Last Updated on November 2, 2019 by LawEuro
FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no.19096/15
Nasser Ahmed JAMAL
against Norway
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 20 March 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Síofra O’Leary, President,
Erik Møse,
Lәtif Hüseynov, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 April 2015,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant applied to the Court as Mr Nasser Ahmed Jamal and stated that he was born in 1989. He stayed in Norway prior to being deported to Sudan in July 2015 and was represented before the Court by Mr T.M. Fagermo, a lawyer practising in Halden.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
3. The applicant applied for asylum in Norway on 21 January 2010. The application was finally rejected by a decision of the Immigration Appeals Board (Utlendingsnemnda) on 10 October 2011. Before the authorities, the applicant had submitted that he was stateless and born in Kuwait, which the authorities did not find proved. The deadline for voluntary departure was set for 15 November 2011.
4. Because the applicant had also been held criminally liable (see paragraph 6 below), his expulsion was ordered by a final decision from the Appeals Board of 15 August 2012. A two-year ban on his re-entry was also issued.
5. The applicant was again arrested on 9 December 2012, for use and possession of drugs. The following day he was fined 3,000 Norwegian kroner – approximately 300 euros.
6. On 11 December 2012 the police applied to the District Court (tingrett) for a decision to detain the applicant under section 106 § 1 (a) and (b) of the Immigration Act (see paragraph 37 below). The District Court ruled the same day that he could be remanded in custody for four weeks. It found that the applicant would otherwise abscond and evade the expulsion order. He had not departed voluntarily; his expulsion had been ordered because he had been held criminally liable in the country; and he had been registered for 37 criminal cases in the police registry, 24 of which had not been settled. His identity was unclear, and apart from a girlfriend in Norway, he had no family, no work or any other bonds to Norway. The risk of his absconding had in addition become strengthened as the applicant had been made aware of police progress on his deportation. Due to that risk, alternatives to detention were also inapplicable. The District Court relied on Article 5 of the Convention in its consideration of the case.
7. Both the applicant and the prosecution appealed against the District Court’s decision to the High Court (lagmannsrett). On 14 December 2012 the High Court agreed with the prosecution that the time for detention be set at eight weeks, until 5 February 2013. It stated, by reference to Article 5 of the Convention, that the interference that this entailed, was sufficiently reasoned.
8. On 5 February and 5 March 2013 the District Court, at the request of the prosecutor, extended the detention by four weeks. In its decision of 5 February it recalled, inter alia, that the applicant was unmarried, had no home or children, no employment and no income. He would be able to clarify his identity even if he was detained. In its decision of 5 March it observed that two analyses of his language test had revealed contradictory results. It was therefore pertinent to have the applicant presented to the Kuwaiti Embassy in Stockholm. The District Court assumed that he could be taken there during the following four weeks. It also noted that there was other conflicting information in the case. Article 5 of the Convention was taken into account on both occasions.
9. On 29 April 2013 the District Court extended the detention by another four weeks. The applicant did not protest. The District Court noted that the Kuwaiti authorities had by then informed the police that the applicant was not a Kuwaiti citizen. Further verification was accordingly needed. The court added that the applicant could reduce his time in detention by helping the authorities to verify his identity. Due to the risk of the applicant absconding, there were no alternatives to detention.
10. On 27 May 2013 the District Court added another four weeks to the applicant’s detention. It noted, inter alia, that since the most recent decision, information to the effect that the applicant was a citizen of Sudan had emerged. The applicant appealed against the decision. On 29 May 2013 the High Court upheld it. The High Court observed that the police had set out their progress in the case and explained how the information that had emerged since the previous court orders had strengthened the doubt concerning the applicant’s identity.
11. On 21 June 2013 the District Court decided that the applicant could be kept in detention for another eight weeks. Further information about the applicant’s Sudanese origins had by then come to light. The applicant could be assumed to be a Sudanese citizen named Nael Jalal Hassan Mohammad, born in 1982, and the police had applied to the Sudanese authorities for authorisation to take him to Sudan. It would take more than four weeks to complete this process. The applicant appealed against the decision. On 24 June 2013 the High Court upheld it, noting, inter alia, that the progress with verification was acceptable. The applicant appealed against the High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court, which rejected the appeal on 8 July 2013.
