been unable to foresee how long it might last.
3. The Court
40. In connection with the applicant’s allegation that his detention did not fulfil the requirement of lawfulness from the viewpoint of the domestic law, the Court reiterates that where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law but also, where appropriate, to other applicable legal standards, including those which have their source in international law. In all cases it establishes the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of the laws concerned, but it also requires that any deprivation of liberty be compatible with the purpose of Article 5, namely, to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see, with further references therein contained, Medvedyev and Othersv. France [GC], no. 3394/03, § 79, ECHR 2010). The applicant in the present case affirms that the Administrative Code allowed a person to be conveyed to a police station and to have his details recorded only if he was suspected of a specific offence. However, as argued by the Government and confirmed by the domestic courts, in accordance with sections 2, 10, and 11 of the Police Act 1991, the police had for its mission the prevention and suppression of crimes and administrative offences, was obliged to prevent and suppress crimes and administrative offences, establish the circumstances leading to their commission and, within the limits of its powers, take measures aimed at the elimination of those circumstances, and had the right to verify citizens’ identity documents if there existed sufficient grounds to suspect the citizens of having committed a crime or of being wanted, or if there existed a reason to institute administrative proceedings against them, to effect administrative detention, and to detain and retain in custody persons suspected of having committed a crime. There is nothing in the reasoning of the domestic authorities which could be regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable, or as lacking a factual basis (see Lebedev v. Russia (dec.), no. 4493/04, 25 November 2004).
41. With regard to the question of whether or not the suspicion of illicit activity held against the applicant by the officers of the police was “reasonable” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, the Court reiterates that a person may be detained under Article 5 § 1 (c) only in the context of criminal proceedings, for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on “reasonable suspicion” of “having committed an offence” (see Jėčius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97, § 50, ECHR 2000‑IX).
42. In order for an arrest on reasonable suspicion to be justified under Article 5 § 1 (c), it is not necessary for the police to have obtained sufficient evidence to bring charges, either at the point of arrest or while the applicant is in custody (see Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, 29 November 1988, § 53, Series A no. 145‑B); nor is it necessary that the person detained should ultimately have been charged or taken before a court. The object of detention for questioning is to further a criminal investigation by confirming or discontinuing suspicions which provide the grounds for detention. Thus, facts which raise a suspicion need not be of the same level as those necessary to justify a conviction or even the bringing of a charge, which comes at the next stage of the process of criminal investigation (see Murray v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1994, § 55, Series A no. 300‑A).
43. However, the requirement that a suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds forms an essential part of the safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention. The fact that a suspicion is held in good faith is insufficient. The words “reasonable suspicion” mean the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence. What may be regarded as “reasonable” will depend upon all the circumstances (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, § 32, Series A no. 182). The length of the deprivation of liberty may also be material to the level of suspicion required (see Murray, cited above, § 56).
44. When assessing the “reasonableness” of a suspicion, the Court must be in a position to ascertain whether the essence of the safeguard afforded by Article 5 § 1 (c) has been secured. Consequently, a respondent Government have to furnish at least some facts or information capable of satisfying the Court that the arrested person was reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged offence (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley, cited above, § 34 in fine).
45. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court has to have regard to all the relevant circumstances in order to be satisfied that objective information existed showing that the suspicion against the applicant was “reasonable”. In that perspective, the Court observes that in the course of target selection, those planning a terrorist attack are known to monitor their targets in advance in order to determine their vulnerabilities. Hostile reconnaissance may be disguised as seemingly innocent activities, for example street photography. The operative will seek to blend in with the local populace and have a cover story to justify his interest in the target. Therefore, anything that seems even slightly out of place for the area or time of day at which it occurs may be a sign of criminal activity. To spot likely wrongdoers, the forces of order must watch out for behaviour which stands out from the normal pattern of life. The applicant was taking pictures of no apparent artistic value near a sensitive building. Given the region’s recent traumatic history, that fact was enough to alert the police. The Court accepts the officers’ interpretation of the unfolding scene as based on objective facts and practical conclusions.
46. The Court concludes that the material put before it meets the minimum standard set by Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention for the reasonableness of a suspicion required for an individual’s arrest and detention. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Complaint under Article 8 of the Convention
47. The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention about having been logged on the police computer. This Article reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
1. Government
48. The Government asked the Court to reject this complaint as inadmissible for the following reasons.
49. The applicant at no time asked the Stavropol Regional Interior Department to archive or delete the data.
50. Domestic law permitted the recording of the applicant’s personal details. It also protected against the unauthorised disclosure thereof.
51. The record of the arrest could not be prejudicial to the applicant. It was truthful and in no way compromising. The applicant’s privacy was assured because the data was open to inspection only by the police.
52. The applicant was not fingerprinted, but even if he had been, no issue would have arisen because fingerprints are routinely stored in biometric passports. Unlike in S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, ECHR 2008), no DNA samples were taken from the applicant. He was merely photographed, and a photograph is less revealing than DNA. Thus, any parallels with that case or with Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany ((dec.), nos. 7841/08 and 57900/12, 4 June 2013) were far-fetched.
