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THIRD SECTION
CASE OF VALDGARDT v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 64031/16)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
6 February 2018
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Valdgardt v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Luis López Guerra, President,
Dmitry Dedov,
Jolien Schukking, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 16 January 2018,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 64031/16) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Yelena VyacheslavovnaValdgardt (“the applicant”), on 17 October 2016.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.
3. On 3 February 2017 the complaint concerning the applicant’s eviction was communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissiblepursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in St Petersburg.
5. According to the applicant, in 1994 she moved in with her partner, N., who lived in a flat in St Petersburg of which he was the sole owner.
6. The applicant alleged that on 7 April 1998 her partner had borrowed 18,000 United States dollars from her for a period of two years. He had undertaken to give her his flat if he failed to repay her.
7. In 1998 the applicant was registered as living in that flat and lived there with N. for the following fifteen years. They never married.
8. On 9 May 2013 N. died intestate.
A. Proceedings for recognition of property rights to the flat
9. In October 2013 the applicant instituted court proceedings seeking to have her property rights over her partner’s flat acknowledged on account ofusucaption.
10. On 17 June 2014 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the District Court”) dismissed the applicant’s claims, having found that although she had lived in the flat since 1994,there were no grounds to acknowledge her property rights to that flat on account of usucaption.
11. On 30 September 2014 the St Petersburg City Court (“the City Court”) upheld that judgment.
12. On 4 March 2015 a judge of the City Court refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant to the court of cassation.
B. Eviction proceedings
13. In 2015 the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg (“the district administration”) brought court proceedings against the applicant, seeking her eviction from the flat. The administration claimed that the flat was an heirless estate and therefore the property rights to it had to be transferred to the administration. The district administration, as the new owner of the flat, had the right to seek the applicant’s eviction in accordance with Article 304 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.
14. The applicant contested those claims on the following grounds:
– she and N. had been living in the flat since 1994 as husband and wife;
– she had shared a common household with N.;
– N. had let her live in the flat as his family member;
– she had been paying the charges for the flat;
– she had no other housing.
15. On 23 November 2015 the District Court refused to evict the applicant from the flat. The court found, with reference to Article 31 of the Housing Code, that N. had let the applicant live in the flat as a family member, and until his death had shared a common household with her. Therefore, after N.’s death the applicant had not lost the right to live in the flat.
16. In its appeal against that judgment the district administration submitted that it had become the owner of the flat on 10 May 2013 following the death of the applicant’s partner.Therefore the applicant’s right to use that flat had come to an end on the same date. The district administration asked the appeal court to quash the judgment of 23 November 2015 and to issue a new decision granting its eviction claim against the applicant.
17. On 25 April 2016 the City Court quashed the judgment of 23 November 2015and ordered the applicant’s eviction from the flat. The City Court held as follows:
“…
The owner of the flat in question, Mr Nikolayev A.A., who had let the defendantlive in [the flat], died on 9 May 2013.
…
Taking into account that none of the heirs of Mr Nikolayev A.A. had come into an inheritance, …, the property right to flat no. 20 at 11, Marshal Novikov street in St Petersburg, which was a heirless estate, had been transferred to the city of St Petersburg from the moment the inheritance had been opened, and in accordance with the law it belongs to social housing which is managed by the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg.
…
Mrs ValdgardtYe.V.[the applicant] had been allowed to live in the flat by the former owner. However, following the death of the owner and the transfer of the property rights in respect of the flat to the City of St Petersburg pursuant to Article 292 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the right of Mrs Valdgardt to use the contested flat had come to an end.
Taking into account that there are no legal grounds which would allow Mrs Valdgardtto continue living in the flat and also because the defendant had not vacated the flat voluntarily, the claims of the administration of the Primorskiy District to evict the defendant from the residential premises should be granted …”
18. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the presidium of the City Court. She submitted, in particular, that the City Court had not taken into account that she was in need of housing and had been put on a municipal housing list.
19. On 15 July 2016 a judge of the City Court refused to refer the applicant’s appeal to the cassation court. The judge noted, in particular, that the fact that the applicant was on a housing list had no legal relevance for the case.
20. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. She submitted, in particular, that the City Court had failed to examine the proportionality of her eviction in violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
21. On 22 August 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the applicant’s cassation appeal to the cassation court.