12. On 16 August 2013 the District Court decided that the applicant could be kept in custody for another eight weeks. The latest status report made by the police, dated 15 August 2013, described, inter alia, how the applicant had been presented to the Sudanese Embassy on that same day, and that the Sudanese Consul had been of the view that the applicant was a Kuwaiti Bedouin. The progress was, in the court’s view, acceptable although it had taken some time to have the applicant presented to the Sudanese Embassy. On 20 August 2013, upon the applicant’s appeal, the High Court agreed with the District Court’s reasons and remarked that the suspicion that the applicant had given a false identity had been strengthened since the last order had been issued.
13. On 10 October 2013 the City Court extended the detention by eight weeks. A passport number had by then been obtained, and the Norwegian police had sent reminders to the Kuwaiti authorities, the most recent on 23 September 2013. The police had also received information about an employer in Kuwait. On 24 October 2013 the High Court, upon the applicant’s appeal, upheld the City Court’s decision. It noted that the progress in the process of verifying the applicant’s identity was acceptable.
14. On 3 December 2013 the City Court extended the detention by another eight weeks. Since the previous order, the police had actively pursued the case before the Kuwaiti authorities; an answer from the Sudanese Embassy in Oslo was awaited and the police were working in parallel and continuously with other sources, including the applicant’s contacts in Norway and abroad. On 23 December 2013 the High Court, agreeing with the City Court’s reasons, upheld the decision upon the applicant’s appeal.
15. By judgment of Oslo City Court of 11 December 2013, the applicant was convicted for possessing and attempting to sell drugs, aiding and abetting to secure the proceeds of thefts, some petty thefts, carrying a box cutter in public and failing to follow police orders. He received a 30-day suspended prison sentence.In the sentencing, the City Court took into account that he had several times been fined for drug related offences.
16. On 28 January 2014 the District Court authorised eight further weeks of detention. A copy of a passport issued in 2000, which the applicant had presented to the Kuwaiti authorities, had by then emerged. The Sudanese Embassy in Saudi Arabia had orally confirmed that it had been issued there and that the applicant was a Sudanese citizen. It had also informed the police that the applicant’s name was different to that previously assumed – he was called Nail Galal Hassan Sarraf. The Embassy wanted the applicant to be presented to them and the police would seek to have travel documents issued. On 4 February 2014 the High Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the decision. It emphasised that a concrete basis for the applicant being a Sudanese citizen had by then been established.
17. On 24 March 2014 the City Court extended the detention for another eight weeks. The court found that the investigation was progressing adequately and that there was reason to believe that there might be a breakthrough within a reasonable time, if not necessarily during the coming eight weeks. Referring to the applicant’s conviction of 11 December 2013 (see paragraph 15 above), it also considered that there was an obvious (nærliggende) risk that the applicant would recommence with drug and property crime (vinningskriminalitet) if released. The risk of the applicant absconding still implied that alternatives to detention were inapplicable. On appeal, the High Court, on 28 March 2014, agreed with the City Court’s reasons. The High Court stated that there would be an obvious (konkret og nærliggende) risk of new criminal acts if the applicant were released.
18. On 16 May 2014 the District Court extended the authorisation of detention for another eight weeks. It found that progress was still acceptable and that continued detention was not disproportionate, particularly in the light of the offences committed and the applicant’s situation; he had no firm ties to Norway, no work and no home. On 20 May 2014 the High Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the decision. It agreed that progress was acceptable and found that there were real possibilities (reelle muligheter) of establishing the applicant’s identity. On 4 June 2014 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the High Court’s decision.
19. On 9 July 2014 the District Court extended the detention by another eight weeks. The police had by then informed the court of certain cooperation difficulties between the authorities involved, which had led to some delay and, moreover, that a lawyer in Khartoum had been engaged to carry out further investigations. When considering the length of the detention, Article 5 of the Convention was taken into account. On 15 July 2014 the High Court agreed with the District Court’s reasons and found that the progress was acceptable and that continued detention would not be disproportionate. The applicant operated with a false identity, was not cooperating and it was necessary to spend a lot of resources on the work relating to his identification. His appeal was rejected.
