Last Updated on November 2, 2019 by LawEuro
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF SHATOKHIN v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 50236/06)
JUDGMENT
This judgment was revised in accordance with Rule 80 of the Rules of Court in a judgment of 16 October 2018
STRASBOURG
27 February 2018
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision
In the case of Shatokhin v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Luis López Guerra, President,
Dmitry Dedov,
Jolien Schukking, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 February 2018,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 50236/06) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Konstantin YuryevichShatokhin (“the applicant”), on 16 November 2006.
2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr I.Kuptsov, a lawyer practising in the Altay region. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.
3. On 18 March 2011 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in the Altay region.
5. At the material time the applicant was serving a sentence for robbery in correctional colony no. LIU-8 in the Altay region.
6. On 22 June, 12 July and 20 December 2004 heattempted suicide by opening his veins.
7. On 12 July 2004 a prison psychiatrist diagnosed the applicant as suffering from a slight mental retardation, psychopathy and claustrophobia with elements of self-aggression. An entry was made in his medical records that solitary confinement was contraindicated for mental health reasons. The correctional colony authorities were informed accordingly. The applicant was prescribed treatment. Since that time he had been examined by the prison psychiatrist at regular intervals. Theprison psychiatrist’s diagnosis and recommendations were confirmed by the psychiatric unit of prison hospital no. 12 where the applicant was treated from 2 to 26 April 2005.
8. On 3 May 2005 the governor of the correctional colony ordered the applicant’s placement in a punishment cell for thirteen days as a punishment for the disorderly state of his bed and bedside table.
9. On 5 May 2005 the applicant was examined by the prison doctor on duty who found that his state of health permitted his placement in a punishment cell, provided that he was not held in solitary confinement.
10. The applicant was then placed in punishment cell no. 32 designed to accommodate two inmates. He was left alone in the cell, butthe doorwas kept open.
11. On the same day the applicant went on a hunger strike in protest against his placement in solitary confinement.
12. At 8 p.m. on 8 May 2005 the applicant was visited by the prison doctor on duty who examined him and found that his health was satisfactory. He reiterated the recommendation that given the applicant’s mental condition solitary confinement was contraindicated.
13. After the doctor left, the door of the applicant’s cell was shut. About an hour later the applicant had a panic attack and attempted to open his veins with his teeth. The doctor was called back. He noted numerous lacerated wounds on the applicant’s forearms and made bandages.
14. By letters of 15 June, 8 August and 1 November 2005 the applicant asked the prosecutor’s office of the Altay Region to initiate criminal proceedings against the warders on duty.
15. On 15 December 2005 a deputy prosecutor of Barnaul refused to open criminal proceedings. He referred to statements by a warder, Mr Sh., that the applicant had himself asked him to shut the door. Moreover, the applicant’s health had not been seriously damaged as a result of the incident.
16. It follows from the letter of 16 December 2005 from the prosecutor of Barnaul that the prosecutor’s office had found that the applicant had been lawfully placed in a punishment cell. At the same time, the warders had disrespected the doctor’s recommendation by leaving the applicant alone in a closed cell. The governor of correctional colony no. LIU-8 had been warned against “permitting similar incidents to occur in future”.
17. Following to further complaints by the applicant, in which he stated in particular that he had never asked the warders to close the door, the prosecutor of Barnaul conducted an additional inquiry. He questioned the applicant and Mr Sh. He also questioned warders Mr K. and Mr S. who testified that the door to the applicant’s cell had been temporarily closed to prevent his communication with other inmates who were at that time receiving clean bedding in the storage room opposite to the applicant’s cell.
18. On 27 January 2006 the prosecutor of Baranaul refused to open criminal proceedings against the warders. He found that the warders had acted in compliance with the internal regulations and had had no intention of provoking the applicant to self-injury.
19. The applicant challenged the prosecutor’s decisions of 15 December 2005 and 27 January 2006 before the Tsentralniy District Court of Barnaul.
20. On 27 September 2006 the Tsentralniy District Court upheld the prosecutor’s decisions, finding that the inquiry had been thorough and the refusals to open criminal proceedings had been lawful and justified.
