Last Updated on October 3, 2020 by LawEuro
FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 64890/14
Gyula SIKLÉR
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 16 January 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Faris Vehabović, President,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Iulia Motoc, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 23 September 2014,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, MrGyulaSiklér, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1956 and lives in Mezőkovácsháza. He was represented before the Court by Ms A.J. Juhász, a lawyer practising in Budapest.
2. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Justice.
The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. On 10 April 2014 the applicant was dismissed from service which he had at a State-owned enterprise.
5. The uppermost portion of his severance payment was then subjected to a special tax of 75%.
6. The details of the underlying legislation are outlined in M.A. v. Hungary ([Committee] (dec.), no. 36642/14, §§ 11 to 14, 28 November 2017).
7. The portion of the severance payment exceeding the statutory threshold of 3.5 million Hungarian forints (HUF) was HUF 2,578,380 (approximately 8,300 euros (EUR)). The 75% special tax on this amount was HUF 1,933,785 (approximately EUR 6,200). The applicant’s compounded gross annual income in 2014, the tax year concerned, was HUF 6,617,795 (approximately EUR 21,300). The deduction of the special tax alone reduced this sum by about 29%.
The tax burden on the severance payment itself was 41%.
COMPLAINTS
8. The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the imposition of the special tax rate on part of his severance payment, which in his view was a disguised and unjustified deprivation of his possessions. He also argued that Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was violated because the imposition of the special tax was allegedly discriminatory.
THE LAW
A. Complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
9. The applicant complained about the levying of the special tax on part of his severance payment. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
10. The parties’ arguments in the present application are in essence identical to the ones outlined in paragraphs 17 to 20 in M.A. v. Hungary ([Committee] (dec.), no. 36642/14, 28 November 2017).
11. In its assessment of the present case, the Court makes reference to the considerations presented in paragraphs 21 to 35 of M.A. v. Hungary (cited above).
12. It notes in particular that, purely on account of the special tax levied only on the uppermost portion of his severance payment, the applicant sustained a reduction of his gross annual income of about 29% (see paragraph 7 above), as opposed to 17.6% in M.A. v. Hungary (see paragraph 9 of the decision). The tax burden on the severance payment itself was 41% in the present case (see paragraph 7 above), as opposed to 42.7% in M.A. v. Hungary (see paragraph 6 of the decision). Nevertheless, bearing in mind the specific circumstances of the present application – in particular, the rather high income at issue and the resultant large amount of severance payment – the Court is not ready to accept, in this case either, that the application of the special tax law fundamentally undermined the applicant’s financial situation.
13. The Court thus concludes that the applicant cannot be regarded as having had to bear an excessive and disproportionate individual burden. The State, in the present case, did not overstep its wide margin of appreciation in the field of taxation when striking a fair balance between the public interest and the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
14. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
B. Complaint under Article 14 of the Convention
15. The applicant also complained that the impugned legislation was discriminatory, in breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
16. Article 14 of the Convention provides:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
17. The parties’ arguments in the present application are in essence identical to the ones outlined in paragraphs 37 to 38 in M.A. v. Hungary ([Committee], decision cited above).
18. For its part, the Court refers, mutatis mutandis, to the assessment contained in paragraphs 39 to 45 of M.A. v. Hungary ([Committee], decision cited above) and finds that the applicant has not demonstrated that, as a former employee of a State-owned enterprise, he was in a relevantly similar situation to employees in the private sector for the purposes of the taxation of severance payments.
19. It follows that there has been no indication of any discrimination and, therefore, no appearance of a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Consequently, this part of the application is likewise manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 8 February 2018.
Andrea Tamietti Faris Vehabović
Deputy Registrar President
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