Abukauskai v. Lithuania (European Court of Human Rights)

Last Updated on April 22, 2020 by LawEuro

Information Note on the Court’s case-law 237
February 2020

Abukauskai v. Lithuania72065/17

Judgment 25.2.2020 [Section II]

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
Positive obligations
Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1
Peaceful enjoyment of possessions

Inconclusive criminal investigation into arson of applicants’ house, without “flagrant and serious” deficiencies: no violation

Facts – The applicants’ house was intentionally set on fire at night, while the first and second applicants were inside; they escaped through a window. A pre-trial investigation was opened immediately after the arson attack and lasted approximately seven months before being suspended. A neighbour was suspected, but no evidence could be found. The prosecutor later accepted in disciplinary proceedings that certain investigative measures had not been carried out properly. When rejecting the applicants’ civil claim against the State, the domestic courts found, however, that that there was no direct causal link between the alleged shortcomings and the investigation’s failure to identify the perpetrator. Indeed, one of the main reasons why it had not been possible was the lack of any traces of flammable liquids on the fire debris taken from the house; thus, without identifying the flammable material that had been used to set the house on fire, other investigative measures – even if they had been carried out properly – would not have yielded any information that would have helped the identification of the perpetrator.

Law

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: In cases concerning life-threatening attacks on individuals, the State authorities had an obligation to act of their own motion once the matter had come to their attention. However, in the absence of any such complaints made by the applicants, as well as any other circumstances which would require the Court to assess the complaints as focused on the lack of an effective investigation into a life-threatening attack on the applicants themselves, the Court’s examination would be limited to establishing whether there had been flagrant and serious deficiencies in the criminal investigation, in accordance with its case-law under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Blumberga v. Latvia, a case concerning burglary). At the same time, the Court was of the view that the principles laid down in Blumberga could not be readily applied in cases where the interference with property rights had been carried out in a manner that was potentially dangerous to the applicants’ life or health.

It was true that the domestic authorities had considered that the damage to the applicants’ property had been caused “in a dangerous manner”. That distinguished the present case from Blumberga , in which the interference with the applicant’s property rights had not been carried out in a manner that could have put her life or health in danger.

However, the applicants had not alleged, throughout the domestic proceedings, that they had suffered any injuries, or that their life or health had been at risk because of the dangerous nature of the arson attack. There was also no indication that they had required medical attention as a result of the arson attack. Nor had the applicants made any complaints under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention in their initial application to the Court.

In those circumstances, the Court’s examination was limited to establishing whether there had been flagrant and serious deficiencies in the criminal investigation.

The fact that the pre-trial investigation had not identified the perpetrator of the arson was not sufficient to find that it had been ineffective. In particular, the Court was satisfied that the evidence which the domestic courts had considered to be of key importance had been taken and preserved properly, and that identifying the flammable material had been impossible, through no fault of the authorities. During the domestic proceedings the applicants had not asked the authorities to carry out any additional investigative measures, such as obtaining or examining any other objects or questioning any more witnesses. Nor had they appealed against the prosecutor’s decisions to discontinue the investigation against their neighbour and to suspend the investigation. Indeed, the applicants had explicitly acknowledged that, in their view, all the necessary investigative measures had been carried out. The Court had no reason to hold otherwise. Moreover, the applicants had not complained about the length of the investigation, nor had they alleged that there had been any periods of inactivity. Therefore, the Court did not find it established that the failure to bring the criminal proceedings to a successful conclusion had been the result of flagrant and serious deficiencies in the conduct of the authorities.

It was true that instituting civil proceedings against the suspected neighbour would have been futile because of insufficient evidence linking him to the fire. However, the Court was unable to find that the lack of prospects of success of such civil proceedings had been the direct consequence of exceptionally serious and flagrant deficiencies in the conduct of the criminal proceedings.

The State had therefore complied with its positive obligations.

Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).

(See also Blumberga v. Latvia, 70930/01, 14 October 2008, Information Note 112)

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