20. On 3 September 2014 the District Court authorised detention for another four weeks. The lawyer in Khartoum (see paragraph 19 above) had, on 21 August 2014, informed the police that she needed two weeks to complete her investigations, and the police planned to present the applicant to the authorities in Sudan during the current detention period. The court found the progress acceptable and the prognosis realistic.
21. On 10 September 2014 the applicant was transported to Sudan. The Sudanese authorities, who had initially agreed to receive him based on the documents presented to them, on 12 September 2014 informed the Norwegian authorities that they would not do so, and the applicant was returned to Norway. In the meantime, on 11 September 2014, the High Court had rejected the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 3 September 2014. The High Court took account of, inter alia, how Interpol, on 5 May 2013, had informed the police that the applicant’s fingerprints had been found in a civil register and that he had been registered as Nael Jalal Hassan Mohammad.
22. On 20 September 2014 the City Court authorised the applicant’s detention for four weeks. The applicant had at the hearing presented himself as Nasser Ahmad Jalal Alaeinzy. The City Court stated that, although it was a matter of reinstating the applicant in detention, it still had to take account of the whole period since the applicant had first been detained, when examining whether further detention would be disproportionate. Since the applicant had been detained for such a long period, continued detention should now be subject to close scrutiny by the courts. It therefore did not consent to further detention beyond four weeks.
23. On 17 October 2014 the City Court extended the detention by four weeks. The court was of the opinion that the police were working sufficiently actively with the case; the police had, inter alia, been making requests via Interpol in Kuwait and Turkey, and were again in contact with the Sudanese authorities. It was, however, uncertain how long it might take to obtain responses and the lawyer in Khartoum (see paragraph 19 above) had not delivered her report. The City Court emphasised the importance of reminding the foreign authorities of the case and of following up the steps taken.
24. On 14 November 2014 the City Court extended the detention for four weeks. It took account of, inter alia, a meeting with the Sudanese authorities that was about to take place, and a meeting with the Sudanese Ambassador which had taken place on 12 November 2014.
25. On 27 November 2014 the High Court quashed the District Court’s decision. The High Court stated that it was in no doubt that the police were working very actively on the case and that the case had high priority. It found, however, that the police’s request and the District Court’s decision did not contain an assessment of what would be a realistic prognosis for how much longer the case might take. It also found that when the detention had lasted this long, the District Court would have to carry out a more detailed assessment of whether alternatives to detention could be used.
26. On 29 November 2014, the case having been returned to it, the District Court decided that the applicant could be kept in detention until 12 December 2014. It made reference to the ongoing police work on the identification and found it realistic to expect that the applicant could be deported within three months. As the applicant’s expulsion from the Schengen area had been ordered, he had nothing to lose in trying to abscond. He had no connections to Norway and alternatives to detention would therefore not be sufficient due to the risk of absconding.
27. On 12 December 2014 the City Court decided, with the applicant’s consent, that the applicant could be kept in detention until 15 December 2014.
28. On 15 December 2014 the City Court decided that the applicant could be kept in detention until 30 December 2014. Two months now remained of the previously indicated three-month period (see paragraph 26 above) and the progress had been as expected. A verification delegation from Sudan was to come to Europe in the near future. In addition, a number of other measures had been taken and there were new findings, including the discovery of two brothers of the applicant in Germany. The City Court found that the police followed the case up adequately and that there was no breach of Article 5 of the Convention.
29. From 30 December 2014 until 15 March 2015, the applicant served a subsidiary prison sentence for failing to pay fines (see paragraphs 4-6 above).
