Last Updated on November 20, 2019 by LawEuro
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF TALATOV v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 11008/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 October 2019
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Talatov v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Georgios A. Serghides, President,
Branko Lubarda,
Erik Wennerström, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 September 2019,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 11008/04) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Rizvan Vakhayevich Talatov (“the applicant”), on 16 February 2004.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.
3. On 9 July 2008 the Government were given notice of the application.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Mineralnyye Vody.
5. On 8 May 2003 the Industrialnyy District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated extortion and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. The public had been excluded from the trial court hearings for unclear reasons.
6. The applicant and his defence attorneys appealed arguing that there had been no grounds to hold the trial in camera.
7. On 16 September 2003 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. The Regional Court not only failed to provide any justification for the closed hearing, but did not mention this complaint at all.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
8. Article 241 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as in force at the material time provided that all criminal trials are public. The exceptions provided by the above Article were the following: 1) trials involving state secrets; 2) trials of persons under the age of 16; 3) trial concerning sex crimes or capable of disclosing intimate or degrading information about trial participants; 4) for the protection of safety of trial participants and their relatives.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
9. The applicant complained that the unjustified restriction of public access to the trial had rendered criminal proceedings unfair. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law….”
10. The Government contested that argument.
11. This complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
12. The applicant stated that the trial court had had no reasons justifying restriction of public access to the applicant’s trial.
13. The Government in their observations stated that the trial had been closed to public to ensure safety of participants.
14. The Court reiterates that the holding of court hearings in public constitutes a fundamental principle enshrined in paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Convention. This public character protects litigants against the secret administration of justice with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the means whereby confidence in the courts can be maintained. By rendering the administration of justice transparent, publicity contributes to the achievement of the aim of Article 6 § 1, namely a fair trial, the guarantee of which is one of the fundamental principles of any democratic society (see Riepan v. Austria, no. 35115/97, § 27, ECHR 2000‑XII).
15. Turning to the Government’s argument in the present case the Court observes that indeed in certain circumstances safety of trial participants could in principle justify restriction of public access. However, given the absence of any reasons provided by the domestic courts for closing of the hearings, the Court is unable to verify whether in the present case any special circumstances required restriction of the applicant’s rights under Article 6 of the Convention.
16. Having regard to the available material the Court concludes that the restriction of public access to the applicant’s trial undermined the overall fairness of the proceedings against him. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONs OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
17. The applicant further lodged a number of other complaints under Article 6 of the Convention.
18. The Government considered that none of these complaints disclosed a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.
19. Having regard to its above finding under Article 6 of the Convention and given that the trial against the applicant had not been fair, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine separately the admissibility and merits of the remainder of the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
20. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
21. The applicant claimed 31,100 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
22. The Government stated that the claim of pecuniary damage was unfounded and the claim of non-pecuniary damage unreasonable.
23. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
24. As regards non-pecuniary damage the Court observes that the payment of monetary awards under Article 41 of the Convention is designed to make reparation only for such consequences of a violation that cannot be remedied otherwise (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 250, ECHR 2000‑VIII). The Court previously concluded that the reopening of the proceedings is the most appropriate form of redress for the established violation of the applicant’s rights, should he request it, given that it is capable of providing restitutio in integrum as required under Article 41 of the Convention (see Zadumov v. Russia, no. 2257/12, § 81, 12 December 2017). Accordingly, the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in the present case.
B. Costs and expenses
25. The applicant did not submit a claim for costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
C. Default interest
26. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares admissible the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning restriction of public access to the applicant’s trial;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of restriction of public access to the applicant’s trial;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the admissibility and merits of the remainder of the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention;
4. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;
5. Dismisses the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 October 2019, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Georgios A. Serghides
Registrar President
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