21. The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the warders had known that he suffered from claustrophobia and had closed the door to take vengeance on him for going on a hunger strike.
22. On 2 November 2006 the Altay Regional Court upheld the decision of 27 September 2006 on appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
23. The 1997 Penitentiary Code provides that a convict in detention who has breached penitentiary rules may be subjected to the following punishment measures: (i) a reprimand; (ii) a fine; (iii) placementin a punishment cell for up to fifteen days, applicable to convicts in a correctional colony or a prison; (iv) placement in cell-type quarters for up to one year for men or up to three months for women, applicable to convicts declared “habitual breakers of penitentiary rules”;(v) placement in solitary confinement for up to six months, applicableto male convicts in a maximum-security correctional colony who have been declared “habitual breakers of penitentiary rules” (Article 115 § 1).
24. Convicts placed in a punishment call may not have visits or telephone calls, buy food or receive parcels from outside. They are entitled to a one-hour outdoor activity per day (Article 118 § 1 of the Penitentiary Code).
LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
25. The applicant complained that his placement in solitary confinement in a punishment cell, despite his condition, had amounted to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
26. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
27. The applicant complained that he had been placed in solitary confinement despite his diagnosis and the doctors’ clear injunction that he should not be held in solitary confinement. After he had spent three days alone in his cell and after the door had been kept closed for quite a long time, he had had a panic attack and had inflicted injuries on himself. The applicant argued that the prison authorities had known about the risk of self‑injury as he had earlier inflicted injuries on himself in similar circumstances, that is to say while he was held in solitary confinement in a punishment cell.
28. The Government submitted that the applicant was a “habitual breaker of penitentiary rules”. During his detention he had committed thirty‑eight breaches of penitentiary rules, had been reprimanded six times, placed in a punishment cell twenty-seven times and in cell-type quarters five times. His placement in a punishment cell in May 2005 had been justified by his unruly behaviour. The punishment had been sanctioned by the prison doctor who had confirmed that the applicant’s health permitted his detention in a punishment cell, provided that he was not placed in solitary confinement. The conditions of the applicant’s detention in the punishment cell had been satisfactory. He had been provided with food. His cell had lavatory facilities, a window and all necessary furniture. It was heated, ventilated and adequately lit.
29. The Government further submitted that punishment cells were designed to accommodate two inmates, but the applicant had been left alone in the punishment cell to exclude a bad influence on other inmates. The door had been however kept open and his psychological state was regularly monitored by the prison doctor. On 8 May 2005 the door to the applicant’s cell had been temporarily closed while the warders were distributing bedding to other inmates. The warders had acted lawfully as it was prohibited by the internal rules to have several doors open at the same time. It was at that moment that the applicant had inflicted injuries to himself. He had been immediately given first aid by the doctor on duty. An inquiry had been conducted into the incident which had found that there were no reasons to open criminal proceedings. Given that the applicant had committed numerous breaches of the penitentiary rules, that the authorities had taken measures to protect him from his suicidal tendencies and had provided him with medical assistance immediately after the incident, the Government argued that the applicant’s placement in solitary confinement had not breached Article 3.
30. The Court reiterates that the prohibition of contact with other prisoners for security, disciplinary or protective reasons does not in itself amount to inhuman treatment or punishment (see, among other authorities, Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 191, ECHR 2005‑IV). Whilst prolonged removal from association with others is undesirable, the question of whether or not such a measure falls within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention depends on the particular conditions, the stringency of the measure, its duration, the objective pursued and its effects on the person concerned (see Rohde v. Denmark, no. 69332/01, § 93, 21 July 2005). Solitary confinement is one of the most serious measures which can be imposed within a prison. In view of the gravity of the measure, the domestic authorities are under an obligation to assess all the relevant factors in an inmate’s case before placing him in solitary confinement (seeRamishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia, no. 1704/06, § 83, 27 January 2009, and Onoufriou v. Cyprus, no. 24407/04, § 71, 7 January 2010). In order to avoid any risk of arbitrariness resulting from a decision to place a prisoner in solitary confinement, the decision must be accompanied by procedural safeguards guaranteeing the prisoner’s welfare and the proportionality of the measure (see Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, § 139, ECHR 2006‑IX; Onoufriou, cited above, § 70; and A.L. (X.W.)v. Russia, no. 44095/14, § 76, 29 October 2015).