30. On 18 March 2015 the City Court decided that the applicant could be kept in detention until 15 April 2015. It observed that the police were working actively on the case; the police took measures and followed up their requests with reminders. The City Court found it realistic to expect that the applicant could be presented to the Sudanese authorities by mid-May and deported by mid-June. In this perspective, there would be no breach of Article 5 of the Convention. On 1 April 2015 the High Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. It observed that a meeting with the Sudanese authorities had been scheduled for 7 April 2015, which was expected to lead to a presentation of the applicant to the Sudanese authorities by mid-May. It also noted that the applicant, in the hearing on 20 September 2014 (see paragraph 22 above), had given a new name and that, according to the information available at the Police Immigration Centre at Trandum (hereinafter also “Trandum”), where the applicant was detained at the time, he had contacted the Sudanese Embassy 17 times between 14 and 26 November 2014, although he denied being from Sudan. It was reasonable to assume (nærliggende) that he had done so in order to work against verification of his identity. As the applicant’s return was still feasible and the police worked actively with the case, there was no breach of Article 5 of the Convention. There was no basis for the applicant’s submission that his detention at Trandum entailed inhuman treatment and was therefore contrary to Article 3. Alternatives to detention were not applicable and the risk of the applicant absconding had increased as deportation came closer. On 10 April 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal.
31. On 15 April 2015 the District Court decided that the applicant could be kept in detention until 13 May 2015. It observed that the police had met with the Sudanese authorities on 8 April 2015 and that agreement had been reached that the applicant would be presented for verification of his identity in mid-May. The prognosis of deportation by mid-June was therefore still realistic. It concluded that there was no breach of Articles 3 or 5 of the Convention. On 20 April 2015 the High Court rejected the applicant’s appeal and agreed with the City Court’s reasons. With respect to Article 5, the High Court noted, in response to a submission by the applicant, that the nature of the offences for which the applicant had been punished, formed only one of the relevant factors in the assessment under that provision. In the present case the applicant had been fined several times for drug and property offences and he had on 11 December 2013 been sentenced to conditional imprisonment for the same types of acts (see paragraph 15 above); these were not of such a nature so as to speak in favour of discontinuing the detention. On 28 April 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s further appeal.
32. On 13 May 2015 the City Court authorised continued detention until no later than 15 June 2015. The court observed that the applicant had been presented to the Sudanese authorities, as previously announced, and that they expected the applicant to be transferred mid-June. The City Court had also been informed that two police officers, who were to travel to Sudan on 18 May 2015, would follow up on the applicant’s case with the Sudanese authorities. Against this background, the City Court found that the prognosis previously established was still valid. The applicant had consented to detention and it was not considered disproportionate. Alternatives to detention were not appropriate, due to the obvious risk of absconding. Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention were not breached.
33. On 15 June 2015 the City Court authorised the applicant’s detention until 29 June 2015. It remarked that, as far as it knew, there had been no expulsion cases in which an applicant had been detained for such a long time as in this case. The process had taken longer than expected because of difficulties in obtaining travel documents. The Sudanese authorities had notified that they would send a report to the Norwegian police; the case was currently dealt with at ministerial level in Sudan and the police had visited Sudan as late as during the second half of May 2015. It was still realistic to expect that the applicant’s identity would now be established and that he could be returned to his home country. It considered that there would not be a breach of Article 5 of the Convention if he were deported within two to three further periods of four-week detention, but that there would be a considerable risk of violating Article 5 were he not. As to the applicant’s submissions concerning Trandum, the City Court noted that his stay there was not inhuman and hence not contrary to Article 3. It further stated that it was very unfortunate that the previous prognoses had repeatedly been incorrect and that, therefore, it would only authorise detention for a further two weeks. On 23 June 2015 the High Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the City Court’s decision. The High Court quoted extensively from the police explanations of the latest progress and agreed with the City Court’s prognosis. Whether the applicant could be returned within the timeframe indicated by the City Court and whether it would entail a breach of Article 5 were he not, would depend, inter alia, on police activity in the days to come.
34. On 29 June 2015 the District Court decided that the applicant could be kept until 13 July 2015. The court stated that the case appeared essentially as it had when last considered by the courts. However, the police had been in contact several times with the Sudanese authorities, most recently on 23 June 2015. The police had then been informed that the results of the Sudanese authorities’ investigations were complete, but that they were awaiting final approval before the results could be sent to the Norwegian police. It had been stated that this could happen within a short time. The District Court found it probable that deportation could be carried out within two to three further periods of four-week detentions. Alternatives to detention were inapplicable because of the clear risk of the applicant absconding. Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention were taken into consideration when the District Court made its decision.