22. On 5 April 2017 the District Court issued a writ of execution.
23. On 15 May 2017 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings.
24. On an unspecified date the bailiffs service informed the applicant that if the writ of execution was not enforced by 8.30 a.m. on 26 July 2017, a forced eviction would be carried out at 9 a.m. on 26 July 2017 with the assistance of the police and bailiffs.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
25. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention of a violation of her right to respect for her home.Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Admissibility
26. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
27. The Government agreed that the eviction order of 25 April 2016 constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her home. However, that interference had been in accordance with the law, pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of other individuals in need of social housing and was “necessary in a democratic society”. In particular, regarding the proportionality of the interference, the Government submitted that the eviction order of 25 April 2016 had not been enforced to date.During the eviction proceedings the representative of the city administration had explained to the applicant the need to apply to the administration with a request to be placed on the housing list. However, to date the applicant had not asked to be placed on the housing list.
28. The applicant submitted that the domestic courts had not carried out any analysis as to the proportionality of her eviction.
29. The Court notes that the applicant had already lived in the flat in question for more than twenty yearswhen her eviction was ordered. Therefore, that flat was her “home” for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention.
30. It was common ground that the eviction order amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her home, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The Court accepts that the interference had a legal basis in domestic law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of individuals in need of housing. The central question in this case is, therefore, whether the interference was proportionate to the aim pursued and thus “necessary in a democratic society”.
31. The Court set out the relevant principles in assessing the necessity of an interference with the right to “home” in the case of Connors v. the United Kingdom, (no. 66746/01, §§ 81-84, 27 May 2004), which concerned the eviction of a Roma family from a local-authority caravan site. Subsequently, in McCann v. the United Kingdom (no. 19009/04, § 50, ECHR 2008), the Court held that the reasoning in the case of Connors was not confined to cases involving the eviction of Roma or to cases where the applicant had sought to challenge the law itself, rather than its application in his particular case, and further held as follows:
“The loss of one’s home is a most extreme form of interference with the right to respect for the home. Any person at risk of an interference of this magnitude should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal in the light of the relevant principles under Article 8 of the Convention, notwithstanding that, under domestic law, his right of occupation has come to an end.”
32. In the present case the applicant raised the issue of her right to respect for her home before the domestic courts and presented arguments linked to the proportionality of her eviction (see paragraphs 14, 18 and 20above).
33. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her home had been necessary for the protection of the rights of other individuals in need of social housing. However, those individuals were not sufficiently individualised to allow their personal circumstances to be balanced against those of the applicant. Therefore, the only interests that were at stake were those of the local authorities. The domestic courts did not weigh those interestsagainst the applicant’s right to respect for her home. Once they had found that the applicant’s right to reside in the contested flat had come to an end following the death of her partner, they gave that aspect paramount importance, without seeking to weigh it against the applicant’s arguments. The national courts thus failed to balance the competing rights and therefore to determine the proportionality of the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her home.
34. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the interference complained of was not “necessary in a democratic society”. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
35. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
36. The applicant claimed the following amounts in respect of pecuniary damage:
– 18,000United States dollars (USD),which she had paid to her partner under a contract dated 7 April 1998;
– 41,864.74 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for repair work which she had carried out in the flat; and
– RUB 50,500 for replacement of the entrance door of the flat, which had allegedly been damaged during the enforcement proceedings.
37. The applicant also claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
38. The Government submitted that the applicant’s claims for pecuniary damage were excessive and unsubstantiated and had no connection to the subjectmatter of the case. They further submitted that her claims for non‑pecuniary damage were excessive, unreasonable and did not correspond to the Court’s case-law.
39. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 7,500 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
40. The applicant also claimedRUB 450 for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts, RUB 2,705.88for postal expenses and also the reimbursement of translation costs.
41. The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim of RUB 450 was not relevant to the consideration of the case by the Court. They further submitted that the applicant’s claims for RUB 1,705.88 had been duly confirmed and could be awarded to her in the event that the Court found a violation.
42. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 30 covering costs under all heads.
C. Default interest
43. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declaresthe application admissible;
2. Holdsthat there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months,the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent Stateat the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 7,500 (seven thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 30 (thirty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 February 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Luis López Guerra
Deputy Registrar President
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