31. The Court further reiterates that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, § 91, ECHR 2001‑III, and Trubnikov v. Russia, no. 49790/99, § 68, 5 July 2005). In the case of mentally ill persons, regard must be had to their particular vulnerability (seeAerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, § 66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑V; Keenan, cited above, § 111; Rivière v. France, no. 33834/03, § 63, 11 July 2006). There are general measures and precautions which will be available to diminish the opportunities for self-harm, without infringing personal autonomy. Whether any more stringent measures are necessary in respect of a prisoner and whether it is reasonable to apply them will depend on the circumstances of the case (see Keenan, cited above, § 92, and Trubnikov, cited above, § 70).
32. Prisoners known to be suffering from serious mental disturbance and to pose a suicide risk require special measures geared to their condition in order to ensure compatibility with the requirements of humane treatment (see Rivière, cited above, § 75). In the Keenan case, the Court found that the imposition on the applicant – who suffered from a chronic mental disorder, presented a suicide riskand did not receive adequate medical monitoring and treatment – of a disciplinary punishment of seven days’ segregation in the punishment block amounted to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention (see Keenan, cited above, § 116). Similarly, in the case of Renoldev. France, a penalty of forty-five days’ detention in a punishment cell accompanied by a prohibition of visits and of contact with other prisonersimposed on a personwith a history of suicide attempts was not compatible with the standard of treatment required in respect of a mentally ill person and constituted inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment (see Renolde v. France, no. 5608/05, § 129, ECHR 2008 (extracts)). In the case of Ketreb v. Francethe placement of the applicant – who had not been diagnosed with any psychiatric disorder but who had previously made two suicide attempts – in a punishment cell for fifteen days without previous consultation with a psychiatrist or adequate monitoring during his stay there also amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment (see Ketreb v. France, no. 38447/09, §§ 114 and 115, 19 July 2012).
33. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant suffered from a psychiatric disorder with elements of claustrophobia and self-aggression. He had already made three suicide attempts before the incident in question in the present application. In view of his condition and his history of suicide attempts, the psychiatrist who treated him recommended that he should not be placed in solitary confinement. That recommendation was reiterated by the prison doctor on 5 May 2005 immediately before the applicant’s placement in a punishment cell for thirteen days, and then again on 8 May 2005 about an hour before the applicant made a new suicide attempt and injured himself. Despite these unequivocal and consistent medical recommendations, the applicant was left in the punishment cell alone. The Court is particularly concerned by the fact that on 8 May 2005, that is to say three days after the commencement of his solitary confinement and immediately after the doctor repeated his recommendation that the applicant should not be left alone, the door to his cell was shut in order to avoid any communication between the applicant and other inmates.
34. It appears that no formal decision to place the applicant in solitary confinement, stating the legal basis and the reasons for that measure, was ever issued. The decision of 3 May 2005 ordered his placement in a punishment cell (punishment cells are designed to accommodate two inmates), without mentioning solitary confinement. The Court therefore finds that the applicant was placed in a de factosolitary confinement without any objective assessment as to whether or not the measure in question was necessary and appropriate and in disregard to his psychiatrist’s recommendation that such measure should not be applied to him. The applicant’s solitary confinement in a punishment cell therefore amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
35. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
36. Lastly, the Court has examined the other complaints submitted by the applicant and, having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as the complaints fall within the Court’s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
37. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
38. The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
39. The Government submitted that the amount claimed was excessive.
40. The Court awards the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
41. The applicant did not claim costs and expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to make an award under this head.
C. Default interest
42. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaints concerning the applicant’s placement in solitary confinement in a punishment cell admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months,EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 February 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Luis López Guerra
Deputy Registrar President
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