35. On 3 July 2015 the High Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The High Court agreed with the District Court’s reasons. In addition it noted that detention beyond twelve weeks required particular reasons (særlige grunner) and presupposed that there was ongoing activity (aktiv prosess) to implement deportation. The proportionality had, in addition, to be viewed in the light of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. When crimes formed the basis for expulsion, the type and extent of the criminal acts would be relevant. The High Court took further note of the measures taken by the police during the last period of detention, in addition to the police having tried a telephone number which the applicant had called, as well as requesting assistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 June 2015. The High Court also agreed with the prognosis considered realistic by the District Court and noted that the applicant had been convicted to suspended prison sentence and fined several times for drugs and property offences. These types of violations amounted to a considerable societal problem. Alternatives to detention were inapplicable because of the clear risk of the applicant absconding. Article 3 of the Convention was taken into account and the High Court found that there were no grounds for considering that the applicant’s stay at Trandum could be inhuman, even though he had been subject to telephone restrictions for seven weeks.
36. On 6 July 2015 the applicant was transported to Sudan.
B. Relevant domestic law
37. The relevant parts of section 106 of the Immigration Act of 15 May 2008 (utlendingsloven) read as follows:
“Section 106. Arrest and remand in custody
A foreign national may be arrested and remanded in custody if
(a) the foreign national is not cooperating on clarifying his or her identity in accordance with section 21 or section 83 of the Act, or there are specific grounds for suspecting that the foreign national has given a false identity,
(b) there are specific grounds for suspecting that the foreign national will evade the implementation of an administrative decision entailing that he or she is obliged to leave the realm. The foreign national may also be arrested and remanded in custody if there is a significant risk that he or she will evade implementation of an administrative decision entailing that he or she is to be transferred to another European country in accordance with the cooperation under the Dublin Agreement, see section 32, fourth paragraph,
…
No decision to arrest or remand in custody shall be made if an obligation of notification or an order to stay in a specific place will be sufficient, see section 105.
Arrest shall be decided by the chief of police or the person authorised by the chief of police. Where there is danger associated with any stay, a police officer may make the arrest. If the police wish to detain the arrested person, they must, at the earliest opportunity, and if possible on the day following the arrest, bring him or her before the district court with an application that he or she be remanded in custody. Sections 174 to 191 of the Criminal Procedure Act shall apply insofar as appropriate. Remand in custody under the first paragraph (b) to (f) may be decided for a maximum of four weeks at a time.
The overall period of custody may not exceed 12 weeks, unless there are particular reasons to the contrary. The period of custody in order to prepare or implement a removal may only exceed 12 weeks if the foreign national does not cooperate on implementing the removal or there are delays in procuring the necessary documents from the authorities of another country. The period of custody may not exceed 18 months, unless the foreign national has been expelled due to being sentenced to a penalty or special sanction.”
The exception from the 18-month maximum period of custody in Section 106 in fine reflected the legislature’s decision not to apply Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (“the Return Directive”) with respect to third-country nationals who have been expelled as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, pursuant to Article 2 § 2 (b) of the Directive.
COMPLAINT
38. The applicant complained under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention of his lengthy detention at the Police Immigration Detention Centre at Trandum.
THE LAW
39. The applicant complained that his detention ran contrary to Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention, which reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
…
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
…”
Moreover, the applicant complained that his detention at Trandum had entailed a breach of Article 3, which reads:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
40. The applicant submitted that he had been detained for too long. He also argued that being detained at Trandum for such a long period was both inhuman and degrading, insofar as that institution was not intended for lengthy detention. He moreover maintained that alternatives to detention, such as imposing on him an obligation of notification or an order to stay in a specific place, would have been sufficient.
41. The Court reiterates that Article 5 of the Convention enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1 contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of those grounds (see, for instance, Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, § 43, ECHR 2008). One of the exceptions, contained in sub‑paragraph (f), permits the State to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context (ibid., § 64).
42. Article 5 § 1 (f) does not demand that detention be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent the individual from committing an offence or fleeing. Any deprivation of liberty under the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) will be justified, however, only for as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not executed with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible under Article 5 § 1 (f) (see, among other authorities, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 113, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V; Saadi, cited above, § 72; and A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 164, 19 February 2009).