53. At any rate, even the retention for many years of a suspect’s fingerprints and photograph do not interfere with his private life because they contain no subjective evaluations which he might wish to refute (see Kinnunen v. Finland, no. 24950/94, Commission decision of 15 May 1996, unreported).
2. The applicant
54. The applicant insisted that his complaint was admissible for the following reasons.
55. Domestic law did not authorise the storage of the personal details of innocent people like him. Because the “Legend” database was one meant for offenders’ data, the mere presence of his data on it humiliated the applicant and could be prejudicial for him in future.
56. There was no comparison between “Legend” and files kept by the Government on passport-holders because applicants for passports gave their personal details of their own accord. Their details were stored together with other data such as their place of residence. Also, “Legend” was more accessible.
57. The data retained on the applicant constituted a comprehensive profile which was invasive and disrespectful of his privacy. The policeman’s visit to his home one year after the detention proved that the profile had tarnished the applicant’s reputation.
58. The applicant’s situation differed from that of the applicants in S. and Marper, Peruzzo and Martens, and Kinnunen because the suspicion against him was groundless.
3. The Court
59. The Court reiterates that the mere storage of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8 (see Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, § 48, Series A no. 116). The subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding (see Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 69, ECHR 2000-II). However, in determining whether the personal information retained by the authorities in this case involves any of the private-life aspects mentioned above, the Court will give due consideration to the specific context in which the information at issue was recorded and retained, the nature of the records, the way in which these records are used and processed, and the results that may be obtained (see, mutatis mutandis, Friedl, cited above, §§ 49-51, and Peck,cited above, § 59).
60. Moreover, public information can fall within the scope of private life in cases where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities. This is all the more pertinent where such information concerns a person’s distant past (Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 43, ECHR 2000‑V).
61. Having given consideration to the question, the Court finds that the information about the applicant that was retained on the information system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was of a kind that disclosed elements of private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention and that its retention therefore amounted to interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
62. The Court reiterates that any such interference can only be justified under Article 8 § 2 if it is in accordance with the law, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims to which paragraph 2 of Article 8 refers, and is necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve any such aim (Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, no. 26839/05, § 130, 18 May 2010). The Court has no difficulty in accepting the Government’s argument that the contested measure was in accordance with the law, in particular, section 11 § 14 of the Police Act 1991, which authorises the police to “keep [and use] … registers of natural and legal persons, items, and facts; use information systems for documenting its activities ….”. The Court also notes that the database “Legend”, into which the applicant’s personal details were recorded, was regulated by two ministerial legal instruments, namely Order No. 721 (FOUO) of 11 September 2006 by the Ministry of the Interior Affairs of Russia “On the Experimental Deployment of an Integrated Data Bank of Town (District) Departments of the Interior Affairs in the Southern and North-Western Federal Districts” and Order No. 91 (FOUO) of 30 April 2004 by the Main Department of the Interior Affairs for the Stavropol Region “On the creation, record-keeping, and use of the automated centralised operational-reference, search and criminal registers of the Interior Affairs bodies of the Stavropol Region”. Nor does the Court have any difficulty in accepting that the interference in question pursued the interests of the prevention of disorder or crime.
63. In the present case, the Government have provided evidence of not insignificant guerilla activity in the region of the country where the material facts of the case took place, which allegedly made the law-enforcement agencies’ efforts in suppressing and preventing such unlawful activities particularly relevant. In that connection, the Court reiterates that it has previously recognised that the absence of an arrest record must be regarded as a most serious failing, given the Court’s traditional view that the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in the Convention and discloses a most grave violation of the provisions relating thereto. An arrest record must contain the date, time and location of the detention, the name of the detainee, the reasons for the detention and the name of the person effecting it (see Fedotov v. Russia, no. 5140/02, § 78, 25 October 2005). Unrecorded detention is a most serious failing, since it enables those responsible for an act of deprivation of liberty to conceal their involvement in a crime, to cover their tracks and to escape accountability for the fate of the detainee in question (see Magomadov and Magomadov, no. 68004/01, § 126, 12 July 2007).
64. Although the information about the applicant retained on the police computer was of a personal nature, it cannot not be deemed intimate or sensitive. Nor is the Court convinced by the evidentiary material in front of it that the mere fact of being included in the database entailed a stigma of suspicion or guilt. The applicant asserted that the very existence of a police record gave rise to inaccurate assumptions about his criminal past, but this assertion remains suppositional. In particular, the applicant has submitted no evidence to show that a policeman did in fact visit his house on 31 August 2009 or that he subsequently lodged a complaint with a court about that visit.
65. It thus follows that, balanced against the objective usefulness of the data for the purposes of countering crime, the retention thereof was necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 12 July 2018.
Stephen Phillips Branko Lubarda
Deputy Registrar President
_________________
[1]. An attack on a school in Beslan, a city in the north Caucasus region of North Ossetia, Russia, committed in September 2004 by insurgentsfrom the nearby Chechnya that killed 333, mostly children.
[2]. As in force at the material time.
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