43. The deprivation of liberty must also be “lawful”. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law (see, for example, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 164). In the instant case the domestic courts, in authorising and extending the applicant’s detention, found it lawful. The Court further observes that the detention had a legal basis in Section 106last sub-section of the Immigration Act, according to which the period of custody may exceptionally exceed 18 months if the foreign national has been expelled due to being sentenced to a penalty or special sanction (see paragraph 37 above).
44. As to whether the length of the detention exceeded that reasonably required for the purpose pursued, the Court observes that the applicant’s detention with a view to expulsion was extraordinarily long – two years and almost seven months, if including the time when he was serving the subsidiary prison sentence (see paragraph 29 above).
45. However, as it appears from the domestic courts’ numerous decisions on authorising the continued detention, the police worked actively on the process of verifying the applicant’s identity from the initial authorisation of detention and until he was finally deported (see in contrast, for example, Amie and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 58149/08, § 77, 12 February 2013). There are no indications of any periods of inactivity (see in contrast, for example, Mikolenko v. Estonia, no. 10664/05, § 64, 8 October 2009), and the Court observes that the domestic courts kept the process under close scrutiny and thereby provided an important procedural guarantee for the applicant (see, for example, Dolinskiy v. Estonia (dec.), no. 14160/08, 2 February 2010).
46. The Court further notes that the question of the applicant’s nationality had a real impact on the length of the detention (see, mutatis mutandis, Bencheref v. Sweden (dec.), no. 9602/15, § 39, 5 December 2017). It is clear that the expulsion was considerably complicated by the applicant’s consistent failure to co-operate throughout the whole detention period, including by providing varying names. Certain co-operation difficulties and communication problems with foreign authorities also affected the length of detention (see, for example, paragraphs 12-14, 19, 21, 23 and 33 above) and the Court has, in particular, noted that the applicant was in fact transported to Sudan on 10 September 2014, after one year and nine months, only to be returned (see paragraph 21 above). It is apparent that the police explored different avenues when facing such difficulties (see in contrast, for example, Louled Massoud v. Malta, no. 24340/08, § 66, 27 July 2010) and it transpires from the domestic courts’ continuous assessments that the complications were not such that his deportation was at any time to be considered as no longer feasible. The Court does not find reasons to criticise the assessments that were made concerning the prospects for returning the applicant, even though some of the prognoses made by the police and domestic courts did not turn out to be correct (see, inter alia, paragraph 26 and the City Court’s remarks in paragraph 33 above).
47. Moreover, the Court observes that the domestic authorities examined the proportionality of the continued detention in the light of the crimes and offences for which the applicant had been fined or convicted (see, for example, paragraphs 31 and 35 above), including crimes which formed the basis for the original expulsion decision. Although of different degrees of seriousness, the offences included property and drug offences (see paragraphs 6 and 15 above). The domestic authorities also took account of the applicant’s personal circumstances, including that he had no family, no work and no income (see, inter alia, paragraphs 6, 8 and 18 above). Furthermore, the Court has no grounds on which to set aside the domestic court’s conclusions that the risk of the applicant absconding precluded alternatives to detention (see, for instance, paragraphs 6, 9, 26, 30, 32, 34 and 35 above).
48. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the grounds for the applicant’s detention – action taken with a view to his deportation – remained valid for the whole period of his detention; there were realistic prospects of the applicant’s expulsion and the domestic authorities conducted the proceedings with due diligence.
49. There are, lastly, no indications of the conditions of the applicant’s conditions in detention at the Police Immigration Centre at Trandum were such as to make the detention disproportionate, and the Court notes that this aspect of the detention was also considered by the domestic courts (see, for example, paragraphs 30, 33 and 35 above). Insofar as Article 3 of the Convention in the instant case raises issues separate from those under Article 5, the Court finds that the application discloses no appearance of a violation of that provision.
50. In the light of the above, the Court finds that the application is “manifestly ill-founded” within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention and therefore must be declared inadmissible.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 12 April 2018.
Milan Blaško Síofra O’Leary
Deputy Registrar President
Leave a Reply